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Introduction
Melissa Dickson, Emilie Taylor-Brown,  
and Sally Shuttleworth
Nervous exhaustion, wrote the New York physician and early neurolo-
gist George Miller Beard in 1881, is ‘a result and accompaniment and 
barometer of civilisation’.1 Throughout his study, American Nervous-
ness, Beard was very explicit in drawing out the relationship between 
the new technologies, work, and education patterns of a modernising, 
industrialising society, and the nervous exhaustion, or what he called 
neurasthenia, of its subjects. The human nervous system had been 
held culpable for a range of diseases since at least the late seventeenth 
century, and anxieties about nervous diseases and other mental ail-
ments arising from the general pressures of modern life were not unique 
to America in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, Beard insisted upon 
the distinct status of neurasthenia not simply as a general condition 
of modern life, but as a culturally specific, new disease with charac-
teristic symptoms that were induced by that life.2 In support of this 
claim, he drew together medical hypotheses with cultural critique and 
social observation, constructing the figure of the neurasthenic as one 
who both produces, and is produced by, the practices and structures of 
industrial modernity. Only the nineteenth century, Beard insisted, was 
capable of suffering from neurasthenia because, while other civilisa-
tions had undoubtedly experienced weak nerves and fatigue, it was this 
period alone that had produced the five elements which he believed 
inculcated such severe nervous exhaustion: ‘Steam power, the periodi-
cal press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of women’.3 
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Held in a continual state of socio-cultural, economic, and technological 
flux, the nineteenth-century American citizen was supposedly living in 
an almost permanent state of nervousness. Furthermore, Beard noted, 
because America, a ‘young and rapidly growing nation, with civil, reli-
gious, and social liberty’, was more advanced in each of these categories 
than any other nation, it was only natural that nervous exhaustion was 
more pronounced in the United States than it was anywhere else in 
the world.4
Beard’s insistence upon the profound connection between the social 
and economic factors of modern living, and the state of the nerves, 
was distinctly nationalistic in its avowal of neurasthenia as a malady 
of what he deemed to be the most evolved, ‘civilised’ societies. This 
may, in part, account for the fact that the term neurasthenia was not 
widely used to refer to conditions relating to overwork and fatigue 
outside the United States. Beard’s nationalism is, moreover, increas-
ingly problematic throughout his analysis, as it is deployed to establish 
national and racial hierarchies in the context of modernity and mod-
ernisation, and to affirm the superior status of American social and 
economic institutions globally. Beard’s descriptions of the disease were, 
as David Schuster has noted, ‘rife with religious, racial, and regional 
assumptions’.5 Those peoples Beard regarded as content to live in igno-
rance, indifferent to science or the mysteries of life, or who lived robust, 
‘primitive’ lives without overexerting their mental faculties, were sup-
posedly spared the sufferings of the neurasthenic. Thus, Schuster notes, 
‘by explaining who was not susceptible to neurasthenia – Catholics, 
southerners, Indians, blacks – Beard was framing neurasthenia as a 
primarily white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Yankee condition’.6 Implicit 
in Beard’s claims is a form of social change whereby ‘civilisation’, figured 
here as an external and rather violent force, ‘invades any nation’ in the 
form of specific social and technological innovations, and individuals 
react by feeling overworked, overstimulated, fatigued, and generally 
anxious.7 He assumes a global history of discontinuous, asynchronous 
cultures on an imperial scale, against which societies might measure 
and define themselves as more or less neurotic, and therefore as more 
or less ‘modern’. Disease itself becomes for Beard a marker of industrial 
and technological modernity, the privilege of the overcultured and the 
affluent, and a critical component of the national identity.8 Neurasthe-
nia, or ‘Americanitis’ as it was sometimes dubbed, was, as one New 
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York doctor reflected in 1904, one of the nation’s ‘most distinctive and 
precious pathological possessions’, and an ‘important stimulus to pat-
riotism and racial solidarity’.9 The pathological conditions seeming to 
emanate from specific changes in the social and physical environment 
were, at least for some, a matter of national pride.10
The present volume, which examines the correlations that were being 
drawn between notions of progress and pathology across a diverse range 
of socio-economic cultures in the long nineteenth century beginning 
with the French Revolution, interrogates such notions of exceptional-
ism. Our purview is deliberately transnational, drawing on case studies 
from Britain, America, France, Germany, Finland, Bengal, China, and 
the South Pacific, in order to provide rich comparative perspectives on 
medical responses to, and constructions of, modernity, while demon-
strating that anxieties about mental and physical ailments arising from 
the general pressures of modern life were not unique to America, or 
to Britain, in the nineteenth century, but engendered concern across 
national boundaries and cultures. Central to this study is the ques-
tion of how self-referential concepts of ‘the modern’ worked to struc-
ture perceptions of health, disease, and medical treatment in the long 
nineteenth century. Neurasthenia was not the only disease constituted 
in relation to problems of modernity or to national character. Similar 
claims were, as our volume demonstrates, made around the world for 
other conditions such as fatigue, cancer, suicide, and general cultural 
or intellectual degeneration. Analogous concerns about the interaction 
between the environment and individual and social well-being also 
emerged in movements for self-improvement and self-care, public 
health and sanitation, and the ‘rescue’ and reform of the poor and disa-
bled. These preoccupations influenced public policies, with numerous 
commissions and scientific inquiries into, for example, incidences of 
suicide and other causes of death amongst expanding urban popula-
tions, and instances of medical negligence and professional account-
ability. Through such activities, new connections were established 
between environmental conditions, social pressures, and bodily and 
mental pathologies. By highlighting such intricate interactions across 
the history of literature, psychiatry, and social and public health and 
reform in the nineteenth century, the chapters in this volume seek to 
understand more broadly how societies and discourses construct and 
formulate health and disease.
4 Introduction
Nineteenth-century advances in the fields of technology, science, 
and medicine, while clearly constituting ‘progress’ for some, nonethe-
less prompted deep concern about the problems and pathologies that 
would potentially be induced by modern life. An increasing number of 
references to the problems of ‘modern times’ and to the ‘wear and tear’ 
of modern life can be traced throughout the nineteenth-century medical 
and general press across national boundaries and cultures. In Italy in 
1891, for example, the physiologist Angelo Mosso’s La Fatica famously 
proffered his formulation of the laws pertaining to exhaustion, while in 
Russia in 1879, the psychologist I. A. Sikorskii studied various condi-
tions of mental fatigue in young people over the course of the school 
day.11 In Germany the shocking number of suicides occurring among 
secondary school students was attributed to the extreme mental and 
physical overburdening of school children, and such a mass of German 
literature emerged on the subject of mental overpressure that the politi-
cian August Reichensperger observed that simply staying abreast of the 
proliferating number of pamphlets and articles addressing the issue 
could overburden the mind.12 The poet Victor Laprade similarly decried 
what he called the ‘L’Éducation homicide’ of French lycées and colleges, 
describing theirs as a ‘regimen entirely contrary to nature, which lowers 
the vital force and enervates the constitution of both the individual and 
the race subjected to it for too long’.13 The physician Aimé Riant in his 
study, Le surménage intellectuel, in 1889, and Alfred Binet and Victor 
Henri in their work, La Fatigue intellectuelle, in 1898, equally registered 
their alarm at what they considered to be the chronic overwork and 
exhaustion of young French citizens.14 At times, as Anson Rabinbach 
has shown in his study of The Human Motor (1992), the scientific and 
cultural frameworks through which notions of progress and industry 
were deployed drew on remarkably similar metaphors pertaining to 
work, energy, and exhaustion. In nations with distinctive politics, prac-
tices, and body imaginaries, stress, fatigue, and nervous exhaustion 
were generally deemed to be the inevitable corollaries of the pressures 
and pace of modern civilisation.
‘Life at high pressure’ was, according to the eminent London-based 
physician Thomas Stretch Dowse, ‘the prominent feature of the nine-
teenth century’, and tracing this concept across nineteenth-century 
cultures affords new insights into both popular and medical under-
standings of the body and mind. Dowse declared in his 1880 study of 
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brain and nerve exhaustion that ‘we cannot be surprised when we find 
that the so-called nervous diseases and exhaustions, dipsomania and 
insanity, are increasing beyond all proportion to the rapid increase of 
the population’.15 People were suffering as never before, he believed, 
from varying states of physical and mental exhaustion, which were 
themselves symptoms of a much broader national deterioration. Here 
again, it seems, a nation’s pride was at stake, as Dowse draws a direct 
correlation between a general decline in the country’s health, and its 
future standing in a competitive industrial economy.16 In his 1875 
address to the Royal Institution, published in an enlarged form in the 
Contemporary Review with the title ‘Life at High Pressure’, the manufac-
turer and journalist W. R. Greg similarly argued that the disconcertingly 
hurried pace of the ‘high-pressure style of life’ was the result of both 
technological and social factors.17 First, the ‘rapidity of railway travel-
ling’, which, Greg noted, ‘produces a kind of chronic disturbance in the 
nervous system of those who use it much’, had forever accelerated the 
individual’s rate of movement.18 Secondly, he argued, the incessant 
demands placed upon professional and public figures such as lawyers, 
physicians, ministers, and politicians – ‘even’, he noted, ‘the literary 
workman or the eager man of science’ – required ‘a greater strain upon 
both bodily and mental powers, a sterner concentration of effort and of 
aim, and a more harsh and rigid sacrifice of the relaxations and ameni-
ties which time offers to the easy-going and unambitious’.19 Excess 
physical and mental exertion, Greg makes clear, could disrupt or even 
deplete an exhausted nervous system, rendering it incapable of further 
function and highly susceptible to a range of diseases. A defining feature 
of the modern civilised subject, heightened nervousness was paradoxi-
cally rendering the human race less fit for survival.
It is a central aim of this volume to explore changing perceptions of 
health and disease in the context of burgeoning global modernities of 
the long nineteenth century. The concept of ‘modernity’, often defined 
exclusively by its Western or European model, is of course a relative 
term, often predicated on a break with the past across social, cultural, 
political, and economic institutions, and conferred by historians as a 
means of determining major shifts in orientation.20 L. S. Jacyna, in his 
recent work on medicine and modernism, contends that historians have 
typically employed this term in such a manner, to ‘refer to the inter-
related series of economic, social, and political transformations that 
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occurred in Western societies during the period of the long nineteenth 
century’.21 However, ‘modernity’ is also a self-referential concept, an 
actors’ category, employed and applied within any given social and 
cultural moment by those seeking to express what they regard as new 
conditions in the social, political, and economic order. In this view, as 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt has argued, modernity is inherently multiple and 
contingent, with different groups of social actors ‘holding very differ-
ent views on what makes societies modern’.22 Differences of perception 
are particularly marked once the question of modernity is placed in a 
global frame. It is these varying perceptions of modernity which we 
are concerned with here, as set within a distinctly medical framework, 
since understandings of the human mind and body were increasingly 
challenged, modified, and reframed by the politics and structures of 
‘modern life’ in the long nineteenth century. Rather than seeking to 
determine what was precisely ‘modern’ about this historical moment, 
or indeed to label the period itself, or any specific geographical or cul-
tural location as ‘modern’, we are interested in tracking a range of anxi-
eties and varieties of experience, as they were expressed and explored 
in the literature, science, and medicine of the time in terms of their 
impact upon social, cultural, and medical formations of the mind and 
body. Our principal concern is how the structures of industrial, com-
mercial, and technological modernity came to be deeply embedded 
within understandings of physiological and psychological identity. As a 
whole, therefore, this volume offers a series of explorations of the ways 
in which modernity was constructed and performed within a range of 
medical discourses across the nineteenth century. Together, these chap-
ters demonstrate the complexity and relativity of the term ‘modernity’ 
itself, and its fundamental instability as a category of analysis in the 
history of medical practice.
As Charles E. Rosenberg suggested in his influential article, ‘Patholo-
gies of progress: the idea of civilization as risk’, the ‘use of disease 
incidence and theories of causation and pathology as vehicles for the 
articulation and legitimation of cultural criticism’ have persisted for 
centuries, as ‘disease has always been construed as both indicator and 
product of less than ideal social conditions’.23 This ‘progress-and-pathol-
ogy narrative’, to use Rosenberg’s terminology, is an oft-recurring, yet 
extremely fluid narrative that ‘can be used in a variety of contexts with 
a variety of social motives’.24 As such, as this volume demonstrates, it 
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has been appropriated for and implicated in a range of social, cultural, 
and psychological formations, providing a useful rhetorical framework 
for, but also affording insight into, the cultural and ideological charac-
ters of its users. By interrogating the deployment of this narrative across 
diverse modes of expression, we ultimately seek to establish the ways 
in which medical, political, and cultural discourses have interacted in 
defining concepts of health and disease as peculiarly ‘modern’.25
Our concern to situate medical knowledge in relation to specific sites 
of social and cultural experience responds to recent currents in history 
of medicine scholarship which explore nineteenth-century anxieties 
about health and modernity. It has often been noted, for example, that 
the jarring effects of new modes of transport, machinery, communica-
tions technologies, and the expansion of print culture fundamentally 
altered human perceptions of space and time, and prompted concerns 
about the equivalent velocity necessary in human thought and action 
in order to keep pace.26 The emergence in mid-Victorian Britain of the 
condition known as ‘Railway Spine’, a physical disorder often said to be 
caused by the excessive vibrations passing through the human body 
during railway travel, and the British fin-de-siècle condition known as 
‘Bicycle Face’, in reference to the wild, staring eyes, strained expression, 
and projecting jaw of the avid female cyclist, were discrete complaints 
that have been explicitly connected to contemporary anxieties sur-
rounding the effects on public health of modern technologies and the 
shocks and strains they imposed.27 Similarly, concerns were being raised 
by British and French doctors in the 1860s surrounding the sexual 
excitement supposedly being induced in female users of the sewing 
machine.28 In such diagnoses, it is clear that definitions and perceptions 
of disease actively inform and are informed by their broader social 
contexts in terms of class, race, gender, and sexual politics. In more 
general terms, also, however, conditions such as ‘nervous shock’ and 
‘traumatic hysteria’, emergent in the nineteenth century, have been 
noted as medicalised expressions of the new and apparently shocking 
conditions of modern life in various contexts.29 Socially and culturally 
inflected experiences of neurasthenia have also been located within a 
multiplicity of medical practices and across a range of modernising 
discourses, for example in imperial Germany, nineteenth-century 
Russia, modern China, and Victorian England.30 In Japan, as Sabine 
Frühstück has argued, neurasthenia was closely connected to concerns 
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about masculinity, masturbation, and homosexuality.31 Contrastingly, 
debates about neurasthenia in nineteenth-century Argentina were, as 
Kristin Ruggiero’s work on modern diseases in the national Argentinian 
identity demonstrates, deeply informed by historical, politicised dis-
putes about national honour and social responsibility.32 This particular 
disease of modern life carried different meanings in different social, 
cultural, and political contexts.
Part of the function of this collection, then, is to register both the 
disciplinary convergences that give rise to such diagnoses, and the 
varying and culturally specific conditions of what constituted medical 
modernity around the world. Nineteenth-century anxieties about 
health and modernity have attracted a good deal of attention in recent 
scholarship, much of this focusing upon discrete disease entities or 
conditions. The field of public and environmental health, for example, 
tends to be treated in isolation from consideration of nervous diseases, 
whilst work on nervous diseases has tended to look at single aspects 
within this category, such as neurasthenia, shock, or agoraphobia.33 It 
is alongside such works that we situate Progress and pathology. However, 
rather than focusing on a specific condition or concern as symptomatic 
of the nineteenth-century psyche, we seek to address the broad range 
of ways in which anxieties about health and disease manifested them-
selves in the period. In its ambition and multidisciplinary scope, our 
project follows the path set by the Victorians themselves in the ways in 
which they traced the relationships between physiological, psychologi-
cal, and social health, or disease. This kind of holistic approach was 
taken by a number of contemporary writers, most notably Benjamin 
Ward Richardson in his 1876 work, Diseases of Modern Life. In this 
volume, we intend to disrupt the frequent compartmentalisation of 
psychiatric, environmental, and literary histories in present practice, in 
order to re-contextualise the problems of modernity.34 Taking our cue 
from Richardson’s work, we thus address anxieties about physical debil-
ity, hygiene and sanitation, nervous illness and exhaustion, psychology 
and mental health, and commodity culture. Each of the following chap-
ters represents a specific avenue of concern as it was expressed and 
explored by nineteenth-century commentators, and each case study 
shows how medicine, broadly and culturally conceived, is intricately 
embedded in, and responsive to, the larger worlds in which it operates. 
The emphasis of this work is deliberately interdisciplinary, as we strive 
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to tease out the range of public and private practices in which the sup-
posed ill effects of modern life were being mobilised, from develop-
ments in psychiatric and public health, to new forms of cancer and 
suicide research, to speculations as to what was being lost in the move-
ment from subjectivity to biomedical objectivity. This diverse range of 
source material highlights the often close dialogue that took place 
between medical professionals and the general public via the pages of 
popular newspapers and magazines, and the circulation of medico-
scientific knowledge. In analysing these interactions, we demonstrate 
that debates concerning the impact of modern life on mental and physi-
cal well-being were being voiced across disciplines, in discussions that 
dovetailed with constructions of modern selfhood in medical, psycho-
logical, political, and literary spheres.
Medicine serves a crucial intermediary role in the processes of nego-
tiation between the self and its environment, between pathologies of 
the body and the broader dynamics of social, cultural, and economic 
exchange. In a condition such as neurasthenia, those dynamics are 
explicitly drawn upon to structure new and evolving identity forma-
tions. For this reason, Roger Cooter has identified neurasthenia along-
side degeneration in his study of ‘medicine and modernity’, as one of 
those ‘new-fangled theories’ that ‘were themselves signs of modernity 
in medicine’, as they ‘cut new social paths in medical thinking at the 
same time as they established new medicalized ways of thinking about 
society and identity’.35 Medical theories and treatments of the diseases 
of modern life were not only deeply embedded in social and cultural 
operations; modernity itself was actively constructed and deployed 
from within nineteenth-century medical discourses.
This volume is framed by questions of epistemology and revolves 
around a tightly focused series of medical and cultural responses to the 
general pressures of modern life. We begin by asking what role medicine 
played in the formation of new and evolving definitions of the modern 
self during the French Revolution, and end by raising this question 
again with reference to medicine more generally when it is set alongside 
the historical record of the long nineteenth century. Our intention is 
not to provide a comprehensive account of the medical and cultural 
transformations of this dynamic period; rather, we ask how medical 
theories, practices, and technologies both structured and were consti-
tuted in relation to problems of modernity across literature, science, 
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and medicine. The authors gathered here illustrate how changing social, 
political, and economic dynamics were drawn upon across multiple 
emergent disciplines to support new conceptions of the healthy or 
unhealthy mind and body. Such conceptions are read within and across 
evolving practices in psychiatry, psychology, psychopathology, physiol-
ogy, marketing, and education. Drawing on current scholarship on the 
history of medicine, science, and technology, disability studies, child-
hood, and consumer culture, we explore how emotional and physical 
ailments in this period were often understood as uniquely ‘modern’. By 
interrogating the practices and ideologies that underpin these under-
standings, we offer new ways of thinking about how the mind and body 
were situated in relation to rapidly changing external environments.
Laurens Schlicht, in the first chapter, opens our discussion at the 
moment of the European age of revolutions, which inculcated not only 
a wave of physical displacement, but also a profound sense of moral and 
political shock. In France, contemporary writers within medicine, poli-
tics, and the developing human sciences maintained that it had been 
necessary to inflict this kind of shock in order to dismantle the rigid 
structures of French society and make way for a radically new regime. 
Sustained metaphors of the medicalised human body, the social body, 
and the body politic commingled in the critical questions that were 
raised about the nature of the relationship between individuals and 
their wider social collective, and about the ways in which the passions 
of France’s citizens might be either stirred into action or carefully regu-
lated by external influences. Manifestations of this conscious interaction 
between medical and political spheres, Schlicht shows, included the 
emergent psychiatric practice of intentionally shocking patients as a 
form of therapy, and the evolving instruction of deaf-mute pupils, as 
schools and asylums provided experimental spaces for controlling and 
adjusting the human passions. In addition to an overt politicisation of 
the body and its responses to shock and strain, these discussions carried 
sustained analyses of the medicalised human body, and informed an 
evolving scientific practice directed towards an essentialised sphere of 
individuality.
In the second chapter, Torsten Riotte takes up the interaction 
between medical and political spheres in the context of nineteenth-
century Germany, and poses questions about accountability, medical 
negligence, and the nature of individual and collective responsibility 
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in relation to accidents. Beginning with the first recorded court case 
in 1811, when a doctor at the Berlin Charité hospital sued a colleague 
over the death of a female patient, Riotte draws upon the files of the 
so-called medical commissions (medical advisory boards to ministries 
of the interior in the German states) in order to analyse the professional 
and public debate that ensued and to engage in a discussion of medical 
negligence as an aspect of professional accountability. The emergence 
of medical courts of honour from the mid-1870s onwards, and the com-
plementary development of liability insurance for doctors, illuminate 
the shifting moral, economic, and social structures in which medical 
practices were embedded.
The interaction of medical and political spheres regarding questions 
of public health also actively informed notions of individual and col-
lective responsibility regarding the figure of the child, who became a 
primary focus for concerns about the moral powers of education and 
the corrupting effects of urban life. Notions of a youthful, ‘natural’ 
state of innocence and purity stem, it has often been noted, from Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762), in which he declared 
that ‘childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling’, and 
that the child mind ‘should be left undisturbed until its faculties have 
developed’.36 Educational treatises of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries generally advised parents to maintain a child’s ‘natural’ 
state of innocence and purity through vigilant protection and preferably 
physical removal from cities and society in general, and from dangerous 
reading materials or formal training in particular. In the next chapter, 
Steven Taylor traces this now very familiar model of childhood through 
to nineteenth-century concerns surrounding the protection and, where 
necessary, the rescue, of children of the urban poor. During this period 
of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in England, Taylor argues, 
there was increased political and evangelical attention directed towards 
children as members of a distinct and vulnerable population in a 
morally dangerous and increasingly adult urban society. The romantic 
desire to ‘protect’ children from the ill effects of modern urban life was, 
in the context of the child rescue efforts of 1870 to 1914, underpinned 
by a desire to produce useful, morally upright, and productive citizens 
of future generations. Those children who were deemed physically or 
mentally incapable of rendering themselves ‘useful’ to society were, 
therefore, thought to be beyond the scope of state improvement and 
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educational intervention. Taylor focuses specifically on the Church of 
England-sponsored Waifs and Strays Society, and examines the manner 
in which discourses drawn on by health and educational professionals 
pathologised disabled children as ‘imperfect’, and even as a potential 
source of violence. Viewed through a lens of pathological difference, 
children living with impairment represented physiological and psy-
chological deviations from a socially and politically accepted model of 
childhood and its patterns of development.
Kristine Swenson further interrogates this model of the patholo-
gisation of physiological and psychological variation in the follow-
ing chapter, by turning to popular reform movements which arose in 
response to what mainstream medicine considered largely innate and 
unchangeable conditions, and actively pursued alternative methods 
of constructing such difference. Drawing on the emergence of the 
American Fowler family – led by the brothers Orson and Lorenzo, 
their sister, Charlotte, and her husband Samuel Wells – as her central 
case study, Swenson considers the Fowlers’ empire of phrenological 
lecture tours, publishing, and therapeutics as a practice that not only 
kept phrenology in the public eye long after its dismissal from scien-
tific practice, but that responded to the perceived ills of industrialised 
capitalism by touting progressive self-improvement and self-care. The 
Fowlers, Swenson shows, exploited the potential of phrenology as a 
form of practical self-help (or ‘self-culture’) allied to hydropathy, dietet-
ics, vegetarianism, dress reform, and temperance. The concept of self-
help, largely associated in Victorian studies with the work of Scottish 
writer and government reformer Samuel Smiles (1812–1904) whose 
Self Help, published in 1859, sold a quarter of a million copies in his 
lifetime, permeated British and American cultures well beyond Smiles’s 
works.37 As cultural fears of degeneration and race suicide became 
widespread, and the middle classes were increasingly seen as subject 
to the ‘modern illnesses’ of neurasthenia and dyspepsia, the Fowlers 
sought means of facilitating social and personal adjustment to the 
demands of a newly industrialised society. Their reform-oriented late-
century phrenology promised personal improvement through proper 
living habits and the ‘exercising’ of the faculties, and seemed to mitigate 
the harsh physiological and psychological consequences of Darwin-
ian evolution and hereditary conditions, which fuelled degenerationist 
discourse.
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Moving from the first section of this volume, which explores 
varying constructions of modernity and the modern subject in rela-
tion to medical practice, Chapters 5 to 8, collectively titled ‘Paradoxes 
of Modern Living’, are devoted to ‘diseases’ and conditions that seem-
ingly emerged from a dialectical relationship between notions of pro-
gress and pathology. Degenerationist discourses across the medical, 
biological, and psychiatric sciences of the fin de siècle illuminated the 
‘dark side of progress’, as the supposed advancement of the human race 
was understood to be constantly threatened with potential reversals 
through collapse, physical and psychological deviancy, or decay.38 Late 
nineteenth-century society appeared to many commentators increas-
ingly to manifest degenerate symptoms of nervous exhaustion, neuro-
sis, psychosis, and general debility derived from prolonged exposure to 
the speed, noise, and constant stimuli of the urban environment. Such 
noxious influences as hysteria, neurasthenia, insanity, criminality, and 
even homosexuality, induced fears concerning the possible corruption 
of the species through the determinism of heredity. As Max Nordau 
explained in his study, Degeneration (1892), when an organism becomes 
debilitated, its successors will not resemble the healthy, normal type of 
the species with its capacities for development, but will form a new sub-
species.39 Images of reversion to lower animal or protoplasmic states 
proliferated in the art and literature of the period, and were frequently 
employed, as William Greenslade and Daniel Pick have shown, in order 
to demonstrate the risks of this kind of atavistic decline, while also 
paranoically creating and enforcing political boundaries between races, 
genders, and nationalities.40 Despite, or indeed, because of its progress, 
the modern, civilised Western subject was continually confronted with 
its own fear of a backwards slide and the loss of control.
Manon Mathias opens this section by analysing new attitudes 
towards disease and hygiene in the nineteenth century in the context 
of the unprecedented growth of cities in this period, which provoked a 
parallel rise in diseases from human excrement (such as typhus, typhoid 
fever, and cholera). This analysis is placed in the context of new scien-
tific understandings of bacteria that began to develop in the late nine-
teenth century, as the realisation that germs spread through human 
contact led to an acute fear of dirt and an increased obsession with 
cleanliness. As human excrement came to dominate discussions of 
public health and disease, fictions of the period provoked and explored 
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imaginative extensions of these concerns. Jules Verne’s Cinq cents mil-
lions de la Bégum (1880), Camille Flammarion’s Uranie (1889), and 
William Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890) each created compelling 
fantasies of alternative, faeces-free societies in which bodily waste and 
dirt have been eradicated. These somewhat anodyne and sterile hygienic 
utopias, however, also reveal the potential unintended consequences of 
extreme cleanliness. Implicated in the rational rejection of disease and 
infection, Mathias argues, is a rejection of human physicality, intimacy, 
and passion.
In Chapter 6, Steffan Blayney pursues this concept of the human 
being who is at odds with their environment by tracing an ongoing 
tension between the overwhelmingly fast pace of industrial modernity, 
and the natural rhythms and pulses of the finite energies of the human 
body. Demands for increased velocity of thought and action inculcated 
a variety of concerns about modernity and its limits, and about social, 
political, and cultural decline. Fatigue, rarely mentioned in scientific or 
medical textbooks before the 1860s, emerged in the latter decades of 
the century as a particularly disturbing symptom of modernity, repre-
senting both its degrading effects and its immanent limits. Blayney 
examines constructions of fatigue at the end of the nineteenth century, 
as both scientific object and cultural metaphor, situating this condition 
alongside other such fin-de-siècle signifiers as decadence and degenera-
tion. In this context, Blayney approaches fatigue as the bodily manifes-
tation of the second law of thermodynamics, as well as a critical part of 
the new medical terminology that proliferated in order to designate the 
exhausting effects of modern life. It was expressive of the inevitable 
dissipation of energy that accompanied the performance of work in this 
period. Paradoxically, an epidemic of fatigue appeared both as the main 
obstacle to the progressive development of industrial civilisation, and 
as the most indubitable evidence of its ascendancy.
The aetiology of nineteenth-century fatigue as a kind of built-in 
counter to the dangers of excess was deeply embedded in social, eco-
nomic, and political realities, and it relied upon a new scientific under-
standing of the material world and of the body, grounded in the concepts 
of ‘energy’ and ‘work’. In her seminal text, Illness as Metaphor (1991), 
Susan Sontag traced similar anxieties about the expenditure of energy 
to the social and cultural perceptions that accrued around more specific 
diseases such as syphilis, tuberculosis, and cancer, which consumed or 
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stored energy at varying rates. ‘The Victorian idea of TB as a disease of 
low energy (and heightened sensitivity)’, Sontag argues, ‘echo[ed] the 
attitudes of early capitalist accumulation’ in that the sufferer was under-
stood to have a limited amount of energy, which may be depleted, or 
wasted away, without appropriate regulation. In contrast, cancer ‘evokes 
a different economic catastrophe: that of the unregulated, abnormal, 
incoherent growth’.41 As a disease with a monstrous capacity for growth 
and expansion, cancer thus typically conjures notions of invasion, 
attack, and unrestraint. In Chapter 7, Agnes Arnold-Forster takes up 
this ongoing interplay between medical understandings of cancer and 
broader social and economic shifts, which, she notes, has given rise to 
cancer’s fluid metaphoric identity. Arnold-Forster situates the ‘new 
cancer epidemic’ of the fin de siècle within a climate of widespread 
anxiety about the vitality of the British Empire and concerns about 
imperial over-reaching, as well as fears of the revolt of an apparently 
unruly, ungovernable, and newly enfranchised urban population. The 
metaphoric associations of the cancerous growth resonated in many 
colonial contexts, as doctors who reflected on medicine in non-
European contexts became particularly engaged with the conceptuali-
sation of certain races as more or less prone to the disease, and therefore 
as more or less ‘modern’. Commentators on the domestic ‘cancer epi-
demic’ perceived its presence as an unintended consequence of the 
public health successes of industrial modernity, such as lower infant 
mortality, increasing hospitalisation, and sanitary reforms. In these par-
allel, but conflicting, constructions of cancer as a pathology of progress, 
the disease itself emerged as a symptom of modern life that nonetheless 
manifested a national deterioration in health.
Another phenomenon discursively connected both to the condi-
tions of modern life and to social degeneration and decline at the fin de 
siècle was suicide. The rise of the new science of social statistics in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century had enabled researchers to 
collect new forms of data on suicide incidence and causes of death 
amongst expanding urban populations and to reinforce their suspicions 
about the disruptive, even fatal, consequences of urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Like cancer, suicide was constructed both as a by-
product of progress, and as a source of social and cultural decline. In 
1879, the Italian professor of psychological medicine, Enrico Morselli, 
drew on the language of Darwin and Spencer to argue that suicide was 
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‘an effect of the struggle for existence, and of human selection’, and that 
urban societies therefore had higher rates of suicide than rural societies 
because the struggle for existence was intensified by city living.42 The 
pioneering social scientist, Émile Durkheim, also drew explicit parallels 
between individual and social maladies in his definitive study, Le Suicide 
in 1897. In Finland, too, the principal case study of Mikko Myllykangas’s 
chapter, the psychiatrist Thiodolf Saelan explicitly attributed the slowly 
increasing suicide rates in Finland to modern urban lifestyles, in an 
effort to accentuate the cultural differences between so-called ‘modern-
ised’ Western nations, and other cultures. Myllykangas interrogates 
such claims in the context of Finnish society, which, he notes, was at a 
very different stage of industrial transition than many of its Western 
European counterparts. In this specific social and political context, 
counterarguments to the widespread conception of suicide in Europe 
were put forward by figures such as the physician and anthropologist F. 
W. Westerlund, who argued that it was in fact the lack of progress and 
modernisation in Finland that constituted its main causes of suicide. 
Likewise, Hannes Gebhard, a member of the Finnish Parliament, criti-
cised what he considered the excessively deterministic view of human 
nature that had been put forward by other commentators. These diver-
gent constructions of the role of modernity in relation to suicide ulti-
mately illustrate the ways in which physiological and psychological 
problems of the period were being constituted in relation to their social 
contexts and to the changing dynamics of urbanisation and industriali-
sation. It also points to the multiplicity of modernities being organised 
around different and evolving definitions of the subjective and/or sui-
cidal self. The notion of modernity here, and throughout this volume, 
is clearly far from static. It is a constantly changing accretion of history, 
social context, and material conditions.
The third part of the book investigates the fluctuating boundaries 
between medical theory, social change, and cultural representation in 
this era within non-European contexts. Drawing on Johannes Fabian’s 
work on the conceptual geography of anthropology, which, Fabian con-
tends, regards different cultures as living in different moments of his-
torical development, Projit Bihari Mukharji points to a similar denial of 
coevalness in the history of medicine.43 The distinctions drawn between 
‘Western’ (later ‘bio’) medicine and various so-called ‘traditional medi-
cines’, Mukharji argues, have consistently relegated the latter to the 
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practices of a bygone era. Nonetheless, ‘Western’ medicine is not the 
only tradition to have engaged with constructions of modernity. During 
the nineteenth century, so-called ‘traditional’ medicines around the 
globe were also forced to confront the notion of modernity in all its 
diversity. The Ayurveda tradition of South Asia was one such medical 
practice, and at the core of Mukharji’s chapter is a demonstration of the 
modernity of Ayurveda. The interplay between Ayurvedic practice and 
social, cultural, and economic change in nineteenth-century South Asia 
was, he shows, twofold. Ayurvedic physicians such as Daktar Binodbi-
hari Ray Kabiraj not only developed a self-conscious discourse about 
modernity and its effects upon the body and mind, but they explicitly 
drew upon the language of modernity in order to radically reconfigure 
the Ayurvedic body. Metaphors, as Laura Otis points out, are not, after 
all, about producing ‘objective knowledge’ but about ‘creating produc-
tive thought’.44 Railways and telegraphs, for these physicians, were not 
simply new material realities; they were also a rich ideational resource 
that encouraged and inspired them to think in new ways about the 
human body and its operations.
In the following chapter, Alice Tsay tracks the global history of a 
patent medicine known as Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People, from 
its invention in Canada in 1866 to promotional spreads dedicated to 
these greatly popular pills in Chinese-language publications in Shang-
hai in the early twentieth century. Dr Williams’ Pink Pills were only 
one instance of the plethora of treatments which were being patented, 
marketed, and experimented with as a means of countering nervous 
exhaustion in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. By the time 
they made their appearance in Shanghai in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, however, Dr Williams’ pills were widely derided in 
England and North America as an archetypal example of quackery, with 
commentators identifying the pills’ continued ubiquity as a sign of the 
public’s refusal to recognise scientific progress. Like the ‘traditional’ 
medicines evoked by Mukharji in the previous chapter, patent medicines 
were now associated with notions of backwardness and regression, par-
ticularly when they were encountered abroad. Foreign advertisements 
for Dr Williams’ pills, however, engaged with notions of modernity 
from within their own social and cultural framework. Resisting the 
claims of scholars such as Erik Elinder and Theodore Levitt, who argue 
that worldwide advertising is a form of standardisation and gradual 
18 Introduction
homogenisation across the globe, Tsay’s comparative study reveals 
a more nuanced, localised form of engagement with the product in 
question.45 Rather than simply translating their Anglo-American coun-
terparts, Shanghai advertisements for the pills came to articulate a dis-
tinctly Chinese vision of twentieth-century society in their depiction of 
new gender roles, their absorption of non-Western medical discourse, 
and their use of baihua, the emerging vernacular. The discourse of the 
modern, at least in the case of this consumer product, was carefully 
tailored to its audience, while also responding to that audience, and 
was part of an ongoing dialogue between producers and consumers.
In Chapter 11, Daniel Simpson delineates a complex model of impe-
rial and cultural entanglement in the context of a controversial medical 
debate surrounding poison arrows in the Victorian South Pacific. The 
death of the naval captain James Graham Goodenough under a hail 
of poisonous arrows on the Santa Cruz Islands in 1875 was, Simpson 
argues, a moment in which previously vague British fears of the poisons 
of Santa Cruz – supposedly a place of primitivism and a source of mys-
terious and dangerous knowledge unknown to the West – were seem-
ingly confirmed. Amidst evangelical formulations of Goodenough’s 
death as a kind of Christian martyrdom which he had suffered while 
heroically spreading Western ‘civilisation’ to the region, research into 
Pacific poisons by the ship’s surgeon, Adam Brunton Messer, pointed 
to certain medical, cultural, and environmental factors that countered 
the popular hysteria. The prevailing superstitious dread of the reputed 
poisons of the region, Messer argued, had predisposed British sailors 
to a nervous irritability, which either mimicked or encouraged the 
onset of tetanus. Furthermore, he insisted, endemic neurosis amongst 
sailors was responsible for the increasing prevalence of tetanus in the 
wounds of those struck by ostensibly poisonous arrows. The suffering 
of many naval men, then, was in fact symptomatic of the mental strain 
associated with working in the Pacific during a period of increasingly 
violent encounters. In drawing upon new scientific, psychopathologi-
cal understandings of the relations between mind and body, Messer 
effectively collapsed the distinctions between the ‘civilised’ and the 
‘uncivilised’ peoples clashing in the South Pacific by imagining that 
modern medical education might work in both cases to supplant 
antiquated superstitions and anecdotal evidence. His medical prac-
tices and hypotheses, deployed at a juncture of intense intercultural 
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contact, served both to characterise and to realise a form of medical 
modernity.
‘The modern’ was a widely deployed nineteenth-century signifier 
without a clearly corresponding signified, and the question of what 
constituted the diseases of modern life was partly the work of social 
perception and consensus, and partly the work of medical analysis and 
hypothesis. In the final section of this volume, ‘Reflections and provo-
cation’, Christopher Hamlin takes up this unstable and often polarised 
relationship between cultural experience and interpretation on the 
one hand, and biomedical objectivity on the other, in order to draw 
our attention to a phenomenon which is so frequently missing from 
current scholarship: embodied subjectivity. In so doing, Hamlin does 
not offer us a single case study, like those of the preceding chapters. 
Rather, he ranges widely from public health archives to literary texts 
in a highly individual style and form, interrogating E. P. Thompson’s 
seminal concept of the ‘moral economy’ through the social history of 
health, and questioning how we might meaningfully register the expe-
riences of those whose words, emotions, and details of everyday lives 
are lost to history, and indeed were scarcely registered in their own 
times. Questioning the very voices and vocabularies through which the 
social history of health has been constructed, Hamlin warns us against 
complacency by recognising both the usefulness and the limitations of 
our approaches to illness and the history of medicine, while adopting 
an integrative and holistic approach to notions of disease. In a provoca-
tive paralleling of the historical figure of the nuisance inspector with the 
gamekeeper (or lover) in D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and 
the tales of patients of Hardwicke Hospital, Dublin, in 1840–41 and 
1844, with the complaints of Agnes Fleming in Charles Dickens’s Oliver 
Twist, he opens up the possibilities of work which crosses literary and 
medical histories as a context in which the formation of an embodied 
subjectivity might be considered.
Although our work focuses on the range of ways in which anxieties 
about health and disease manifested themselves in medical and cultural 
discourses of the long nineteenth century, the authors in this volume 
frequently draw parallels to the present, positing Victorian perceptions 
of the diseases of modern life as close precursors to early twenty-first-
century worries about the psychological and physiological strains of 
our own ‘modern’, technology-saturated lives. While we do not wish to 
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draw a direct line of comparison between nineteenth-century attitudes 
to such technologies as the telegraph, train, telephone, and expanding 
print culture, and our own responses as a culture to the advent of the 
internet, the mobile phone, and associated complaints of ‘fake news’ 
and information overload, the longer historical context of such con-
cerns, and their resonances across multiple fields of operation, is made 
evident throughout this volume. What emerges from such analysis is 
an increased alertness, not only to the anxieties induced by new devel-
opments and ‘modern’ technologies in and of themselves, but to the 
broader, and deeply intertwined, social, cultural, economic, and politi-
cal contexts from which they have developed.
Notes
1 George M. Beard, American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences (New 
York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1881), 186.
2 The nerves were central to the work of, for example, the English physician 
Thomas Willis (1621–75) and, subsequently, the Scottish Enlightenment 
physician George Cheyne (1671–1743), and the French physiologist 
Xavier Bichat (1771–1802). A detailed outline of this nervous history is 
provided in Roy Porter, ‘Nervousness, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Style: From Luxury to Labour’, in M. Gijswijt-Hofstra and R. Porter (eds), 
Cultures of Neurasthenia from Beard to the First World War (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2001), 31–49.
3 Beard, American Nervousness, p. iv.
4 Ibid., 176. Charles E. Rosenberg, in ‘The place of George M. Beard in 
nineteenth-century psychiatry’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 36 
( January 1962), 245–59 (pp. 255–7), explores the ‘long and familiar’ tra-
dition of nationalism underpinning Beard’s aetiology of neurasthenia.
5 David Schuster, Neurasthenic Nation: America’s Search for Health, Happi-
ness, and Comfort, 1869–1920 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2011), 22.
6 Schuster, Neurasthenic Nation, 22.
7 Beard, American Nervousness, 186. Our emphasis.
8 For a detailed examination of the relationship between neurasthenia and 
the era’s politics of race, nationalism, and citizenship, see Brad Campbell, 
‘The making of “American”: race and nation in neurasthenic discourse’, 
History of Psychiatry, 18:2 (2007), 131–56.
9 Charles L. Dana, ‘The partial passing of neurasthenia’, Boston Medical and 
Surgical Journal, 150:13 (1904), 339–44 (p. 341).
Introduction 21
10 For a discussion of peculiarly British views on the concept of neurasthenia, 
and its advent as a useful addition to the British medical lexicon, see Janet 
Oppenheim, ‘Shattered Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in Victo-
rian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 79–109.
11 On the history of education in Russia and the late nineteenth-century 
concerns surrounding overpressure, see Patrick L. Alston, Education and 
the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).
12 James C. Albisetti, Secondary School Reform in Imperial Germany (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 123.
13 Victor Laprade, L’Éducation homicide. Plaidoyer pour l’enfance (Paris: 
Didier, 1868), 30.
14 Aimé Riant, Le Surménage intellectuel et les exercices physiques (Paris: J. B. 
Baillère, 1889); Alfred Binet and Victor Henri, La Fatigue intellectuelle 
(Paris: C. Reinwald, 1898).
15 Thomas Stretch Dowse, On Brain and Nerve Exhaustion: ‘Neurasthenia’, Its 
Nature and Curative Treatment (London: Ballière, Tindall, and Cox, 1880), 
40.
16 These claims were reflective of more general cultural perceptions of the 
dissipation of mechanical, mental, and physical energy under the strain of 
modernity. As Anson Rabinbach has shown, a decline in nervous energy 
was understood to create a corresponding decline in labour and productiv-
ity and was, therefore, in many ways an important indicator of a nation’s 
longevity. See Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and 
the Origins of Modernity (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
17 W. R. Greg, ‘Life at High Pressure’, Contemporary Review (December 
1874), 623–38 (p. 627).
18 Ibid., 627. Greg adds to this form of chronic disruption, the anxiety to be 
on time and the hurrying pace to catch trains which further the daily wear 
and tear of the nervous system.
19 Ibid., 629.
20 Marshall Berman, for example, identifies three distinct transitional periods 
in his investigation of modernism and its complexities: 1500 to c. 1800, 
the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century. Crane Brinton and 
Richard Tarnas argue that a distinctly ‘modern’ world view emerged in the 
Enlightenment period. According to Richard Tarnas, it is science that dic-
tates these shifts in orientation, while according to Warren W. Wagar, it is 
the process of secularisation. See Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts 
into Air: The Experience of Modernity (London: Verso, 1983); Crane 
Brinton, The Shaping of Modern Thought (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1963); Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understand-
ing the Ideas that have Shaped our World View (London: Pimlico, 1996); 
22 Introduction
Warren W. Wagar (ed.), The Idea of Progress Since the Renaissance (New 
York: John Wiley, 1964).
21 L. S. Jacyna, Medicine and Modernism: A Biography of Sir Henry Head 
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008), 4.
22 S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple modernities’, Daedalus 1:129 (2000), 1–29 (p. 
2). See also Dominic Sachsenmaier, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Jens Riedel (eds), 
Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese, and Other Interpreta-
tions (Leiden: Brill, 2002). For further exploration of the notion of multi-
ple modernities, see Alberto Martinelli, Global Modernization: Rethinking 
the Project of Modernity (London: SAGE, 2005).
23 C. E. Rosenberg, ‘Pathologies of progress: the idea of civilization as risk’, 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 72:4 (1998), 714–30 (p. 716).
24 Ibid., 730.
25 The emphasis throughout this study on the interrelations of modernity and 
the human mind and body has resonances with Michael Sappol’s recent 
book, Body Modern: Fritz Kahn, Scientific Illustration, and the Homuncular 
Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), which locates 
modernity within the human body in the context of art and design, and 
considers the ways in which ‘the surfaces of modernity’ are ‘brought into 
the depths of the body, and the depths of the body’ are brought out ‘onto 
modernity’s industrial, urban, and domestic surfaces’ (165).
26 The jarring effect of new modes of transport, machinery, or technological 
advances have been explored by Rabinbach in The Human Motor, Andreas 
Killen in his Berlin Electropolis: Shock, Nerves, and German Modernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), and in the more recent 
edited collection by Laura Salisbury and Andrew Shail, Neurology and 
Modernity: A Cultural History of Nervous Systems, 1800–1950 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Now ‘classic’ texts in the field, such as Wolf-
gang Schivelbusch’s The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and 
Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 
are also instructive in considering how contemporary technological and 
scientific developments could alter perceptions both of the world and of 
the individual’s place within it.
27 On railway spine, see Jane F. Thraikill, ‘Railway Spine, Nervous Excess and 
the Forensic Self ’, in Salisbury and Shail (eds), Neurology and Modernity, 
96–112. A detailed medical-historical analysis is provided by Michael R. 
Trimble, Post-Traumatic Neuroses: From Railway Spine to Whiplash (Chich-
ester: John Riley, 1981). On Bicycle Face, see Patricia Anne Vertinsky, 
The Eternally Wounded Woman: Women, Doctors, and Exercise in the Late 
Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 
75–81.
Introduction 23
28 On the influence of the sewing machine on female sexual health, see Judith 
Coffin, ‘Credit, consumption, and images of women’s desires: selling the 
sewing machine in late nineteenth-century France’, French Historical 
Studies, 18 (1994), 749–83, and Shelley Trower, Senses of Vibration: A 
History of the Pleasure and Pain of Sound (London: Continuum, 2012), 
132–8.
29 See, for example, Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner (eds), Traumatic Pasts: 
History, Psychiatry and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), which offers a variety of perspectives 
on shock in technological, industrial, and medical modernity, and Tim 
Armstrong, ‘Two types of shock in modernity’, Critical Quarterly, 42 
(2000), 61–73.
30 See Joachim Radkau, ‘The Neurasthenic Experience in Imperial Germany: 
Expeditions into Patient Records and Side-Looks upon General History’, 
in M. Gijswijt-Hofstra and R. Porter (eds), Cultures of Neurasthenia from 
Beard to the First World War (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), 199–217; Laura 
Goering, ‘Russian nervousness: neurasthenia and national identity in 
nineteenth-century Russia’, Medical History, 47:1 (2003), 23–46; Arthur 
Kleinman, Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Depression, Neurasthenia, 
and Pain in Modern China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); 
Janet Oppenheim, ‘Shattered Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in 
Victorian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 79–109.
31 Sabine Frühstück, ‘Male anxieties: nerve force, nation, and the power of 
sexual knowledge’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 15 (2005), 71–88.
32 Kristin Ruggiero, Modernity in the Flesh: Medicine, Law, and Society in Turn-
of-the-Century Argentina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 
139–43.
33 For work in the field of public and environmental health, see Christopher 
Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick: Britain, 
1800–1854 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Pamela 
Gilbert, Cholera and Nation: Doctoring the Social Body in Victorian England 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), and Mary Poovey, 
Making a Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830–1864 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). Previous work focusing on nervous 
diseases includes Janet Oppenheim, ‘Shattered Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, 
and Depression in Victorian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), and Mark Micale, The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and 
the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880–1940 (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2004), and Hysterical Man: The Hidden History of 
Male Nervous Illness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
Work on the history of neurasthenia includes Frederick Gosling, Before 
24 Introduction
Freud: Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1987), Gijswijt-Hofstra and Porter (eds), Cultures 
of Neurasthenia, and Schuster, Neurasthenic Nation. On shock, see Jill 
Matus, Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), and on agoraphobia David Trotter, 
The Uses of Phobia: Essays on Literature and Film (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 
2010).
34 Benjamin Ward Richardson, Diseases of Modern Life (London: Macmillan, 
1876).
35 Roger Cooter, ‘Medicine and Modernity’, in Mark Jackson (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 100–16 (p. 103).
36 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. Barbara Foxley (London: Everyman’s 
Library, 1992), 54.
37 For more on the rise of Victorian self-help culture, see J. F. C. Harrison, 
‘The Victorian gospel of success’, Victorian Studies, 1:2 (1957), 155–64, and 
Kenneth Fielden, ‘Samuel Smiles and self-help’, Victorian Studies, 12:2 
(1968), 155–76. Boyd Hilton discusses self-help in a religious context in 
The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicism on Social and Economic 
Thought, 1795–1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
38 J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman, Degeneration: The Dark Side 
of Progress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
39 Max Nordau, Degeneration (London: William Heinemann, 1896 [1892]).
40 William Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture, and the Novel, 1880–1940 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Daniel Pick, Faces of 
Degeneration: A European Disorder c. 1848–c. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989).
41 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors (London: 
Penguin, 1991 [1968]), 64.
42 Enrico Morselli, Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics (New 
York: D. Appleton, 1882), 354.
43 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
44 Laura Otis, Networking: Communicating with Bodies and Machines in the 
Nineteenth Century (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 12.
45 Theodore Levitt, ‘The globalization of markets’, Harvard Business Review, 
83:3 (1983), 92–102 and Erik Elinder, ‘How international can European 
advertising be?’ Journal of Marketing, 29 (1965), 7–11.
I




Revolutionary shocks: the French 
human sciences and the crafting of 
modern subjectivity, 1794–1816
Laurens Schlicht
Between 9 August and 9 October 1793, the French city of Lyon was 
besieged by military forces of the central authority in Paris. Earlier that 
year, the Jacobin municipality at Lyon had been overthrown by a 
counter-revolutionary insurrection. Subsequently, the ville rebelle was 
besieged by the National Convention in Paris and ultimately defeated. 
The Hôtel-Dieu hospital at Lyon was reduced to ruins in the battle. 
Three years later, in 1796, Antoine Petit, a surgeon who was present 
during the siege, gave an account of that disturbing episode in the inau-
gural lecture of his anatomy course at the rebuilt Hôtel-Dieu on the 
‘Influence of the French Revolution on public health’. Petit believed in 
the healing effects of the Revolution: rather than emphasising his 
mental or physical suffering at the hands of the revolutionary forces, he 
used his medical training to highlight what he regarded as the positive 
political and therapeutic aspects of fear and terror. The first and most 
necessary function of political revolution, according to Petit, was radi-
cally to change the existing social and political habits of the populace 
in order to clear the way for new and better ones:
Revolutions are, for the political body they shake, what medicines are 
for the impaired human body whose harmony they must restore. In both 
cases, the first effect is a disorder, the first sensation pain.1
Petit thereby claimed that the ‘shock of all passions’ which had been 
inflicted by the Revolution had revealed hitherto unknown powers of 
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the mind.2 It was, he argued, the reign of malicious customs among the 
enslaved peoples in particular – causing a ‘moral fever’ – that had led to 
the outbreak of Revolution.3 He believed that women, especially, 
offered proof that ‘moral affections’ contributed to healing, providing 
the example of a case of dropsy stemming from puffiness in the legs.4 
As Nina Gelbart has shown, doctors during the Revolution were 
increasingly expected to understand and cure not only individual but 
also social diseases and the Revolution thus was seen as a ‘medical 
event’.5 The French and American Revolutions thereby created spaces 
within which this new expertise could be practised and which provided 
material for reflecting on the behaviour of people during what George 
Rosen has termed ‘social stress’.6 As a part or result of these reflections, 
a new way of thinking about the human mind was formed, whose 
empirical study became a task for the emerging human sciences. 
According to Robert Wokler, they replaced the speculative anthropol-
ogy and conjectural history of the eighteenth century.7 One part of this 
project of creating an empirical knowledge system was a rearrangement 
of philosophical reflections about the human mind through the lens of 
medical and pedagogical expertise. When most administrative and 
pedagogical systems of the ancien régime for organising people were 
abolished or deeply transformed during the French Revolution, this 
necessitated at the same time a new way of thinking about the human 
mind, of new systems of control, of disciplining and organising people: 
the ‘citizen’ of a ‘republic’ was a different kind of subject, a subject at 
the same time demanding ‘equality’, ‘liberty’, and individuality.8 As Jan 
Goldstein has shown, after 1800 one new version of subjectivity con-
sisted of a separation of the enigmatic inner world and the phenomenal 
appearance of the soul, which I will refer to as one version of ‘modern 
subjectivity’.9 By focusing on interpretations of the shock of the Revolu-
tion I want to show how in the beginning the positive potential of the 
collective shock was a discursive option, while after 1800 shock as a 
medical intervention became an instrument of experts in controlled 
spaces.
Petit’s short text is only one example from a series of interpretations 
of the political shocks inflicted on the French population, from the 
outset of the French Revolution in 1789 until the rise of Napoleon 
Bonaparte (1769–1821) to power in 1799. In 1789, for example, the 
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well-known physician Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) observed in the 
Journal de Paris that, from the viewpoint of a ‘physician observer’, it was 
impossible to ignore the ‘salutary effects of the progress of liberty’, 
which had injected ‘vigour’ and ‘energy’ into the ‘animal economy’. Like 
Petit, Pinel discussed this topic through the lens of gender, expressing 
his belief that ‘moral causes’ like the Revolution especially affected the 
‘weaker sex’, that is, women.10 Pinel also did more than any other physi-
cian in France to disseminate the concept of ‘moral treatment’, which 
was based on the assumption that ‘moral causes’, in contrast to ‘physical’ 
ones, could cure mental diseases.11 In 1805, his student Jean-Étienne 
Esquirol (1772–1840) introduced the concept of the ‘moral shock’ 
(sécousse morale), which relied upon the notion of moral treatment and 
made further suggestions on how to strategically use moral shocks to 
cure types of insanity.12
This chapter argues that the therapeutic, educational, and scientific 
approach to the moral shock that arose after 1800 was only possible in 
a new framework for treating the human mind within spaces of expert 
knowledge and control such as the asylum and the school. Further-
more, this framework depended on a specific assessment of the history 
of the French Revolution. At various stages of the Revolution, optimis-
tic interpretations of the shock were discarded. In the beginning, the 
universal concepts of equality and liberty had opened up the possibility 
of conceiving of a comprehensive shock as an equalising force that 
would create something like a tabula rasa.13 After the fall of Robespierre 
in 1794, however, this essentially positive image of the ‘people’ became 
questionable, since it was precisely the ‘people’ who had been seduced 
by leaders of the Terror into committing appalling crimes, as the now 
ascendant Thermidorians believed. While these leaders still used a 
medical vocabulary to interpret the shock of the Revolution and to 
suggest a means of pacifying France, they no longer believed in the 
universal goodness of human beings and suggested avoiding immoder-
ate affects.14 After Napoleon’s coup d’état the idea of the shock was again 
transformed.15 Within the new interpretative scheme, which redefined 
the ‘mind’ and subjects’ relation to it, a relegitimation of moral shock 
became possible in the form of the intervention of medical or educa-
tional experts within spaces of control, or of research strategies for 
finding something out about the enigmatic content of the mind. This 
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chapter aims to show that this version of modern subjectivity was 
defined, on the one hand, as a semi-autonomous unit that came to be 
called the ego, the Moi. It was understood to be visible through careful 
introspection only and had an inexhaustible content. On the other hand 
this modern version of what Jan Goldstein has called the ‘mental stuff ’ 
allowed for a sphere of scientific and administrative expertise, dealing 
with observing, experimenting on, and controlling the modern self and 
its deviations.16 Unlike, for example, ‘the citizen’ at the beginning of the 
Revolution who, in Sieyès’s eyes, could deal with ‘good shocks’, this 
kind of modern self was vulnerable, irritable, and principally unstable.17 
While the shock as a conscious intervention therefore had to be con-
trolled by medical experts, the regime of inwardness was a prerogative 
of bourgeois subjects, and administrative professionals took over the 
control of spaces in which passions arose as threatening forces. What I 
call the ‘modern subject’ here, has to be understood as a result of these 
three agencies of acting on an inner zone.
Advocates of the evolving human sciences believed that the mind 
was characterised by some specifically human essence, some core, that 
was at least partially invisible.18 The moral shock was thereby confined 
to spaces where it was used to encourage the development of individual 
human beings or groups of human beings and to find out something 
about their specific potential. From the perspective of moral shock, it 
is thus possible to show how, in the treatment of the human mind, a 
specific relationship between experts and subjects evolved on the basis 
of modern subjectivity and contributed to its production.
The first two sections of the chapter describe the first phase of rev-
olutionary shock after the Terror, while the following three sections 
analyse the interventions of experts during the Consulate (1799–1804) 
on the basis of whether they rejected or adopted the technique of 
moral shock for the treatment of sourds-muets (deaf or hard-of-hear-
ing persons),19 the ‘wild boy’ Victor, and the insane. The moral shock 
and political disruption of the French Revolution led ultimately, the 
chapter concludes, to a new consciousness of the passions and the har-
monies or disharmonies of the inner self, and to an evolving scientific 
practice directed towards an essentialised sphere of individuality. In 
the concluding section, I focus on the question of how these exam-
ples might help elucidate our understanding of a version of modern 
subjectivity.
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The shock of the Revolution after the terror, 1794–99
The idea of moral shock was, from the onset, a political one that also 
had therapeutic, educational, and institutional corollaries. Its basic 
argumentative premise can be summed up as follows: despotic regimes, 
such as the ancien régime, have the tendency to keep the general popu-
lace in ignorance in order to keep it subordinate. This ignorance pre-
vents people from reasoning well enough, for example, to identify their 
natural rights and interests. Therefore, some kind of shock has to break 
down these rigid structures and open up the possibility of creating new 
ones. Fundamental to this notion of the political shock of the Revolu-
tion was the belief that the nation’s individuals could become alienated 
from their inner, rational, and universal mind that nevertheless remained 
intact even under very unfavourable external and internal conditions.20 
As the views of Pinel show above, the idea of insanity as a kind of 
obstruction of the principally undamaged rational mind also inspired a 
medical analysis of the early history of the Revolution.
At the beginning of the French Revolution, the inner self corre-
sponded in many ways to the classical sensationalist theory of mind, 
especially as it was expressed by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714–80) 
and, based on his theories, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy 
(1754–1836).21 In his essay on the origin of human knowledge (Essai 
sur l’origine des connoissances humaines (1749)), for example, Condillac 
provided an explanation of the mind that relied solely on the faculty of 
sense perception and the mind’s basic capacity for ‘attention’. Within 
this framework, the mind was continually affected by three possible 
causes: impairment of the sense organs, different ways of processing 
sense perceptions, and types of storage and connection of these percep-
tions in the form of ideas.22 His basic hope, and that of Destutt de Tracy 
as well, was to discover laws governing the workings of the human mind 
that were analogous to the laws of physics. The intervention of the 
expert on the human mind should one day be based on the knowledge 
of these laws of, for example, ‘morals’, that is for Destutt de Tracy, the 
‘knowledge of the effects of our inclinations and our sentiments on our 
happiness’.23 In Destutt de Tracy’s eyes then, these experts would, on 
the basis of such ‘human laws’, help to create the optimal conditions for 
human social life.24 While Destutt de Tracy wrote this after the fall of 
Robespierre, when he had embraced a moderate stance highlighting the 
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dangerous potential of any kind of disturbance, before 1794 the positive 
effects of shock had been more pervasive in both political and scientific 
discourses.
The idea that shocks could heal was not without precedent, espe-
cially in medical circles, where the practice of curing patients by induc-
ing a state of terror in them had existed since at least the beginning of 
the eighteenth century. A professor of medicine at Leiden University, 
for instance, Johannes Oosterdyk Schacht (1704–92) had supposed, 
with reference to Stoic philosophy, that even if terror (terrore) were a 
rather devastating disturbance of the soul (perturbatio animi), submerg-
ing an ill person in cold water could induce a shock that might cure 
rabies.25 This kind of shock was adopted by the evolving psychiatric 
discourse at the end of the eighteenth century, as Philippe Pinel popu-
larised the idea of the ‘moral treatment’ through his work at the Bicêtre 
hospital, claiming that dopted interventions – that is, those not involv-
ing direct physical contact – could cure insanity. In Pinel’s case, as 
Goldstein argues, these moral interventions were understood to be 
effective because the faculty of imagination seemingly had an organis-
ing effect on the mind and could be affected by every external stimulus 
(including pictures, theatre plays, and sounds).26 It was not absurd to 
transfer this idea of the effects of the imagination to the interpretation 
of the shock of the Revolution, which, for the advocates of the Revolu-
tion, could be interpreted as salutary, while in the eyes of its critics it 
was detrimental.27
The Thermidorians’ stance
As Bronisław Baczko has demonstrated through sustained analysis of 
political debates after the Terror, providing a plausible explanation as 
to how a freed people could have succumbed to the seductive voices 
of the discourse of the Terror, and especially to that of Robespierre, 
became a central task of the post-Terror period.28 The figure of a people 
easily seduced gained in prominence during this period, and the idea of 
the gentle and uniform progress of reason was delegitimated. Instead, 
the discourse of the Thermidorian Convention (1794–99), which had 
replaced the regime of the Terror, betrayed a deep-seated anxiety that 
the people might again be seduced by ‘tyrants’ (referring mainly to 
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Robespierre and Louis XVI). One of the central figures of this Thermi-
dorian reaction, Jean-Lambert Tallien (1767–1820), made this stance 
very clear in his speech soon after the fall of Robespierre, on 28 August 
1794.29 While speaking about the concrete system of Terror that was, 
in his eyes, instituted primarily by Robespierre and Saint-Just, he drew 
attention at the same time to the medical concept of terror:
the terror is a general and regular shock, an exterior shock that affects 
the most hidden fibres, which degrades man and reduces him to a beast. 
It is the shock of all physical forces, the concussion of all moral faculties, 
the disturbance of all ideas, the reversal of all feelings (affections). It is a 
genuine disorganisation of the soul, which, because it leaves the soul 
only the ability to suffer, robs it of both the sweetness of hope and of the 
resources of despair.30
Several texts published soon after the end of the Terror presented nar-
ratives similar to Tallien’s, which utilised vocabulary of the human sci-
ences in order to demonstrate how the people had been either deceived 
or driven mad by the abuse of passions or of words (the so-called abus 
des mots).31 In 1798, for example, Destutt de Tracy published a series of 
articles in the Mercure de France in response to a prize question posed 
by the Class of Moral and Political Sciences at the National Institute, 
one of the first institutionalisations of the ‘human’, ‘moral’, ‘political’, 
or ‘social’ sciences.32 The question read: ‘What means should be con-
sidered to establish morality among a people?’ (the question was later 
modified, so Destutt’s essay did not enter the competition). Referring 
to the disturbing experiences of the Terror, de Tracy sharply criticised 
faith in the gentle progress of reason and instead put forward the thesis 
that the basic social and political operations of humanity are defined by 
the conflict of interests. To mitigate these conflicts one had, in his eyes, 
not to convince people by the force of arguments, but rather to ‘indoc-
trinate’ them, to ‘use every indirect means to influence the dispositions 
of its [the people’s] members’.33 Morality, Destutt contended, is not 
something ‘out there’, it must be produced through a knowledge-based 
process aimed at changing people’s customs (habitudes) by instituting 
good laws, promptly executing these laws, and furnishing the requi-
site material resources. For Destutt, the transition from one system 
to the other always generates a ‘crisis where one experiences all the 
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problems of both systems’, which could, if prolonged, lead to ‘irremedi-
able disorders’.34
One of the major figures of the Thermidorian reaction was Benjamin 
Constant (1767–1830), a staunch defender of the ideals of moderation 
and harmony. Constant considered the idea that the Terror was a neces-
sary phase and ingredient of the Revolution influential and dangerous 
enough to be opposed in detail. Terror, for Constant, reinstated the 
arbitrary (as opposed to the ‘natural’) political regime of the past by 
establishing a distance between the government and the people on the 
basis of fear.35 Furthermore, by using misleading words (such as ‘justice’ 
for unjust actions), it contributed to the confusion of things, words, and 
ideas, thereby creating a gap between the sacred law of nature and the 
arbitrary imaginations of despotic rulers:
[The Terror] has habituated the people to hearing the most sacred 
words being pronounced to motivate the most abhorrent actions. It has 
confused all notions, accustomed [the people’s] minds to despotism, 
inspired disdain for manners (formes), and prepared the ground for acts 
of violence and crimes in all directions.36
The impetus for Constant’s criticism was a book by Adrien Lezay-
Marnésia (1769–1814) entitled Of the causes of the Revolution and of its 
results (1797), which defended the Terror as a necessary episode of the 
Revolution. Like Petit, Lezay considered the Revolution a ‘complete 
change of customs, habits, circumstances, properties’.37 He situated his 
analysis of the shock of the Terror within a broader interpretation of 
historical forces, that is, the progress of enlightenment, which he 
believed had led to Revolution. In his own words, ‘enlightenment and 
corruption progress together, which is why every popular revolution 
brought about by the progress of enlightenment is necessarily violent’.38 
Lezay-Marnésia was convinced that in order to destroy ancient customs 
(‘anciennes habitudes’), an excessive despotism (‘despotisme outré’) 
had been necessary to prepare the ground for a free constitution.39 
Drawing once again on the field of medicine to furnish an analogy, the 
Terror was for Lezay-Marnésia a kind of ‘fever’, whose tremors would 
be felt even after the actual political event had subsided.40 The despot-
ism of the Terror had in this way made a ‘new people’ who could only 
attain liberty through ‘shocks’, even if those shocks were inflicted by 
‘criminals’.41
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After the coup d’état in 1799
Dominant figures in the burgeoning field of the human sciences after 
the establishment of the National Institute in 1795 presented a rather 
different analysis of the people in periods of violent political circum-
stances. The physiologist and materialist philosopher Pierre-Jean-
Georges Cabanis (1757–1808), for example, believed that the practice 
of the human sciences could contribute to avoiding revolutionary vio-
lence and that it was only the anachronism of the political regime, as 
compared to the progress of enlightenment, that caused the excesses of 
the revolutionary struggle. Indeed, this violence could be avoided 
through careful attention to the people’s state of mind (état des esprits).42 
For Cabanis, the human sciences would provide a means of governing 
that would allow social institutions to avoid friction between the peo-
ple’s state of mind and the nature of the social institutions that had 
produced the revolutionary violence in the first place. One way or the 
other, these advocates of the human sciences sought to produce situa-
tions in which the progress of the mind and the state of societal institu-
tions did not show any difference in development. These could be 
called ‘regimes of contemporaneity’, and such regimes were regarded as 
the foundation of a harmonious society.
In these circumstances, a heterogeneous group of actors gathered in 
Paris to establish a learned society, the Society of the Observers of Man 
(Société des observateurs de l’homme (1799–1804)). Its forty-five resi-
dent and sixteen corresponding members included physicians (Félix 
Vicq d’Azyr and Philippe Pinel), orientalists (Antoine-Isaac Silvestre 
de Sacy (1758–1838)), mathematicians (Auguste-Savinien Leblond 
(1760–1811)), naturalists (Aubin-Louis Millin de Grandmaison 
(1759–1818)), and philosophers (Pierre Laromiguière (1756–1837)). 
The society was established just after Napoleon’s coup d’état in 1799 and 
promised to generate a range of useful knowledge for safeguarding the 
new political regime against instability. One of its main actors, Joseph 
Marie de Gérando (1772–1842), believed that the general shock to ‘all 
beliefs’ that had been caused by the Revolution necessitated a profound 
reflection upon the rights and duties of human beings and the place of 
each being in French society.43 Therefore, he argued, a new and uni-
versal science of human beings should form the basis of a harmonising 
knowledge system, providing insight into the workings of the human 
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mind, and the effects of education and various external influences, such 
as climate.44
The most visible activities of the Society were concentrated at Paris’s 
Institution nationale des sourds-muets, which was a central revolutionary 
institution because it could demonstrate the moral power of education 
in very tangible ways during the public sessions which were attended 
by many, sometimes famous, visitors (such as the Pope, who attended 
a public session in 1805).45 Visitors to the school could admire its reali-
sation of the Enlightenment’s educational utopia, which promised to 
render every human being equally rational.46 This programme was 
based on a conception of human beings as naturally good and virtuous, 
and it maintained that only the aberrations of history, that is, arbitrary 
developments, could corrupt these natural qualities. One of the more 
remarkable means of corrupting people was the above-mentioned 
misuse of words, the abus des mots, which is why advocates of this posi-
tion were highly interested in reforming language.
The school’s director, Roch Ambroise Sicard (1742–1822), claimed 
to have developed a ‘methodical sign language’ that was able to replace 
the sign language normally used by sourds-muets, by which he meant 
that every sign would unequivocally represent only one idea, which, in 
turn, was connected to only one type of thing in the world.47 While 
there is not space to discuss this idea in detail here, Sicard’s basic strat-
egy was to base the signs of the methodical sign language on what he 
thought to be a natural analysis of the parts of speech, a natural grammar, 
which therefore represented the structure of things in the world per-
fectly in language. Hence, Sicard believed he could translate the order 
of things into an order of words and preserve this order in a language 
unobstructed by tradition, creating a new language of a new people, the 
methodical sign language. Contemporary critics of Sicard pointed out 
that he had entirely overlooked the fact that sourds-muets generally 
already had an elaborate language and that he failed to sufficiently deal 
with its structure – a disregard that remained a characteristic aspect of 
the marginalisation of the Deaf Community.48
For Sicard’s admirers, on the other hand, his methodical sign lan-
guage seemed ideally suited to eliminating the abus des mots, which, for 
Tallien as well, was crucial to explaining the power accumulated during 
the Terror. He enjoyed significant success with his programme. A high-
ranking official of the Interior Ministry, Jean-Pierre Barbier de Neuville 
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(1754–1822), mentioned Sicard’s public lessons and ‘discovery’ of the 
methodical sign language in a letter of recommendation to the Interior 
Minister, because Sicard was hoping for a pay rise: ‘Mr Sicard is well 
known to the learned foreigners who all frequent his lessons, and who 
rank his discovery among the achievements upon which our nation 
prides itself and which elevate it above the others’.49 One admirer of his 
work, the Abbé Pierre David, claimed that Sicard’s methodical sign 
language could form the basis for a much needed clarification and puri-
fication of the political vocabulary. Terror, he argued, had managed to 
deceive people through the misuse and perversion of words such as 
‘equality’ and ‘democracy’, which would not be possible in a ‘natural’ 
language such as Sicard’s.50 Sicard had influential supporters from the 
outset. Charles-Maurice Talleyrand (1754–1838) surmised in his 1791 
report on public education that Sicard’s methodical sign language might 
help create a universal language ‘which will be for thinking what algebra 
is for calculation’.51 An archival report of the Committee of Public Assis-
tance in 1796 proposed that ‘the analytical signs of the school of the 
sourd-muets might become ‘the universal language of educated men of 
all nations’.52
Sicard was also active, under the pseudonym of ‘Dracis’, as a writer 
for the Annales religieuses, where, in 1797, an account was published of 
his experiences during the September Massacres of 1792. This piece 
described a riot involving the slaughter of imprisoned enemies of the 
Revolution, including so-called ‘refractory priests’ like Sicard who had 
refused the civil constitution of the clergy. Here as well, Sicard painted 
a picture of an ‘irascible’ people whose misguided actions stemmed 
solely from their dependence on the opinions of their leaders.53 The 
people were susceptible to the voice of reason, but they also listened to 
those who wanted to inflame unjust passions – they were, ultimately, 
dependent on the whims of the elite.
Sicard believed that sourds-muets represented a perfect natural state 
prior to the onset of education. They were therefore ideal objects for an 
‘experimental metaphysics’, which he believed could demonstrate how, 
from the raw, natural state of humanity, an enlightened educational prac-
tice would produce enlightened and peaceful citizens.54 Sicard’s project 
effectively responded to the Consulate’s need to build up a coherent 
system of knowledge that allowed for the creation of a functioning 
society through a series of prudent educational and administrative 
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interventions.55 The figure of the sourd-muet, also referred to at this 
time as the ‘savage’ or the ‘automaton’ 56 because of an alleged lack of 
communication, was conceived as a being without history and there-
fore deemed suitable for the implementation of a perfect system of 
customs, habits, and signs. Many audience members at Sicard’s regular 
public lessons at the Institution nationale des sourds-muets shared this 
conviction; one of them even believed he had attended the ‘creation 
of man’.57 Sicard’s perspective also existed in governmental contexts, 
as demonstrated by this unpublished report of the Director General of 
Public Instruction (c. 1795–99):
It is less by communicating words that are only ever used to signal ideas, 
than by helping to beget ideas themselves, that it is possible to proceed 
with some success in the teaching [of sourds-muets]. It is as if there is a 
sort of world map on which the philosophical genius of the teacher 
establishes, between the ideas that are supposed to be covering the 
surface, connections that tie them together.58
Sicard’s experimental metaphysics was an answer to the challenge of 
regeneration, that is, of how a society with a history, with traditional 
customs and habits, might be regenerated without violence or shock, 
on the sole basis of the laws of nature, thereby avoiding the arbitrary 
abuse of power witnessed during the Terror. He framed this reference 
to nature within a sentimental narrative depicting education as an 
unimpeded discovery and development of immanent abilities through 
the enjoyment and admiration of nature. In Sicard, we therefore often 
find emotional descriptions of Jean Massieu (1772–1846) – one of his 
most famous pupils – hard at work classifying various natural phe-
nomena, but we are very seldom privy to scenes of conflict.59 Sicard 
here reflects the wide-ranging discourse about ‘nature’ that blossomed 
during the French Revolution, a discourse that highlighted its harmo-
nious, normative, and tender aspects. Roederer, one of the architects 
of Napoleon’s coup d’état and an outspoken champion of Sicard’s 
method, shared Tallien’s perspective on the Terror, regarding it as a 
‘disease where the moral and the physical constantly influence each 
other’.60 Since that system had relied on the ‘arbitrary’ whim of 
despots, the appeal of an educational technique that promised to rein-
state the ‘natural’ order had a special appeal. If, as Roederer believed, 
the ‘natural’ was intimately tied to the good and the beautiful, then a 
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concrete technique for attaining the ‘natural’ was a way to avoid the 
regression to Terror and the moral and physical distress associated 
with it. In 1799, he was therefore already staunchly critical of any 
approach to interpreting the Terror as a necessary phase of the Revo-
lution, regarding it instead as the work of ‘some villains’ who had 
merely seized the opportunity to deceive an ‘impatient and blind 
people’.61 Sicard’s version of enlightened education thus fulfilled at 
least two functions: first, it served as a rhetorical device to criticise the 
regime of the Terror as ‘unnatural’; second it created the possibility to 
relate to a positive concept of ‘nature’ serving as a tool to preserve a 
normative stance towards the concept of ‘humanity’ without giving 
up the securalised anthropology. While this latter provided orienta-
tional knowledge to situate the new ‘citizen’ within a sphere of new 
possibilities for action, it defined human beings as self-referential and 
developing systems of processing sense perceptions. In order still to 
be able to claim for ethical norms the actors followed different paths: 
one, Sicard’s and Roederer’s, was to add to this self-referential image a 
concept of ‘nature’ that already implied the values in question; another, 
Gérando’s and Maine de Biran’s, was to define a centre, which was at 
the same time empty and invisible and could be used to found and 
legitimate ethical and political norms. Both options were taken to deal 
with the challenge of a human being as part of nature without tran-
scendence, but which should at the same time serve as a means to 
formulate a knowledge system for creating a new society. Winfried 
Wehle has put forward the thesis, that it was precisely this latter con-
flict (Zerrissenheit) to form a centre but not to fill it out that formed 
the basic concern of the ‘modern subject.62
Victor, the ‘wild boy’
So far, I have shown that protagonists of the coup d’état of 1799 rejected 
the interpretation of the Terror as a necessary phase of the Revolution. 
However, the year 1800 saw a different version of shock within the 
human sciences emerge in rather local circumstances, when a so-called 
feral, or ‘savage’ (‘sauvage’) child was transferred to Paris’s school for 
deaf mutes.63 This child, approximately twelve years of age, who was 
later named Victor, initially served the same functional role as the figure 
of the sourd-muet. The Society of the Observers of Man had high hopes 
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that Sicard’s educational methods would succeed in integrating him 
into society.64
Sicard withdrew from the case the same year. Eventually, the 
task of educating Victor was taken over by Jean Marc Gaspard Itard 
(1774–1838), the school physician and a student of Pinel, who worked 
with the boy for five years, gave him his name, and wrote reports on his 
progress for the Interior Minister. His reports of 1801 and 1806 stand 
out in the history of feral children because, compared to other cases, 
they are quite long and very precise in their descriptions of his educa-
tional interventions.65 Itard started out in his education of Victor from 
Sicard’s conviction that Victor’s supposedly natural condition would 
allow for the ‘creation of man’, the harmonious unfolding of his pupil’s 
faculties through his classifications of nature. Since, for Sicard and 
Itard, nature was generally good and virtuous, transferring the natural 
order to an order of signs and ideas meant safeguarding nature for 
society.
It is clear from his early report that Itard, like Sicard, began his work 
assuming that education was the most powerful means of moulding 
human beings and, furthermore, that humanity owed everything it had 
to education.66 It is clear from his later report of 1806, however, that 
Itard increasingly deviated from his initial convictions. He saw Victor 
more and more as a particular, unique research object, who could not 
serve as a model for all human beings, for he could be compared only 
to himself.67 Within this new framework, the once joyful classification 
activities were abandoned in favour of a new ensemble of techniques 
designed to act on Victor’s mind, including punishing and surprising 
Victor, as well as traditional medical treatments such as hot and cold 
baths. Itard’s report of 1806 illustrates how a different version of the 
sensualist self was taking shape in educational and research practices. 
While he still believed that sense perception was highly important in 
moulding human beings, he also used techniques aimed at producing 
unexpected results, an approach we do not find in Sicard. The kind of 
self Itard tried to act on was therefore defined at least in part as an area 
that could only be made visible by an experimental approach in the 
modern sense. In some way or the other, Itard had to shock Victor’s 
inner self; for while the self itself may be invisible, its effects could, in 
Itard’s view, be made observable. In carefully designed experimental 
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spaces, moral shock thus made perfect sense. Sometimes, Itard also 
used his personal bond with Victor to experiment with the effects of 
emotions:
I approached Victor; I spoke affectionately to him, expressing myself in 
terms suitable for him to grasp their meaning, and adding even more 
intelligible signs of friendship. His tears redoubled, accompanied by 
sighs and sobs. Increasing the intensity of my caresses, I drove the 
emotion to its highest point and, if I may say so, made tremble the moral 
Man unto his last fibre.68
With interventions like these, Itard was trying to stimulate Victor 
into active and inventive, especially linguistic, performances. His strong 
focus on Victor’s activity was due to his reading of Gérando’s book on 
the generation of ideas, in which Gérando proposed a transformation 
of Condillac’s conceptualisation of the human mind.69 The focal point 
of this transformation was the mind’s passivity or activity.70 Gérando 
concentrated here particularly on the faculty of attention. One of the 
central claims of his philosophy is that the human being has an active 
ability to create hitherto unknown combinations of ideas. Attention 
and invention were means of staking out a specific terrain proper to 
being human, for – as Michel Foucault has shown – classical sensualist 
philosophy lacked an argumentational device for defining a particular 
being called ‘man’: every totality capable of processing sense percep-
tion, of generating ideas and signs was indistinguishable from ‘man’ 
(this also partially explains the excitement about ‘automatons’ and the 
question of whether they could potentially become human).71 Gérando 
chose a path that enabled him to define the essence of human beings 
within a sensualist vocabulary while dispensing with Condillac’s com-
mitment to the absolute emptiness of the mind before education. He 
called this essence the Moi, the ego. It was consciously characterised 
as an active principle. In the first lines of his Des signes (On signs), 
Gérando thus defines the verb ‘to think’ as analogous to the verb ‘to 
act’.72 This activity of the ego begins with the faculty of attention, 
which is the moral counterpart of physical sensation. While sensation 
comes from the outside, Gérando claims, attention comes from ‘us’, 
meaning that there is a structuring principle which we cannot alter 
(the system of the nerves, the sense organs etc.) and an active principle 
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dependent on the ego. On the first pages of his prize-winning essay, 
Gérando observes that both principles had to be treated as unknown 
variables. This was attractive for philosophers like Victor Cousin 
(1792–1867), who embraced this concept of the human being with 
a specifically human core, as well as for other researchers, since the 
existence of such a core ultimately called for the existence of a research 
programme.
I contend that it was precisely this human core that also underpinned 
Itard’s subsequent research activities at the Institution nationale des 
sourds-muets. Sicard’s ideal rational Enlightenment subject was replaced 
by a subject whose rich interiority was difficult to locate and to 
expound.73 This was also the interpretative framework that Itard used 
in his larger work on the education of sourds-muets.74 Itard thereby par-
ticularised the notion of ‘civilisation’, so important for revolutionary 
discourse, and applied it to partially discrete zones of action. The Institu-
tion nationale des sourds-muets was one such zone, characterised by its 
unique progress of reason and sensibility. As in the 1806 report on 
Victor, this particular civilisation of the school’s pupils could only be 
measured against its own zone of action; there could be no comparison 
with the universal progress of enlightenment.75
This version of modern subjectivity as a local challenge of negotia-
tion within local developments necessitated a concomitant interpre-
tation of the place of individuals within their wider social collective. 
In an 1802 manuscript about insanity, Itard introduced a concept he 
called the ‘spirit of the present time’ (‘esprit du temps actuel’), which, 
he argued, constituted the most basic measure of mental health and 
illness.76 Sanity could thus only be defined as a function of the devel-
opment of a more general, sometimes national, spirit. Political revo-
lutions were comparable to the ‘blind anger of a maniac during the 
most terrible attack’, a ‘universal and contagious exaltation of every 
human passion’ to the level of ‘national mania’.77 At the same time, Itard 
assumed that a diagnosis of mental illness was closely linked to the 
ensemble of ‘national customs’.78 Cabanis and Itard shared a perspective 
on the historicity of nations and of individuals that diverged from the 
universal narratives of progressive enlightenment.79 In their view, the 
prerequisite for a morally and physically sound relationship between 
the individual and their more or less extensive community was the 
synchronous development of their mental progress.80
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Esquirol and the insane
Itard’s friend Jean-Étienne Esquirol (1772–1840), who also was a 
student of Pinel, published his influential medical dissertation on the 
human passions in 1805. Esquirol was one of the first physicians in 
France to reflect systematically on how the passions might be used to 
cure the insane.81 In addition, he introduced the concept of ‘moral 
shock’ (‘sécousse morale’) to this framework and added to the history 
of medicine several striking case studies of moral shock at work.82 
Esquirol believed that the Revolution, and especially the Terror, had 
produced devastating effects on the mental, emotional, and physical 
state of the French people:
The political shocks, by bringing all the passions into play, by stimulating 
artificial passions, by overemphasising violent passions, by multiplying 
the needs of certain individuals, by depriving the others of the fortune 
which had become necessary for their habits, the political upheavals 
have increased the number of the insane. It is what was observed after 
the revolution in England, it is what has been observed in France since 
our revolutionary turmoil.83
Throughout his dissertation, Esquirol generally criticises the effects of 
every sort of disturbance, such as the increasing levels of noise pro-
duced within European cities; but at the same time, he believes that 
the calculated interventions of medical experts in the form of moral 
shocks may have salutary effects. In many cases, these interventions 
are arranged analogically to theatrical plays, in order to convey to the 
insane an understanding of their illness and escort them back to their 
rational selves. Esquirol uses every means of dissimulation and disguise 
to induce the necessary moral shock and to break the delusions of 
insanity:
We have never pretended we could cure [the insane] by arguing with 
them. This pretension would be contradicted by daily experience. Do 
the passions give way to reasoning? […] [T]o treat them with dialectical 
formulas and syllogisms would be to misunderstand the course of the 
passions and the clinical history of insanity.
Esquirol argues that it is ‘only by giving a moral shock, by placing the 
insane in a state opposite and contrary to that in which they were 
before’ that they can be cured.84
44 Constructing the modern self
In 1816, Esquirol drew on his intellectual and medical forebears – 
the physicians Cabanis, Moreau de la Sarthe, and Pinel – in order to 
strengthen his hypothesis that insanity was caused by an imaginary 
passion, which, by means of moral shock, could be substituted with 
a real passion.85 To achieve this, the physician first had to master the 
art of reading the signs of physical and moral disorders (physiogno-
mic signs, for example, but also specific kinds of fever etc.) in order 
to contrive a specific and individual form of intervention. This would 
result in breaking the ‘veil’ that separated the interior world of a ‘vicious 
chain of ideas’ from the outer world.86 While individually tailored 
moral shock could be a legitimate means when carefully controlled by 
a medical expert, Esquirol considered abrupt changes of habits, ‘danger-
ous innovations’, and the loss of ancient forms, especially among the 
lower classes, to be particularly dangerous.87 Republican and demo-
cratic regimes, in particular, encouraged insanity, according to Esquirol, 
who, in this particular text of 1816, criticised the whole course of the 
Revolution.88
In summary, in the texts describing the medical interventions of 
Itard and Esquirol, two types of shock can be distinguished: a political 
shock, which is harmful, and a therapeutic shock induced by a medical 
expert, which can be helpful. In the texts of both doctors, the invention 
of a certain relationship between experts of the mind (psychiatrists, 
physicians, educators) and objects of this expertise can be retraced. 
This relationship was characterised by the reification of the objects of 
medical intervention and the attempt to confine the use of the passions 
to controlled spaces, while the more general and public zones of action 
were to be kept free of the excessive shocks linked especially to the 
Terror. An article by Michel Gourevitch tells of a case that illustrates 
this dissipation, in the new expert regime, of the Enlightenment’s con-
viction that every human being is a rational decision-maker with regard 
to her or his own mind. In 1812, Gourevitch notes, a dispute between 
the administrator and the physician of the asylum for the insane at 
Charenton was brought before the police commissioner. The two men 
disagreed on the question of whether only the physician or also the 
administrator had a right to make decisions on curing insanity. The 
police commissioner decided in favour of the physician and thus, as 
Gourevitch argues, in favour of the consequential growth of ‘medical 
power’.89
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Conclusion: modern subjectivity and moral shock
By using moral shocks physicians such as Itard and Esquirol adopted a 
perspective on the relationship between the individual and society that 
entailed specific assessment of the individual’s capacity for freedom and 
the right of social and scientific elites to exert control over individuals. 
This type of scientific and therapeutic activity was marked by constant 
reflection on the regime of the Terror. In 1789, Pinel had put his trust 
in the justice of the heated passions of the people, which had shaken off 
a ‘long lethargy’ through an eruption of the human spirit, and ‘could no 
longer be oppressed’.90 But the Terror had shown human scientists that 
the moulding of a republican people was not as easy a task as they had 
hoped. The people were understood to have proven themselves deceiv-
able and seducible, and their passions had been easily manipulated by 
the leaders of the Terror.
Itard and Esquirol are only two examples of an array of administra-
tors, physicians, and educators (such as Gérando, Pinel, and Cabanis) 
who were active in discussions about the human and social sciences 
around 1800, who, especially after the downfall of the universalist hope 
for a unified science de l’homme, helped to develop new medical and 
scientific spaces for controlling and adjusting the passions. They mis-
trusted the naturalistic narrative espoused by figures such as Lezay-
Marnésia and Petit, who tried to include the Terror in a civilising story 
of progress. Instead, they advocated an elitist regime that would harmo-
nise the violent passions of the people. For this reason, institutions like 
the asylum and the school – and, as Michel Foucault has shown, the 
prison – became important centres comparable to laboratories, where 
experiments on the control and analysis of the passions could be carried 
out.91 Within these spaces, a system of control was established that 
might be labelled an ‘elitist regime’, as it was based on the figure of the 
expert who controlled different aspects of the people’s behaviour. This 
elitist approach held that the people may have a rational and, to some 
degree, free will, but in cases of deviance, an administrative or scientific 
expertise is needed to explain, control, and limit the discrepancies.
There are, of course, other anthropological reactions to the chal-
lenges of the restructuring of French society, such as clearly mystical or 
religious answers, that, like the ones presented in this chapter, took up 
the modern challenge to define human beings as part of nature and at 
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the same time to formulate normative (ethical and political) claims. 
This chapter has pointed out that the kind of subjectivity espoused by 
the human sciences around 1800 explicitly reacted to the experiences 
of the French Revolution and the anxiety that the people might again 
fall prey to an instrumentalisation of their easily heated passions. The 
advocates of Napoleon’s coup d’état of 1799 therefore rejected the uni-
versalist hope for a complete regeneration of ‘the people’ and ‘the mind’ 
and instead tried to install spaces of control within which subjects 
might exercise their rights freely as long as they did not conflict with 
basic governmental interests. These spaces made possible a transformed 
concept of difference: at a governmental level, a single, homogeneous 
layer of education, wealth, or power was no longer necessary; there 
could be differences everywhere, as long as they were kept within a 
certain tolerance range. Within these zones of action, attempts were 
undertaken to establish regimes of contemporaneity. The idea of the 
civilising mission, so important for the eighteenth century, was thus 
transformed and used to establish a general scheme of administration.
Another expert, who has been the focus of this chapter, was the 
medical expert. As pointed out, medical experts like Pinel, Itard, or 
Esquirol built on a discourse about the effects of the shock of the Revo-
lution to formulate a new version of medical intervention. Esquirol 
thereby distinguished the political and harmful shock from the medi-
cally controlled and curative shock. The kind of modern subjectivity 
informing this stance towards shock rested upon the figure of the vul-
nerable and unstable subject on the one hand and the medical, admin-
strative, and political expert systems taking care of mitigating the impact 
of unstable political and social constellations on the other. Thus, this 
version of the modern subject was basically semi-autonomous, being 
unobstructed as long as kept within a tolerance range, and becoming 
the object of expert systems of control when transgressing the bounda-
ries of situatively defined norms of the tolerable. As Herrnstadt has 
shown at length, the establishment of the Napoleonic version of author-
itarian administration was based on a comparable concept of semi-
autonomous units, which was itself based on a transformed version of 
sensualism.92 We thus find the same kind of shift – from transparency 
predicated upon a universal scheme towards opacity predicated upon a 
semi-particularised scheme – at the level of the individual, as well. On 
this individual level, the education of the passions within controlled 
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spaces was supposed to form the basis for a general harmonisation and 
pacification. There emerged in this regard a new type of experimental 
object within the traditional field of the ‘analysis of ideas’, a specifically 
human being, with an opaque inner zone called the Moi, which enabled 
the renewed application, now in the context of ‘moral treatment’, of 
an old approach to curing physical diseases through shock. We can 
therefore distinguish two kinds of shock: a universal and revolutionary 
shock, which is uncontrolled and therefore extremely harmful, and a 
local shock used to heal the mind or to find out something about the 
interdependence of the physical and the moral. The kind of subject 
proffered by the human sciences was marked by an authoritarian rela-
tion between experts and the human beings whom they viewed as 
objects of research, who were at once potentially dangerous and in 
need of care. This combination of anxiety and care enabled the emer-
gence of two approaches to the problem of control: welfare and the 
human sciences. And this modern subject, conceived on the basis 
of mistrust, accordingly reappears as an object of research and as an 
administrative unit.
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Medical negligence in  
nineteenth-century Germany
Torsten Riotte
In 1933, the German lawyer Friedrich Franz König published an essay 
on medical negligence.1 He pointed out that the number of negligence 
cases in Germany had risen to unprecedented heights in recent times. 
The years 1927–29 had seen an increase of close to 50% of negligence 
cases, as the insurance statistics demonstrated. König suggested that 
such a rise was due to the global economic crisis that had hit Germany 
hard.2 As a second argument for this growth, König referred to the 
doctor–patient relationship. He saw patients as increasingly estranged 
from their doctors and lacking confidence in the representatives of the 
medical profession.3 Finally, König claimed that the popularisation of 
medical sciences had made patients less reluctant to sue doctors. He 
wrote: ‘The traditional belief in the authority of doctors has vanished.’ 4 
Although such arguments seem plausible, it remains to be discussed 
whether (and to what extent) broader social trends had an impact on 
the figures of negligence cases.5 The democratisation of scientific know-
ledge, and the availability of data and information, as well as the rise in 
popularity of so-called alternative medicines and hence the contesta-
tion of general medical practice, all seem to have encouraged patients 
to sue doctors more readily for negligence.6
This chapter discusses medical jurisdiction in Germany as a case 
study to explain how professional accountability changed during the 
nineteenth century. It examines the transformation that occurred in 
medical jurisdiction, in order to discuss how doctors were held 
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responsible for professional malpractice and how legal procedures 
changed. The transformation of medical jurisdiction is understood as 
the result of changing patterns of accountability in more general terms. 
The French sociologist François Ewald sees a shift in accountability in 
the workplace, from the idea of individual liability to the collectivisa-
tion of personal risk, as an indicator of modern European society. While 
an individual would traditionally be accountable for his or her perfor-
mance at work and possible injury or damage in the workplace, the 
complexity of labour in an industrialised society created a new idea of 
accountability that Ewald links to the emergence of the term ‘accident’.7 
In the course of the nineteenth century, most employers learnt to accept 
that work, particularly in the new industrial workplaces, had become 
too complex generally for workers to avoid making mistakes.8 By the 
end of this development, the strict liability of the employer became a 
common feature for occupations in European nation states – hence 
Ewald’s argument that such a transition from individual accountability 
to social insurance should be understood as the beginning or the origin 
of modernity.9
In practical terms, the emergence of the concept of the ‘accident’ 
meant that employers and employees no longer faced legal persecution 
in cases of professional misconduct. This is why Ewald’s interpretation 
is closely linked to the emergence of the welfare state in Europe. From 
the late nineteenth century, most accidents in the workplace were 
covered by insurance policies, with a rising number of states introduc-
ing compulsory insurance systems for employees.10 To explain such a 
transition, historiography has emphasised the evolving relationship 
between risk, responsibility, and statehood. Julia Moses writes in her 
comparative study of social states in Europe: ‘to contemporaries in the 
late nineteenth century, accidents had seemed a shadowside of indus-
trial modernity that would require a thoroughly modern solution: 
national social policy managed by a modern bureaucracy.’ 11
Although the state as the manager of ‘risks’ 12 became a key player 
in modern industries, such interpretation appears to be more difficult 
to translate into the medical profession. The introduction of the term 
‘medical negligence’ around 1800 can be seen as indicative of a rene-
gotiation of doctors’ accountability. Due to the increasing complexity 
and sophistication of medical therapies, it became increasingly unlikely 
that a single medical authority could provide reliable, consistent, and 
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long-lasting guidelines for medical jurisdiction. Negotiating the legal 
frameworks included arbitrating professional, scientific, and legal poli-
tics. The question arose as to whether the state would need to act as leg-
islator or institutional innovator to master the challenges of medicine 
and modernity. A substantial number of doctors in Germany argued in 
favour of medical disciplinary courts, but it took until the last third of 
the century before so-called courts of honour were introduced. Until 
this period, doctors, politicians, and the public discussed whether 
medical negligence should be treated as a civil or criminal offence.
The chapter also addresses institutional responses to the challenges 
of modernity. The late Napoleonic and Restoration periods saw the 
birth of medical commissions in most German states. Such medical 
advisory boards were intended to ensure the quality of medical training. 
They also advised the ministries in the German states in cases of medical 
negligence.13 Exploring the archival material produced by the medical 
commission in Hanover, the chapter explores different cases of negli-
gence. While the need for expertise in cases of medical negligence had 
been identified by the authorities at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, legal reform was delayed until the last third of it.
Finally, the chapter points to an additional element that constituted 
the transformation of liability in the workplace. In accordance with the 
so-called risk historiography, it is argued that collectivising professional 
accountability not only meant the rise of the state as the manager of 
‘risks’ but also, and arguably more importantly, the commodification of 
the latter.14 The invention of liability insurance for doctors in the 1880s 
will be used as a point in case. While the traditional idea of individual 
accountability prevailed in modern medicine, the opportunities to 
tackle the economic consequences of professional liability changed 
fundamentally.
The first popular court case and the discourse on medical 
negligence from 1800
Until around 1800, the German term used for medical misconduct was 
Unkunst, a word that went back to the criminal code established by the 
German emperor Charles V in 1532, known under its Latin name of 
Constitutio Criminalis Carolina.15 The Carolina sanctioned the suing of 
a doctor for compensation in cases of serious professional misconduct. 
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It distinguished between cases where doctors were accused of failing to 
meet professional medical standards (Unkunst) and those where 
patients suffered due to carelessness or neglect (Unfleiss).16 The Caro-
lina listed a number of prerequisites necessary to sue a doctor. It laid 
down that medical experts should advise the judge in his decision, and 
also regulated the amounts of compensation for different forms of 
misconduct.17
With regard to German medicine, a new word entered the medical, 
legal, and political discourse around 1800. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, medical professional misconduct began to be referred to as 
Kunstfehler, which translates as ‘medical negligence’. The first mention 
in a German encyclopedia dates to 1797, but it was the first prominent 
court case a few years later that sparked wider public discussion.18 In 
December 1811, Ernst Horn, a Professor at the Berlin Charité hospital 
was sued over the death of one of his patients. The twenty-one-year-old 
Louise Thiele had been hospitalised in August 1811 and diagnosed with 
hysteria. The doctor recommended the full variety of applications com-
monly prescribed at the time. Cold water baths were applied with doses 
of a hundred buckets of cold water. The patient was put in a rotating 
bed, an apparatus inspired by the English swing machine, restrained 
and rotated with a cadence of 120 times per minute.19 After an addi-
tional number of other treatments that all failed to calm her, Thiele was 
finally put in a restraining jacket, covered in two woollen sacks and left 
to herself. Unattended for a couple of hours, she died of a heart attack 
on 1 September 1811.20
Heinrich Kohlrausch, one of Horn’s colleagues at the hospital, filed 
a complaint against the doctor to the Prussian Ministry of Justice, 
blaming him for professional misconduct and cruelty.21 Kohlrausch and 
Horn had been at odds over several other professional and also personal 
issues beforehand. It was well known that the two did not show any 
sympathy towards each other.22 The Prussian Ministry of Justice con-
sidered whether Kohlrausch’s complaint should be moved to a criminal 
court. Johann Christian Reil, one of the experts who acted as medical 
consultant to the ministry, argued against a prosecution. In a private 
letter to a colleague, Reil criticised Kohlrausch as stupid, mean, and 
devious.23 By some mysterious route, Reil’s private correspondence 
found its way into the hands of Kohlrausch who forwarded it to the 
ministry.24 The Prussian Ministry of Justice finally decided that the case 
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should be moved to court. Further evidence was collected, experts 
consulted, and witnesses heard. In November 1812, Horn was acquitted 
and found not guilty. Kohlrausch left the Charité the following year.25
The conflict between Horn and Kohlrausch counts as the first 
modern court case of medical negligence, not least due to the promi-
nence it gathered in the public reaction. To a certain extent, it appears 
to be a personal feud between colleagues. The medical historian Moritz 
Kalisch, who published a number of documents on the case in 1860, 
argued in favour of a conspiracy against Horn.26 However, this was only 
part of the story. The political authorities had felt the necessity to 
respond to Kohlrausch’s accusations because they had caused public 
interest.27 In this context, it is important to consider that an earlier 
complaint by a relative of Louise Thiele had been turned down by the 
ministry.28 As the trial gained more prominence, the Prussian authori-
ties acted out of necessity.29 Independent of Kohlrausch’s motivation 
and the outcome of the trial, the Thiele case also caused a public debate 
about medical negligence.30 The following decades saw a substantial 
number of publications on the topic. While there were more theoretical 
tracts about doctors’ accountability until approximately the 1850s, case 
studies in medical negligence increasingly appeared during the second 
half of the century.31
The expanding nature of medical knowledge and its impact on 
medical therapy was perceived as a fundamental problem in defining 
doctors’ accountability in fixed legal terms. As the German pathologist 
Rudolph Virchow argued, what was regarded as established medical 
therapy at one time could become serious professional misconduct at 
another.32 How should the law respond? Contemporary medical authors 
did not grow tired of pointing out that the rising body of medical 
research showed many examples of groundbreaking innovations that 
challenged traditional assumptions about medical care.33 Virchow 
wrote that there was no authority in science that could lay down once 
and for all what should be allowed in medical care and what should be 
banned.34 With regard to medical jurisdiction, he argued against medical 
negligence as a criminal offence and in favour of civil legislation that 
would refer to the leading medical authorities for advice in such cases.35
The core of Virchow’s argument advances a generally optimistic 
outlook on the benefits of medical research and the expansion of scien-
tific knowledge.36 He argued that ‘there are certain types of surgery that 
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nowadays save the lives of thousands of people that used to be seen as 
daring and foolhardy in the past’.37 In the context of the more general 
question of state interference in cases of professional accountability, 
two aspects seem worth elaborating upon. Firstly, a codification of good 
medical practice seemed restrictive with regard to innovation in medical 
sciences. As a general principle, scientific research needed to transgress 
boundaries in order to innovate. Hence, doctors depended on the 
liberty to experiment beyond established practices.38 In its most extreme 
form, such an understanding of medical science as innovation included 
human experimentation.39 One of the most notorious cases of medical 
jurisdiction in Germany involved the German doctor Albert Neisser, 
who injected nine female patients with blood serum from syphilis 
patients in 1892. Four patients developed syphilis. After a delay of 
several years, the Neisser case sparked a debate about the legality of 
human experimentation. As a result, the Prussian Ministry for Reli-
gious, Educational, and Medical Affairs passed instructions to the heads 
of clinics and hospitals laying down a list of regulations for such experi-
ments.40 Although historiography has justly claimed that the doctor–
patient relationship during this period was characterised by the 
disregard of medical researchers for the safety and consent of their 
patients,41 the publicity of the Neisser case demonstrates that negli-
gence cases could provide a patient (or more generally, the public) with 
the means to challenge doctors’ authority.
Secondly, and despite such notorious cases as the syphilis experi-
ment, doctors claimed enormous successes in treating patients, particu-
larly during the last decades of the nineteenth century. While, in the 
example of the German federal state Baden, only three out of ten babies 
survived a birth by Caesarean section in the period from 1865 to 1874, 
these figures rose to almost nine out of ten in the 1890s (with the total 
number of Caesareans increasing substantially).42 To be hospitalised 
would have posed a serious risk to health in the 1850s and 1860s, but 
this was clearly not the case by the 1890s.43 This breakthrough in hos-
pital surgery can be dated to the last third of the nineteenth century, 
when asepsis and antisepsis helped to fight gangrene, which had been 
a contributing factor to high mortality rates after operations. Claudia 
Huerkamp argues that due to more reliable practices in several fields of 
medicine, doctors were no longer challenged as the most reliable 
experts in treating illnesses from the 1850s onwards. Medical pluralism 
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progressively disappeared and the expert status of doctors became 
increasingly uncontested.44
In the light of such successes, the inability to cure a patient began to 
appear as a failure of the individual doctor, rather than being attributed 
to the incapability of wider medical practice. This meant that increasing 
success in medical and surgical procedures at large correlated with a rise 
in the number of negligence cases brought against individual doctors.45 
Doctors, and the medical associations of which they were members, 
had to defend their professional status and they worried that individual 
failure would damage the reputation of the wider medical profession.46 
Patients increasingly expected to be fully and swiftly cured by a doctor, 
and, as patient or client, demanded successful and reliable treatment. 
In Germany, patients showed more readiness to sue if doctors failed 
to help.47 Finally, an increase in competition within the health sector 
(particularly since the 1880s) made it necessary for doctors to appear 
superior to lay healers and other medical personnel.48 As medical his-
toriography has emphasised, growing success made the profession not 
less but more controversial – at least on the level of individual account-
ability.49 In this sense, the doctor–state relationship proved ambivalent. 
While the medical profession relied on state protection to establish 
university-trained doctors as the dominant and indisputable authority 
in the health sector, its growing self-confidence based on more suc-
cessful treatment led to a cry for institutional reform and professional 
autonomy.
Responsibility in transition: an institutional perspective
During the second half of the nineteenth century, state-of-the-art labo-
ratory sciences and the latest medical innovations were only reluctantly 
introduced into medical practice on a broader scale. Although the 
leading authorities could point to great successes within the profession, 
doctors with limited financial resources or without access to modern 
medical training centres had difficulties in keeping up with the latest 
research or in applying such breakthrough innovations to medical prac-
tice.50 Therefore, the image of the doctor during the second half of the 
nineteenth century was characterised by a certain ambiguity. What 
qualification, training, and performance could be expected from the 
‘average’ doctor? German medical discourse referred to the idea of a 
Medical negligence 63
generally accepted and commonly agreed upon medical expertise as a 
standard for doctors and as a benchmark for cases of medical negli-
gence.51 But who was to judge?
Since the sixteenth century, early modern German legislation offered 
the means to sue doctors in civil and criminal court cases. German 
doctors could be liable for criminal offences if a patient under their care 
died. They could also be sued for compensation in civil court cases for 
injuries or neglect. However, no specific law on medical liability existed. 
Instead, doctors were charged with manslaughter or bodily harm with 
some qualifying remarks on professions with close contact to clients or 
patients.52 For a substantial time during the nineteenth century, German 
doctors argued against the practice of treating negligence as a ‘common’ 
crime, and hoped to establish professional courts that would treat neg-
ligence as a disciplinary offence.53
German doctors had been state-controlled and legislated since the 
early modern period (and with increasing intensity since the second 
half of the eighteenth century). Whether or not doctors were allowed 
to settle and practice at a specific place depended on an official licence 
issued by the so-called medical police.54 In addition, until the trade 
ordinances of 1869, doctors were legally bound to provide professional 
help to patients within their assigned district and could be forced to take 
on public functions.55 As the historian Andreas Holger Maehle writes: 
‘Since the early nineteenth century German doctors had virtually been 
treated as civil servants. Governments could discipline them with rep-
rimands and fines, or even withdraw their license if they showed a lack 
of professional competence and reliability’.56 The medical police were 
part of the ministry of the interior, which generally acted on a regional 
level; its members are best understood as representatives of the local 
or regional bureaucracy. They dealt with complaints about individual 
doctors, but only occasionally compiled statistical data. In essence, they 
represented a tool of state bureaucracy and administration – though 
with an exclusively regional outlook.
Due to an increasing demand for professional medical expertise, the 
majority of German federal states set up advisory boards, or commis-
sions, to the (often reorganised) ministries of the interior in the first 
two decades of the nineteenth century.57 In the case of the Kingdom of 
Hanover (which will be used as a case study in this chapter), the com-
mission consisted of two directors, three permanent members, and 
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three extraordinary members, as well as two members of the pharma-
ceutical profession.58 These were all university-trained doctors (some-
times pharmacists), whose expertise was more medical than legal. The 
commission supervised medical training standards (including medical 
exams), and its members acted as consultants to the government 
(including the medical police) for complaints against doctors. It was 
the introduction of the medical commissions that coincided with the 
‘invention’ of the term ‘negligence’ in the first third of the nineteenth 
century. Their introduction points to a new awareness on the part of 
German governments of the increasing complexity of modern medi-
cine, but also to an increasing self-confidence in the medical profession: 
doctors could not be judged by a legal expert alone.59 In more general 
terms, the medical commissions appear as an institutional equivalent 
to the invention of the term ‘negligence’ and coincided with the rene-
gotiation of the state–doctor relationship.
Although the available data overwhelmingly concerns local or 
regional incidents and lacks the quantity of twentieth-century statistical 
data, a survey of the cases dealt with by the commission in Hanover 
gives an indication of how medical jurisdiction and doctors’ account-
ability were debated in the period before 1900.60 A large number of files 
deal with disciplinary aspects that had little to do with medical exper-
tise. Doctors were reprimanded for drunkenness or other forms of mis-
behaviour in public.61 In the period between 1848 and 1850, an 
additional motive for disciplinary action can be identified. The 1848 
European revolutions are generally understood as a turning point in 
doctors’ political engagement. The historian Tobias Weidner argues 
that medicine became an ‘un-political’ profession in the aftermath of 
the revolutions.62 In accordance with such an interpretation, several 
incidents can be identified where doctors were disciplined due to politi-
cal engagement. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, politi-
cal offences referred more often to socialist doctors than to their liberal 
colleagues. Medical jurisdiction looked beyond professional practice 
and towards the doctor as a public person.63
Conflicts between individual doctors can equally be found in the files 
of the medical commission. Senior doctors regularly complained about 
the government’s licensing of their younger colleagues.64 The medical 
profession as a whole experienced increasing competition in the course 
of the century.65 When applying for a licence from the medical police, 
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doctors would refer to their qualification, but also to their knowledge 
of the region to which they applied. Often, doctors who had just quali-
fied would apply for a licence in their home town or somewhere close 
by.66 Such arguments of familiarity became increasingly obsolete after 
the medical commissions started advising on the granting of licences. 
However, personal networks still mattered enormously for a doctor’s 
career.
Early modern medicine had encompassed different types of medical 
practitioners with distinct forms of training and social function.67 Phy-
sicians with university training competed with surgeons who conducted 
a smaller range of medical practices. Such distinctions continued into 
the nineteenth century and did not disappear until the early twentieth 
century. In a number of complaints to the medical commission of 
Hanover, university-trained doctors accused surgeons of carrying out 
practices for which they were not qualified.68
Although a substantial number of cases point towards the interpreta-
tion of medical courts as watchdogs for professional honour and 
habitus, about half of the cases in Hanover refer to medical negligence. 
A husband sued a doctor over the death of his wife after she died giving 
birth.69 An employer sued another doctor for an incorrect certificate for 
one of his employees.70 Although the figures are in no way representa-
tive, the Hanoverian cases allow for the conclusion that there was 
indeed some interest in the performance of doctors, which could lead 
to accusations by private persons. In some instances, however, it was 
the government that interfered. This could be the case when a law had 
been broken. In 1850, for example, a surgeon was accused of performing 
an abortion, which was illegal (and continued to be so throughout the 
century).71 The medical commission gathered six volumes of files for its 
statement on the case to the ministry.72
Despite such activity, the medical authority was lacking the legal 
means to discipline doctors in the majority of cases. This is best illus-
trated by a case study.73 In the Prussian town of Pollitz, a thirty-four-
year-old pregnant woman had gone into labour in May 1854. It turned 
out to be a breech birth and she was unable to deliver the baby’s head. 
A surgeon was called and after some unsuccessful efforts to assist in 
delivering the baby, he pulled at the baby’s legs so hard that he tore the 
baby’s head from its body. The head was retained within the woman’s 
body. Instead of completing the surgery, the surgeon gave the mother 
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a laxative and left her with the assurance that the continuing contrac-
tions would expel the head. It was only due to a physician being called 
that the life of the mother was saved. Shortly after this incident, the 
surgeon moved from Prussia to Hanover, which explains why the case 
received special attention. In response to a Prussian enquiry, the local 
authorities in Hanover consulted the federal state’s general medical 
commission. In its report, the commission suggested that the surgeon 
should receive a formal warning for failing to use the forceps correctly. 
No other disciplinary measures were advised.74 The Prussian authorities 
thought such a decision too lax, and applied for a second opinion, invit-
ing their own (regional) medical commission to supply a statement.75 
In accordance with their ministry, the Prussian medical commission 
argued that the surgeon’s licence should be withdrawn. As their report 
stated, the surgeon had not only shown insufficient skill, but far more 
importantly, his behaviour showed disregard for the scientific standards 
of gynaecological care.
The commission particularly criticised the fact that the surgeon had 
shifted some of the blame on to the attending midwife. In his defending 
statement, the surgeon argued that the latter had already damaged the 
spine of the unborn baby before he arrived. However, the Prussian 
commission wrote that there existed no possibility for any doctor 
(surgeon or physician) to delegate responsibility (and hence account-
ability) to some other (subordinate) person.76 The surgeon was respon-
sible for the accident. If the midwife had caused damage to the spine, 
the doctor should have shown even greater attention in treating baby 
and mother. The surgeon was also criticised for leaving his patient unat-
tended for more than eighteen hours. The surgeon’s fatigue and exhaus-
tion (a point he had referred to in his defence) would not suffice as an 
excuse for the failure in treatment. Instead, the commission argued that 
the surgeon’s behaviour should be regarded as serious professional mis-
conduct and be punished accordingly.
In response to the second statement, the Prussian ministry banned 
the surgeon from practising in Prussia.77 Despite Prussian protest, 
he was allowed to continue working as a surgeon in Hanover. With 
regard to medical jurisdiction, a closer look thus seems necessary. The 
Prussian ministry disallowed the licensing of the surgeon in Prussia. 
Should he ever want to return to his former workplace, no Prussian 
ministry would grant a licence. The Hanoverian commission discussed 
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the jurisdictional options open to its own authorities.78 Although the 
baby had died, the mother survived. As a request by the ministry to a 
Hanoverian court confirmed, such a case would not count as a criminal 
offence. There was no reason for a police investigation, either. Hence, 
according to the existing legislation, a withdrawal of the granted licence 
was not justified. The surgeon was not under the government’s direct 
disciplinary jurisdiction. Only surgeons (or physicians) in public offices 
would fall under government disciplinary control.79 The medical com-
mission, on the other hand, did not possess the authority to punish 
the surgeon. Instead, a formal warning was the maximum penalty it 
could issue.80
As to medical negligence, the case demonstrates the intensity with 
which the state – in collaboration with the medical experts of the 
medical commissions – discussed medical legislation and the limits of 
possible disciplinary action. In another case, in which a doctor refused to 
look after a patient, the commission stated that the licence could not be 
withdrawn. Again, no criminal offence existed that would legitimate the 
withdrawal of the licence. Instead, the medical commission suggested 
that the government should issue additional licences to doctors within 
the district: an increase in competition as a form of punishment.81 In 
a further case, a doctor had lost his licence because he had spent time 
in a penitentiary. The medical commission raised some doubts as to 
whether the medical police’s withdrawal of the licence on such grounds 
(which had nothing to do with medical practice) was lawful.82 The 
medical commission’s reports confirm that the Hanoverian government 
debated the shortcomings of existing medical jurisdiction.
To clarify: it is not sufficient to describe the process of medico-legal 
reform as the rise of state control. Instead, a more complex transition 
occurred in which the state and medical profession collaborated and 
negotiated optional changes. It was the lack of coercive means that 
caused disciplinary professional courts to be introduced in the German 
states from 1864 onwards. In order to fully understand the difficulties 
in establishing these courts, we must consider Germany’s federal tradi-
tion. German doctors became part of a national organisation (Deutscher 
Ärztevereinsbund) in the early 1870s.83 Legislation concerning doctors, 
however, was not negotiated on a national level. Neither the German 
Confederation (post-1815) nor the German Empire (post-1871) passed 
national laws on medical jurisdiction.84 Instead, the (at times more than 
68 Constructing the modern self
thirty) federal states oversaw medical societies, medical boards, and 
professional courts individually.85 The early medical societies founded 
in the German federal states of Baden, Brunswick, and Saxony in the 
1860s, for example, included disciplinary bodies with the right to issue 
fines.86 In Prussia, negligence was treated as a civil or criminal offence 
until the end of the nineteenth century. It was not until 1899 that 
the Prussian government introduced medical courts of honour.87 In 
Bavaria, medical chambers with some disciplinary control were estab-
lished in 1871, but professional courts were not introduced until 1927.88 
In institutional terms, German medical jurisdiction remained diverse 
and heterogeneous.
The introduction of medical courts of honour led to a more system-
atic approach to medical negligence. From 1903, the Prussian medical 
authorities compiled statistical data on court cases. The historian 
Andreas-Holger Maehle has examined the files for the period between 
1903 and 1921.89 His results for doctors in Prussia are revealing with 
regard to the specific character of the medical courts of honour. In the 
majority of cases, and this represents a central argument in Maehle’s 
analysis, it was not the patient who sued the doctor. Instead, the largest 
number of trials involved conflicts within the profession itself, brought 
against individuals by their colleagues and peers.90 With regard to the 
registered offences, medical negligence proved the exception. Most 
complaints (in Maehle’s case study of the medical court of honour for 
Brandenburg and Berlin between 1903 and 1920) concerned issues like 
advertising, financial misconduct, slander or libel, and sexual offences.91 
Unfair competition or lack of collegiality could also be found amongst 
the reasons for disciplinary punishment.92 A much smaller number of 
accusations referred to issues that would nowadays be considered 
medical negligence. False certifying, negligent certifying, and maltreat-
ment do not rank high in the court’s statistics.93 Hence, the main argu-
ment in Maehle’s publication is that medical courts of honour were 
introduced to discipline doctors and to ensure the coherence of the 
medical profession, rather than to improve patient safety.94
By 1900, the overwhelming majority of cases of medical miscon-
duct would be treated by a professional disciplinary court. Criminal 
court cases proved the exception. Instead, national organisation and 
professional institutionalisation of doctors had increased throughout 
the century. Medical courts of honour existed exclusively on the level 
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of federal jurisdiction with differences between the federal German 
states. Honour and habitus appear as the key to understanding medical 
courts in Germany. With regard to the time-gap that existed between 
the early court cases of medical negligence and the introduction of the 
professional courts, it appears noteworthy that medical commissions 
had already provided scientific medical advice since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. However, they did so without any disciplinary 
authority. Questions of medical misconduct were more prominent in 
the commissions’ cases than in Maehle’s case study. More importantly, 
the period from 1810 to 1900 showed representatives of the state (in 
our case study from Hanover) pointing towards the limits of medical 
jurisdiction. The intensifying debate about the shortcomings of the 
existing legislation and the introduction of disciplinary courts are an 
indicator of such change. However, the result of such involvement led 
to professional courts with a high degree of autonomy. The overwhelm-
ing majority of cases of medical negligence would not be considered 
by a legally trained judge but by representatives of the profession itself. 
Professional autonomy went so far that the legal historian Peter Collin 
has described medical courts of honour as resulting in multinormativity 
in a mononormative legal order.95 With regard to the question of profes-
sional accountability and modernity, medical experts did not argue in 
favour of a no-fault compensation scheme. Instead, they insisted on sole 
responsibility based on expertise. They themselves were to judge their 
colleagues in the profession. But who was to pay for fines and penalties?
Commodifying risk: a German case study in  
international perspective
As the example of medical negligence in nineteenth-century Germany 
has amply demonstrated, the social and legal status of the expert is best 
understood as the result of a process of negotiation – a process that can 
hardly be regarded as uniform, and knows several stages and multiple 
agents. Negotiating accountability could be an international enterprise. 
German efforts to establish disciplinary courts were inspired by similar 
institutions in Britain. The foundation of the General Medical Council 
in 1858 introduced mechanisms for disciplining practitioners for mis-
conduct and negligence.96 With regard to the difficulties in translating 
leading scientific research into medical practice, German authors also 
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referred to their British colleagues. The British medical directory of 
1881 had laid down that in considering medical conduct a doctor was 
not expected ‘to use the highest possible degree of skill’ when treating 
a patient.97 Instead, he was expected ‘to bring a fair, reasonable, and 
competent degree of skill’.98 The majority of medical authors in Germany 
agreed with the British approach and stipulated in accordance that each 
case of medical negligence required due consideration of individual 
circumstances such as the availability of equipment.99
There were also substantial differences in medical legislation between 
European nation states. German doctors longed for state recognition to 
a much larger degree than their British colleagues, emphasising doctors’ 
special status in comparison to other professions.100 The most peculiar 
differences can be noted between German and Austrian legislation. The 
Austrian criminal code of 1852 stated that doctors who had caused 
‘severe bodily harm’ to a patient under their care were banned from 
practising only until passing an additional exam to justify the renewal 
of their medical licence. As very few doctors failed such a test, legal 
historiography treats this section of the criminal code under the heading 
of ‘doctors’ privilege’ (Ärzteprivileg).101 Unlike their German colleagues, 
Austrian doctors did not face legal prosecution in cases of negligence.
This difference in legislation reminds us that questions of account-
ability were a matter of negotiation between state authorities and pro-
fessional representatives. From the perspective of medical jurisdiction 
in Germany, the individual accountability of doctors remained of great 
importance. The court cases explicitly stress doctors’ responsibility for 
the content and performance of medical therapy. The concept of the 
employer’s (or in the case of German doctors, the state’s) strict liability 
(Gefährdungshaftung) was never introduced into the medical profes-
sion.102 The idea of reduced accountability due to a special privilege, as 
in the Austrian case, did not come up. The prominence of personal 
honour in medical jurisdiction reinforced the idea of individual account-
ability with all its consequences. Few doubts appear to have existed in 
the public mind that German doctors remained legally accountable for 
the results of their treatment.103 Instead, such responsibility, the sophis-
tication of medical knowledge (i.e. expertise) and the complexity of 
medical therapy were used to legitimise status and privilege.
There exists, however, an important reservation to the idea of full 
individual accountability. As a closer look at the private insurance 
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sector demonstrates, professionals, including doctors, could rely on 
private liability insurances minimalising the practical consequences 
of individual accountability from around 1880 onwards. The German 
government passed a law on liability (Reichshaftpflichtgesetz) in 1871 
that laid down under what conditions compensation had to be paid 
in railway industries. Questions of accountability were further defined 
with the introduction of employers’ strict liability as part of the German 
law on social insurance of 1884. Only three years later, in 1887, the first 
private liability insurance for doctors was advertised, covering costs 
for fines issued for medical negligence. Although liability insurance for 
doctors was criticised in public discourse, 6,500 doctors had signed up 
for this kind of insurance with the largest German insurance house (the 
Stuttgarter Versicherungsverein) by 1901.104 A glance at the numbers of 
liability policies for all professions in the Stuttgarter insurance company 
overall supports such an interpretation. It rose from 41,000 in 1892 
to almost 270,000 in 1900. The price for individual policies had to be 
renegotiated several times, sometimes doubling in consecutive years. 
This was due to the doubling of liability cases from 1889 to 1898.105 
The majority of workplaces saw an increase in reported accidents. In 
this sense, the emergence of private liability insurance for doctors can 
be seen as a complementary development to the emergence of the 
welfare state. Accidents in the workplace were increasingly covered by 
insurance for wage labour (by the state) and the professions (privately) 
alike.
Although this chapter has been concerned with demonstrating the 
importance of doctors’ legal accountability in negligence cases (and 
hence contests Ewald’s claim of collective accountability in modernity), 
with some caveats Ewald’s interpretation can help us to understand 
the transformation of medical jurisdiction. While doctors remained 
accountable in legal terms, they benefitted from the commodification 
of risk.106 The German phrase Verantwortung embraces two very distinct 
meanings. On the one hand, it can describe the ‘authority’, ‘command’, 
or ‘entitlement’ of a person, in German legal terms ‘ex ante responsibil-
ity’. On the other hand, the German phrase can equally be translated 
as ‘accountability’ or ‘liability’, the German legal expression of ‘ex post 
responsibility’. Although German doctors were legally accountable for 
negligence and malpractice, the private insurance business collectivised 
the potential danger of being economically liable.107 With reference to 
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the discussion of risk it is stipulated that it was less the rise of the state as 
manager of risks that constituted modernity than the disentanglement 
of professional accountability and private/personal risk. In opposition 
to Ewald, this chapter has demonstrated that the latter did not replace 
the former. Instead, the two interacted within different spheres – such 
as the legal, the professional, and the economical.
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Imperfect bodies:  
the ‘pathology’ of childhood in  
late nineteenth-century London1
Steven Taylor
[S]ocial institutions are those that best know how to denature a man, to 
take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one 
and transport the I into the common unity.2
This quote, taken from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s influential text Émile 
(1762), serves to outline the overarching objective of this chapter: to 
assess whether charitable interventions directed at children living with 
impairment in the late nineteenth century, over a hundred years after 
the publication of Émile, were designed to ‘denature’ their subjects for 
the benefit of society or instead served as an attempt at improving and 
integrating youngsters, so as to develop them into independent and 
productive adults. A raft of work has focused on the nature of social 
institutions. The most enduring and compelling arguments have been 
espoused by Michel Foucault who presented them as vehicles for super-
vising, controlling, and disciplining individual bodies.3 With regard to 
‘child rescue’, the moniker given to evangelical attempts at ‘improving’ 
the lives of children living in poverty in the late nineteenth century, the 
scholarship is less complete, especially when it comes to the sick and 
disabled.4 By considering the treatment and experience of the impaired/
disabled child in a voluntary organisation, the Church of England-
sponsored Waifs and Strays Society, this chapter embarks on a signifi-
cant departure from the current literature, navigating through the 
successes and failures of reform and the subsequent categorisation of 
the non-normal child.
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The late nineteenth century was a significant time in the formula-
tion of ideas about welfare and childhood. The socio-economic land-
scapes of urban environments were shaped by industrial depression and 
severe cholera outbreaks during the late 1860s. These factors fed into 
an evangelical movement that became prominent in the same period. 
It was primarily led by influential middle-class women, eager to expand 
beyond the well-defined gender roles of the period, and whose moralis-
ing gaze focused on the amelioration of children who were perceived 
to be helpless and deserving.5 The Goschen Minute of 1869, issued 
by the President of the Poor Law Board, George Goschen, signalled 
a renewed focus on reducing poor law expenditure and stricter adher-
ence to the principals of the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834). His 
core demand was for a closer relationship between welfare and philan-
thropy, with the workhouse dealing with the truly destitute, and chari-
ties supporting the needs of families that were just about managing. 
This shift legitimised and energised the efforts of evangelical reformers 
who were increasingly worried by the perceived ubiquity of ‘ragged’ 
children on the streets of British cities. With the average population 
being much younger than it is today, these children, often orientalised 
as ‘arabs’ or ‘urchins’, came to symbolise a fear of national decline and 
social degeneration.6 This fed into a proto-eugenic discourse, adopted 
by evangelical reformers, aimed at breaking the ties between urban 
families accustomed to immorality (such as intemperance, promiscuity, 
and criminality) and their children.7 Evidently, the last three decades 
of the century are of crucial significance to historians, as philanthropic 
practice changed from intervention aimed at improving the living con-
ditions of the urban poor child (and family), to intrusive attempts at 
rescuing and removing them.8
As the core themes of this volume highlight, self-conscious reflec-
tions on ‘modern life’ in Britain and its social, cultural, and political 
consequences, increased concerns about urban environments and 
the place of individuals within them, as well as raising broader ques-
tions about the nature of identity, nation, and social development. 
Subsequently, within this climate the elevation of children’s health 
to a national concern should be unsurprising as they represented the 
future of state and empire.9 Legislation in the form of the Factory Acts 
(1833–1901), Education Acts (1870–1902), Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act (1889), and later free school meals (1906) and medical 
80 Constructing the modern self
inspection (1907) reinforced this position. Increased state investment 
in the education and improvement of children worked in tandem with 
reduced welfare options offered by the Poor Law Crusade10 to create 
a vacuum in which the child rescue movement flourished. Yet despite 
the perception of children being vulnerable and in need of ameliora-
tion in this nascent ‘modern’ ideal, Harry Hendrick notes that the child 
victim was ‘nearly always seen as harbouring the possibility of another 
condition, one that was sensed to be threatening: to moral fibre, sexual 
propriety, the sanctity of the family, the preservation of the race, law 
and order, and the wider reaches of citizenship’.11 In essence childhood 
was a battleground where the future success of the ‘modern’ state would 
be decided.
This chapter focuses on the ‘unacceptable’, ‘unideal’ children, who 
lived with physical impairments and were understood to be incapable 
of ‘improving’ without charitable intervention. Later they were con-
sidered to be beyond help or, as Hendrick outlines, ‘threats’ to society. 
The failure of reformers to meet the needs of these youngsters meant 
they were subsequently constructed as ‘pathologically’ different from 
the norm.
Two core issues sit at the heart of this chapter: firstly the nature of 
childhood in late nineteenth-century England, and, secondly, defini-
tions and concepts of impairment. At a rudimentary level, Rousseau 
provided a framework in which to consider ideas of childhood. On the 
one hand there is the ‘sheltered’ or ‘innocent’ childhood that features 
in Émile that still has resonance today as an idealised, and quintessen-
tially ‘modern’, notion of the ‘perfect’ child. Yet this paradigm was chal-
lenged by another category of youngster, one that has been labelled 
here the ‘pathologically’ different child. Of course, this is an imperfect 
and polarised model and the majority of children, according to medical, 
social, cultural, and familial viewpoints, would fit somewhere between 
these binaries. This chapter concentrates on those that congregated 
around notions and conceptions of ‘imperfection’. It is therefore impor-
tant to delve a little deeper into what is meant by the idea of ‘pathology’ 
in this context.
In its strictest definition the term refers to the scientific process of 
exploring the causes of disease through the inspection of bodily materi-
als. However, the phrase has evolved into common usage and devel-
oped a pseudo-scientific social meaning. Those whom we consider to 
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be pathological behave in a habitual way that does not comply to an 
accepted social norm. Yet, pathology in this instance is not synonymous 
with impairment. Therefore, children who were not physically impaired 
could be pathologised by philanthropic reformers and vice versa. 
Louise Jackson has argued that the ‘ugly twin’ of the modern, romantic, 
child was the juvenile delinquent.12 Similarly, Pam Cox has demon-
strated that two distinct discourses functioned within the criminal 
justice system of the early twentieth century: the first concerned with 
care and protection, and the second control and punishment.13 Whilst 
these assessments have furthered our understanding of transgressive 
childhoods, the concept needs to be refined and expanded to include 
children of the poor more generally. For children whose childhoods 
were ‘pathologised’, and not necessarily criminalised, they were con-
structed as distinct and separate from the norm and in need of special-
ised help and intervention; this may have been through physical or 
mental impairment, knowledge of sexual activity, questionable moral-
ity, or criminality. Pathology refers to ideas about improvability in a 
non-medical charitable institution, the Waifs and Strays Society. Yet, 
the spectre of the pathologically different youngster haunts the aca-
demic literature dealing with childhood in the past.
It has been argued that social groups became of interest to authori-
ties when they posed particular problems or threats.14 Such a chronol-
ogy fits with increased state and philanthropic focus on children from 
the 1870s.15 Consequently a discourse was constructed by philanthro-
pists and reformers at a time when the welfare, physical condition, and 
health of youngsters appeared to reflect the moral and physical fibre of 
the empire.16 Ideas about normalcy and abnormality took on a scientific 
form by the turn of the twentieth century. ‘Technologies’ such as height 
and weight charts in the first instance and then more specific tools, such 
as intelligence tests, made it possible to count, measure, and evaluate 
children, with the result of both reinforcing and visualising concepts of 
normality/abnormality.17 Early physical checks conducted on newborn 
babies from the mid-twentieth century, Cathy Urwin has suggested, 
were efforts designed to identify potential deviance.18 In the years fol-
lowing the First World War, child mental well-being was a particular 
concern and John Stewart has explored the child guidance movement 
that grew in the British welfare system. Its underlying principle – that 
any child might experience emotional or psychological disturbance, 
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regardless of how ‘normal’ they might be considered, and demonstrat-
ing that the idea of a pathologically different child, or indeed of child-
hood itself as a pathology – perpetuated into the twentieth century.19 
The sample of impaired/disabled children used in this chapter adds 
to this scholarship and provides a particularly useful vehicle for this 
analysis, primarily because it has been convenient to blame a lack of 
‘progress’ on physical (and visible) defects rather than carefully ana-
lysing the experiences of these individuals. This chapter outlines the 
conception, growth, and coming to maturity of childhood as pathology 
in and of itself. By the late nineteenth century children were thought 
capable of causing familial, social, and moral instability. Hence the path-
ological childhood needs to be considered within broader histories of 
childhood.
The Waifs and Strays Society
The historical records of the Church of England Waifs and Strays 
Society provide rich source material to better understand how patholo-
gised children were cared for by philanthropic institutions in the late 
nineteenth century. The Society was founded by Edward Rudolf in 1881 
and offered residential childcare to families facing poverty-induced 
crises. Alongside Dr Stephenson’s Homes (founded in 1868) and Dr 
Barnardo’s Homes (founded in 1870), it was one of the major voluntary 
organisations of the period that made up a mosaic of welfare options 
which were developing for children in the late nineteenth century.20 
When a child was admitted, they were accompanied by an application 
form that explained their personal, family, and health circumstances. 
These documents have been used initially to identify those admitted 
with physical ‘impairments’ and thus more likely to be pathologised. As 
a cohort, they reveal much about Victorian attitudes towards childhood 
and disability. When entering the Waifs and Strays Society, children 
were usually seen by two doctors for diagnostic purposes before being 
moved to a residential home run by the society. Two of these homes, 
St Agnes and St Nicholas, functioned solely as homes for ‘crippled’ 
children. The application, along with both medical forms, was then 
placed in a casefile where the experience, movements, and interactions 
of that child with the charity were kept.21 These records, now held 
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by the Children’s Society, contain a wealth of information and, much 
like the children whose stories they reveal, are diverse in both content 
and detail.
Between the years 1882 and 1899, there were 7,400 successful appli-
cations made to the Waifs and Strays Society. Of these, there were 
roughly 300 children, aged between one and seventeen years old, who 
were living with some form of physical impairment or deformity.22 The 
age classification deployed here is that defined by the Waifs and Strays 
Society as an institution exclusively for children.23 The recorded impair-
ments were varied, and included mental disabilities, epilepsy, amputa-
tions of digits, arms, and legs, those suffering from burns, paralysis, 
and sensory impairments of sight and hearing. Most common were 
those described as ‘crippled’ who had experienced some kind of physi-
cal deformity usually caused by rickets, scoliosis, tuberculosis of the 
bones, or acquired through an injury. This is in line with the broader 
population and supports Ashley Mathisen’s research into the London 
Foundling Hospital during the eighteenth century, where physical 
deformity and the loss of a limb were the most recorded disabilities 
amongst children there.24
The cohort of impaired children at the Waifs and Strays Society 
included both sexes but girls were in the overwhelming majority, 
accounting for 78% of those admitted with impairments. This is at 
variance with other studies of the period where impaired boys were 
more commonly institutionalised,25 a state of affairs explained by the 
usefulness of young girls in the domestic environments of poor families 
where they were capable of completing simple household chores or 
caring for younger siblings while their parents were at work.26 In the 
case of this particular charitable home it might be assumed that the 
number of girls was a reflection of a middle-class desire to improve 
the respectability of the working poor and ‘improve’ the life chances of 
these individuals. Comments such as those that accompanied Annie 
C. who was impaired ‘owing to the careless habits of the mother – who 
drinks’,27 or the statement that Catherine W.’s ‘home is quite unfit for an 
invalid’ and she only ever was seen ‘wearing one dirty garment’ were not 
uncommon.28 The institutional concerns about these girls were directly 
related to broader ideas about what it meant to be ‘modern’: in the near 
future there was a strong possibility that they would be responsible for 
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their own households and their progeny would be the men and women 
that the British Empire relied on as industrial workers and members of 
the armed forces.
Childhood and the welfare experience
Able-bodied children of the working poor were regularly found in the 
workplace throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.29 In 
line with increasingly Rousseauesque views of childhood, however, 
their economic role was gradually questioned by authorities, and the 
first effective government inspectorates into child workers were intro-
duced in the 1830s.30 From the mid-nineteenth century, it can be 
observed that the legislative agenda towards children reinforced the 
dichotomy between the innocent and the pathologically different child. 
Workplace and education reforms, such as the numerous Factory and 
Elementary Education Acts, were all geared towards the protection of 
the innocent, and by the turn of the century education was being pro-
vided up to the age of twelve, even if it was on a half-time basis in some 
circumstances. The criminal justice system, however, lagged behind. 
The age of criminal responsibility was set at seven in the seventeenth 
century and it remained so until it was raised to eight with the Children 
and Young Person’s Act of 1933, and was finally increased to ten by an 
Act of the same name in 1963. In comparison, during the medieval 
period, often considered a time when children were treated as proto-
adults, the criminal trial of children under the age of twelve was banned 
because they could not be held responsible for their actions. We might 
consider such a young age in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as 
a legal mechanism to manage those who did not conform to accepted 
social norms.31
The children who came into contact with the Waifs and Strays 
Society were most commonly orphans or those who had been deserted, 
and thus they were often filtered towards philanthropy via the institu-
tions of the poor law system. From its inception in the Tudor period, 
the poor law sought to distinguish between the deserving and unde-
serving poor. It was implemented at a local level so that officials could 
use knowledge of their catchment area to identify those truly in need 
of assistance, usually defined in relation to ‘usefulness’ in the work-
place.32 In 1697, John Locke stated that the poor law should consider 
using the malleability of children to mould them into well rounded 
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adults and he, in particular, highlighted the benefits of education for 
them.33 Doing so, he argued, would break the cycle of dependence, an 
obsession that extends into modern times. This was a somewhat differ-
ent view from that of Rousseau, who later argued that children should 
be at liberty to enjoy childhood before entering the adult world. Despite 
their differing philosophies regarding the nature of childhood, their 
influence reshaped understandings of what it meant to be a child in the 
modern world.
The belief that children deserved support in varying degrees was a 
political and cultural subtext throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.34 The majority of children under public care in the nine-
teenth century were there because of their parental situations. However, 
Frank Crompton has also stated that Poor Law Guardians were eager 
to remove the influence of parents who had proved themselves unsuit-
able.35 Thus, there was a particular awareness, both in the poor law and 
charitable spheres, that children were not responsible for their poverty; 
rather families, the nature of parenting, and the environments in which 
they lived, were the fundamental elements in constructing the need for 
intervention. These are themes that have persisted through to the 
present day.36 Similar attitudes are evident in the sample of children 
admitted to the Waifs and Strays Society, demonstrating the fluidity of 
ideas between the state and voluntary sectors. James T., for example, 
was three years old when he was admitted to the care of the Waifs and 
Strays Society from his home in east London where he was said to ‘live 
in an unhealthy neighbourhood’.37 In this situation we can observe the 
environment in which the child was living as the key negative factor, 
and it was a widely held view that parents, at the very minimum, were 
supposed to provide for their children. Those parents unable to do so 
upset the social order.
In a different case, Lucy F. was taken into the Society’s St Chads 
home in 1889 at the age of fourteen. The catalyst for her admission was 
the death of her mother and ‘her father [wa]s a good for nothing, igno-
rant man, with no idea of looking after his children, though he would 
not wilfully injure them’.38 We are thus provided with a picture of 
working-class parenting that did not comply with middle-class expecta-
tions. Interestingly, this case makes no reference to drunkenness, idle-
ness, or criminality, which so often occurred in the records for other 
children. In contrast to the father’s ignorance of child-rearing, Lucy F. 
was described as ‘a bright, happy-tempered child by nature, responding 
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readily to kindness – very quick and intelligent – and has made great 
efforts to keep her father’s house tidy’.39 Two important threads emerge 
here. First, there was a parent in danger of tainting a child who had the 
potential to fit with the ideal of a respectable childhood, that being one 
who would grow into an independent and productive adult. She was 
eager to learn and evidently a hard worker. Secondly, there was the 
underlying tension created by an adolescent girl living with a working 
man who, because of his status, could be a physical or sexual threat to 
her. This fear was elucidated later in the application where it was stated 
that, ‘so far we have every reason to believe that the child has escaped 
moral injury, but that she is in grave danger there can be no doubt’.40 
Despite no actual harm coming to the child, this danger was perceived 
to be ever present in homes of the poor, especially when there was no 
mother figure available to prevent potentially abusive behaviour.
The perceived unsuitability of working-class homes for young chil-
dren is further evident in the case of Minnie K. who was aged just two, 
and diagnosed with a curvature of the spine, when she came under 
the care of the Waifs and Strays Society in 1890.41 Twelve years later, 
in 1902, her mother wrote to Edward Rudolf asking for Minnie to be 
returned to her care. This letter to the society is important as it makes a 
wider point about the nature of disability during the period. It has often 
been assumed that those with impairments were cast aside or ignored 
by their families, but here we witness a parent requesting that their 
child is returned to them after an extensive period of separation. While 
Rudolf initially agreed to the mother’s demands, Katherine Warton in 
the St Agnes Home, Croydon, put up more resistance and wrote the 
following statement back to Rudolf at Society Headquarters:
We shall be very sorry to lose Minnie K., as she is a nice child, Miss 
Carling quite hoped she was going to be of great use in the Home, as she 
grew older. She is very delicate, and very backward at school, and Mrs 
Pereira wondered if it could not be arranged for her to stay with us up 
to Christmas, for the childs [sic] own sake. If Mrs K. has the means 
would she not be willing to pay something, as it would be so much to 
the childs [sic] advantage to stay on with us, as I understand the mother 
is out at work all day so suppose Minnie is going to keep house for her. 
Minnie is attending the Church day school, and having been so long we 
should be very sorry for her to leave at such short notice. Should I write 
to Mrs K. about it?42
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Numerous strategies are deployed by Warton in this letter to emphasise 
the benefits to the child of remaining in the care of the society, rather 
than being returned to the family home. There was a clear expectation 
that she would be a productive and useful worker in the charity home, 
despite her slow progress at a church school. The irony of the letter is 
that Warton expected Minnie to do nothing more than ‘keep house’ for 
her mother once back home, a role considered negatively in compari-
son to the similar work she was most probably carrying out in the St 
Agnes Home. Furthermore, Katherine Warton felt so strongly about 
the benefits of the charitable institution for the child that she was 
willing to ask her mother for a contribution to her maintenance, despite 
the mother clearly stating that she wanted her returned to the family 
home. Rudolf encouraged Warton to write but later conceded that the 
mother ‘appears to be very respectable, and although I did what I could 
to persuade her to leave the daughter under the society’s care, she still 
reiterated her desire to have her under her control’.43 Here we witness 
two significant elements in the care of children during the late nine-
teenth century. The first is the agency that poor parents could exert 
when faced with philanthropic interference in their lives; the second is 
an unwavering belief on the part of middle-class philanthropists that 
intervention into the lives of the poor had moral and economic value, 
both for the individual and wider society. From the three cases pre-
sented thus far it can be seen that middle-class expectations regarding 
child-rearing, environment, and acceptable behaviour were integral to 
the construction of pathologically different children.
Children who were cared for within the state welfare system of the 
poor law were expensive and were often dependent on tax-payer support 
for a good number of years. Therefore, keeping families together was 
often a pragmatic decision made by overseers and guardians.44 This 
philosophy, however, was often complicated by issues such as parental 
disability, ill-health, or premature death. Moreover, there was a prevail-
ing belief that children under the age of seven were entitled to parental 
care. Children occupied a unique place in the poor law system and were 
not always subject to harsh conditions, especially after the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834. The New Poor Law introduced a welfare 
system whereby the position of those receiving state help had to be in 
situations that were deemed ‘less eligible’ than the lowest labourers.45 
Such punitive measures were not usually applied to children who were 
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directed to ‘improvement’ through schooling, apprenticeship, and 
eventually employment, contradicting and inverting the eligibility test.
Childhood disability and pathological difference
Scholars of disability have painted a bleak picture of the exclusion, sepa-
ration, and incarceration of individuals living with impairment in the 
past. Those working in the field have argued that disability was a social 
construction imposed on the biologically impaired through architec-
ture, stigma, and socio-economic structures, all of which were shaped 
by an able-bodied society.46 Much literature in this field has concen-
trated on the twentieth century, with the experience of earlier periods 
being relatively neglected. When a child, with what today would be 
called a disability, was admitted to the Waifs and Strays Society, their 
application forms usually described them as being impaired, crippled, 
or lame. The term disability did not feature, and therefore this chapter 
uses the linguistic register of the time.
Recently, there has been a growing historiographical interest in chil-
dren living with impairment in the past. David Turner has observed an 
increased concern with ‘problem’ children in the eighteenth century, 
who were growing up with impairments existing from birth or acquired 
through mismanagement and were inevitably a burden, either on their 
families or the state.47 Ashley Mathisen has also demonstrated a more 
nuanced understanding of the ‘disabled’ child body deployed at the 
London Foundling Hospital in this period.48 She outlines how indi-
vidual development through work (and work-associated activities such 
as apprenticeship), within the hospital itself and beyond, instilled ideas 
about adult independence. A picture of equal complexity is presented by 
Steve King in the context of nineteenth-century England. He contends 
that the experience of impairment for the young was often negotiated, 
between families, employers, and relieving officers, and the nature of 
relief depended on the able-bodiedness of the individual. It might thus 
be suggested that an imperfect body was not necessarily socially or eco-
nomically liminal.49 Furthermore, Dale and Borsay’s collection of essays 
exploring experiential and definitional concepts of childhood disability 
have raised the profile of this subject further.50 Their volume begins by 
linking general concerns about childhood health with an emerging pro-
fessional interest in the disabled child in the mid-nineteenth century. 
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The impaired child was thus, by the 1870s, a subject of attention for a 
range of observers and commentators that led to numerous judgements 
about their abilities and potential future lives.
Rescuing children of the poor – The Waifs and Strays Society
By the late nineteenth century, children had acquired a wider social 
significance and were seen by authorities and those in philanthropic 
circles as the future of the nation and imperial project.51 The terminol-
ogy used to describe those who sought to protect and improve children 
in the late nineteenth century is particularly telling. They were ‘child 
rescuers’ or ‘child savers’ and thus were guardians of the discourse. They 
alone were supposedly responsible for bringing children back into the 
folds of acceptability and respectability. What is particularly interesting 
is the class gulf between those intervening and the children themselves. 
The philanthropists making judgements on the habits and cultures of 
the working poor had limited understanding and no lived experience 
of the circumstances of their subjects. The likes of Barnardo, Stephen-
son, Rudolf, and Rye were, without exception, raised and educated in 
very different conditions.52
To emphasise the key arguments of this chapter, examples have been 
chosen to reflect the complexities of how pathological difference was 
constructed. These are distinct cases, but all evidence the intricate 
nature of this process. In 1889, Albert C., a six-year-old boy whose 
mother had died and whose father had deserted him, entered the care 
of the Waifs and Strays Society. Not only was he an orphan but he had 
been ‘crippled’ after having his right leg amputated due to ‘a palsy 
disease of the knee joint’.53 Albert was thus representative of deserving-
ness in Victorian society through two avenues, first through his youth-
fulness and secondly through his physical impairment. It might have 
been expected that he would have lived his life dependent on state 
welfare and charitable assistance but, despite his condition, he was 
apprenticed eight years after entering the charity to a tailor in Frome, 
Norfolk, and a note was placed in his file that stated ‘he will not be able 
to maintain himself until the end of his apprenticeship’.54 While this 
reveals the poor wages he received as an impaired apprentice, it also 
makes clear that following the completion of his term he was expected 
to be independent. A similar case was that of Edward M. who was taken 
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into the care of the Waifs and Strays Society in 1883 at the age of five 
from the home of his mother and stepfather.55 His impairment was from 
ankylosis (stiffening of the joints due to fusion of the bone) and a 
deformity of the vertebrae: he had not attended school because it was 
three-quarters of a mile away and he could not walk there. Yet on his 
arrival it was stated that he ‘is a bright intelligent child and provided his 
health keeps well will be capable of earning his living in some way with 
either his hands or his head’. Edward did not go into an apprenticeship 
like Albert, but from his file it is clear that the organisation had an 
expectation of him developing into an independent and productive 
adult, a core facet of the modern idea of childhood where individuals 
were expected to support themselves into adulthood. While these chil-
dren may have lost the sheltered innocence that was only available in a 
family home, philanthropy was enthusiastic about moulding them into 
responsible and respectable future citizens.
The situation was different, however, for children viewed through a 
lens of pathological difference. Annie B. was taken into the care of the 
Waifs and Strays Society on 9 October 1888. She was aged thirteen and 
had been an orphan for almost three months.56 The aunt with whom 
she had been staying following the death of her mother had agreed to 
bring up her two younger siblings, but could not afford to keep the older 
girl and provide for her own family. Annie was noted to be in good 
health and had attended the Harrow Board School for five years, reach-
ing the Standard of Level IV which was in line with academic expecta-
tions of the time. At admission, she was described as ‘a rough uncouth 
girl but there is every reason to believe that under the good training she 
would get in the Home she would turn out well’.57 At this point the girl 
fulfils the established modern model of a child of the working poor ripe 
for improvement. The notes from the case file continue: ‘whereas were 
she sent to the workhouse (which is the only alternative) she would 
probably become quite unfit for respectable service’.58 Here we can see 
recognition of the two models of childhood in operation. There was 
deservingness, respectability, and potential for improvement in the 
philanthropic home of the Waifs and Strays Society on the one hand 
and the undeserving dependence found in the publicly funded work-
house, a place to be avoided at all costs, on the other. Upon her admis-
sion Annie was initially sent to the Society’s Arnold Grove Home but 
while there it soon became apparent that ‘she is a very dull girl, and will 
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not be fit for domestic service’.59 Following this judgement she was then 
passed through numerous homes for industrial training before eventu-
ally being taken into St Chads where she was to learn machine knitting. 
However, by 1894, Annie had grown into an adult and her lack of 
development and progress led officials to decide that nothing more 
could be done with her. In a letter to Rudolf, Mr Stansfield at the St 
Chads Home lamented that ‘this girl will be on the society’s hands all 
her life unless she is sent to the workhouse’.60 He continued that she is 
‘not quite all there’ implying that she had some form of mental or learn-
ing disability and he complained that ‘she is simply taking the place of 
a girl who might be learning a trade’, before signing off by observing 
that she was ‘particularly dull and stupid’. To Stansfield, the girl was 
clearly different from the norm and she was destined to not fulfil the 
expectations of a deserving childhood or adulthood. The only option, 
in his opinion, was to send the girl back to the workhouse, so that 
somebody more deserving might take her place in the home.
Sending Annie B. to the workhouse though was not as simple a task 
as it might appear. In order to receive relief an individual had to have 
earned a settlement. This could be achieved through birth, apprentice-
ship, marriage, or continuous employment for twelve months. Annie, 
however, had been touring the institutional provision of the Waifs and 
Strays Society and not been in one place long enough to earn a settle-
ment. Stansfield had assessed that she was most likely to live out an 
existence dependent on ratepayer assistance. She was thus expensive 
and a burden to whichever workhouse in which she was placed. The 
Leeds Poor Law Guardians refused to take her and, following discus-
sions of her settlement, Annie was eventually placed in the Edgware 
Workhouse, where we lose track of her narrative. This case demon-
strates that both models of childhood could operate in tandem. First, 
there was the ideal of improvability that was applied until it became 
clear that a productive and independent future was unlikely. Then the 
child was pathologised because she was considered to be mentally inca-
pable, even though before becoming orphaned she had reached Stand-
ard IV in the education system. Nevertheless, she had not met the 
requirements for trainable childhood and she was cast aside into the 
workhouse.
Mary B.’s experience further underscores how compounding condi-
tions shaped reform attempts. She was admitted to the Society aged 
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ten in 1889 having suffered severe burns to her hands. Her home was 
a poor one, with her father earning just eighteen shillings a week and 
the mother unable to work due to blindness.61 In this situation the 
child was unable to help around the home due to her injuries; she 
was unproductive and constituted a drain on the limited household 
economy. The Waifs and Strays Society took the girl in with the objec-
tive of teaching her a trade. However, she soon was ‘returned to her 
mother … being crippled in her hands consequently not able to learn 
the knitting machine’. Again we see evidence of a child not being able 
to progress vocationally and being sent back to conditions that were 
considered unfavourable and dangerous prior to their interaction with 
philanthropy. This was a similar fate to that experienced by Jane M., 
aged fifteen, who was admitted to the St Chads Home to learn industrial 
knitting. It was said though that she was ‘simply filling a bed that might 
be occupied by a capable girl’.62
The experience of Annie B., Mary B., and Jane M. were evidently not 
isolated examples. Now we turn to the case of Annie M., which provides 
a slightly different situation. Annie M. was admitted to the Waifs and 
Strays Society aged fourteen with both of her parents still alive.63 She 
had been suffering from spinal disease and had received medical atten-
tion and care intermittently in a hospital for seven years. By way of treat-
ment she wore a plaster jacket that was designed to aid the straightening 
of her spine. It might be assumed that physical deformity in itself was 
enough to establish difference but the situation was far more complex. 
Regardless of impairment, the Waifs and Strays Society sought and 
found occupations for children suffering from a range of conditions; it 
was not simply that disability equalled difference.
The construction of Annie M.’s pathological difference was multi-
factorial. Her father had been certified a lunatic and confined in the 
Cane Hill Pauper Lunatic Asylum for twelve months. He was seen to 
demonstrate family weakness and proto-eugenic bad heredity, while 
her mother worked at bookbinding earning a meagre two shillings per 
week, which was subsidised with three shillings on a temporary, yet 
ongoing, basis by the Poor Law Guardians, and consequently incur-
ring the stigma attached to it. Furthermore, the girl displayed a lack 
of potential for improvement and was sent back to her mother on 7 
October 1888, less than a month after being admitted, even though the 
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Guardians had committed to paying £13 a year for her care. The patho-
logically different were evidently constructed according to their ability 
to fit the established expectations of the ‘modern’ model. When this was 
not possible, evidence from family, occupation, and domestic spheres 
was used to demonstrate undeservingness and difference.
Further complexity in the construction of pathologically different 
childhoods is observed with the case of Frederick F.64 He was taken into 
the care of the Waifs and Strays Society aged just eighteen months old. 
At this young stage of development it was more difficult to construct 
the child as falling outside of the parameters of a ‘normal’ childhood, 
so instead there was an increased emphasis on his background. Such 
actions highlight the expectation that individuals in some circum-
stances would always be marginal to acceptable society. In this case, the 
boy had been conceived as a result of a sexual assault committed against 
his mother by his uncle. The mother admitted herself to the poor law 
union workhouse to escape the familial and social repercussions associ-
ated with bearing an illegitimate child and sought a space in the Waifs 
and Strays Society for her ‘innocent’ infant. In these circumstances, the 
pathological difference was directly related to the criminal tendencies 
and bad heredity of the father. The initial response of the Waifs and 
Strays Society was to attempt emigrating the child to Canada but this 
was not an option because of his age. Here, we see another example of 
how childhood difference was created and the various methods of 
dealing with it. Frederick was never sent to Canada, but he eventually 
moved away from London to Warwickshire where he was apprenticed 
and then later employed as a tailor.
Conclusion
The formative years in establishing pathologically different childhood 
as a distinct conceptual entity were the thirty years after 1870, what 
one might label the high watermark of child rescue efforts. The archive 
of the Waifs and Strays Society provides a valuable window into the 
lives of children living with disability and in poverty at this time. From 
their records we can glean insights into the everyday lives of working 
families and the relationships that were developed between them and 
those doing charitable work. Furthermore, the records reveal important 
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discourses about attempts to mould children’s lives based around ideals 
of dependence and ‘modern’ citizenship. Moving into the twentieth 
century, many of the historical sentiments still persist but interven-
tions into the lives of children have shifted from lay do-gooders to 
scientifically informed professionals. This has been achieved particu-
larly through the medicalisation of children, primarily via the education 
system, that sees early intervention into diet, sensory impairment, and 
mental/behavioural disorders.
A continuity that is fairly well hidden is the widespread practice of 
child removal, albeit by the state rather than a voluntary sector today. 
Little has changed over the past hundred or so years. A child in an 
economically deprived area is more likely to be taken into care than a 
child living in an affluent one. This practice is surprisingly common. In 
the UK, youngsters are more likely to be removed from their families 
than anywhere else in Europe; there were nearly 28,000 children 
removed from their families in the UK in 2015 compared to 200 in 
Germany and twenty-eight in the Netherlands, a process supported by 
government policy and that can be completed within twenty-six 
weeks.65 Furthermore, a child from a poor background is more likely to 
receive a diagnosis of behavioural or learning disorder such as attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder 
(ODD), or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Add into this the complex 
issue of race and ethnicity and it becomes apparent that the pathologi-
cally different child remains in the twenty-first century, even if the 
nomenclature and categories have altered somewhat.
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Phrenology as neurodiversity:  
the Fowlers and modern  
brain disorder
Kristine Swenson
In Self-Culture and the Perfection of Character (1847), the American phre-
nologist, Orson Fowler, offered phrenology as a remedy for those who 
‘are daily and earnestly inquiring –“How can I REMEDY my defects? 
By what MEANS can I increase my deficient organs, and diminish 
or regulate those that are too large? … How can I make my children 
better?” ’ 1 Orson and his brother, Lorenzo, founded a phrenological 
and publishing empire in mid-nineteenth-century America that revi-
talised and popularised this heterodox medical practice. Phrenology 
had enjoyed widespread, if controversial, application within Western 
medicine in the century’s first decades, but by the 1840s, it had been 
marginalised and largely branded as quackery, as laboratory-based bio-
medicine increasingly monopolised the medical marketplace.
Phrenology began in the late eighteenth century under the Viennese 
physician Franz Joseph Gall, who argued that the brain is an aggregate 
of mental ‘organs’, each with localised and specific functions such as 
fidelity, ambition, or poetic talent. The larger the organ, the greater the 
corresponding faculty, which could be measured by the size and shape 
of the skull. Thus, phrenology could explain the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of a person’s mind and character. Although phrenology’s 
claims were not substantiated by experimental scientific method, his-
torians of science have traced the real and lasting impact of Gall’s think-
ing, from the diffusion of scientific naturalism that prepared the public 
for Darwinian evolution, to its influence upon fields as diverse as 
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psychology, physical anthropology, and neuroanatomy.2 However, the 
cultural impact of phrenology is more complicated. Roger Cooter 
argues that phrenology first gained traction among physicians in the 
1820s and 1830s not because of its scientific validity but as a way to gain 
social power and assert meritocratic values over traditional forms of 
authority.3 Once bourgeois-liberal thought became dominant, it lost 
this particular power of social aggrandisement, but took on other roles.4 
Alternative medical practices such as phrenology gained popularity 
after 1840 in part because they were more responsive than laboratory-
based medicine to nineteenth-century culture and politics. If, as Stanley 
Finger asserts, phrenology as a science was finished by 1840,5 it never-
theless left its mark on ‘virtually every cultural province of Victorian 
life’.6 Phrenology was integral to the fabric of mid-century Anglo-
American culture, from major literary works such as Charlotte Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre (1847) and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass (1855), to the 
educational reforms of Horace Mann, and the workings of the criminal 
justice systems of both countries. If the scientific and intellectual elite 
were sceptical of phrenology by the mid-century, the ‘doctrine served 
as a cohesive cultural factor’,7 and in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, it ‘became in many ways more deeply entrenched than ever in 
everyday thought and expression’.8
This chapter will examine how the Fowlers, as entrepreneurial popu-
larisers, revitalised phrenology in the US and, to a lesser degree in 
Britain, in the mid-nineteenth century, by the masterful dissemination 
of their ideas and products and their direct appeal to consumer-patients 
who sought alternatives to mainstream medicine through self-help and 
self-culture. ‘Practical’ phrenologists such as the Fowlers responded 
to the supposed ills of modern, industrialised capitalism by touting 
progressive self-improvement through phrenological self-knowledge. 
The Fowlers’ ‘nonintellectualist’ and ‘healthean’ 9 brand of phrenology 
enabled a populist response to perceptions of ‘epidemic’ health issues 
and, in particular, to what mainstream medicine considered largely 
innate and untreatable conditions. It was working-class Victorians who 
bore the brunt of widespread cultural fears of degeneration and race 
suicide, while the middle classes were increasingly diagnosed with the 
‘modern’ illnesses of neurasthenia and dyspepsia. The Lamarckism of 
nineteenth-century practical phrenology, which promised personal 
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improvement through proper living habits and exercising the faculties, 
served as a response to the harsh consequences of modernity, Darwin-
ian evolution, and hereditary conditions. The Fowlers’ phrenology also 
prospered from a popular distrust of the newly orthodox laboratory-
based medicine. Though dismissed by nineteenth-century intellectuals 
as pseudoscience or as a ‘vulgarisation’ of earlier European and British 
phrenology, its appeal is perhaps less surprising given that working-
class patients were disproportionately subject to the experimentation 
of laboratory-based medicine that often caused more immediate harm 
than good to their families.10 The Fowlers’ phrenology ultimately sus-
tained the essentialist taxonomies from which it promised to liberate 
its adherents. Their programme of individualistic self-culture was also 
a means of self-regulation within a normative social code.
Phrenology has remained an undercurrent in Western medicine and 
culture, resurfacing recently in relation to diagnosing neurological con-
ditions.11 In the twenty-first-century press, duelling headlines proclaim 
that the ‘Brains of Those with Autism are Not Shaped Differently’ 12 and 
that ‘Kids with ADHD Have Some Brain Regions that are Smaller than 
Normal’.13 In response to such studies and the sharp rise in children 
diagnosed with neurological disorders, the cerebral self-help industry 
is alive and well with works such as The Whole-Brain Child and Brain 
Rules for Baby.14 After analysing the Fowlers’ phrenological practice, this 
chapter will draw parallels between the Fowlers’ phrenology of the 
nineteenth century, and the twenty-first-century neuro-information 
campaign which, like practical phrenology, resists orthodox medicine’s 
theories about the mind and brain. Both movements demonstrate the 
broad public appeal of alternative medical theories and treatments in 
the face of modernity’s ‘mass medicine’,15 with its drive toward a nor-
mativised body and brain. And both demonstrate the pitfalls as well as 
the advantages of populist medical movements that respond to cultural 
exigencies.
Early phrenology
Phrenology in both theory and practice evolved significantly between 
Gall’s initial formulation and the Fowlers’ publications in the 1840s. 
Young calls Gall the ‘first modern empirical psychologist of character 
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and personality’ because he rejected the idea of normative mental 
faculties, an assertion that has been vital to thinking about cognitive 
difference to the present day.16 However, Gall was a pre-evolutionary 
thinker who assumed that organisms, placed within the Great Chain 
of Being, were static.17 In contrast, Gall’s dissectionist, Johann Gaspar 
Spurzheim, introduced ‘practical phrenology’ to Britain in the 1810s, 
with a new emphasis on training and education as a way to develop 
positive faculties and support social reform.18 In an argument that pre-
figures the later eugenics movement, Spurzheim regrets that ‘the laws 
of hereditary descent are so much neglected, whilst … whole nations, 
might be improved beyond imagination, in figure, stature, complexion, 
health, talents and moral feelings.’ 19 It was Spurzheim’s follower, George 
Combe, a Scottish lawyer and philosopher, who was most responsi-
ble for the transformation of phrenology from an ‘arcane theory’ to a 
‘socially respectable scientific vehicle of “progressive” ideas’.20 Combe 
was a ‘moralizing popularizer’, who combined Spurzheim’s phrenol-
ogy with the social reform of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.21 At 
mid-century, Combe’s Constitution of Man was the third most likely 
text to appear on shelves in English-speaking homes after the Bible and 
Pilgrim’s Progress.22 Because, like Spurzheim, Combe believed the size 
and shape of the phrenological organs were inherited, he perpetuated 
race and class prejudices in pseudo-scientific language, for instance 
asserting that working-class and racially ‘primitive’ women feel less pain 
in childbirth than middle- and upper-class white women.23 A ‘practical’ 
benefit of phrenological knowledge was the ability to choose appropri-
ate servants.24 At the same time, Combe advocated a phrenological 
Larmarckism that encouraged self-improvement and protected against 
transmitting negative traits to offspring through the proper application 
of the ‘Natural Laws’ as established by the Creator and revealed through 
phrenology.25 Under the guidance of the phrenologically knowledge-
able, inherited faculties would be directed to ‘proper objects’ and their 
‘action [would] become good’.26 Cooter reads Constitution of Man as a 
‘secular revival’ of Scottish Calvinism, ‘sacralizing the social norms and 
values most appropriate to the industrially modified and modifying 
economic order’.27 Spurzheim and Combe brought practical phrenol-
ogy, with its promise of personal and social betterment, to the United 
States in the 1820s, where it soon became even more popular under 
the Fowlers.
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The Fowlers’ practical phrenology
The Fowler family – led by the brothers Orson and Lorenzo, their 
sister Charlotte, and her husband, Samuel Wells – were among the first 
fully to exploit the potential of phrenology as practical self-help (or 
‘self-culture’). Their motto was ‘self-made or never made’.28 Heeding 
their own advice, they built an empire of phrenological lecture tours, 
publishing, and therapeutics that kept phrenology, broadly defined, 
profitable and in the public eye into the twentieth century. Orson and 
Lorenzo Fowler, like George Combe, were not medical men by train-
ing but they saw in phrenology a way to combine their oratorical skills 
with their commitment to progressive reform. The brothers began as 
itinerant phrenologists in the 1830s, lecturing and giving demonstra-
tions on the heads of audience members and taking plaster casts of the 
prominent or interesting. Sometimes performing blindfolded or giving 
‘double-test’ examinations, the theatrical brothers thrived in front of 
local audiences, pronouncing noted painters as possessing ‘small Color’ 
or well-loved clergymen as having ‘an utter absence of Conscientious-
ness’.29 The brothers defended ‘the science’ and their readings, even 
when local audiences disagreed with them, revelling especially when 
some secret life or bad behaviour was revealed to confirm an earlier 
diagnosis. By the late 1830s, Orson had established an office and exami-
nation room in Philadelphia, which housed many of the busts and 
their Phrenological Journal, which ran from 1838 to 1911.30 Meanwhile, 
Lorenzo opened offices in New York, where Orson and the bust collec-
tion joined him in 1842. This Phrenological Depot became the centre of 
the Fowler empire. There they offered private examinations and clinical 
instruction, sold books, charts, porcelain busts, and other phrenologi-
cal paraphernalia, and ran a large publishing house that printed not 
only the Fowlers’ own tracts but works by many ancillary progres-
sive health and social reformers. These publications were widely dis-
seminated in Britain as well through the Fowlers’ agent in London.31 
In the 1860s, Samuel Wells, Lorenzo Fowler, and Fowler’s wife, Lydia 
Folger Fowler, exported their American style of practical phrenology 
directly to Britain with highly successful lecture tours; in London, they 
opened the Fowler Phrenological Institute, published The Phrenologist, 
and founded the British Phrenological Society which remained active 
until 1967.32
104 Constructing the modern self
At least some of the Fowlers’ great success must be attributed to 
how much their programme of self-study and exertion was in keeping 
with the mind-set of the mid-nineteenth century. The idea of self-
improvement was foundational to the American republic, with Benja-
min Franklin – Lydia’s cousin through the Folger line33 – a much cited 
exemplar.34 However, the phrase ‘self-made man’, which the Fowlers 
appropriated for their motto, is generally attributed to US senator, 
Henry Clay, who, in 1832, used it explicitly in the context of entrepre-
neurial capitalism.35 By the 1830s, the pressures of new urban popula-
tions, market capitalism, and abolitionist rhetoric saw the liberalism of 
the Enlightenment give way to an emphasis on differences and hierar-
chies within the social body. ‘[N]ew statistical practices’ in science and 
social science ‘divided society into masses of standardized or deviant 
individual bodies’, with the aim of creating a ‘fit’ citizenry; the rhetoric 
of natural rights was replaced by an emphasis on natural laws that must 
be understood and followed for the good of the self and the nation.36 In 
the United States, antebellum reform movements promised the ‘moral 
transformation’ of the individual and thus the nation.37 Cynthia Eagle 
Russett cites phrenology as an example of a new scientific practice that 
nevertheless served social reform, at least for a time.38 She singles out 
the Fowlers’ phrenology, in particular, as the ‘crescendo’ of American 
optimism in scientific reform before the rise of physical anthropol-
ogy with its explicit emphases on biological differences and human 
limitations rather than aptitudes and possibilities.39 Within the Fowlers’ 
programme, the entrepreneurial capitalism of being ‘self-made’ was 
in tension with the religious idea of ‘self-culture’, introduced to the 
American public by the Unitarian theologian William Ellery Channing 
and then spread through the writings of nineteenth-century transcen-
dentalists and progressives, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and James 
Russell Lowell. Channing defined self-culture as the ‘care which every 
man owes to himself, to the unfolding and perfecting of his nature’, 
and noted that Americans held the ‘means of improvement, of self-
culture, possessed no where else’.40 Nevertheless, the Fowlers managed 
to persuade many in Britain that they, too, had the means and the duty 
of phrenological self-culture. In ‘A Farewell Entertainment to Mr and 
Mrs Fowler’ during their Scottish lecture tour in 1863, a working man 
from Glasgow explained that in contrast to earlier, British phrenolo-
gists, Lorenzo Fowler ‘gives us higher and more ennobling views of the 
mission and destiny of the human race … .[N]ot only are we privileged, 
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but it is our duty, so to use them [mental faculties] for the purpose of 
raising ourselves mentally and morally.’ 41
In contrast to their European and British counterparts, and very 
much in keeping with mid-nineteenth-century American thought, 
the Fowlers’ phrenological programme was self-directed and, with 
notable exceptions, largely egalitarian. Whereas Combe denied that 
‘original propensities can be eradicated by education and other means’ 
and trusted only the most morally and intellectually virtuous to guide 
their own phrenological improvement,42 the Fowlers promised ‘self-
improvement’ to ‘every individual’ with publications such as The Illus-
trated Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology (1857) and Education 
and Self-Improvement, Founded on Physiology and Phrenology (1843).43 
The Fowlers were not unique among phrenologists in advocating a self-
help doctrine, but they were certainly the most successful. Historian 
Mary Miles credits this achievement to the Fowlers’ drive to commod-
ify phrenology via public lectures and their publishing house.44 For the 
Fowlers, ‘self-made’ meant body and mind, but it also meant an unapol-
ogetic entrepreneurialism. Orson Fowler’s preface to the first edition 
of Education and Self-Improvement champions the Fowler programme 
over that of earlier phrenologists: ‘Too long … have Phrenologists been 
content with knowing themselves by this science. It is now high time for 
them to apply it to their own mental cultivation, and to the intellectual 
and moral improvement of mankind.’ 45 To that end, the Fowlers’ self-
help texts often include tables listing the phrenological organs keyed 
to their full descriptions in the text and with space for charting family 
members. The Fowlers translated complex scientific language and a 
physical examination into simple images on the page (see figures 4.1 
and 4.2)46 and adopted the language of an accessible photorealism to 
win their audience: phrenology was ‘the camera through which we 
may look at ourselves’, wrote Samuel Wells.47 Ironically, this accessibil-
ity, which purported to bring the mental and moral self to the easily 
readable surface, made categorising and discriminating against groups 
and individuals a simpler process. Allan Sekula has argued that the 
conjunction of photography and phrenology in the nineteenth century 
‘contributed to the ideological hegemony of capitalism’ by their ‘taxo-
nomic ordering’.48
Combe and phrenologists who aspired to scientific acceptance were 
cautious about making claims for phrenology’s ability to alter the brain 
physically. Orson Fowler, however, asserts unequivocally that one may 
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Figure 4.1 ‘Numbering and Definition of the Organs’, O. S. Fowler and  
L. N. Fowler, The Illustrated Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology with 
over One Hundred Engravings.
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change not just the character of the faculties but their literal, physical 
size through their exercise or disuse.49 As proof, Orson cites the ‘decided 
increase of the whole intellectual lobe’ of the plaster casts of the Rever-
end John Pierpont taken in 1835 and then in 1841, an increase attrib-
uted to Pierpont’s ‘almost continual exercise of his intellectual faculties’ 
in the composition of poetry, temperance lectures, and debate with 
‘rum-sellers of his congregation’.50 This example demonstrates the con-
nection that the firm made between phrenological health and other 
progressive reform movements. At times, the Fowlers’ politics clearly 
ran ahead of their science, for instance, when enumerating the cranial 
distinctions among members of various Christian denominations: 
strict Calvinists have heads that are ‘tolerably wide’ and rise ‘rapidly 
from the intellectual organs’ in contrast to the more balanced heads of 
Episcopalians, Unitarians, and Congregationalists.51 Not surprisingly, 
the Fowlers were Congregationalists. These sorts of claims not only 
alienated scientists, but led to followers of Spurzheim and Combe criti-
cising the Fowlers for their ‘many inaccuracies’ and ‘Yankee go-a-head 
Figure 4.2 ‘Parental Love’, O. S. Fowler and L. N. Fowler, The Illustrated 
Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology with over One Hundred Engravings.
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principle’ that took coincidences for ‘causations’.52 Far from being intim-
idated by charges of popularisation, however, Orson shot back that 
British phrenology was ‘rather too anxious to place phrenology on a 
scientific and philosophical basis, to the neglect of the practical examina-
tions. Mere theorizing and abstract reasoning will never advance the 
interest of phrenology’.53 Orson Fowler’s easy dismissal of the scientific 
basis of phrenology suggests to what degree its scientific pretensions 
were waning even as its cultural relevance continued.
The Fowlers laid claim to the scientific when it suited them, but 
distancing phrenology from the scientific was, in fact, a shrewd rhetori-
cal strategy, not uncommon in populist political and social movements 
that eschew expertise in favour of ‘common sense’ or the ‘natural’. From 
the mid-nineteenth century, medicine became increasingly regularised 
as a profession and practice; using modern industrial and business 
models, it promised a new uniformity and efficiency in providing a 
healthy citizenry.54 Biomedicine modernised itself by way of new tech-
nologies and laboratory-based experimentation, and sought to monop-
olise the market in response to a host of heterodox medicines that 
threatened its new power as a profession.55 But as orthodox practition-
ers claimed greater authority to read and control the bodies of the 
public, the public themselves were drawn to heterodox practices, such 
as practical phrenology and homeopathy, which promised more patient 
control. The public resistance engendered by nineteenth-century health 
campaigns such as the Contagious Diseases Acts and compulsory vac-
cination suggest the degree to which the new biomedicine was dis-
trusted.56 Roberta Bivins argues that heterodox medical practices were 
and continue to be attractive alternatives to orthodox biomedicine 
insofar as they place patients’ somatic experience ‘at the centre of the 
therapeutic encounter’, individualise that experience, and assume a 
‘dynamic relationship between bodies and their social and physical 
environments’,57 all characteristics of the Fowlers’ practical phrenology. 
Moreover, ‘scientificity’, asserts Bivins, ‘was no more the sole criterion 
of nineteenth-century consumers than it is today’.58 Cooter remarks 
that the ‘standard historical emphasis’ on orthodox medicine’s aban-
donment of phrenology is ‘misplaced’.59 Phrenology and other hetero-
dox and self-help medical practices were, ‘curatively speaking’, as likely 
to ‘deliver the goods’ as orthodox medicine, given the limitations of 
orthodox medicine at the time.60
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Dr Lydia Fowler and health reform
It is misguided, then, to characterise the Fowlers as charlatans. Fol-
lowing Combe, who was ‘driven by a genuine religious commitment 
to improve the physiological condition of humankind’,61 the Fowlers 
turned phrenology into a popular and self-guided practice allied to 
hydropathy, dietetics, vegetarianism, dress reform, and temperance 
– all movements that contributed to a more health-conscious popu-
lation. Practical phrenologists often achieved positive ends despite 
unscientific and occasionally laughable claims, and the Fowlers’ facil-
ity with marketing and publishing made them particularly influential. 
They helped reform the treatment of criminals and the insane, were 
pioneers of American sex education and marriage counselling, and 
promoted educational ideas that were ‘startling in their modernity’ 
including promoting educational rights for children with physical and 
cognitive disabilities.62 Moreover, though the brothers were not medi-
cally trained, the extended Fowler family contained several medical 
doctors, albeit with heterodox leanings, who practised in both phreno-
logical and mainstream medical contexts. The Fowlers’ younger half-
sister, Almira Fowler Ormsbee Breakspear, received her MD in 1853 
from the Female Medical College in Philadelphia, and then served on 
its faculty as a demonstrator of anatomy and chemistry.63 And their 
younger half-brother, Edward Payson Fowler, received an MD from 
New York Medical College in 1855; deeply interested in spiritualism, 
mesmerism, and the ‘phenomena of the mind’, Edward set up a success-
ful practice in New York with two homeopathic physicians.64
Most importantly, Lorenzo’s wife, Lydia Folger Fowler, became in 
1850 the second woman in the United States after Elizabeth Blackwell 
to receive an accredited medical degree, and the first woman professor 
of medicine in the country.65 Madeleine Stern comments that ‘by the 
mid-1850s’, Lydia had ‘not only exerted an influence upon the interests 
and publications of her husband’s firm but made a niche for herself in 
the history of American medicine’.66 Lydia practiced ‘eclectic’ medicine, 
‘accepting the best of the homeopathic and even a modicum of the 
drug-ridden allopathic system’.67 Although allopathy became orthodox 
medicine in the twentieth century, eclectic practice was entirely respect-
able and probably the least harmful medical approach in the 1850s; it 
embraced all manner of health reforms from the truly efficacious to 
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the merely faddish. Thus, the Fowlers’ marriage of phrenology and 
medicine was mutually supportive and beneficial. Lydia accompanied 
her husband on his popular lecture tours across the United States, 
Canada, and Britain, where she preached the physiological benefits of 
temperance, hydropathy, and hygiene to great success. Lydia earned 
‘handsome sum[s] of money’ and received accolades from lecture 
attendees as a ‘true benefactress’ who relieved the ‘woes of the suffer-
ing’ by ‘her knowledge and skill in the medical profession’.68 When at 
home in New York, Lydia kept daily appointments at her own office 
and at the Fowler Phrenological Depot, and taught medical courses 
at the Metropolitan Medical College and the New York Hydropathic 
and Physiological School.69 After she and Lorenzo moved to London 
in the 1860s, Lydia continued her work as a health lecturer and district 
visitor; she furthered her medical studies in Paris and served three 
months in charge of the obstetrical department at the London Maryle-
bone Road Hospital.70 The early feminist periodical, The Englishwoman’s 
Review, noted that the ‘largest halls in England have not infrequently 
been filled’ to hear Lydia’s lectures, which encouraged women to ‘study 
for themselves’ the laws of life and health.71 Lydia herself estimated that 
some ‘200,000 women in English-speaking countries had attended her 
lectures’.72
Lydia Folger Fowler’s accomplishments place her at the forefront of 
early women doctors in Britain and America, alongside Elizabeth Black-
well, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson, Sophia Jex-Blake, and Mary Putnam 
Jacobi. Compared to these women, however, Lydia has received very 
little scholarly attention.73 In part, this neglect stems from the energy 
with which physicians, including Blackwell and Jacobi, worked to dis-
credit graduates of ‘irregular’ medical schools and practitioners such as 
eclectics and homeopaths.74 This is true even when their practices were 
quite similar; for example, Lovejoy notes that in the 1870s, Elizabeth 
Blackwell and Lydia Fowler were both living and working in England as 
‘writers and lecturers on medicosocial subjects, and both were calling 
attention to the influence of the mind upon bodily ailments’.75 That 
Blackwell was allowed on the Medical Register in England and Lydia 
was not was due to a loophole in the Medical Act of 1858 rather than 
because her credentials or her practice were superior. Eve Fine and 
others have shown that eclectic credentials did not necessarily disqual-
ify physicians, and especially women, from professional consideration.76 
Phrenology as neurodiversity 111
Lovejoy suggests that Lydia’s association with phrenology was as 
important – I would argue more important – as her eclecticism to 
her ‘disadvantage’ in the ‘general eulogy of pioneer medical women’.77 
Most pointedly, when Lydia is mentioned in histories of women and 
medicine, her marriage to the ‘phrenologist publisher’ Lorenzo often 
precedes mention of her medical degree.78
That Lydia’s historical neglect stems from her association with phre-
nology is ironic since phrenology prompted her medical studies and 
allowed her to develop a successful career and inspire other women to 
study medicine. Moreover, the Fowlers championed medical women 
enthusiastically and extended their reform activities to the woman’s 
movement generally. ‘The bridge was short’, writes Stern, ‘between the 
rights of women to water cure, dress reform, and health, and the rights 
of women to extended employment, equal pay for equal work, and full 
suffrage.’ 79 In both the United States and Britain, Lydia was a leader in 
women’s organisations, including her role as secretary at the Seneca 
Falls convention, where she won the admiration of Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, and as honorary secretary of the Woman’s British Temperance 
Society.80 Lydia’s combination of feminist politics and medicine was not 
unique – Elizabeth Garrett Anderson and Sophia Jex-Blake were both 
active suffragists, for instance. But as part of the Fowler enterprise, her 
feminist views received widespread publicity and were allied to more 
general and very popular reform movements. Of all the Fowlers, Lydia 
forces us to acknowledge that phrenology, however misguided as 
science, was integral to legitimate health and social reform of the nine-
teenth century. Her work also offers an example of how difficult it could 
be to distinguish between what we now consider heterodox and ortho-
dox medicine. As Bivins and others have argued, the ascendancy of 
biomedicine was neither smooth nor inevitable. The Fowlers’ phreno-
logical theory partook of and contributed to the discourses surround-
ing modern disorders such as neurasthenia and dyspepsia and to the 
fears of racial degeneration. But their holistic practice, with its emphasis 
on education, self-help, and especially brain plasticity also offered the 
public ways to transcend the determinism of those discourses.
As did most other early women physicians, Lydia Fowler treated 
women and children; therefore, her publications, which included a tem-
perance novel and volume of poetry as well as self-help medical tracts, 
brought phrenology and eclectic medical ideas to that audience. Her 
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writings demonstrate the degree to which she both participated in and 
resisted the new medical orthodoxy that sought to organise bodies for 
modern society. Lydia’s most widely read publication, the two-volume 
Familiar Lessons on Physiology and Phrenology, was specifically ‘designed 
for the use of children and youth in schools and families’.81 In her preface 
to this popular volume, Lydia writes to parents and teachers that physi-
ology and phrenology should be studied together because they are 
‘absolutely necessary to a full understanding of the mind’.82 She ‘cheer-
fully’ recommends that parents and teachers place her Familiar Lessons 
‘into the hands of their children as a guide to self-knowledge’.83 From 
the 1830s, American physiology textbooks promoted the better health 
of the individual and the nation,84 and the 1840s ‘saw an extraordinary 
flowering of the literature of child development’.85 The Fowlers come 
out of this tradition of self-help medicine and hygiene; their addition 
of phrenology to ‘right living’ brought currency to the tradition. And 
Familiar Lessons contains the sort of pious advice that one would expect 
from a mid-nineteenth-century text for children: ‘Children, if we culti-
vate [the social and domestic organs] properly, life will be a source of 
joy and happiness’ for ‘we can all … enjoy the sweets of a quiet home’.86 
Characteristic of heterodox medicine, it insists that mind and body 
work together: ‘The body must be in a healthy condition for the mind 
to act freely and vigorously.’ 87
However, despite its generic familiarity, Familiar Lessons on Physiol-
ogy and Phrenology is surprising. First, in keeping with the Fowler belief 
in self-culture, it directs advanced medical information toward its audi-
ence of children – for instance, a detailed discussion of the nerves of 
the brain illustrated in cross-section.88 Though some physiology text-
books in this period targeted students,89 the degree of specialised infor-
mation directed at young children is unusual and striking. Interestingly, 
the familiar phrenological skull appears only on the title-page, whereas 
the brains within the text appear as standard anatomical illustrations, 
emphasising the scientificity of Lydia’s phrenological theory. Secondly, 
Lydia asserts the social and evolutionary advantages even of negative 
traits, and that phrenological organs can be resized to better advantage. 
Combativeness and Destructiveness, for instance, ‘if rightly exercised, 
produce spirit, force, and energy of character’.90 Third, Familiar Lessons 
shows awareness of how children’s strengths and weaknesses exist on a 
spectrum. Lydia recounts how, in developing phrenology as a young 
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man, Gall had noticed that some of his schoolmates ‘were very generous 
and amiable, some selfish, some obstinate and cruel … He found that 
one liked the study of arithmetic, another could commit to memory, 
and so on … He became convinced that there must be a cause why he 
could not recite his lessons as rapidly and as freely as some of the other 
boys’.91 In other words, the text eschews a normative model of child 
development in favour of one that allows for neurological diversity.
Phrenology and neurodiversity
Although Familiar Lessons on Physiology and Phrenology resists norma-
tivising children and their development, and though Lydia is writing 
here about all children, both what we would call neurotypical and atypi-
cal, her phrenological descriptions bear a striking resemblance to how 
doctors and scientists have worked to define children with neurological 
disorders since the nineteenth century. For instance, the passage that 
Lydia recounts above from Gall resembles Hans Asperger’s descrip-
tions of the autistic children he studied in the 1930s at the Children’s 
Clinic in Vienna. Asperger has been applauded for his treatment of 
autistic children as ‘unique personalit[ies]’, whose conditions are a 
matter of ‘degree’, often with remarkable intelligence.92 Asperger resisted 
normative neurological descriptions much as Lydia had in Familiar 
Lessons. As did phrenologists and other physiognomists, Asperger 
assumed correlation between mental make-up and appearance, gener-
alising that ‘Autistic children lose their baby features very quickly … 
Their early thoughtfulness has formed their faces’.93 In his thesis on 
‘ “Autistic Psychopathy” in Childhood’ (1944), Asperger praises psy-
chotherapist Ernst Kretschmer for developing an accurate typology 
that matched ‘in feine Einzelheiten’ (‘in fine detail’) the physical to the 
psychological constitution – an idea embraced by ‘der alten Physiogno-
mik und der Phrenologie’.94 Also like phrenologists, Asperger accepted 
as functionally useful a range of abilities, personalities, and behaviours. 
As opposed to most autism researchers of the mid-twentieth century, 
who thought institutionalisation was the best option for autistic chil-
dren – and in contradiction to the Nazi regime under which he worked 
– Asperger asserted that ‘autistic people have their place in the organism 
of the social community’, particularly in fields that require single-
minded focus and originality.95 Still, Asperger and his colleagues were 
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working to identify ‘typical characteristics’ of this ‘highly distinctive’ 
personality. Phrenologists claimed to read character quickly from facial 
features and the shape of the skull; Asperger claimed that ‘Once one 
has properly recognised an autistic individual one can spot such chil-
dren instantly’.96
As Edith Sheffer has shown in persuasive detail, Asperger’s example 
demonstrates how categorising children – even with the most humane 
intentions – creates opportunities for systematic pathologising and dis-
crimination of the kind discussed by Steven Taylor in the previous 
chapter.97 Asperger’s clinic grew out of the progressive and interven-
tionist medical policies of socialist Vienna in the 1920s. But in the 
1930s, Austrofascism and then the Nazi Anschluss saw Asperger’s clinic 
move to the far right and participate in Nazi directives to sterilise, for-
cibly institutionalise, and murder children deemed socially unfit. Asper-
ger himself, who had previously resisted pathologising children in his 
clinic, introduced the idea of autism as a ‘psychopathy’.98 Though not 
as extreme as the ‘diagnosis regime’ of the Third Reich, Anglo-American 
culture since the Victorian period offers plenty of examples of such 
phenomena, from Francis Galton’s anthropometric laboratories, which 
collected anatomical data from thousands of students in public schools99 
to the ways in which intelligence testing in US schools confirmed ‘nativ-
ist, racist, and antisocialist political programs’.100
It is important to acknowledge, then, that the relative social and 
neurological progressivism of the Fowlers’ phrenology, like these later 
examples of measuring and categorising minds, is haunted by those 
who were excluded or diminished by its theory. With its evolutionary 
underpinnings and influence on physical anthropology, phrenology 
has been tied to the racial science that inspired the eugenics move-
ment, even as it fostered certain forms of progressivism. Carla Bittel, 
for instance, has noted that although phrenology could be adapted 
to ‘women’s rights causes’, it also helped white, middle-class women 
to distinguish themselves from ‘others’ and to ‘naturalize their own 
positive qualities’ and ‘further engrained scientific racism in American 
culture’.101 Phrenology remained implicated in and hampered by the 
taxonomic hierarchies of its times. Yet the Fowlers’ adherence to non-
normative theories of the brain and human behaviour, belief in the effi-
cacy of education and the possibility of full social integration, and the 
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commitment to broad access of their ideas also contributed to their appeal 
and legacy.
The Fowlers’ ambiguous legacy finds a parallel in the contradictions 
of the neuro-information campaigns of the twenty-first century and the 
populist political movements that resist mainstream medicine’s treat-
ment of those diagnosed with neurological conditions. These cam-
paigns, which are driven largely by new media and in response to rising 
rates of diagnoses of neurological conditions, include positions that are 
both deeply sceptical of science and that demand cures from research-
ers, that are both liberationist and reactionary. What they share is a 
dissatisfaction with mainstream medicine’s inability to adequately treat 
– sometimes even clearly diagnose – certain chronic or innate neuro-
logical conditions whose rates of diagnosis are perceived as ‘epidemic’. 
The case of autism is particularly instructive in this regard. Like neuras-
thenia in the Victorian period, autism is a sort of cultural signpost of 
the present moment whose prevalence has been blamed variously upon 
genetics; twenty-first-century mating practices, and especially those 
tied to women’s greater education and career advancement; environ-
mental toxins; poor parenting; or dangerous vaccinations.102 Regardless 
of cause, autism, like Victorian disorders of modernity, involves the 
family and extended social structures such as schools, social services, 
and healthcare. Similarly, the inability of modern medicine to provide 
a cure or even definitive therapy regimen for autism has opened the 
door for heterodox medical solutions and autism’s commodification in 
the medical marketplace.
Just as Lydia Fowler’s Familiar Lessons on Phrenology found an audi-
ence among mothers anxious for their children’s brains and futures, 
the most driven twenty-first-century autism activists have been parents 
seeking alternatives to the bleak predictions of an autism diagnosis. 
The success of autism awareness campaigns has been driven by pub-
licity and the broad dissemination of information beyond ‘experts’ to 
families and to autistic people themselves. The explosion of books, 
websites, and blogs published by and for the neurodiverse parallels 
the explosion of public health information in the nineteenth century, 
exemplified by the Fowlers’ public relations machine, and with similar 
spectacular results. The Fowlers influenced everything from criminal 
reforms to sexual education to hygienic house design in the US.103 The 
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neurological information campaign has shaped special education ser-
vices and products, paediatric practice, and even home design.
On one hand, this explosion of information has exposed families and 
the neurodiverse to commercial exploitation. In response to medical 
pronouncements that autism is ‘hardwired’ and incurable, families 
pursue expensive and sometimes dangerous alternative therapies of 
dubious medical value. The lobbies of many autism conferences are 
filled with vendors selling expensive technology or promoting risky 
biomedical treatments. Persuaded by faulty research such as Andrew 
Wakefield’s 1998 study that MMR vaccines cause autism, some families 
have refused to vaccinate their children, despite surges in measles and 
pertussis. The impact on public health of the anti-vaccination move-
ment of the twenty-first century rivals that of the nineteenth, when 
anti-vaccination activists argued that state-sanctioned medicine under-
mined individual civil liberties.104
An alternative wing of the neuro-information campaign, the emer-
gent neurodiversity movement, offers a more positive and less dan-
gerous response to mainstream medicine’s stance on autism as largely 
untreatable. Though not a ‘new phrenology’, the neurodiversity move-
ment shares certain features with the Fowlers’ practical phrenology, 
both in theory and methods. Neurodiversity activists pursue alterna-
tives to the ‘pathology paradigm’ surrounding the rise in neurological 
disorder diagnoses, and argue that neurodiversity is both a ‘natural and 
a valuable form of human diversity’.105 Neurodiversity activists argue for 
greater acceptance of neurological difference, that human brains exist 
along ‘continuums of competence’, and for an anthropological view 
of neurological ‘competence’ as culturally determined, all notions that 
were present in practical phrenology.106 Significantly, as did the Fowlers’ 
phrenology, the neurodiversity paradigm assumes a degree of neuro-
plasticity by which individuals might develop their brains through ther-
apies, learned strategies, or assistive technologies. This is particularly 
the case when therapies are begun at an early age, and so children are 
central to the politics and therapeutics of both. And like the Fowlers, 
the neurodiversity movement both resists and employs science, in 
particular, by integrating the difficult issue of heredity/genetics into 
its paradigm while retaining space for individual development. Practi-
cal phrenologists such as the Fowlers found cultural and evolutionary 
value in certain innate but maligned traits, and neurodiversity activists 
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use evolutionary arguments in support of their cause. For instance, Ari 
Ne’eman cites the warning of autism researcher, Simon Baron-Cohen, 
that testing for autism could ‘repeat the history of eugenics’ and ‘inad-
vertently “cure” not just autism but the associated talents that are not 
in need of treatment’.107
Just as the Fowlers linked health to politics and social reform, the 
neurodiversity movement is closely allied with disability rights and 
other civil rights movements that see self-advocacy and representation 
as key to social justice. Their motto ‘nothing about us, without us!’ is 
not far from ‘self-made or never made’.108 However, unlike phrenolo-
gists, whose theories leant validity to racist and sexist taxonomies, neu-
rodiversity activists have largely avoided the danger inherent in self-help 
strategies that ultimately place responsibility upon individuals to fit into 
a normative system. Cooter contends that Victorian phrenology ‘mostly 
encouraged changing oneself to fit the system’ rather than fuelling the 
social reform that Combes and the Fowlers sought.109 And Julie Prebel 
observes that the ‘digital body slices’ produced by neural imaging tech-
nologies are analogous to the invasive taxonomic ordering of nineteenth-
century phrenological sketches and photographs; both create ‘epistemic 
changes in the scientific surveillance of the human body’.110 In fact, most 
autism research and most parent-led autism awareness campaigns con-
tinue to emphasise cures and strategies whereby autistic people can 
adapt themselves to a neurotypical world. In contrast, the more radical 
and autistic-led neurodiversity movement asserts that our neurotypical-
based culture itself needs to change. Neurodiversity activists, dissemi-
nating information on the internet, and working through parents and 
schools are becoming increasingly successful in their efforts to create 
accommodation for the neurodiverse and to make our culture more 
‘neurocosmopolitan’.111
Both the Fowlers’ phrenology and the neuro-information campaigns 
demonstrate that pressure from the popular front – from parents, 
schools, and physicians – can push orthodox medical researchers to 
re-evaluate their assumptions and shift their paradigms. What seems 
possible to both scientists and the public is socially constructed in many 
respects. Just as phrenology opened the door for advances in brain 
science, neurodivergents are increasingly shaping scientific research 
both as activists and scientists around the lived experience of the 
patient.112 Similarly, the predictive nature of diagnoses in phrenology 
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– ‘you are X’ and so will make an excellent ‘Y’ – often resulted in a ful-
filled prophecy. Stern argues that Lorenzo Fowler’s analysis of the young 
Walt Whitman’s head in 1849 exerted ‘a deep influence not only upon 
his character … but upon his work’: ‘Leading traits of character appear 
to be Friendship, Sympathy, Sublimity and Self-Esteem … and a certain 
reckless swing of animal will’ wrote Fowler.113 The American Civil War 
nurse, Clara Barton, recounted in her memoirs Lorenzo Fowler’s pre-
dictive reading of her head when she was fifteen: ‘She will never assert 
herself for herself –she will suffer wrong first – but for others she will 
be fearless.’ 114 The extraordinary popularity of the Fowlers was surely 
enhanced by the self-fulfilling power of such optimistic readings, just 
as promises of neuroplasticity or an increasingly neurocosmopolitan 
society are reassuring to autistic people and their families in the present. 
In many cases, these promises will prove illusory or incomplete, but 
without medical cures or demonstrably effective medical therapies, 
they are preferable to extreme and dangerous therapies.
The Fowlers’ negotiation of medicine and modernity was decidedly 
uneven. While not denying the diseases of modern life or the evolution-
ary correlation between progress and pathology, the Fowlers offered a 
medical paradigm and system of treatments that lessened the weight of 
modernity upon the individual. They triumphed in the modern arenas 
of market capitalism and information dissemination, advocating a 
radical individualism that promised greater agency in modern society 
through self-determination. At the same time, however, their phreno-
logical theory reinforced neurological taxonomies of class, race, and 
gender that undergirded a white middle-class society. The Fowlers’ 
medical eclecticism offers a path for postmodern consumers who can 
and do choose among a variety of orthodox and heterodox medical 
therapies – from acupuncture to chiropractic, herbalism to energy 
medicine – to pursue their ‘healthean’ goals. Their example also offers 
a warning not to ignore the socio-political implications of those choices 
and goals.
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Paradoxes of modern living

5
A disease-free world: the hygienic 
utopia in Jules Verne, Camille 
Flammarion, and William Morris
Manon Mathias
Modern Western societies have a complex relationship with hygiene. 
Since the publication of David Strachan’s 1989 article, the ‘hygiene 
hypothesis’ has been taken up by both scientists and society at large as 
the basis for the idea that Western households are too clean.1 Strachan’s 
research has been further developed by immunologists such as Graham 
Rook, whose ‘old friends’ theory suggests that beneficial microbes have 
been eliminated through time, contributing towards today’s inflamma-
tory disorders.2 Warnings of increasing antimicrobial resistance also 
seem to justify the belief that dirt is good for us.3 But definitive answers 
to these questions are yet to be found, and the idea that ‘somehow 
people should be less clean’ is unhelpful, as shown by the high numbers 
of gastric ailments still caused every year by lack of handwashing.4 The 
debate surrounding links between cleanliness, dirt, and health con-
tinues. This chapter intervenes in the debate by focusing on literary 
engagements with the topic and thereby challenges the narrative of 
a straightforward move from dirt to cleanliness by demonstrating a 
much more complex relationship between filth, hygiene, and modern 
selfhood.
Strachan’s hygiene hypothesis seemed to undermine, indeed reverse, 
accepted wisdom regarding dirt and its nefarious qualities, which had 
been the broad consensus since germ theory was widely accepted. A 
connection between disease and filth, especially human waste, had, of 
course, been drawn by humans for centuries: Egyptian physicians, for 
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instance, believed that disease was caused by the absorption of putrefy-
ing faeces,5 and as asserted by Micaela Sullivan-Fowler, ‘perhaps no 
other part of the body has played a longer or larger part in disease origin 
than the intestines and its most visible, odorous by-product, feces’.6 
Although human excrement had been valued for its positive qualities 
in certain periods, Western culture broadly witnessed a shift away from 
the valorisation of faecal matter from the 1500s.7 Indeed, studies explic-
itly focused on excrement have mostly concentrated on early modern 
periods of English literature, when attitudes towards filth were strongly 
mediated by religious concerns and moral distinctions.8 It was in the 
nineteenth century, however, that the fixation with dirt and its links 
with ill health came into prominence, as the growth of cities led to 
unprecedented levels of overcrowding and subsequent sanitary prob-
lems, particularly in relation to human waste.
Many explanations have been proposed for the increasing human 
revulsion towards excrement in modern Western society. Sociologist 
Paul Rozin has suggested that disgust is based on links with digestion, 
drawing on Darwin’s position on disgust as a form of food rejection.9 
Others have posited a combination of biological and sociological 
factors. According to David Inglis, for instance, our attitudes towards 
excrement are based on both medico-scientific knowledge and moral 
factors.10 Anthropologist Mary Douglas’s classic study of dirt and 
hygiene also focuses on the social dimension, arguing that the phenom-
ena considered as dirty are those which disrupt the moral or social 
order of society: ‘dirt is essentially disorder’.11 Such a line of thought 
plays an important role in the formulation of modern selfhood in the 
nineteenth century, and since the turn of the millennium, a wealth of 
reflection has emerged, particularly within Victorian studies, on the 
interconnected topics of dirt, filth, waste, and human response to these 
phenomena, disgust.12
Early nineteenth-century hygienist debates on the spread of disease 
targeted excrement particularly within working-class quarters, as has 
been noted by historians such as Christopher Hamlin and William 
Cohen.13 The centrality of excrement within the broader develop-
ment of modern societies, especially through attempts to control and 
excise the substance, is also outlined by Dominique Laporte and Alain 
Corbin, as well as by David Barnes in his study of the century’s Great 
Stinks.14 Studies highlight the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in 
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particular, as a key moment for discussions of excrement and its links 
with disease,15 as the realisation that disease spread through microbial 
transmission, especially human contact, intensified the fear of dirt and 
led to an increased obsession with cleanliness.16
The topic is all but absent within French studies, however, as far as 
the study of literature is concerned. Laporte’s Histoire de la merde 
(1978), and to a lesser extent Corbin’s Le Miasme et la jonquille (1986), 
are historical studies which do not focus on literary texts.17 Scholarship 
on the complex nexus between dirt and hygiene and on their role in 
shaping modern selfhood is so far overwhelmingly historical in focus, 
and much of this scholarship traces a broad move from dirt to cleanli-
ness, linked with the shift from primitivism to civilisation. This chapter, 
however, takes issue with the ‘narrative of progress and deodorization’ 
away from the dirty, malodorous body, and the unqualified benefits of 
such a development, through an investigation of specifically literary 
reflections on the consequences of dirt removal for human identity.18
This chapter analyses attitudes towards dirt and bodily waste in 
nineteenth-century British and French science fiction novels as a means 
of understanding perceptions of disease and hygiene in the early period 
of bacteriology. One of its aims is to consider what this tells us about 
the modern individual’s relationship with the body, especially the ways 
in which the ambivalence of this relationship is distinctively explored 
through literary texts. To do this, I examine three utopian novels from 
the last decades of the century, when the emphasis on extreme cleanli-
ness was at its height:19 Jules Verne’s Cinq cents millions de la Bégum 
(1880), Camille Flammarion’s Uranie (1889), and William Morris’s 
News from Nowhere (1890). Morris’s novel is now widely recognised 
as an important contribution to English social and political thought, 
but has rarely been studied in relation to health and disease. The two 
French novels have also received little critical attention in relation to 
this topic, particularly Flammarion’s Uranie, which has not been the 
focus of any sustained analysis. Through their visions of alternative 
societies, however, these three texts provide valuable insights into views 
on disease and hygiene in the 1880s and 1890s, the legacies of which 
continue to this day.
The decision to focus on French and British novels from this period 
is driven by the fact that the two largest cities in Europe, and its ‘fore-
most urban and cultural centres’ in the nineteenth century, were 
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London and Paris.20 These two cities were regarded as the epicentres of 
modernity in the sense of a social and medico-scientific phenomenon 
involving the emergence of Western bourgeois identity and values. The 
chapter focuses on issues of ‘hygiene’, a term which comes from the 
French hygiène and is derived from the ancient Greek goddess of health, 
Hygeia. Hygiene became a shorthand term for the Greek natural science 
of preserving and extending life,21 and the use of the word to refer to 
‘that department of knowledge or practice which relates to the mainte-
nance of health’ 22 continued into the nineteenth century. I use the term 
in this way when speaking of ‘public hygiene’, which was largely con-
cerned with practices for preserving health. By the late nineteenth 
century, however, the triumphs of the sanitary reform movement made 
hygiene synonymous with ‘cleanliness’, and by the end of the century, 
hygiene held ‘a considerably narrower meaning than [it] had held his-
torically, reflective of the overriding significance cleanliness had 
acquired over the course of the nineteenth century’.23 On the whole, 
this chapter uses the term ‘hygiene’ on its own in this narrower sense 
of purity or cleanliness, the meaning acquired by the end of the nine-
teenth century and still used today.
I will place the analysis in the context of new scientific understand-
ings of bacteria that began to develop in the late nineteenth century. It 
was during this century that filth, and particularly human excrement, 
came to dominate discussions of health and disease: as waste removal 
became a major issue with the unprecedented growth of cities, diseases 
that were spread through contamination with excrement (such as 
typhus, typhoid fever, and cholera) became prevalent, and the volume 
of urban filth and efforts to remove it ‘surpassed its previous dimen-
sions’.24 Within this context, France and Britain were leading nations in 
public hygiene, the founding of which has been noted by historians and 
sociologists as a significant factor in the emergence of modern Western 
societies.25 The establishment of public hygiene as a distinct scientific 
discipline began in France in the 1820s with the formation of the first 
dedicated journal, the Annales d’hygiène publique et de médicine légale, in 
1829, and the pioneering work of individuals calling themselves hygien-
ists, especially Louis-René Villermé and Alexandre Parent-Duchâte-
let.26 In terms of practical public health measures, Britain soon took the 
lead, and by the second half of the century the British were largely 
regarded as the front runners in public health reform. On the level of 
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theory and research, however, France continued to make major contri-
butions to the field, and it was in France that the germ theory of disease 
was born in the last decades of the century with Pasteur’s research on 
microorganisms.
Up until the second half of the nineteenth century the causes of 
infection remained in dispute,27 and it was in the 1860s and 1870s that 
experimental work to link germs and diseases began to show marked 
signs of success.28 The main contributions to the debate were made by 
Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, who linked particular microorganisms 
to specific diseases. Up to this point, miasma theory had provided the 
predominant explanation of disease – the belief that disease developed 
through the spontaneous generation of harmful elements from putre-
fying matter – and a whole range of potential sources of disease had 
been identified, such as dampness, bad soil, and bad air.29 Bacteriol-
ogy, however, now posited that disease was the outcome of contagion 
by germs, specifically the transmission of germs through water-based 
means and through human contact.30 The repugnance towards dirt was 
already present in miasma theory, with the fear towards bad smells 
emanating, in particular, from human excrement as a potential cause 
of disease. This fear now intensified into a more specific anxiety, since 
the seemingly clean could be harbouring a host of invisible microbes. 
Further, although the cause and nature of disease was now better under-
stood, cures through antimicrobial drugs would not be discovered until 
the first half of the twentieth century, and thus the implications of early 
bacteriology on a practical level was a focus on prevention and a height-
ened preoccupation with cleanliness.31
One of the texts that most obviously exemplifies the obsession with 
hygiene in the late nineteenth century is Jules Verne’s Cinq cents millions 
de la Bégum (1880). In this text, a French Napoleonic soldier settles in 
India and marries the widow (the begum) of a wealthy rajah. When he 
and the widow die, the fortune is divided between the two remaining 
heirs: Dr Sarrasin, a French hygienist, and Dr Schultz, professor of 
chemistry at Jena University. Both decide to use the money to set up 
their ideal city; the benevolent Sarrasin creates ‘France-Ville’, a society 
engineered to promote health and longevity in Oregon, USA, whereas 
the despotic Schultz forms Stahlstadt, a hierarchical city which pro-
duces firearms and aims to destroy or conquer all other communities. 
Those few critics who refer to Verne’s novel highlight the contrast 
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between the utopian France-Ville and the dystopian Stahlstadt and its 
‘evil scientist’ creator.32 Nadia Minerva has perceptively suggested that 
the portrayal of Stahlstadt is in fact more compelling than that of 
France-Ville.33 Indeed, Verne himself wrote in a letter that he preferred 
Stahlstadt.34 But this is precisely what makes France-Ville, an apparently 
ideal city of hygiene, such an arresting case.
Peter Schulman argues that docteur Sarrasin in Bégum is ‘propelled 
by fear of microbial contamination’ in his preoccupation with health 
and hygiene,35 while historian Georges Vigarello refers to Verne’s text 
as ‘the first Utopia dominated by the war against the microbe’.36 However, 
there are no references to microbes in Bégum, and neither Schulman 
nor Vigarello go any further in examining the medical context of the 
novel or in explaining what leads them to make these inferences. The 
term ‘microbe’ was first coined (in both French and English) when 
Verne was writing his novel, in 1878. Bégum refers instead to ‘germs’, a 
word that had long been used to denote the ‘seed’ of contagion.37 Advo-
cates of the new germ theory of disease in the 1870s adopted the term 
to refer to microscopic organisms capable of causing human or animal 
disease. The ‘germ theory of disease’ came into common use in medical 
literature around 1870 as a scientific shorthand for propositions associ-
ated with the work of Pasteur, Koch, Tyndall, and others.38 Bégum does 
include a direct reference to Benjamin Richardson’s Hygeia, an address 
delivered by the renowned public health activist in 1876. Richardson’s 
understanding of disease was largely based on the earlier theory which 
posited that disease agents were chemical ferments produced by decay-
ing filth, and could generate spontaneously.39 Richardson’s sanitarian 
ideal was based on the view that miasma emanating from filth, particu-
larly from human excrement, caused disease. It would therefore seem 
that Verne’s text draws on earlier, pre-bacteriological understandings of 
disease.
However, bacteriology and miasmatic theory initially existed in 
tandem until at least the beginning of the twentieth century, and in 
some senses the new science simply replaced the already existing 
emphasis on excrement in miasma theory.40 The prominent French 
physician, Fonssagrives, for example, refers in his La Maison. Étude 
d’hygiène et de bien-être (1871), to ‘putrid’ or ‘fetid’ emanations and 
‘mephitis through putrid matter’ 41 whilst also noting the work of 
Tyndall and the idea that ‘many contagious illnesses or epidemics are 
A disease-free world 133
due to the movement and dissemination of living germs’.42 Initially, 
bacteriological theories were woven into earlier conceptions of filth, 
and strengthened and justified aspects of miasmatism.
We now know that when he was writing Bégum, Verne was reworking 
a manuscript by Paschal Grousset and it seems that it was Grousset who 
initially drew on Richardson. The manuscript by Grousset has not sur-
vived but we have Verne’s letters outlining his response to the work, 
where he notes his intention of making quite considerable changes. 
Verne specialists, however, consider the novel as a thoroughly Vernian 
text43 and it is known that Verne himself was exceptionally well read in 
contemporary science.44 When writing the novel in the late 1870s he 
specifically showed strong respect for Pasteur, placing him alongside 
writer Victor Hugo as one of the greatest Frenchmen of the nineteenth 
century for his contributions to science.45
Verne was writing Bégum before Pasteur’s theory was widely accepted 
and understood by the general public. Nevertheless, the new bacterio-
logical view of disease was beginning to be introduced to both medical 
and popular audiences,46 and Verne would certainly have been aware 
of the developments in the understanding of disease and the gradual 
adaptation of earlier sanitarian principles in the service of germ theory. 
The language used for hygiene and infection in Bégum presents a com-
bination of miasma theory and the newer understanding of germs: 
carpets and wallpaper are referred to as ‘veritable nests of miasma’, and 
the government’s main task is said to be ‘cleaning, ceaseless cleaning, 
destroying and annihilating the miasma that constantly emanate from 
human agglomerations as soon as they are formed’.47 But with regards to 
offensive materials such as carpets and wallpaper, ‘not a single morbid 
germ can conceal itself ’ within them.48 The laundrettes in the city 
feature ‘disinfection rooms’, and illnesses are said to be due to contagion 
transmitted either through air (adhering to earlier miasmatic theory) 
or through food – a more recent finding of bacteriology.49 Rather than 
demonstrating a preoccupation with microbes, Bégum presents a tran-
sitioning moment between the earlier sanitarian model and the newer 
principles of bacteriology.
Moreover, in Bégum, Verne is less interested in disseminating new 
knowledge of disease and bacteriology than with exploring the implica-
tions of extreme hygiene for society. France-Ville, ‘the city of Wellbe-
ing’,50 is entirely devoted to hygiene: a journalist notes that ‘we would 
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never be done if we tried to enumerate the hygienic perfections which 
the founders of the new city have put into place’,51 and asserts that ‘the 
question of individual and collective cleanliness is the central preoc-
cupation of the founders of France-Ville’.52 Its creator, Sarrasin, repeat-
edly highlights his desire to build a city ‘based on rigorously scientific 
data’ 53 in the name of Humanity and of Progress.54 The city has no theft 
or murders, very few illnesses, and no epidemics. Whereas the annual 
mortality rate in affluent European cities is said to be at least 3%, in 
France-Ville the average is 1.5%.55 All the inhabitants lead healthy, 
regular, hardworking lives in an egalitarian community run by a com-
mittee which rejects ‘the tiring and insipid uniformity’ of other cities.56 
Bégum thus seems to depict the perfect balance between public hygiene 
and individual freedom.
However, as Peter Schulman notes, France-Ville is ‘somewhat fright-
ful’.57 The ambiguous nature of France-Ville is suggested through its 
unequal status in the text: only a very few pages are devoted exclusively 
to descriptions of France-Ville whereas Stahlstadt is the focus of several 
chapters. Further, the city of hygiene is presented indirectly: as a pro-
spective project in Sarrasin’s speech to the medical conference, in an 
article in a German review, and through other brief glimpses. Nadia 
Minerva suggests that this might be because ‘perfection cannot be rep-
resented without falling into the stereotypes of a well-worn genre’.58 But 
the refusal to offer direct descriptions of France-Ville might also be due 
to its problematic nature. Whereas the novel appears to offer a model 
city, the absence of dirt and disease entails the absence of passion, 
excitement, and independence of thought.
The regularity of the inhabitants’ lifestyle or ‘scientific regime’ is 
repressive.59 A set of ten rules, for example, is laid out for all households, 
including specific regulations for their construction: the walls will be 
made of ‘tubular bricks conforming to the patented model’,60 a model 
that is ‘perfectly regular in form, weight and density, and pierced length-
ways by a series of cylindrical and parallel holes’.61 More specifically 
with regards to hygiene, certain materials are forbidden due to their 
threat to human health, and the streets and pavements are to be kept as 
clean as the tiles in a Dutch court: an extremely high standard.62 Food 
markets are kept under strict surveillance by trained experts through 
‘sanitarian policing’ 63 and the city is made up entirely of streets lined 
up ‘at right angles, at equal distances, of uniform width, planted with 
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trees and designated by ordering numbers’.64 Dirt is immediately 
removed: a stain on a child’s clothes, for example, is considered ‘an 
absolute disgrace’.65 All excrement is swiftly expelled from the city.66
The effect of this rigorous hygienic regime on the inhabitants is 
telling. The city has reached ‘the highest degree of prosperity’ in mate-
rial and intellectual terms,67 but when it comes to the citizens’ psycho-
logical condition, it is the absence of emotion that is striking. During 
the peak crisis of the book, when the population is at risk of extermina-
tion, they remain perfectly composed, ‘above all disorderly emotion of 
alarm or anger’.68 They are steady, calm and silent, and, troublingly, ‘in 
thrall’ 69 to Sarrasin’s words. The hygienic lifestyle leaves them incapable 
of experiencing strong emotions or of exhibiting independence of 
thought. Underneath the portrayal of this ‘model city’ 70 of health and 
well-being, then, is a covert criticism of extreme hygiene.
In this sense, Bégum can be read as an example of the ‘utopian after-
life’ as defined by Daniel Sipe. Scholars have argued that the yearning for 
utopia disappears from literature in France after the Enlightenment and 
is expressed instead through social experiments and technological pro-
jects.71 Sipe, however, points to the ‘utopian afterlife’ as a literary form 
which both takes up and rejects aspects of the literary and scientific 
utopia.72 J. J. Grandville’s Un autre monde (1844), for example, which 
mockingly fictionalises Charles Fourier’s utopian system, embarks on 
a utopian adventure whilst undertaking ‘a critique of the manner in 
which utopian designers like Fourier intend to bring it about’.73 Bégum 
draws on the literary tradition of utopian writing though its creation 
of a model city and the exploration of this space through a foreigner’s 
gaze, that of a young Alsatian worker. It is also utopian in the socio-
scientific sense in that its North American setting echoes the social 
experiments of Robert Owen or Étienne Cabet. However, whilst the 
novel does not offer the explicit critique that Grandville’s text does, 
it rejects the utopian tradition by failing to demonstrate wider social 
happiness in France-Ville, by refusing to offer precise descriptions of 
the city, and through its distressing portrayal of a life ‘regulated by 
science’.74
Camille Flammarion’s Uranie (1889) goes one step further both in 
its setting and in its take on hygiene. Flammarion published several 
successful popular science books in the second half of the century, and 
he is perhaps best known for his defence of intelligent life on other 
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planets. But Flammarion also wrote philosophical dialogues and fiction, 
and in Uranie he combines his interest in astronomical explanation with 
reflections on hygiene and the body. As one of the leading popularisers 
of science in the second half of the nineteenth century, Flammarion 
would have been familiar with the evolving understanding of disease. 
Uranie was written in the 1880s, by which point new understandings of 
infection were more widely disseminated beyond scientists and physi-
cians.75 It is important that the first disease convincingly linked to a 
specific microorganism (in a paper of 1876 by Koch) was anthrax, as 
this disease had hardy spores, which could survive even though the 
bacteria might have been killed. The resistant nature of anthrax had a 
particular effect on the preventative strategies developed against disease 
in the name of germ theory: it was widely believed that all pathogenic 
microorganisms were tenacious and needed to be addressed in aggres-
sive terms, leading to a heightened emphasis on the removal of dirt.76 
Although filth had long been linked with disease and was central to 
miasmatic theory, the idea that everyday substances such as food, cloth-
ing, and even body parts might be teeming with pathogenic and highly 
resilient organisms, added a new urgency to the battle against dirt.
In the only commentary I have found on Uranie, Everett Bleiler criti-
cises the work’s lack of cohesion.77 I would argue, however, that its three 
main sections are unified through a consistent attempt to transcend 
earthly reality. In the first section, for example, the narrator is taken on 
a journey to other planets inhabited by a range of creatures superior to 
human beings. On one planet he sees creatures that are translucent, 
androgynous, and blessed with superior intellectual and moral quali-
ties. On another, he comes across individuals that have been reborn as 
superior beings through a process of ‘transmigration’.78 There is a yearn-
ing for the ideal in Section II also, as ‘Uranie’, a symbol for astronomy, 
is said to lead to infinity.79 Throughout the text there is an attempt to 
move beyond material, earth-bound existence.
The most significant section from a hygienist standpoint is the final 
one, ‘Ciel et Terre’ (Earth and Sky), where the first-person narrator 
wakes up to find himself on Mars. Two aliens explain to him that life 
on Earth is ‘a total failure’ 80 due to humanity’s reliance on the body. 
Tracing our planet’s downfall to the moment when the first mollusc 
developed a stomach, the Martians criticise our practice of killing and 
consuming other creatures and explicitly identify ‘the first digestive 
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tube’ as the cause of our baseness.81 Human bodies are ‘repugnant’, 
‘base’, and ‘monstrous’,82 whereas the Martians nourish themselves 
simply through breathing and have never digested food: ‘we do not eat, 
we have never eaten and we will never eat’.83 They consider it impossible 
for human beings (‘ignoble organisms’) to have thoughts that are 
‘healthy, pure, elevated, … clean’.84 Cleanliness is thus identified as the 
basis for moral and intellectual superiority, achieved through detach-
ment from the body. On Mars, for instance, there has never been reli-
gious intolerance, martyrs, torturers, war, or murder, and the Martians 
live in peace, liberated from all material needs and constantly engaged 
in intellectual activity.
Uranie combines fiction (utopia, fantasy, love story), popular astron-
omy, religion, and psychic research, fulfilling the generic diversity and 
multiplicity which Sipe insists characterises the utopian afterlife.85 In its 
exploration of space, the text calls to mind the writings of Bergerac 
(L’Autre monde: ou les états et empires de la lune, 1657), Voltaire (Micro-
mégas, 1752), and Verne (De la terre à la lune, 1865), and it draws on 
the tradition of literary utopianism by using the framework of a fictional 
account to consider an imagined world. Yet, like Bégum, Uranie also 
rejects the utopian tradition, as the novel offers little sense of any coher-
ent form of society. Moreover, although the narrator is disappointed to 
find himself back on Earth and seems to idealise what he has seen on 
Mars, the portrayal of life on the other planet is ambiguous.
The Martians live an apparently ideal existence free from pain and 
all physical needs. The text repeatedly notes the immaterial nature of 
their existence: they live ‘for the spirit and through the spirit’ and ‘mate-
rial forces play only a secondary role’ in their lives.86 Bodily waste is not 
mentioned at all, presumably since, if the Martians do not eat, neither 
do they defecate. Excrement only appears in the earlier sections in the 
text. It is said, for example, that, without the awareness of the soul, the 
earth’s entire history would be doomed to nothingness and become ‘a 
disappointing absurdity, more miserable and more senseless than the 
excrement of an earthworm’.87 A later tale involves the discovery of a 
corpse in a pile of manure. Excrement is thus posited as a worthless 
by-product or is associated with death.
Beyond the elimination of excrement from their lives, the Martians 
are also explicitly free from decay or disease: ‘the heavy burdens of the 
earth and the suffering of pain are completely unknown. Everything [on 
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Mars] is more heavenly, more ethereal, more immaterial’.88 But the 
release from the body comes at a price. The Martians’ nervous systems 
are so advanced that they are compared with electrical appliances,89 and 
their most sensual impressions are experienced ‘more by the soul rather 
than by the body’.90 They live without passion: their liberation from ‘the 
crudeness of earthly needs’ 91 means not only that they do not eat, but 
that they are also asexual. Conception takes place through a method 
similar to that of flowers. They feel no erotic pleasure, and all sensations 
are experienced on an intellectual level only. The novel presents a pas-
sionless existence.
Despite the constant denial of materiality in Uranie, however, the 
narrator does notice some physical activity being carried out on Mars 
by machines ‘operated by perfected animal races, whose intelligence is 
similar to that of humans on earth’.92 No more is said of the status or 
well-being of these creatures. Although they are referred to as animals, 
the comparison with human intelligence leads us as readers to make 
uncomfortable connections with them. This sinister reference to 
exploited entities in Uranie can be compared with the explicit subjuga-
tion of individuals in Verne’s Bégum. Chinese workers are essential to 
the construction of France-Ville, for example, with ‘an army of twenty 
thousand Chinese coolies’ toiling under the direction of ‘five hundred 
European supervisors and engineers’.93 When the city is threatened by 
an attack from Schultz, it is these labourers who mobilise to protect it: 
‘armies of coolies moved the ground, dug trenches, raised ramparts and 
fortifications at all appropriate points’.94 The list of verbs stresses the 
active contribution made by the workers. But, having supplied their 
labour, the ‘coolies’ are no longer welcome in the city: they can only 
access their earnings by promising not to return. This discriminatory 
policy is presented by the narrator as ‘an indispensable precaution for 
getting rid of a yellow population, which would certainly have had an 
adverse effect on the character and genius of the new city’.95 The workers 
are discarded to ensure the economic, ethnic, and intellectual stability 
of France-Ville. Hygiene is thus presented as a multilayered phenome-
non in Verne’s text, not only physical and mental, but also racial.
Laura Otis has shown that the germ theory of disease was crucially 
intertwined in the late nineteenth century with concepts of invasion 
and colonialism, especially in France and Britain: ‘if one believes that 
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invisible germs, spread by human contact, can make one sick, one 
becomes more and more anxious about penetration and about any 
connection with other people – the same anxieties inspired by impe-
rialism’.96 These comments are particularly pertinent to the context of 
Bégum and Uranie, written after France’s bitter defeat in the Franco-
Prussian war and at a point when France was acutely aware of its ailing 
position on the world stage, with falling birth rates, and a range of 
serious pathologies plaguing the nation.97 Docteur Sarrasin in Bégum, 
for example, reads an article at the beginning of the novel, entitled ‘Why 
are all Frenchmen suffering from varying degrees of hereditary degen-
eration?’ 98 There is therefore a dark side to the relentless emphasis on 
health and strength in these texts which can be linked with France’s 
contemporary desire for racial and national purity.
The portrayals of ideal hygienic societies in Verne and Flammarion 
and the unsettling consequences of dirt removal can be compared with 
William Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890), a novel which Virginia 
Smith reads as ‘a full account of [the] wonderful hygienic world to 
come’.99 The new world in Morris’s text is set in a fictional London of 
the future, removed of filth, and offering a vision of pastoral, ecological, 
and hygienic harmony. Society has been cleansed of literal dirt – indus-
trial soot, grime, and urban squalor –and filthy lucre, crime, and disease 
are also absent. Morris’s work focuses mainly on social organisation, 
and this is the main angle from which the text has been analysed by 
critics. Unlike Verne and Flammarion, who famously engaged with the 
new scientific developments of the day, Morris is primarily known for 
his contributions to socialist theory, aesthetics, and his ecological con-
sciousness. There are no explicit references to germs or bacteria in the 
novel. Rather, it is on a more indirect level that the preoccupation with 
cleanliness and purity surfaces here.
There is a strong emphasis, for instance, on health, vigour, and lon-
gevity in Morris’s text. The women that the narrator meets are ‘well-knit 
of body, and thoroughly healthy-looking and strong’ and he observes 
that beauty is now ‘not so fleeting as it was in the days when we were 
burdened heavily by self-inflicted diseases’.100 The fact that the diseases 
of earlier times were self-inflicted shows that they can be removed 
through effort of will. Indeed, almost all diseases have been eradicated 
from the new society, including the scourge which posed one of the 
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greatest threats to nineteenth-century urban centres: cholera. The 
residents’ youthfulness is highlighted in contrast with the nineteenth-
century narrator’s wizened appearance: he meets a lady who is forty-
two, for example, but looks as though she were twenty.
In contrast with Flammarion’s text and Verne’s Bégum, Morris’s News 
from Nowhere offers an apparently anxiety-free view of excrement. In 
Verne’s and Flammarion’s works, human waste is mentioned only to be 
denied. In Bégum, for example, the ‘products of the sewers’ 101 are imme-
diately expelled and transported to the countryside, and in Uranie, the 
lack of digestion makes excrement non-existent; indeed, the Martians 
place strong emphasis on the digestive system as the epitome of human 
baseness. Although in Bégum human waste seems to be used as ferti-
liser, this is only briefly mentioned, whereas in News from Nowhere, 
England is said to be ‘a garden where nothing is wasted’ and dung is 
explicitly highlighted as a source of fertility.102
There is also a freedom and openness towards sexuality and the body 
in News from Nowhere that is absent in Verne’s and Flammarion’s novels. 
Morris’s protagonist, William Guest, repeatedly responds to women on 
an erotic level, especially the central female figure, Ellen. Guest notices 
her scantily clad physique, for example, and comments on ‘her face and 
hands and bare feet’.103 His main interlocutor, Dick, also draws attention 
to women’s physical attributes and the main object of these comments, 
Clara, responds by reddening with pleasure.104 Morris’s novel was in 
some ways a reaction against the highly regimented society presented 
in Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888), and desire is a central 
and valorised force in News from Nowhere.105
The novel’s emphasis on personal relations is not surprising given 
Morris’s privileging of love and desire in his thinking about the socialist 
future.106 The stronger utopian dimension of News from Nowhere, com-
pared with the two French novels, might also be explained by the sense 
of disillusionment in France towards the possibility of social renewal 
following the failure of the 1848 Revolution.107 Morris’s less troubled 
approach to the body can further be situated in the context of develop-
ments in public health reform, which were in a much more advanced 
state in Britain by the 1880s. The linking of homes with sewers and 
the prohibition of cesspits, for example, had been achieved in London 
by the late 1840s whereas this did not happen in Paris until the early 
twentieth century. Britain passed its first Public Health Act in 1848, 
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while France had to wait until 1902 for this to happen. Whatever the 
reasons, Morris’s novel appears to offer one of the most viable visions 
of an alternative world, and the society in this text is often viewed as 
one of the most attractive literary utopias created.108
Yet the society in News from Nowhere continues to be haunted by the 
spectre of disease. Idleness and crime are pathologised, with the latter 
seen as a ‘spasmodic disease’ cured by society’s many ‘nurse[s] or 
doctor[s]’.109 David Pike also argues that, even though Morris shows 
London as a purified space, ‘not everything can be made useful and 
beautiful’ in this novel, as ‘the dust of the new city of London is sym-
bolically disposed of in another filthy and irredeemable institution, the 
Houses of Parliament’.110Although the novel is offering political symbol-
ism and not a hygienic blueprint, it is notable that whereas the value of 
manure is highlighted as a source of fruitfulness and fertility, there is no 
mention of what happens to the ‘dust’ placed in Westminster.
Moreover, in addition to the reference to Parliament as a dungheap, 
excrement is used in Morris’s novel to refer back to nineteenth-century 
society as a place of dirt and depravity –‘these people, whether they 
found the dung sweet or not, certainly lived in it’ – and America is also 
described as ‘a stinking dust-heap’.111 In both examples, faeces are used 
to denigrate societies distanced from the speaker in space or time, 
exposing more unease towards bodily waste in Morris’s text than at first 
seems apparent. Therefore, although both Bégum and News from 
Nowhere gesture towards a valorisation of excrement in the form of 
manure, at the same time, all three novels display a continuing level of 
anxiety towards the body and especially bodily waste.112
Some psychoanalytic theorists have argued that excrement disturbs 
us because it stands for a hostile residue of the past: Norman Brown, for 
example, argues that excrement represents the past in that it is ‘the dead 
life of the body’.113 Such interpretations of faeces as residues of the past 
are especially relevant to News from Nowhere, which engages so essen-
tially with the question of time. Natalka Freeland has argued that the 
novel refuses the genealogical continuity and historical determination 
of realist narrative in favour of temporal ‘rupture’ which enables a new 
evaluation of waste as a bounteous resource to be reused.114 A similar 
argument regarding the novel’s release from conventional narrative is 
put forward by Patrick Parrinder, who asserts that the novel ‘show[s] 
Morris subsuming and rejecting the tradition of Victorian fiction and 
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historiography’.115 Of more interest to this chapter is the link between 
the rejection of the past and the rejection of human waste.
Some thinkers suggest that the revulsion towards faeces as a remnant 
of the past is in fact a fear of death, as excrement highlights our bodily 
nature and reminds us of our own mortality. Such theories are put 
forward, for example, by Freud and more recent theoreticians of disgust, 
such as Paul Rozin.116 But Colin McGinn points out that some forms of 
death, such as skeletons or frozen bodies, do not elicit the same degree 
of disgust as others. He therefore suggests that the greatest cause of 
disgust is in fact ‘the interpenetration of life and death’.117 The thinker 
who articulates this position most powerfully is Aurel Kolnai in his 
phenomenological study On Disgust (originally published in German 
in 1929). Kolnai argues that what causes disgust is the persistence of 
life in death: our inability to keep the two seemingly separate categories 
apart causes us distress, such as in a rotting corpse teeming with 
maggots.118 This ‘death-in-life theory’ is clearly expressed in excrement: 
our digestive system is founded on death since it involves the consump-
tion and excretion of other living things (animal, plants) and produces 
an inert object (faeces), but it is also this process that sustains life.119
In Morris’s novel, the inhabitants notably know nothing of the past 
and are horrified by references to social history.120 Clara, for example, 
refers with scorn to ‘the dreadful times of the past’ in contrast with 
‘our modern life’, and feels a distinct unease towards the idea of ‘talking 
of past miseries’ – ‘I don’t like this: something or another troubles 
me’.121 This refusal to confront the past suggests a deep psychological 
disturbance, and the erasure of history in this text can be linked with 
the novel’s negative understanding of the dungheap. It is just at the 
point when old Hammond starts discussing the state of America as 
‘a stinking dust-heap’, for instance, that Dick and Clara re-enter and 
Clara firmly breaks in with the retort: ‘no more questions now before 
dinner’.122 Shortly afterwards, Dick’s comment on the stories of the past 
brings a cloud over her face.123 Although News from Nowhere offers a 
more positive approach to the body than Bégum or Uranie, and even 
seems to valorise waste (with the ‘dustman’, for example, highly valued 
in society124), the denial of the past and use of excremental imagery 
to vilify others reveals underlying anxieties towards the body and its 
ephemerality.
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Furthermore, an indirect upshot of our disgust towards life-in-death 
is a potential rejection of passion and desire. Psychoanalytic thinking is 
well known for connecting anal products with sexual pleasure,125 but 
Freud also more broadly links disgust with the archaic libido.126 Other 
thinkers have also developed an affirmative position on the disgusting 
as an erotic, energising force.127 With specific reference to nineteenth-
century France, for instance, historian Jonathan Strauss suggests that 
the fear of illness and dirt is, on a deep and dissimulated level, ‘the 
attempt to manage a recurrent and unspeakable erotic desire’.128 If 
hygienic concern regarding dirt and disease is permeated with a form 
of desire, then the suppression or elimination of dirt entails a rejection 
of this desire, as seen in Verne’s and Flammarion’s texts. France-Ville’s 
inhabitants in Verne’s Bégum show an alarming lack of emotion or 
passion, and Flammarion’s Uranie demonstrates the passionless and 
sexless existence that results from extreme hygiene. Morris’s novel, by 
contrast, is permeated by the erotic and seems to advocate the value of 
desire and sexuality.
There is little emotional depth to the characters in News from Nowhere, 
however; while the novel includes lengthy discussions on questions of 
political and social organisation, scant analysis is offered of the inhabit-
ants’ inner lives, undermining the sense that the emotional and libidinal 
dimensions of life are valorised in the community. Moreover, as argued 
by Norman Kelvin, by removing many of the legal and social con-
straints placed on love in the nineteenth century, Morris’s society of 
Nowhere ‘manages’ the erotic and thus ‘extinguishes’ its power.129 By 
ensuring that all inhabitants are healthy and attractive such that ‘every 
Jack may have his Jill’,130 society makes fights over beautiful mates 
unnecessary. There is therefore a link between the management of 
desire in News from Nowhere and physical attractiveness, as the novel’s 
focus on health, vigour, and longevity is a means of diminishing erotic 
desire’s potentially dangerous and disruptive influence.
The attenuation of the erotic is also revealed in Guest’s relationship 
with Ellen. In many analyses of desire in this novel there is a degree of 
slippage in the use of the term, as critics move from erotic desire to 
‘socialist desire’ or ‘utopian desire’ – a much broader force, which might 
more accurately be defined as aspiration or ambition.131 Such slippage 
is, however, faithful to the novel itself in that Guest’s feelings for Ellen 
144 Paradoxes of modern living
also shift into a tamer wish for solidarity and friendship. By the end, 
they become ‘good friends’ and Guest’s erotic longings go unfulfilled.132 
He learns instead to appreciate Ellen’s beauty as part of the wider attrac-
tiveness and happiness of the new society. This shift from the erotic and 
the personal to the social and the general is a further example of the 
way in which the society of Nowhere controls and neutralises the power 
of the erotic.
Like Verne and Flammarion, Morris creates a hygienic, disease-free 
society just at the moment when such a world was emerging as a pos-
sibility with the discovery of microbes as the cause of disease, and on 
one level, News from Nowhere does offer a ‘glowing vision of an actual-
ized utopia’.133 At the same time, however, the novel reveals some of the 
more disturbing implications of moving away from dirt and the body.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on utopian visions of alternative worlds as a 
way of considering the increasing attempts made in nineteenth-century 
society to overcome the dirty body. Such attempts are often regarded 
by scholars as central to the project of modernity. Helen Sullivan, for 
example, posits that ‘the challenge of shaping dirt … functions as a 
metaphor for the project of modernity’.134 Scholars of history and soci-
ology also point to increasing levels of disgust, and especially lowering 
tolerance of dirt and smell, as constitutive of the modern Western 
subject.135 However, whilst the dissemination of germ theory from 
1880s onwards certainly rendered fears of dirt and pollution particu-
larly acute, a narrative of straightforward human advancement away 
from the lowly and animalistic towards an apparently sanitised, civilised 
Western society needs to be re-evaluated, as has been argued by Mark 
Jenner.136 I would argue that looking at novels written in this period 
offers a starting point for this process.
As the texts examined here reveal, the outright rejection of dirt is 
problematic and at times paradoxical. Verne, Flammarion, and Morris 
all present positive images of a disease-free world and the benefits 
of a hygienic society. All three, however, also reveal the unintended 
consequences of extreme cleanliness and suggest that dirt cannot be 
straightforwardly removed. Bound up with the rejection of excrement, 
filth, and bodily processes is a rational rejection of disease, infirmity, 
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and infection, but also an indirect rejection of passion, diversity, 
and desire.
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‘Drooping with the century’:  
fatigue and the fin de siècle1
Steffan Blayney
In the prologue to his 1892 short story, Number Twenty, the English 
satirist Henry Duff Traill personifies the nineteenth century as an 
exhausted, dying old man. Opening at 11.30 p.m. on 31 December 1900, 
Traill’s story finds Old Seekleham – an ungainly pun on the Latin saecu-
lum (century) – with just half an hour to live. Far from mourning his 
impending death, however, Seekleham greets it with a weary resigna-
tion, even relief: ‘It was not that he had attained to a greater age than 
his ancestors, who, in fact, had all been centenarians like himself; it was 
that his life, as measured by exciting and consequently fatiguing experi-
ences, had already far exceeded most of theirs.’ 2
From the violent wars and conflicts of his youth, through a middle 
age spent in energetic trade and travel, to yet further achievements in 
old age as a scientist and inventor, Seekleham’s life is one that has been 
uniquely enervating. At the same time however – for all of its frenzied 
activity – it has also been singularly unsatisfying. While industry and 
empire have opened up the globe to an extent unknown to his ances-
tors, he feels more alone in the world than ever. For all of its promise, 
modern science has revealed ‘almost everything except what he most 
wanted to discover’.3 All the effort that Seekleham has spent on his own 
progress, has only advanced him closer to oblivion. With less than half 
an hour of his life remaining, he is left reclining limply on a couch, disil-
lusioned, dissatisfied, and above all, exhausted.
As he reaches his final minutes, Seekleham is joined at his bedside 
by a choir of ‘Decadents’, who sing ‘in praise of exhaustion, and 
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disillusion, and failure, and emptiness, and weariness’. Individual singers 
explore themes of ‘decay’ and ‘decline’, with another reciting a ‘sombre 
poem’ on the subject of exhaustion. Finally, as the clock strikes mid-
night, they all join in an ‘Ode to the Spirit of Decadence’.4 Before the 
performance ends, however, Seekleham has already succumbed to his 
fatigue, disappearing to make way for the newborn Twentieth Century.
Traill, who fittingly died himself in 1900, was not alone in associat-
ing the end of the nineteenth century with exhaustion. Medical writers, 
as the physician Clifford Allbutt observed in 1895, were likewise con-
cerned that the British population was ‘drooping with the century’.5 The 
final decades of the century saw a proliferation of attempts to define, 
describe, measure, and control physical and mental fatigue, a category 
that had been practically absent from medical or scientific discourse 
before the late 1860s. At the same time, the question of the conser-
vation of bodily energies was discussed by commentators across dis-
ciplinary boundaries (including, not only physicians, but physicists, 
philosophers, and political economists), as one of the key problems 
of the modern age. By the close of the century, contemporaries were 
certain that they lived in an ‘age of fatigue’, with medical professionals 
concerned that their era would be remembered by posterity as ‘the 
Tired Age’.6
Late nineteenth-century discourse on fatigue expressed a variety of 
concerns about modernity and its limits, and about social, political, and 
cultural decline. It did so in a language that drew on a range of scientific 
and cultural tropes. Crucially, this discourse relied on a new scientific 
understanding of the material world and of the body, grounded in the 
concepts of ‘energy’ and ‘work’. As Anson Rabinbach has shown, this 
new paradigm, inaugurated by the ‘discovery’ of the laws of thermo-
dynamics, exerted a pervasive influence across Europe in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.7 At its centre was the metaphor of the 
‘human motor’: the notion that the body operated in the same way as 
a thermodynamic engine, converting nature’s ‘energies’ into produc-
tive ‘work’. In this context, older moral proscriptions against sloth and 
idleness were superseded by materialist concerns about the limits of 
bodily efficiency. Fatigue – understood as the body’s inbuilt resistance 
to continued productivity – emerged as ‘the endemic disorder of indus-
trial society’, coming to embody a vast range of anxieties about social, 
economic, political, and cultural decline.8
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While Rabinbach’s account, focusing primarily on Continental 
Europe, barely mentions developments in Britain, for a number of 
British scientific writers and cultural commentators in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, energy and fatigue were central preoccupa-
tions. Particularly after 1870 – with Britain’s dominant global status 
increasingly threatened by the rise of international competitors such as 
Germany and the United States – bodily exhaustion became a focus for 
a wide range of anxieties about economic and political decline, cultural 
stagnation, and the challenges of industrial civilisation. Fatigue took its 
place alongside those other richly overdetermined fin-de-siècle signifiers 
– decline, degeneration, and decadence – with which historians of late 
nineteenth-century Britain are familiar.
Fin-de-siècle discourse was characterised by a powerful homology 
between the biological and the social. Repeatedly, physical and mental 
exhaustion were characterised as symptoms of a much broader national 
deterioration. Across a range of texts, metaphors of fatigue were mobi-
lised to signify political decline, social regression, and cultural deterio-
ration. In an influential article of 1871, the historian James Froude 
painted a picture of an England overcome by ‘lethargy’, the political and 
racial ‘vigor’ of its people teetering on the brink of ‘exhaustion’.9 By the 
end of the century, in the words of Conservative politician Joseph 
Chamberlain, Britain had become a ‘Weary Titan’, overburdened by its 
vast colonial possessions and struggling to match the energy and dyna-
mism of its international rivals.10 In British cultural life the critic John 
Addington Symonds diagnosed a pervasive ‘world-fatigue [which has] 
penetrated deep into our spirit’.11
Medical writers were likewise concerned that modern civilisation 
was taking its toll on the physical and mental constitution of the British 
population. The ‘working powers of the community at large’, it was 
argued, were undergoing depletion as a result of the vast and rapid 
social and technological changes that had characterised the nineteenth 
century.12 The spread of industrialisation, urbanisation, education, and 
new technologies such as the railway and the telegraph had increased 
the pace and intensity of modern life to such a degree that the body was 
unable to muster the energy to withstand its constant pressures and 
demands.
While it is possible to emphasise the pessimistic overtones of these 
writers, the status of fatigue in medical discourse – and its relationship 
156 Paradoxes of modern living
to modernity in particular – was always ambiguous. While the spectre 
of exhaustion produced anxieties about the detrimental consequences 
of civilisation, the limits to progress, and the inevitability of degenera-
tion, scientific investigation of the body’s energies at the same time held 
out the hope of revitalised and reinvigorated bodies, increased produc-
tivity, and social efficiency.13
Notions of energy and fatigue were shaped at the intersection of 
various nineteenth-century discourses, from physics and chemistry, to 
biology and medicine, to philosophy and literature. This chapter does 
not seek to identify direct lines of influence from a putatively discrete 
sphere of ‘science’ or ‘medicine’ to one of ‘culture’. Instead, it examines 
the ways in which ideas from a variety of discursive arenas were adopted, 
modified, and reincorporated in a continual and reciprocal process. A 
number of historians and researchers in the medical humanities have 
drawn attention to the ‘rich and complex interplay’ between various 
scientific and cultural ‘languages and systems of representation’ operat-
ing in the late nineteenth century.14 The fin-de-siècle preoccupation with 
fatigue is here treated in these terms: not simply as the consequence of 
certain scientific ideas or empirical findings, nor as an isolated cultural 
phenomenon, but as the result of a complex exchange of ideas, images, 
and concepts.
Energy, work, and waste
In broad terms, the two faces of the fin-de-siècle discourse on fatigue 
can be mapped onto the first and second laws of thermodynamics, 
which, in turn, formed the basis of a new scientific understanding of 
the human body in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
first law – originally theorised by Hermann von Helmholtz in 1847 
and variously developed and elaborated by a number of physicists 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards – asserted that all of the 
different physical forces observable in the universe were in fact mani-
festations of a single and universal ‘force’ (or later ‘energy’). This 
energy could be neither created nor destroyed, but was capable of 
infinite interconversion into its different forms. Most importantly, as 
the example of the steam engine showed, nature’s energies could be 
converted – through the intercession of human agency – into useful 
mechanical work.
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The ‘law of the conservation of energy’, as an article in the British 
Medical Journal asserted in 1870, was of ‘immense importance in its 
bearing on the subject of physiology’. It was now possible to understand 
the ‘vital energy’ of animals and human beings to be ‘merely a form of 
physical energy, and convertible with it’.15 Furthermore, from the prin-
ciple of the conservation of energy it followed that ‘the total quantity 
of work of which a healthy man was capable … [was] constant, no 
matter in what description of labour he was employed’.16 The human 
body could now be seen – like the productive machines of the Victorian 
factory – as simply another arena for the conversion of an abstract and 
universal labour-power into useful ‘work’. Increasingly, medical text-
books envisioned the human body as a ‘physical machine’: an ‘engine 
furnace … convert[ing] energy into work’.17
However, the reassuring picture of a constant supply of universal 
energy ripe for conversion into useful ‘work’ offered by the first law of 
thermodynamics was almost immediately undercut by the arrival of the 
second. As William Thomson explained in 1851, in any transfer of 
energy from a warm body to a cold one, only a small fraction of the heat 
generated could actually be harnessed for useful ‘work’, with ‘the 
remainder being irrecoverably lost to man’.18 In 1865, the German physi-
cist Rudolf Clausius coined the term ‘entropy’ to describe the result of 
this irreversible loss of energy which accompanied any real-life process 
of energy conversion. Followed to its conclusion, the second law 
implied ‘a universal tendency to the dissipation of mechanical energy’: 
the universe was gradually tending towards an equilibrium at which 
point human life, let alone useful work, would, ‘within a finite amount 
of time’, be impossible.19 In the fin-de-siècle imagination, the image of a 
universe slowly, but inexorably, running out of energy both reinforced 
and further fuelled contemporary notions of decline and cultural pes-
simism. If the principle of the conservation of energy opened a space 
for utopian dreams of a society engineered so as to best exploit the 
infinite productive potentials of nature, the notion of entropy brought 
shadows of ‘deterioration, decay, and dissolution’.20
The upshot of the second law was that ‘all work implies waste’, and 
that ‘the work of life’ was no exception.21 From the very beginning, 
discussion of ‘energy’ in British medical and scientific discourse was 
characterised by a preoccupation with its dissipation. Rather than being 
a boundless productive resource, ‘the energy of a human body’ was ‘a 
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definite and not inexhaustible quantity’.22 It was in this context that 
fatigue – the body’s inbuilt ‘resistance to effort’, or ‘to the conversion of 
latent energy into active motion’ – emerged as a distinct phenomenon 
and object of concern.23 If degeneration, in the words of Stephen G. 
Brush, was the ‘cultural counterpart of the second law of thermodynam-
ics’, then fatigue appeared as its bodily expression.24
In the mid-1870s, the question of ‘overwork’ became a locus for 
medical negotiations of energy and fatigue, and of the relationships 
between the body and modernity. An 1874 article in the Contemporary 
Review argued that the late nineteenth century was characterised by ‘life 
at high pressure’, with the ‘severity of exertion’ and ‘incessant strain’ 
demanded by modern industrial and commercial life leaving large 
numbers ‘shattered, paralysed, reduced to premature inaction or senil-
ity’.25 From 1875, a series of articles and letters in the Lancet and the 
Journal of Mental Science debated the extent to which ‘society at large is 
really suffering from an amount of work, physical and mental, which is 
injurious to the individual, and therefore to the human race’.26 Doctors 
mobilised the language of the physical sciences to argue that the natural 
‘energies’ and ‘nervous power’ of patients were being depleted through 
overuse.27
While fatigue had rarely before been considered a medical issue, now 
it was increasingly associated with pain, disease, or even death. For the 
esteemed surgeon, Sir James Paget, writing in 1871, fatigue had ‘a larger 
share in the promotion or permission of disease than any other single 
causal condition you can name’.28 By 1875, the physician George Poore 
was able to elevate fatigue from a mere predisposing factor in illness to 
a medical condition in its own right, which he further subdivided into 
its ‘general’ and ‘local’, ‘acute’ and ‘chronic’ forms.29 Increasingly, dis-
tinctions were drawn between normal and pathological states of fatigue, 
or ‘between fatigue and over-fatigue’.30 By the early twentieth century 
the ‘pathology of fatigue’ was also supplemented by a proliferation of 
related conditions, from ‘fatigue dyspepsia’ to ‘exhaustion psychosis’.31
The particular discursive configuration of pathological exhaustion 
with which historians of medicine and fin-de-siècle culture are most 
familiar is neurasthenia. Introduced into the medical vocabulary by the 
American physician George Miller Beard in 1869, the diagnosis gained 
widespread currency internationally from the late 1870s.32 Translated 
by Beard as ‘nervous exhaustion’, neurasthenia referred to a syndrome 
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consisting of a wide range of symptoms, but defined most prominently 
and consistently by chronic fatigue. Characterised as a specifically 
modern (and for Beard, specifically American) disorder, neurasthenia 
is arguably the archetypal ‘disease of modernity’. While the diagnosis 
was never as popular in Britain as elsewhere (notably in the United 
States, France, and Germany), a steady flow of publications on the 
subject began to emerge from the 1880s onwards, and neurasthenia, 
often in combination with earlier concepts of ‘nervous exhaustion’, 
became an increasingly common framework for interpreting the prob-
lems of life at high pressure.
Like fatigue from overwork, neurasthenia was interpreted as a special 
case of the second law of thermodynamics. Its explanation in terms of 
the dissipation of ‘nervous energy’ was ubiquitous. ‘It is a general prin-
ciple in physics that energy in performing work is expended and finally 
exhausted’, wrote Thomas Stretch Dowse, one of the first British physi-
cians to adopt the diagnosis. For Dowse, biologists and physicians 
could ‘account for the exhaustion of nervous energy in very much the 
same way as the physicist’.33 Neurasthenia was a pathology of energy 
conservation. In the healthy individual, fatigue was the ‘natural conse-
quence of some accomplished muscular or mental work’, after which 
‘the store of our latent forces’ could be ‘readily and easily replenished’. 
For the neurasthenic, however, ‘fatigue means that such a demand has 
been made upon the already inefficient reserve forces that they cannot 
be well repaired, and nervous exhaustion is thus increased’.34 Or, as 
another expert on neurasthenia put it, ‘instead of fatigue the result is 
exhaustion’.35 While a certain amount of fatigue was the natural conse-
quence of normal work, continued overexertion put body and mind at 
risk of severe, or even permanent, debility. Behind every discussion of 
fatigue lay the dark entropic spectre of ‘total collapse’ or ‘irrecoverable 
degeneration’.36
Tiredness and civilisation
While some discussions of pathological exhaustion emphasised the 
dangers of pushing the body beyond its physiological limits, for other 
writers, the idea of fatigue as a naturally set limit on working capacity 
seemed to provide the key to a healthy accommodation between the 
body and modern civilisation. As the frenetic pace of late Victorian 
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society placed increasing demands on bodies and minds it was argued, 
fatigue acted as a kind of biological safety mechanism, alerting the 
subject to the dangers of overexertion, and preventing any permanent 
damage to the body’s tissues. Fatigue was a ‘warning illness’, ignored at 
one’s peril.37 The authority of nature was placed in opposition to the 
pressures of modernity: in contrast to a ‘primitive life’ in which humans 
lived in harmony with nature and with their bodies, the demands of 
modern life were ‘opposed to all biological laws’.38 It was the task of the 
physician ‘to see that Nature is not thwarted’.39
Similar appeals to nature – and further claims of fatigue’s beneficial 
qualities – can be found in medical and physiological discussions of the 
body’s inbuilt ‘rhythms’, which were supposed to govern both voluntary 
movements and automatic biological functions. Like the idea of a single 
motive force behind the material universe, the unifying concept of 
natural rhythms had a pre-existing philosophical pedigree. For the phi-
losopher Herbert Spencer, writing in 1862, rhythm was a law of nature: 
‘a necessary characteristic of all motion’ uniting phenomena as diverse 
as the movement of the tides and the vibrations of a violin string.40 
Though perhaps nowhere, Spencer speculated, were ‘the illustrations of 
rhythm so numerous and so manifest as among the phenomena of life’.41 
The beating of the heart, the rhythms of digestion, and the breathing 
cycle were all undeniable evidence of the body’s innate periodicities.
For medical writers in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
concept of rhythm was key to understanding how the body conserved 
its energies. Periods of action, in which work was done, alternated with 
periods of rest, when the body’s energies could be restored. ‘Every 
living structure’, as one author claimed, ‘passes through alternating con-
ditions of repose and activity: when active, the tissue is consumed; 
when at rest, the tissue is nourished, and the waste repaired’.42 Rest, it 
followed, was not truly inaction, but an active process of ‘re-creation’.43 
In this context, fatigue was seen to play a crucial role in regulating the 
body’s rhythms of work and rest. In a state of nature, the physical and 
mental sensations of weariness had the protective function of compel-
ling rest at regular intervals and so preventing the body’s rhythms from 
becoming dangerously syncopated.
Here again, the problem of fatigue was understood less as the inev-
itable consequence of modern progress than as a failure of adapta-
tion. Biological and social rhythms had fallen out of step. The natural 
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synchronisation of human beings with their environment had been 
disrupted. The unnatural rhythms of economic and industrial life, of 
motors and machines, had not been designed with the natural tempos 
of body or society in mind, and fatigue was the price paid by bodies – 
both biological and social. As George Poore explained in his article on 
the subject, ‘Fatigue occurs directly we attempt to alter the rhythm of 
our vital vibrations by prolonging the periods of tension at the expense 
of the periods of relaxation, or by demanding for any length of time a 
quickening of the normal rate of vibration.’ 44
For the physician Joseph Mortimer Granville, neurasthenia likewise 
consisted ‘in the disturbance of the rhythm of the vibration of the nerve 
elements’, caused, for example, by the body’s exposure to the artificial 
and mechanically driven rhythms of a railway carriage.45 Such malign 
rhythms, Granville and others proposed, could be corrected via the 
application of electronic vibrating instruments, specially designed – it 
was claimed – to ‘control and rectify the disorderly vibrations’.46 Thus 
the fatigue wrought on modern bodies as a result of technological 
changes could be palliated or prevented through technological means, 
reconfiguring the challenges of modernity as solutions.
Similarly, while modern civilisation was often placed in opposition 
to a supposedly ‘natural’ order governed by the rhythms of the body, at 
other times biological comparisons functioned to naturalise the 
rhythms of modernity. The metaphors used to describe energy and 
fatigue commonly aligned the body either with the technologies of 
industrial machinery (for example, the ‘human motor’), or with the 
economic logic of the market. Susan Sontag is one of a number of theo-
rists to observe that nineteenth-century anxieties about the waste of 
energy often ‘echo[ed] the attitudes of early capitalist accumulation. 
One has a limited amount of energy, which must be properly spent … 
Energy, like savings, can be depleted, can run out or be used up, through 
reckless expenditure’.47
For health to be maintained and exhaustion avoided, fin-de-siècle 
doctors argued, the ‘economy of the body’ needed to be properly bal-
anced.48 If the ‘daily out-goings’ of ‘bodily expenditure’ exceeded the 
‘body-income … paid in daily from the food we eat’, the inevitable 
result would be ‘the exhaustion of the body-capital’ and ‘physiological 
bankruptcy’.49 As Chandak Sengoopta has observed, neurasthenia, in 
particular, was often presented as a pathology of economic efficiency, 
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striking down ‘the most productive section of society in the most pro-
ductive years of their life’.50
Anson Rabinbach attributes an intensified focus on ‘the wasteful 
expenditure of energy’ in 1870s Britain to concerns about rising costs 
of labour, and the accompanying recognition that ‘the costs of repro-
ducing labour power could be turned into profit’ through the develop-
ment of a lucrative working-class consumer market.51 However – in 
contrast to much of the early discourse on fatigue in Continental 
Europe – the object of medical concern in Britain in the late nineteenth 
century was not, at least at first, the industrial working class. In almost 
every article on the subject, overwork, fatigue, and neurasthenia were 
problems said, for the most part, to affect ‘the official, the professional, 
the commercial, and the literary classes’.52 It was not the manual worker, 
but ‘the eminent lawyer, the physician in full practice, the minister, and 
the politician who aspires to be a minister … the literary workman, or 
the eager man of science’ who were the archetypal subjects of fatigue.53 
In general, concerns about overwork focused on the ‘excessive mental 
labour’ that many saw as being increasingly demanded of a swelling 
class of so-called ‘brain workers’.54 As one article on neurasthenia cat-
egorially put it, ‘it is not among the working classes that we meet with 
examples of nerve exhaustion’.55
For these writers, neurasthenic and fatigued patients were less the 
discontents of modern civilisation than they were its agents. While 
pathological fatigue was associated with weakness and degeneration, it 
was, at the same time, an affliction of success. If it could be called upon 
to explain Britain’s decline, it could also be used as evidence of its social 
and cultural pre-eminence and imperial dominance; in a word, its 
modernity. ‘The more advanced a nation becomes’, wrote one physi-
cian, ‘the more prevalent have nervous diseases been amongst its 
people’.56 The tendency to exhaustion, wrote another, was ‘characteristic 
of high states of civilisation’.57
Late Victorian doctors were thus faced with an uncomfortable 
paradox. Fatigue represented the failure of the human body to meet 
the demands of modern life, and yet, at the same time, its increasing 
incidence was the best possible evidence of a society’s modernity.58 An 
epidemic of pathological exhaustion, if alarming, at least proved that the 
British nation – and particularly its ‘strenuous’ middle classes – stood 
at the forefront of human progress.59 The problem that preoccupied 
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medical and scientific writers, therefore, was to reconcile immutable 
constraints on the powers of the body with continuing social and eco-
nomic progress. Did fatigue represent the impassable boundary of 
modernity, or an obstacle which it was possible to overcome?
Re-energised bodies
As Catherine Oakley has argued, while scholarship on the Victorian fin 
de siècle has often stressed fears surrounding ‘the dissipation or curtail-
ment of human capacity’, less attention has been paid to ‘the ways in 
which these anxieties about biological, moral and racial decline were 
counterbalanced by a more optimistic interest in the physical potential 
of the human body’. While the spectres of physical and social degenera-
tion provoked anxiety, Oakley argues, they also offered a rationale for 
new ‘interventionist strategies of corporeal “regeneration” ’, which 
aimed to recuperate, augment, or maximise bodily energy.60 If concerns 
about overwork, exhaustion, and neurasthenia were frequently impli-
cated in pessimistic narratives at the end of the nineteenth century, 
medical and physiological writing on human energy was, at the same 
time, often characterised by an optimistic – or even utopian – confi-
dence that fatigue and inefficiency could be conquered. Through the 
discovery of the scientific ‘laws’ of human effort, it was argued, fatigue, 
the body’s inbuilt resistance to work, could be understood, controlled, 
or even eliminated.
In his essay on ‘metaphors of human biology’, the medical historian 
Owsei Temkin argued that the elaboration of mechanical models of 
human physiology allowed the development of ‘a more active attitude 
toward the body’ than was previously possible. Whereas older notions 
of the body as a divine creation ‘imagined the human organism to be 
so perfectly constructed that an improvement was not even thinkable’, 
the idea of the body as a machine or motor implied that improvements 
were both possible and desirable.61 While mechanical models of animal 
and human physiology had been articulated since at least the seven-
teenth century, the development of thermodynamics from the middle 
of the nineteenth century – for a number of thinkers – effectively closed 
the gap between animate and inanimate mechanisms. For dogmatic 
materialists, such as the biologist Thomas Huxley, ‘the idea that the 
physical processes of life are capable of being explained in the same way 
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as other physical phenomena’ was no less than ‘the expressed or implied 
fundamental proposition of the whole doctrine of scientific Physiol-
ogy’.62 The concept of ‘Life’ itself, the chemist H. A. Huntley went so 
far as to suggest, should, ‘scientifically speaking’, be referred to under 
the term ‘Thermo Dynamical Phenomena’.63 For those who insisted on 
the ‘physical doctrine of life’, the ‘human motor’ was more than just a 
metaphor: the human body was, in its essential properties, no different 
from any other heat engine, motor, or industrial machine converting 
energy (or ‘force’) into useful work.64 Increasingly, physiologists and 
physicians viewed themselves as engineers, tasked with maintaining 
and increasing the efficiency of the body, optimising its potentials and 
expanding its capacity to convert energy into work.
In this context, fatigue – the body’s inbuilt resistance to continued 
effort – was viewed less as an absolute barrier to the expansion of the 
body’s productive powers, than a contingent and surmountable ineffi-
ciency. ‘[T]he power, and hence the usefulness, of the machine we call 
the human body is limited by two shortcomings prominent among 
others’, the physiologist Michael Foster proclaimed in 1893: ‘by the 
inertia, the sluggishness which makes it so hard to set agoing, and the 
readiness with which it wearies, so that its work is stopped before its 
task is done’. For Foster, the scientific study of fatigue would indicate 
how both the individual, and society as a whole, might ‘extend [the] 
limits’ of working capacity and productivity.65 While fatigue might be 
the ‘inevitable’ consequence of work, others argued, the ‘suitable man-
agement’ of the body would make it possible ‘to secure the maximum 
efficiency for the human machine’.66
As concerns mounted about the dissipation of the nation’s energetic 
resources towards the end of the nineteenth century, scientific research 
into the physiology of fatigue gained social significance. As Richard 
Gillespie has argued, the problem of fatigue enabled physiology, as a 
distinct branch of medical science and as a profession, to forge itself a 
‘social role’ in the application of laboratory research to questions of 
supposedly national importance: systematic knowledge of the body’s 
mechanisms, physiologists argued, could provide the key to industrial 
and social efficiency.67 This was a period which saw the creation of 
Britain’s first professional association for physiologists, the Physio-
logical Society, in 1876, and the early issues of the society’s journal 
carried numerous articles on the origins and nature of the body’s 
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energies, the biochemical mechanisms of fatigue, the optimal rhythms 
of muscular contractions, the effects of different foods and drugs on 
bodily efficiency, and different means to measure the extent of fatigue.
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, social, industrial, and 
economic problems were increasingly framed in terms of the efficient 
deployment of human energy. Through scientific research into the 
‘maximum efficiency’ of the body, the economist William Stanley 
Jevons argued in 1870, ‘definiteness might possibly be given by degrees 
to some of the principles and laws which form the basis of our science 
of political economy’.68 Physiological research into the ‘laws of fatigue’ 
focused increasingly on the rate and quantity of ‘useful work’ which the 
human body was capable of giving out.69
For psychology, too, questions of fatigue and efficiency provided a 
means by which researchers could assert the practical utility of their 
methods. In the rush of late nineteenth-century industrial modernity, 
psychologists argued, mental fatigue was becoming an increasingly 
important problem, and its objective measurement was seen as an 
essential step in combating its effects. For William McDougall – a key 
figure in the development of a new, self-consciously scientific psychol-
ogy at the turn of the twentieth century – ‘the general speeding up of 
life’ was ‘the most striking characteristic of modern civilisation’, and was 
‘rendering the study of the problems of fatigue a matter of the most 
urgent practical importance’. The study of fatigue, McDougall argued, 
‘must always be of the deepest interest from the point of view of pure 
science, because in studying fatigue we are studying the source of 
human energies, the modes and conditions of their operations, and, 
above all, their limitations’.70
For McDougall, psychological fatigue had nothing to do with the 
subjective feelings of the individual, but was an entirely objective phe-
nomenon measurable in terms of declining capacity for work. While 
acknowledging that of ‘all the manifestations of fatigue the most famil-
iar are the subjective’, McDougall maintained that feelings of tiredness 
bore no direct relation to the capacity of the body or mind for exer-
tion.71 As his close associate and former tutor W. H. R. Rivers put it, 
in 1908:
In the performance of mental work especially, decided sensations of 
fatigue may be experienced when the objective record shows that 
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increasing and not decreasing amounts of work are being done; and 
there may be complete absence of any sensations of fatigue when the 
objective record shows that the work is falling off in quantity, or in 
quality, or in both.72
In order to measure ‘objective’ fatigue, the subjective elements of tired-
ness had to be ruthlessly dispensed with. Instead of seeking to under-
stand the psychology of fatigue from the internal perspective of the 
individual, mental fatigue was externalised and objectified. It could be 
measured without reference to any feelings of tiredness, purely in terms 
of the amount of ‘work’ which a subject was able to produce. In the 
psychology of McDougall and Rivers, the brain, as well as the body, 
became just another site of the transformation of potential energy into 
useful, productive work.
If the image of the body-machine paved the way to a more interven-
tionist attitude towards the physiological engineering of the individual, 
its combination with social Darwinism and eugenics at the end of the 
nineteenth century introduced the prospect of improving the efficiency 
of the race en masse. While Geoffrey Searle long ago associated the 
eugenics movement in Britain with the ‘quest for national efficiency’, 
ideas of energy and human productivity have been underexamined in 
histories of eugenic discourse.73 In Francis Galton’s project of racial 
regeneration, the category of ‘energy’ was central. In the work in which 
he introduced the term ‘eugenics’, in 1883, Galton proclaimed that 
energy – ‘the capacity for labour’ – was ‘an attribute of the higher races’. 
‘In any scheme of eugenics’, he argued, ‘energy is the most important 
quality to favour’.74 While some human beings were born with ‘large 
powers of endurance’, others were naturally ‘quickly fatigued’.75 Particu-
larly, under ‘the strain and exhausting calls of modern civilised life’, 
Galton argued, the need for a ‘measure of fatigue’ was essential to ensur-
ing the progressive evolution of a re-energised human race.76
Conclusion: fatigue and the fin de siècle
In their introduction to fin-de-siècle culture, written at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst stress the 
ambivalence of end-of-the-century thinking. Too great an emphasis on 
degeneration in accounts of the Victorian fin de siècle, they argue, risks 
‘forgetting a host of other voices that contested visions of collapse with 
‘Drooping with the century’ 167
dreams of regeneration’.77 Likewise, any history of fatigue and its scien-
tists at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century 
needs to accommodate both deep anxieties about the dissipation of the 
body’s powers and optimistic projects for the restoration and expansion 
of human energies.
In Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray – perhaps the text (and 
author) most readily associated with the fin de siècle and its paradoxes 
– the phrase itself is immediately associated with exhaustion:
‘Fin de siècle,’ murmured Lord Henry.
‘Fin du globe,’ answered his hostess.
‘I wish it were fin du globe,’ said Dorian, with a sigh. ‘Life is a great 
disappointment.’
‘Ah, my dear,’ cried Lady Narborough, putting on her gloves, ‘don’t tell 
me that you have exhausted Life. When a man says that one knows that 
Life has exhausted him.’ 78
Like Old Seekleham in Traill’s Number Twenty, Dorian finds fatigue to 
be the inevitable consequence of modern life. In both cases, however, 
decline is only one side of the story. If Dorian fantasises about the end 
of the world, he is at the same time hopelessly enchanted with the idea 
of his own rejuvenation; degeneration and regeneration are two sides 
of the same coin. Likewise, in Traill’s story, the moment of death is 
coextensive with that of rebirth: in the same instant that Seekleham 
succumbs to his accumulated exhaustion, the infant Twentieth Century 
is born.
In fin-de-siècle Britain, fantasies of fatigue spawned visions of effi-
ciency. Far from resigning themselves to the march of entropy, or relaps-
ing into a gloomy therapeutic pessimism, a significant number of 
doctors, scientists, and social thinkers expressed – implicitly or explic-
itly – the confident conviction that, if fatigue could not be eliminated 
altogether, the accumulation of scientific knowledge of the body’s ener-
gies would create the potential for an unparalleled increase in the effi-
ciency and productivity of bodies both biological and social. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century – as concerns mounted about the 
physical deterioration of the working population – these convictions 
would form the basis of a new scientific approach to industrial work. 
Fatigue research turned its attention explicitly to the working class, with 
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the British government and employers sponsoring large-scale scientific 
investigations into factories and workplaces aimed at the optimisation 
of the working body, and the physiological and psychological rationali-
sation of work.79 If fatigue had seemed to some late nineteenth-century 
observers to be a pathology caused by modern life, for others, as Rabin-
bach has argued, the science of fatigue itself became ‘part of a broader 
strategy of social modernity’, in which social problems would be over-
come through technical knowledge, empirical investigation, and scien-
tific and industrial progress.80
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‘A rebellion of the cells’:  
cancer, modernity, and decline in 
fin-de-siècle Britain
Agnes Arnold-Forster
In 1899, the Contemporary Review published an article by the English 
physician Woods Hutchinson (1862–1930) entitled ‘The cancer 
problem: or, treason in the republic of the body’.1 In this article, thick 
with metaphorical allusions and polemic, Hutchinson condensed to 
thirteen pages the diverse and fraught anxieties that attended cancer in 
late nineteenth-century Britain. He wrote about how, over the past 
thirty years, the ‘deaths per thousand living from this malady’ had 
doubled in England, and ‘nearly trebled’ in the United States. Writing 
in the fin de siècle, Hutchinson argued that cancer was among ‘our oldest, 
deadliest, and most-studied diseases’, while at the same time position-
ing it as an unintended consequence of Victorian civilisation and pro-
gress. He presciently posed cancer as ‘the riddle of the Sphinx for the 
twentieth century’.2
It is a well-known and often rehashed trope that cancer today con-
stitutes an unintended consequence of modernity. Or, as Charles 
Rosenberg so eloquently puts it, ‘the notion that the incidence of much 
late twentieth-century chronic disease reflects a poor fit between 
modern styles of life and humankind’s genetic heritage’.3 However, 
while Roy Porter called cancer ‘the modern disease par excellence’ and 
Siddhartha Mukherjee described it as ‘the quintessential product of 
modernity’, they locate that modernity firmly in the twentieth century.4 
Thus, while cancer is widely recognised today as a problem of progress, 
it is strangely absent from histories of this idea. This chapter goes some 
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way towards filling this lacuna by exploring the construction of cancer 
as a ‘disease of civilisation’ in Victorian Britain. Cancer in the nine-
teenth century remains understudied, and work that has been done has 
predominantly focused on the twentieth century.5 This asymmetry can 
be partly explained by the ways in which cancer and chronic disease 
have been conceptualised. There is an internalised understanding of the 
history of health as aligning with the epidemiological transition model, 
which posits era-specific diseases: from the age of pandemics in the 
medieval and early modern periods, to the age of infectious diseases in 
the nineteenth century, to the age of degenerative or man-made mala-
dies in the twentieth.6 All this works to obscure cancer from our view 
of the nineteenth century.
Yet, and as exemplified by Woods Hutchinson’s anxieties, this posited 
relationship between civilised life and the incidence of cancer is not 
confined to the present day. Rather, similar debates about the impact of 
modern life on the integrity of our cells can be found circulating at the 
end of the nineteenth century. This chapter owes much to recent histo-
riography on the fin de siècle. Such scholarship has focused on micro-
histories and examined the period through ‘kaleidoscopic edited 
collections’.7 Cancer is one such micro-history, and allows us not only 
to trace the metanarratives of progress and decline, but also to inter-
rogate what, if anything, was specific to the conceptualisation of the 
disease at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. In what 
follows, I will outline the ways in which this perceived ‘cancer epidemic’ 
captured the medical and lay imagination, and promoted fierce debate 
in the pages of medical journals, general-interest periodicals, and in 
parliament. Drawing from literature on medical metaphors by scholars 
such as Laura Otis, Michael Stolberg, and Susan Sontag, I argue that 
cancer was easily incorporated into contemporary anxieties about 
degeneration and decline, and constructed as a malady of modern life 
using long-standing and flexible disease metaphors.8 In this way, the 
disease was used to interrogate those facets of society and culture that 
appeared new and ‘modern’ to nineteenth-century medical men.
Cancer in the nineteenth century
From the late eighteenth century, cancer was increasingly addressed in 
both medical practice and culture, corresponding with rising popular 
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and professional anxiety about the disease. Cancer appeared regularly 
in print and periodical material: alternative and itinerant practitioners 
hawked their wares, philanthropists lamented the cancerous pauper, 
and obituaries recorded it as cause of death among the wealthy and 
notable. It was also etched on the urban landscape – from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, cancer-specific institutions 
were constructed in London and later in other towns and cities across 
the British Isles. In 1792, the Middlesex Hospital established a ward 
devoted to the care of cancer patients, and in 1802 a close-knit circle of 
medical and surgical elites founded a cancer hospital just off Tottenham 
Court Road.9 Both institutions served the local, urban, plebeian popu-
lation, but people also travelled in from the surrounding countryside.
These two hospitals provided clinical evidence for a flurry of publica-
tions, and various familiar figures – urban surgical elites like John Aber-
nethy, Everard Home, Charles Bell, and Thomas Denman – wrote tracts 
and treatises on the disease, derived from their new encounters with 
cancer on the hospital wards.10 Thus, both institutions contributed to 
the codification of cancer, by which various incidental features of the 
disease were transformed into essential, identifying characteristics. For 
both doctor and patient, cancer was first indicated by the presence of a 
mass or growth. When someone arrived at the hospital they were sub-
jected to physical examination – the surgeon on the ward poked, 
prodded, felt, smelt, and tasted the tumour. However, cancer could not 
be diagnosed by the senses alone; it was also defined by its long dura-
tion, its irreversible capacity for growth and spread, and ultimately its 
incurability. The clinical context made the disease more visible to the 
practitioner by enabling them to witness the entire ‘life course’ of the 
disease, from diagnosis through to death and beyond.
These cancer-specific institutions were explicit in allowing patients 
to remain ‘until either relieved by Art, or released by Death’.11 Conse-
quently, people could be housed for months or even years, and fre-
quently made repeat visits to the hospital for increasingly lengthy 
stretches of time. Most people who sought medical care at the hospitals 
did so while suffering under tumours of considerable magnitude. A 
patient treated by the surgeon John Pearson had a ‘cancer in her right 
breast the bulk of a man’s head’.12 These extreme scales confirmed cancer 
as a disease with a monstrous capacity for growth and expansion. The 
Irish physician and pioneer in the study of cancer, Walter Hayle Walshe 
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wrote in 1842, ‘One of the most essential attributes of cancerous sub-
stance is an unswerving tendency to grow’.13 This growth potential was 
not just about the tumours’ ability to expand, but also about cancer’s 
tendency to metastasise. Practitioners were well aware that masses on 
the surface of the skin might have ancestors or descendants buried deep 
within internal flesh. Finally, with depressing regularity, the patients on 
the cancer ward died. Thus, cancer in the nineteenth century was 
defined as an intractable malady, unassailable by medical intervention 
and nature alike.
However, cancerous growth and spread was not confined to the tex-
tures of the human body. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
disease was increasingly conceptualised as extending through the popu-
lations of the British Isles. This new anxiety depended on the increasing 
use and authority of vital statistics. The 1840s and 1850s saw the British 
populace increasingly quantified on a local, regional, and national 
scale. This practice derived in part from the development of statistical 
methods and epidemiology, and grew alongside a quantitative study of 
people and their activities more generally.14 These intellectual move-
ments were increasingly institutionalised and professionalised, and by 
the 1860s the government was systematically undertaking a large quan-
tity of official, numerical inquiries into the health of the nation. The 
main source of disease statistics was the Annual Report of the Registrar-
General on Births, Deaths and Marriages in England, first presented to 
Parliament in 1838.15 In 1839, the statistician William Farr joined the 
General Registry Office (GRO), and proceeded to tabulate regional 
and national vital statistics – births, marriages, and deaths – for each of 
the country’s divisions. The GRO also calculated the annual mortality 
by each cause and the proportion of deaths in 100,000 effected by each 
class of disease in each region. Parallel reports were later produced for 
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.16 Cancer was integrated into this practice 
from the outset.17 The Medical Officers of Health (MOH) reports, first 
produced in 1848, ran parallel to the GRO’s output. They, too, pro-
vided vital data on birth and death rates, infant mortality, incidence of 
infectious and other diseases, and a general statement on the condi-
tion of the population. The MOHs tabulated causes of death accord-
ing to disease and stratified by age. From 1856, the reports included 
cancer in their nosology. Narrative prefaces to each annual report situ-
ated individual investigations within a broad chronology, and enabled 
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doctors and public health professionals to comment on yearly shifts in 
the disease profile of the nation.18
As the quantity of data on cancer accumulated, observers began to 
draw conclusions about the changing incidence of the disease over 
time. Cancer appeared to be increasing. The Forty-Second Annual 
Report, published in 1879, recorded that among men of all ages, cancer 
was the cause of 4,121 deaths, the same order as diseases such as diar-
rhoea (5,712), whooping cough (5,804), scarlet fever (9,148), and 
measles (4,678). It also caused many more deaths than cholera, the 
quintessential Victorian malady (122). Among women the figures were 
even more dramatic, accounting for 8,508 deaths, more than any other 
disease.19 The preface elaborated on these high numbers, and expressed 
concern over the increased mortality from cancer, which had ‘main-
tained the increase to which it has been gradually mounting for many 
years’.20
Responses to this observed increase became progressively fretful. In 
1883, the British Medical Journal published an article which lamented 
that, ‘a cursory examination only is sufficient to divulge that the Fell 
disease claims year by year a higher ratio of victims’.21 Commenters 
made use of an emotive vocabulary to express their concern: ‘Unhap-
pily … a strict examination of the facts and figures bearing upon it, must 
lead to the painful and disquieting conviction that cancerous disease is, 
year by year, becoming more fatal in this country.’ 22 This bleak progno-
sis – both for individuals afflicted with cancer, and for the population as 
a whole – filtered through multiple strata of nineteenth-century society. 
Concern over the new ‘cancer epidemic’ was not confined to profes-
sional discourse; rather evidence for, and debates about, the increase in 
cancer appeared in a variety of publications. Writers frequently invoked 
melodramatic language to impress upon the public the gravity of the 
cancer epidemic. In 1895, the English physician and inventor of the 
clinical thermometer, Clifford Allbutt, commented in the Contemporary 
Review: ‘There is a bitter cry that cancer is on the increase.’ 23 In 1907, the 
New York Times wrote, ‘The cancer problem is assuming more and more 
menacing proportions … we are doing nothing to hold cancer in check 
as a cause of mortality.’ 24 Even the fashion magazine Vogue despaired: ‘It 
is sad news indeed that cancer is increasing at such a rate that it begins 
to rival the white plague – as tuberculosis is called – in the number 
of its victims’.25 Comparing cancer to consumption – the archetypal 
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romantic tragedy of the fin de siècle – would have had a powerful impact 
on readers and cemented the supposed increase in the incidence of 
cancer in the imaginations of the middle classes.26
Why, then, was cancer increasing at such a rate? Writers at the end 
of the nineteenth century drew on an eclectic range of theories, all 
grounded in the intellectual, cultural, and political climate of the fin de 
siècle. Some argued that diet and lifestyle were key to the shifting epi-
demiological profile of the disease. The medical officer of Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, W. Renner suggested that ‘preserved and imported foreign 
[European] food’ was responsible for cancer’s spread and increase 
amongst indigenous populations.27 Similarly, the Surgical Registrar to 
the Middlesex Hospital, W. Roger Williams proposed that a simpler, 
less decadent diet was likely to protect against the disease.28 Cancer – 
then as now – was conceptualised as a disease of civilisation, an unin-
tended consequence of progress. Anxiety over the perceived increase of 
cancer was provoked in part by research that seemed to suggest the 
epidemic was not confined to Western or so-called ‘developed’ nations. 
Doctors across the British Empire were, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, engaged in a large-scale evidence-gathering mission. Data and 
anecdotal evidence was compiled to create cancer maps of the globe. 
Commenters plotted populations on a gradient – from immune to 
cancer-riddled – at one end Sub-Saharan African communities, at the 
other Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic races: ‘Observation has shown that 
cancer has a certain geographical distribution. It prevails extensively in 
some parts of the globe, and is scarcely known in others.’ 29 This mapping 
was marshalled as evidence for cancer as a ‘disease of civilisation’. Not 
only was the disease on the increase, the epidemic was confined to 
nations that were understood as biologically, culturally, and economi-
cally superior.
If Britain was particularly susceptible, its colonies were at the other 
end of the spectrum. The British Medical Journal acted as a nexus of 
cancer evidence, sent in from across the empire. Medical men reported 
back from their respective colonies with quantified and narrative assess-
ments. In 1906, the British Medical Journal commented: ‘There can be 
no doubt that cancer in natives of British Central Africa is of the utmost 
rarity. Repeated efforts made by Government medical officers through-
out the country for some time past have so far resulted in the discovery 
of but a single case.’ 30 The situation in Sierra Leone was similar: ‘Cancer 
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as a disease is very rare among the aborigines … I would rather not say 
that the aborigines are immune from the disease, but that the disease is 
rare among them.’ 31 Dr A. J. Craigen, writing from Port Moresby in New 
Guinea in 1905, reported ‘that during his stay of nearly four years in the 
Possession he has not yet seen a single case of cancer among the native 
population’.32 The disease was also rare in Ceylon.33 Cancer rates were 
slightly higher in Hong Kong: ‘The returns made to the Registrar-
General show that the total number of deaths among the Chinese in 
the period 1895–1904 was eleven, giving an annual death rate from 
cancer of 4.45 per 100, 000 of population.’ 34 However, as Dr Francis 
Clark, Acting Principal Civil Medical Officer pointed out, this com-
pared ‘very favourably with the death rate from the same cause in 
England’.35
Cancer was also used to subdivide the ‘advanced’ races. William Hill-
Climo, a fringe clinician articulating mainstream views, wrote in 1903:
During the past forty years the death-rate from cancerous diseases in all 
European countries, and in the United States of America has steadily 
risen … So widespread and so continuous is this increase, that it cannot 
be ascribed to local or accidental causes, but it must be sought for in the 
growth of new conditions, to a greater or less extent, common to all the 
affected countries, which the people themselves have produced.36
According to Hill-Climo, the ‘cancer epidemic’ was man-made, and pro-
duced by some shared element of civilised society. England appeared 
to suffer the greatest burden: ‘Englishmen may be regarded as unfor-
tunate; for within the geographical area of these islands cancer asserts 
largely its malignant and fatal influence’.37 The British Medical Journal 
wrote in 1903, ‘In considering countries as a whole it appears that the 
disease is more common in rich countries such as England, France, 
Holland, and Bavaria, while the lowest rates are among the poorer 
nations, Italy and Ireland’.38
It was in this period in Britain that meditations on national decline 
and biological degeneration reached their zenith. Thus, this pathologi-
cal asymmetry was explained through then current notions of racial 
hierarchy.39 In 1880, E. Ray Lankester wrote, ‘We are subject to the 
general laws of evolution, and are as likely to degenerate as to pro-
gress’.40 He was one of many writers negotiating theories of decline at 
the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. This body of 
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literature dealt with the ‘apparent paradox’ that civilisation itself ‘might 
be the catalyst of, as much as the defence against, physical and social 
pathology’.41 Fin-de-siècle commenters were anxious that neither the 
‘natural’ triumph of the ‘civilising’ imperial Western powers, nor the 
stability of the racial order, was guaranteed. Such a socio-cultural evo-
lutionary viewpoint was characteristic of British anthropology after c. 
1860 and infiltrated a range of academic pursuits and public conversa-
tions.42 Scholarship in this area is extensive and the historical narratives 
are complex; cancer theorists, however, were drawing on a variety of 
overlapping concepts that formed the vocabulary of the late Victorian 
bourgeoisie. These concepts included ideas about the diversity of 
humankind and its maintained relationship with biblically determined 
hierarchies; the positivistic and naturalistic study of the progress of 
civilisation; a tradition of Anglo-Saxon racialism and ideas about inher-
ent Teutonic superiority; and broader notions of biological and racial 
determinism.43 These intellectual movements were taking place in a 
context of increasingly punitive and violent imperialism, intra-European 
competition, rising nationalism, and anxieties about demographic reali-
ties within the United States of America, Britain, France, and the rest 
of Europe.44
Animal health was used as a proxy for human diversity in disease 
incidence and the shape of the debate confirmed the causal relationship 
between cancer and civilisation. Wild animals were discursively con-
nected to ‘wild’ or ‘uncivilised’ peoples. And, parallels were drawn 
between ‘civilised’ man and domesticated creatures: ‘Cancer is by no 
means an uncommon disease among the domesticated animals, while 
in wild animals and uncivilized man it is rare’.45 This comparative exer-
cise rested on the assumption that cancer was the same disease in both 
humans and animals.46 W. Roger Williams claimed: ‘I have never met 
with a single instance of cancer in any wild animal in a state of nature 
… It is, of course, well known that wild animals that have been kept 
long in confinement may be thus affected’.47 This caveat tapped into a 
key question for late nineteenth-century cancer theorists: was the dif-
ferential between civilised and uncivilised cancer rates (in both animals 
and humans) caused by body or lifestyle? If you brought a wild creature 
into a domestic context – a menagerie for example – would its propen-
sity to cancer increase? Or, did the inherent bodily structure of each 
dictate its vulnerability?
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Thus, various commenters sought to explain why ‘civilised’ races 
might be more prone to cancer than their ‘barbarous’ counterparts. 
Some argued that a propensity towards cancer was created by inherent 
racial distinctions between home and abroad, whereas others suggested 
the uneven epidemic was a product of correlating styles of life. This 
opposition (although not an explicit one) was in part a product of 
chronology, and can be mapped on to a broader shift from environmen-
tal determinism to biological determinism in fin-de-siècle science and 
medicine. It is a hallmark of late nineteenth-century anthropology that 
race was believed to rest on material facts – ‘it is no arbitrary idea, no 
abstraction’.48 Moreover, that certain races were inherently more or less 
vulnerable to certain diseases was a common concept in Victorian 
medicine. In his 1883 ‘Address in Pathology’, the parasitologist Charles 
Creighton wrote that smallpox was ‘peculiarly an African disease’. This 
particularity was a biological one – ‘the loathsomeness, the peculiar 
odour, and the no less peculiar scars of small-pox, might of themselves 
suggest another skin than ours’.49 In contrast, cancer was a disease of 
white skin. However, for most fin-de-siècle commenters, cancer was less 
a product of the civilised body, and more of the civilised way of living.
The impact of the civilised experience was, for nineteenth-century 
writers, clearest in Creole or mixed-race populations. W. Renner wrote 
about the Creole populations of Sierra Leone – ‘the descendants of the 
liberated Africans’. He claimed that there was an increase in cancer 
among them, in contrast with its, ‘apparent rarity among the aborigines 
in the colony and in the hinterland of Sierra Leone’.50 Renner’s argu-
ment was that this was due to the influences of European civilisation 
and the adoption of the ‘European mode of living’: ‘the existence of 
cancer and other malignant growths among the creoles, and its absence 
or rarity among the aborigines, are due in my opinion to the civilised 
habits of, and the civilising influences operating upon, the former, and 
to the primitive mode of living of the latter’.51
Renner was concerned that changes in lifestyle were making Creoles 
more prone to cancer – that through adopting the ‘mode of living, the 
food and dress, of the Europeans’, creoles had discarded their ‘natural’ 
African environment and styles of life, and substituted instead an inap-
propriate decadence. In their ‘eager pursuit for wealth and luxury’, they 
had brought about premature degeneration and decline.52 This senti-
ment was echoed by Sir William MacGregor, Lieutenant-Governor of 
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British New Guinea, in the Lancet. During his nine-and-a-half-year 
tenure, the only example of cancer he ever saw was, ‘in the person of a 
Papuan who had for seven or eight years lived practically a European 
life’.53 Renner framed his analysis as concern for the well-being of the 
Creole population. However, it can equally be read as an invective 
against populations deviating from their ‘proper’ and ‘natural’ state of 
existence. In ‘their eager pursuit for wealth and luxury’, the Creoles were 
subverting the hierarchy inherent in the British Empire’s system of 
rulers and ruled, and suffering increased rates of cancer as a result. 
Renner was reflecting commonly held views at the end of the nine-
teenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. His concerns mani-
fested widespread beliefs about the dangers of transgressing natural 
racial divisions. Many Victorian commentators saw Nature as aristo-
cratic, mercilessly punishing impure blood.54
W. Roger Williams made parallel arguments about Africans. While 
they remained in Africa, ‘negroes’ appeared to be ‘almost exempt’ from 
cancer. Similarly, living in slavery in the United States – ‘with hard work 
and frugal diet’ – cancer remained uncommon. However, since the 
abolition of slavery, ‘and the altered habits thus entailed’, the ‘United 
States negroes have become almost as prone to cancer as their white 
neighbours’. According to Williams, there was nothing inherent in the 
bodies of black Africans, rather their susceptibility to malignancy was 
conditioned by the way they lived.55
Metaphors of degeneration and decline
Why did fin-de-siècle citizens construct cancer as a disease of civilisa-
tion?56 Why did they discursively connect it to social degeneration 
and decline? I argue that this phenomenon was dependent on the 
metaphorical fluidity of cancer’s identity in the nineteenth century 
and before. Scholars such as Laura Otis have argued that metaphors 
and analogies are not just rhetorical techniques, but express actual sci-
entific and medical understanding.57 The extent to which cancer, in 
particular, has been understood through metaphors and analogies is 
well documented.58 In her seminal work, Illness as Metaphor, Susan 
Sontag wrote, ‘I want to describe, not what it is really like to emigrate 
to the kingdom of the ill and live there, but the punitive or sentimen-
tal fantasies concocted about that situation: not real geography, but 
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stereotypes of national character’.59 She navigates various diseases, but 
returns to cancer time and again: ‘Cancer remains the most radical of 
disease metaphors’.60
There was a confluence between imaginings of society and biologi-
cal understandings of cancer in this period – a relationship made pos-
sible by the well-established ‘essential congruity between medicine 
and culture’.61 Crucial to this connection was language that linked the 
body biological to the body politic. This relationship was not specific 
to cancer, but common to cultural and medical discourse through-
out the nineteenth century and before. In Hutchinson’s text, the body 
is described through analogy to the state; he speaks of ‘cell-citizens’, 
‘lymph-roads’, and ‘the body-fortresses.62 Similarly, Rudolf Virchow 
repeatedly described the cell through analogy to the individual person: 
‘A cell … yes, that is really a person and in truth a busy, and active 
person.’ 63 Thus, the ‘cancer epidemic’ was read through this meta-
phorical body–nation connection, and its narration was particularly 
dependent on prevalent assumptions about the disease’s specific causes 
and cures.
Various aspects of cancer’s identity in this period shaped the disease’s 
discursive relationship to civilisation and its decline. Cellular pathology 
– introduced into Britain in the late 1850s – played a significant role. 
As applied to cancer, the idea was that normal human cells were con-
verted to malignant cells – that these diseased units arose spontane-
ously in the body and were derived from healthy tissue. As one observer 
wrote in 1858, ‘there appears, then, no reason to regard the cells found 
in cancerous growths other than as the ordinary ones formed for the 
development of healthy tissue, which have taken on an abnormal char-
acter’.64 This ‘abnormal character’ was primarily their capacity for 
growth: ‘the primordial cell divides and divides again, till the whole has 
become converted, by the process of segmentation, into a mass of 
nucleated cells’.65 Frequently, this process was described in ‘unnatural’ 
terms. In his 1874 Goulstonian Lectures, J. F. Payne wrote that ‘the 
tumour … has no very definite limit, and shows no conformity to rule 
in its shape’.66 Unlike ‘natural’ bodily processes, cancer was not gov-
erned by discernible laws; cancerous tumours instead demonstrated a 
‘monstrous exaggeration of growth’.67
Such narratives found easy parallels with fin-de-siècle discourses 
about the civilised nation and its supposed inevitable decline. There 
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were clear parallels to be drawn between a healthy body ultimately suc-
cumbing to disorder, and a prosperous nation or empire suffering nec-
essary deterioration. The new ‘cancer epidemic’ emerged in a climate 
of widespread anxiety about the vigour of empire, concerns about 
imperial overstretch, and worries that Britain might be vulnerable to 
the destructive effects of the unruly, ungovernable, and the newly 
enfranchised ‘crowd’.68 This latter anxiety tracked contemporary bour-
geois fears over the threat of social revolution, political anarchy, and 
urban proliferation. The idea that these ‘advanced’ societies (or bodies) 
– marked in every other way by order and design – could be particularly 
susceptible to cancerous growth resonated with the metaphorical lan-
guage used to describe the disease’s physiology and pathology, and only 
cemented the connections between cancer and these worrying aspects 
of late nineteenth-century Western civilisation.
In line with the links drawn between cells and citizens, Hutchinson 
described cancer as ‘a rebellion of the cells’.69 He went on to describe 
how, ‘in the body-republic, where we have come to regard harmony and 
loyalty as the almost invariable rule, we suddenly find ourselves con-
fronted by anarchy and revolt’.70 Another writer outlined the cancer 
process: ‘one day, from an unknown cause, these microcosms are 
thrown into disorder. A cell or a group of cells commences to multiply 
and proliferate in an unusual manner, and the mass thus formed forces 
back the healthy tissue around it.’ 71 When a cancer is discovered in the 
body, ‘anarchy may have been said to have arisen in the community, and 
everything is in confusion’.72 This is a declinist narrative of the body – 
hitherto governed by order and progress, now entropy takes over, and 
it descends into chaos. Drawing on cellular pathology, these evocative 
descriptions personify the cancer cell: ‘In a cancer we have cells and 
nothing but cells, which refuse to explain why they have left their places, 
and have much less the air of policemen than the suspicious demeanour 
of vagabonds.’ 73
This declinist narrative of cells and nation was not without its dis-
contents. While cancer might have been tied to the late stages of civili-
sation, the same metaphors that linked the body biological to the body 
politic also provided evidence of social advance and prosperity. In 1893, 
George King and Arthur Newsholme published a thirty-three-page 
article entitled ‘On the Alleged Increase of Cancer’ in the Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of London.74 The introduction sculpted the shape and 
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profile of the debate at the fin de siècle: ‘During the last few years the 
minds of medical men and of the general public has been exercised over 
the rapid and striking increase in the mortality from cancer, as shown 
by the statistics contained in the Registrar-General’s Annual Reports.’ 75 
However, they then went on to offer a rebuttal to the dominant narra-
tive of increasing cancer rates. They presented a careful consideration 
of the GRO data and summarised many of the key critiques of the sup-
posed increase in the incidence of cancer. King and Newsholme were 
not alone. For every commenter insisting on the epic proportions of 
the cancer epidemic there was a countervailing argument suggesting 
that the panic was baseless.
Anthropologist Erin O’Connor has argued that the metaphors used 
by nineteenth-century doctors allowed them to ‘contemplate breast 
cancer as a surgical rather than sexual problem’. The discursive connec-
tions they drew between cancer and civilisation, so she argues, separated 
the breast from ‘questions of sexuality, identity, and womanhood’ and 
so enabled surgeons to develop effective operative techniques: ‘objec-
tifying, yes: but only as a saving grace’.76 O’Connor suggests that these 
processes were intimately associated with, and led up to, the devel-
opment of the radical mastectomy in the 1890s. I argue instead that 
these rhetorical devices not only continued into the new century, but 
they also served a slightly different purpose. Rather than just enabling 
increasingly radical surgical intervention, metaphorical allusions to 
progress and decline in cancer discourse allowed medical men to invert 
the distressing conclusions of social commentators. Cancer was articu-
lated not as an indicator of collective failure, but as a barometer for the 
quality of a nation’s social medicine and public health. This helped to 
redefine cancers as a disease of health. This was both explicit and implicit 
in the writings of medical men and their lay counterparts. Hugh P. 
Dunn wrote, ‘cancer is said to abound in the healthiest districts and 
amongst the people who are most robust’.77 This claim was supported 
by close statistical analysis, undertaken by the Scottish statistician 
and later president of the Royal Statistical Society (1947–49), David 
Heron. He wrote in 1906, ‘the conditions of prosperity and culture 
which lead to a low birth rate also conduce to a high cancer death-rate. 
In other words, cancer cannot, like phthisis, be taken as a measure 
of that unhealthy environment with which a high birth-rate seems to 
be associated’.78 Here, Heron inverted contemporary speculation that 
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falling birth rates were the result of national decline and degeneration.79 
For Dunn and Heron the relationship between cancer and civilisation 
was unlike the conceptualisation of various diseases of poverty such as 
cholera, rickets, and typhoid. Cancer may have been a pathology of 
progress, but it was not caused by industrialisation and its well-known 
pathological corollaries: filth, overcrowding, lack of sunlight, and moral 
depravity. But rather, and somewhat paradoxically, the disease was an 
unintended consequence of civilisation and its attendant health, wealth, 
and social improvement.
Even publications sceptical of Heron’s analysis had to begrudgingly 
admit their research revealed that the cancer death rate tended to rise 
with increasing social status.80 This inverse relationship worked on a 
national level as well. Dunn emphasised a correlation between an entire 
population’s ill health and infrequent cancer incidence, ‘a high general 
mortality would be associated with a low cancer one’.81 Hutchinson was 
succinct in his analysis of the question of cancer and national health, 
‘Paradoxical as it may sound, [cancer’s] greater prevalence is a symptom 
of increasing longevity and vigour on the part of the community. Cancer 
is the price paid for longer life’.82 Dunn went even further, ‘a disease such 
as cancer, which is characteristic of the healthy, may be expected to 
abound amid conditions of health’.83
Key to this conceptualisation of cancer as a disease of individual or 
national health was the increasingly prevalent understanding that this 
was a malady that particularly affected the elderly. Hutchinson described 
cancer as ‘emphatically a disease of senility, of age’.84 This tendency was 
used to explain the increase in the incidence of the disease as the nine-
teenth century progressed. Commenters criticised statistics that failed 
to correct for error due to the survival of an increasing number of 
persons to higher ages. The age-incidence of cancer was also brought to 
bear on discussions of the disease’s geographical variations. Head of the 
Imperial Cancer Research Fund, E. F. Bashford observed:
Civilised man’s responsibility for the occurrence of cancer among native 
races brought into contact with civilisation, and in domesticated 
mammals, may merely be limited to providing them with opportunities 
for reaching their respective cancer ages.85
Civilisation was indeed bringing cancer to colonised territories, but 
only, he suggests, in that it was improving the life expectancy of their 
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inhabitants. The cancer incidence of various nations and regions was 
now tied up with their demographic profiles. Shifting birth rates, death 
rates, and infant mortality were responsible for variations in cancer 
rates, further cementing the association between cancer, the popula-
tion, and national health.
Cancer was, therefore, constructed as a disease of late nineteenth-
century modernity. For some it was a product of social and biological 
progress, and for others, a consequence of national and imperial decline. 
In the minds of nineteenth-century writers, the nation-state mirrored 
the processes of the natural body. It grew, advanced, and improved, 
before beginning an inevitable and irreversible decline, only for life to 
be ended by a catastrophic rebellion of cells, or rather population. This 
trajectory was only available to those nations/individuals who achieved 
both longevity and modernity. Thus, societies and communities that 
were situated on lower rungs of the Victorian racial hierarchy were 
vulnerable to neither cancer nor collapse.
However, the age incidence of cancer, and discourse that used it to 
explain away the epidemic, was not without its paradoxes and compli-
cations. There are clear parallels to be drawn between a healthy body 
ultimately succumbing to disorder, and a prosperous nation or empire 
suffering inevitable decline. Cancer was understood to affect organs 
that had begun to ‘atrophy’ (breasts after the menopause, for example), 
and to flourish in countries and empires that had diminished in influ-
ence (as many interpreted Britain to be). High cancer incidence was, 
therefore, both an indicator of civilisation, and the mechanism by which 
that civilisation would fall apart. This metaphorical coating around the 
age-incidence of cancer gestures towards the paradoxes inherent in late 
nineteenth-century disease discourse. A greater proportion of your 
population living to old age was in many ways a positive indication of 
the ‘quality’ of your people and the ‘quality’ of your governance and 
ways of living. However, if that ‘old age’ was also a ‘cancer age’ there were 
certain implications – practical and theoretical – for the nature and 
trajectory of individual bodies and societies at large. Anxieties about 
social and national decline were particularly fraught in the fin de siècle 
– the ‘end of the century’. What did it say about the logic of the human 
body if at a certain point its internal order broke down? And what might 
that suggest about the logic of the body politic? And what was the role 
of public health and the medical profession in this unstable climate? 
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Perhaps the late-Victorian faith in progress buttressed a belief in these 
professionals’ ability to tackle the new array of challenges presented by 
a healthier, and yet more cancerous, population. Cancer at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century was simultaneously the ‘dread disease’ – a 
malady synonymous with death and disorder, which found easy meta-
phorical parallels in debates concerning the health and wealth of the 
nation and empire –and a disease of health. Accordingly, it came to be 
conceptualised in ways that reflected the complexities and ambiguities 
of ‘civilisation’ as a concept in fin-de-siècle Britain.
Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich’s edited collection, Fin de Siècle and 
its Legacy, argues that this period was both a turning point and an 
enduring influence.86 Various contributors trace the after-effects of the 
period through the twentieth century, and seek to show the ramifica-
tions of fundamental changes from before 1900. My micro-history of 
ideas around cancer slots into this approach, and provides an example 
of how the meta-narratives of progress, degeneration, and decline were 
themselves contextualised. While understandings of cancer at the 
fin de siècle owed much to their ancestors in the eighteenth century 
and before, they nonetheless acquired a unique character during the 
nineteenth century. This character persists into the twentieth century, 
and continues to shape our troubled relationship with the disease today. 
Cancer remains both the archetypal modern malady – tied to Western 
civilisation and necessitating the full technical arsenal of biomedical 
science – and an intractable and untameable foe, one that draws out our 
basest fears and anxieties about suffering and death. The most deadly 
of diseases is paradoxically a consequence of an increasingly healthy 
society. There is, therefore, an initimate and interdependent relation-
ship between cancer and civilisation, which should cause us to rethink 
the nature of modern life and its capacity to incorporate death and 
disease.
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The curse and the gift of modernity 
in late nineteenth-century suicide 
discourse in Finland
Mikko Myllykangas
‘In greater nations, where large numbers of people create complicated 
social situations, where one can find plenty of riches, a lot of suffering, 
and high intelligence but also many degenerated individuals, the battle 
against self-murder can at times seem hopeless, and the onlooker is lead 
to believe it’s all caused by grim determinism’.1 This is how the Finnish 
physician Fredrik Wilhelm Westerlund (1844–1921) summarised the 
late nineteenth-century suicide discourse in April 1897. Observing the 
European debate on suicide from the north-eastern corner of Europe, 
the geographical distance and especially socio-economic remoteness 
between Finland and the leading countries of modernisation pre-
sented Westerlund with a bird’s eye view of the burning question of the 
connection between suicide and industrialisation, urbanisation, and 
modern society. Westerlund, like his contemporaries, acknowledged 
that suicide – the most repugnant of sins for over a thousand years – was 
a disease brought about by progress, a dark stain that signified a modern 
society. In this chapter, I explore how suicide as a sign of modernity 
was interpreted in a country where the material side of modernity – big 
cities and railroads – were rarely seen by the majority of the population.
The relationship between suicide discourse and modernisation has 
been a recurring subject in the historiography of suicide since at least 
the 1980s. The historian Howard Kusher has described in his book Self-
Destruction in the Promised Land and subsequent articles how ‘the fear 
of modernity’ was reflected in how suicide was conceptualised in the 
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nineteenth century.2 Yet, however frightening modernisation might 
have seemed, it was still worth pursuing. For many contemporaries, 
high suicide rates represented a sign of modernity, an undesirable but 
at the same time unavoidable price that a society had to pay on its path 
to the higher reaches of civilisation. While disturbing, the suicide phe-
nomenon was often positioned as something to be proud of; the higher 
suicide rates in the West were seen as a proof of racial superiority. As 
Evelyne Leuf notes in her article on Scandinavian suicide statistics, 
some suicide researchers presented the local suicide figures with often 
barely disguised pride.3 However, this rather widespread conception 
was not shared by all those who studied the suicide phenomenon in 
European countries. Towards the end of the century, suicide began to 
be seen more and more as a symptom of degeneration instead of a sign 
of increasing mental or cultural sophistication.
In this chapter, I analyse the conflicting views of nineteenth-century 
suicide researchers as they were faced with the increasing numbers of 
suicides in societies experiencing modernisation. I point out how local 
circumstances influenced the way concepts such as modernisation and 
progress were understood by those who studied suicide. As a historical 
case, I discuss a suicide study by F. W. Westerlund from 1897, pub-
lished in 1900. Westerlund’s essay ‘Själfmorden i Finland’ (‘Suicide in 
Finland’), over 150 pages long, shows that suicide research in Finland 
followed closely in the footsteps of European authors in many ways. In 
this regard, Finnish suicide researchers viewed (or at least wished to 
view) their own nation as being part of the modern, civilised world, in 
which the increasing rates of suicide had become something of a yard-
stick of progress. However, the local idiosyncrasies of Finnish society 
also offered Westerlund an outside perspective from which to critically 
evaluate the established ‘truths’ about suicide and its connection with 
the modernisation process. Before examining the suicide discourse of 
the late nineteenth century, I look at the formation of what could be 
called ‘a modern concept of suicide’.
The shaping of modern suicide
The difference between the modern conception of suicide and the pre-
modern understanding of suicide is very clear. ‘From Satan to Sero-
tonin’ and ‘From Sin to Insanity’: these are just two examples of how 
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the historians of suicide (in this case Kushner and Jeffrey R. Watt, 
respectively4) have summarised this transition. The two millennia of 
premodern discourse of suicide were characterised by suicide being 
understood within the frameworks of philosophy and theology, both of 
which aimed at answering the question ‘is it right or wrong to commit 
suicide?’ In ancient Greek and Roman texts, we can find mythological 
accounts of suicide followed by both condemnation and apologies for 
suicide by the philosophers. Whether suicide was regarded as a crime 
depended on the social status of the actor and the circumstances of the 
act.5 During ‘the Middle Age of suicide’, beginning around the dawn of 
the early medieval period, European culture became generally hostile 
towards suicide, and its criminalisation was backed by theological con-
demnation. The only escape from criminal sanctions, which were suf-
fered by the relatives, was the verdict of madness.6 During a transitional 
period of approximately three hundred years, starting around the 1500s 
and lasting until the dawn of the modern era, universal condemnation 
of suicide was contested gradually with the culmination of Enlighten-
ment philosophers openly challenging the practices of legal prosecu-
tion of suicides.7 The resulting contrast between the medieval suicide 
discourse firmly built on moral codes based on religious authority and 
the modern concept of suicide formed by the processes of medicalisa-
tion, secularisation, and decriminalisation is sharp. Suicide was removed 
from the realm of metaphysics and both religious and earthly condem-
nation and set on the field of scientific enquiry, rooted in modern medi-
cine and the social sciences.
As the modern concept of suicide emerged during the long nine-
teenth century, phenomena such as industrialisation, urbanisation, 
institutions of democracy, nationalism, and capitalism and the free-
market economy were spreading throughout the Western world and 
were already seeping into societies on the fringes of Europe, including 
Finland. Those who studied suicide in the nineteenth century pointed 
their fingers frequently at the very features that constituted what was 
understood as modernisation. After all, it was the new institutions of 
modern nation-states that raised awareness of the occurrence of suicide 
in the population. One of these new enterprises was the collecting of 
social statistics, as the gathering of data became part of the nation-
building process.8 For example, in the 1840s, the Finnish philosopher 
and statesman Johan Wilhelm Snellman (1806–81) urged Finnish 
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officials to collect statistical data to get a better understanding of the 
Finnish people. Statistics, he believed, offered an in-depth view, not 
only of the material qualities of a society, but also of the psychological 
and moral character of its people.9 It appears that Snellman was calling 
for more systematic and in-depth statistical inquiries to supplement the 
existing mortality statistics, the likes of which, including causes of 
death, had been collected in Finland since the 1740s. In fact, the Finnish 
and Swedish birth and mortality statistics are the oldest continuously 
collected population statistics in the world.10 Gathered under the 
heading of ‘moral statistics’, the series of numbers representing crimes, 
suicide, and other forms of deviance consolidated a new way of regard-
ing human behaviour, as just another measurable part of the world. 
Because of its moral, medical, and juridical aspects, suicide became the 
focal point of statistical investigations.11
In addition to statistics, the emergence of modern, secular, decrimi-
nalised suicide was closely linked to the formation and development of 
the psychiatric profession in the early years of the nineteenth century. 
Ian Marsh has gone as far as to claim that ‘alienists’ – the early French 
psychiatrists – and especially the renowned Jean-Étienne Dominique 
Esquirol (1772–1840) used the connection between suicide and 
madness to bolster their professional claims on the domain of mental 
health. Traditionally, the provision of ‘spiritual counselling’ (as a form 
of psychotherapy), as well as broader care for the mentally ill, had been 
the duty of the religious establishment.12 The emerging psychiatric pro-
fession, through their contributions to medical and social debates, 
played an essential part in the formation of the modern conception of 
suicide, which can be characterised as ‘medicalised suicide’.
The discussion of suicide among medical professionals began in 
France and Britain, and soon spread to other European countries and 
the rest of the Western world during the first two decades of the nine-
teenth century. The first scientific enquiries of suicide in Finland were 
published in the second half of the century (at the time Finland was a 
Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, and remained so until independ-
ence in 1917). In 1864, psychiatrist Thiodolf Saelan (1834–1921) pub-
lished his doctoral thesis Om sjelfmordet I Finland I statistiskt och 
rättsmedicinskt afseende (On Suicide in Finland: A Study in Statistics and 
Medical Jurisprudence), in which he examined the suicide phenomenon 
in Finland using statistical data from the past thirty years. Saelan’s thesis 
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introduced the international methodology of suicide research to Finnish 
academia. Based on official statistical data, edited by a private statistical 
enthusiast,13 and illustrated by a handful of case descriptions, Saelan’s 
study was in line with its European counterparts. By presenting several 
sets of statistics, Saelan endeavoured to shed light on various environ-
mental and temporal circumstances as context for the reported causes 
of suicides. Saelan’s study, like the majority of the suicide research 
written during the nineteenth century, followed a trend of ‘cataloguing 
of causes’,14 a prominent feature of mid-nineteenth-century French psy-
chiatry.15 This was no wonder, as most of Saelan’s quotations came from 
French authors, such as the psychiatrists Esquirol, Jean Pierre Falret 
(1794–1870), and Alexandre-Jacques-Francois Brierre de Boismont 
(1797–1881).16
As Saelan employed moral statistics as his chief instrument of 
enquiry, he also embraced mid-nineteenth-century determinism as a 
way to explain the rising suicide rates. Echoing one of the founding 
fathers of moral statistical research, the Belgian astronomer Adolph 
Quetelet (1796–1874), Saelan stated that suicide rates were governed 
by social laws, comparable to the laws of physics.17 Quetelet and other 
early moral statisticians, such as André-Michel Guerry (1802–66), had 
been impressed by the regularities in statistical data that illustrated 
forms of behaviour traditionally attributed to free will, for example 
murder and suicide. Their conclusion was that there had to be some-
thing larger than individual volition at work.18 These findings contrib-
uted to the rise of deterministic social theories, which became an 
integral part of late nineteenth-century suicide discourse. In Le suicide 
(1897), today the most famous work on suicide produced during the 
nineteenth century, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) 
presented his own concept of suicide based on environmental deter-
minism as he formulated his theory of ‘suicidogenic currents’.19
The application of statistical data and statistical analysis in suicide 
research also contributed to the transformation of the meaning of 
suicide from an act defined by the individual’s immorality (in premod-
ern suicide discourse) and insanity (in modern suicide discourse), to a 
phenomenon with large-scale social significance. The primary concern 
for the early and the mid-nineteenth-century suicide researchers had 
been to establish whether or not suicide was to be regarded as a form 
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of madness, or at least as a direct result of psychological morbidity. 
For example, in the 1860s, Saelan had underlined the importance of 
not assuming that all suicides were committed by the mentally ill, and 
of distinguishing mad and sane self-killers as separate categories to 
establish best possible ways to prevent suicides.20 In the latter part of 
the century, the focus shifted towards the social aetiology of suicide. 
This change was facilitated by the creation of a mass of statistical 
suicide data. Another major reason for the shift towards epistemol-
ogy grounded on moral statistical data was the rise of Darwinism in 
biology, and the introduction of evolutionary thinking into the social 
and human sciences.
In psychiatry, which had a tremendous significance in the shaping of 
understandings of modern suicide, Darwin’s theory and other evolu-
tionary ideas paved the way for conceptions of mental illness based on 
biological predisposition.21 Simultaneously, the theory of evolution was 
being taken up by social scientists. Especially through the works of 
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), evolutionary thinking was introduced 
into the emerging sociological perspective of understanding complex 
systems such as social organisation, and how various characteristics of 
a society, such as suicide rate, could be understood in terms of natural 
selection.22 The theory of evolution and its applications in the nascent 
social sciences helped to undermine the conviction that human socie-
ties would be remain somewhat unchanged through time. Following 
social evolutionary thinking, it seemed that human societies were in 
constant change and that, by analysing the statistics, outcomes could 
be predicted. In some cases, the outcome could be undesirable if left 
unchecked. In the eyes of some contemporaries, modernity was seen as 
a catalyst for various new and harmful behaviours, such as a capitalistic, 
egocentric way of life, or urban idleness. These changes were thought 
to be injurious for individual and society alike, and if not addressed, 
they would spread in the society causing, for example, neurasthenia, 
mental illness, and suicide at increasing rate.23
Anxiety about the course of the evolution of a given society became 
more pronounced towards the end of the century, as the dark side of 
evolution – degeneration – entered the discourses of social sciences, 
medicine, and suicide.24 Degeneration provided a theoretical frame-
work in which to express fears of modernity using the language of 
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science. The perceived increases in the incidence of suicide, mental 
illness, prostitution, alcoholism, and crime were explained within the 
parameters of theories of degeneration,25 and, following a circular logic, 
degenerated individuals were typified by low morality, low intelligence, 
madness, and devious behaviour.26 International competition fanned 
the fears of degeneration, which, in turn, created social programmes 
such as psychological testing of children in France and calls for policies 
to advance birth rates among people of ‘good stock’ in the UK and other 
Western countries.27 The concern over the future of a nation was 
directed towards certain parts of the society as the poor and uneducated 
working classes began to be seen as threats to civilised society.28
Due to its political, social scientific, and biological connotations, it 
is little wonder that the theories of degeneration swept over academia 
in the wake of evolutionary thinking. According to Ian Dowbigging, for 
psychiatrists, in particular, the allure of theories of degeneration and 
evolutionary thinking in general was that they seemed to provide a 
conceptual framework for explaining the very nature of madness (and 
suicide) in seemingly empirical and scientific terms by pointing to 
heredity as the physical cause of insanity.29 There were rather obvious 
reasons for psychiatrists to embrace the theory of degeneration. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, psychiatrists could not present any 
meaningful scientific breakthroughs in diagnosing and even less in 
curing madness, unlike their colleagues in bacteriology, for example. 
Degeneration theory offered a double-edged sword to psychiatrists, 
who wanted to be regarded as scientists.30
Following the increasingly mechanistic view of many social phenom-
ena, the philosophical implications of presumed social laws became an 
integral part of explaining why suicide happened. For centuries, suicide 
had been understood as something that an individual chooses to 
commit. The perceived statistical regularities in people’s behaviour 
raised doubts over whether such acts as suicide and homicide were in 
fact voluntary, or were somehow predetermined by social and cultural 
forces. The mounting statistical data on rising suicide rates provided 
groundwork for the idea that suicide was an illness of society rather 
than an outcome of voluntary human behaviour or, in a more modern 
view, a specific and individualised pathology.31 Towards the end of the 
century, suicide together with madness was increasingly interpreted as 
a symptom of harmful aspects of modernity, but also as a sign of 
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civilisation that separated modern nations from those who were 
regarded as barbaric races living outside of the Western cultural sphere.
The sickness of civilisation
The scientific and philosophical debates surrounding the use of social 
statistics produced a major transformation that restructured the dis-
course of suicide. These changes became visible in Fredrik Wilhelm 
Westerlund’s 1897 study, as he fine-tuned the statistical analysis of 
Finnish suicides. Psychiatric considerations played a lesser part in West-
erlund’s study in comparison to the previous study by Saelan as he 
attempted to establish a social aetiology of suicide. Westerlund enriched 
his arguments by employing statistical data from abroad, and by quoting 
the international authors on suicide, moral statistics, and determinism, 
such as German moral statistician Adolph Wagner (1836–1917) and 
philosopher Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802–96), as well as British 
author Thomas Henry Buckle (1821–62), whose deterministic History 
of Civilization in England was published in three volumes between 1857 
and 1868.32 By historically contextualising the changes in suicide statis-
tics, Westerlund sought means for suicide prevention on a national 
scale. All of these features distanced Westerlund’s work from Saelan’s 
research of thirty years earlier. To understand the shift in focus of 
Finnish suicide research by the end of the nineteenth century, we need 
to look at one particular author on suicide, who was a major influence 
on Westerlund’s study.
When it comes to late nineteenth-century suicide research, one 
work stands out for its major influence on subsequent research: the 
pan-European moral statistical analysis of suicide, Il Suicidio. Saggio di 
statistica morale comparata by the Italian psychiatrist Enrico Morselli 
(1852–1929), originally published in 1878. As Maria Teresa Brancac-
cio points out, what made Morselli’s work so important and also so 
typical for the era was the way that he fused together some of the most 
popular topics in the human sciences of the late nineteenth century.33 
Statistics and statistical analysis formed the empirical foundation of 
Morselli’s enquiry. He embraced statistics in general and moral statis-
tics, in particular, as a way of uncovering the social laws that govern 
human behaviour. Statistics provided a supposedly objective view of 
the present state and historical development of a society. Furthermore, 
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statistical analysis would provide answers to profound questions on 
the nature of human agency that philosophy had struggled to solve for 
centuries. For Morselli, the absolute independence of human actions 
had been refuted by observed statistical regularities in many forms of 
human behaviour.34 He embraced the notion of determinism whole-
heartedly, as he argued that the seemingly most arbitrary deeds, such as 
suicide, were, in fact, results of social laws that govern the behaviour of 
each individual.35 Morselli’s conclusion was a rather typical example of 
how the increasing interest in collecting and analysing moral statistics 
fed the debate over freedom of will and determinism intensified by the 
end of the nineteenth century.36
To come up with a universal explanation to interpret and explain his 
statistical findings on suicide, Morselli turned to evolutionary theories. 
He argued that psychologists and sociologists should seek the origins 
of social and psychological phenomena alike from the laws governing 
the evolution of life, and therefore they should base their arguments on 
natural laws instead of on idealistic rhetoric or sentimentalism.37 From 
this premise, Morselli formulated an extremely deterministic definition 
of suicide: ‘suicide is an effect of the struggle for existence and of human 
selection, which works according to the laws of evolution among civi-
lized people.’ 38 Those who did not come out of the struggle as victorious 
suffered from ‘some morbid aberration’ in their brains and were removed 
from the survival contest by voluntary death.39 As we can see here, 
Morselli’s definition of suicide was not meant to be a universal defini-
tion. Instead, his focus was on the suicide phenomenon in modern, 
‘civilised’, societies, where the main source of misfortune and suffering 
causing suicides (and other individual and social maladies such as 
madness and prostitution) was the psychologically taxing struggle for 
existence.
The mechanism of suicide that Morselli outlined was rooted in a 
psychiatric understanding of nervous illnesses. Morselli argued, echoing 
the psychiatric and neurological conception of the causes of hysteria 
and neurasthenia, that in civilised societies the struggle for life mani-
fested itself intellectually instead of through physical violence.40 ‘The 
struggle’, as Morselli wrote, ‘between civilized peoples tends to become 
still more a struggle of intelligence.’ 41 Therefore, suicide was more 
common in civilised and secular societies, as intellectual aspirations 
were thought to cause strain and damage to the brain and nervous 
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system, which then might lead to insanity. The connection between 
mental illness and suicide had already been made by early nineteenth-
century psychiatrists, especially by Esquirol, although not all agreed 
with him on this point, and therefore high mental activity was seen as 
a possible risk factor that could lead to suicide.42
According to Morselli, as modern societies became more complex, 
if the suicide phenomenon were to be left unchecked, suicide rates 
would continue to increase at the same pace as cultural advance-
ment. This hypothesis was shared by many late nineteenth-century 
suicide researchers, including the coroner William Wynn Westcott 
(1848–1925) in England, who had noted in 1885 how it was beyond 
dispute that ‘a preponderant rate of suicide, and a high rate of madness 
exist in countries the farthest advanced in our modern ideas of civi-
lization.’ 43 In the German-speaking world, Alexander von Oettingen 
argued that materialism of modern civilisation made people weary of 
life, and his pupil in moral statistical research, Adolph Wagner, argued 
that Protestantism as a more ‘modern’ form of Christianity produced 
more suicides.44 On the other side of the Atlantic, William Mathews 
(1818–1909) came to a similar conclusion in his essay ‘Civilization and 
suicide’, published in 1891. Praising Morselli as one of the most brilliant 
students of suicide, Mathews confirmed that modern civilisation was 
to blame for the increasing numbers of suicides.45 A fast pace of living, 
excitement, and competition were at the centre of nineteenth-century 
life. ‘Express-railway stock wears out far more rapidly … and man’s 
nervous system is subject to the same law’, Mathews wrote, conjuring 
images of a speeding mechanised lifestyle.46 And finally, writing in 1897 
– the same year that Westerlund completed his suicide study – Emile 
Durkheim described ‘the hypercivilization which … refines nervous 
systems, making them excessively delicate … [and] more accessible 
both to violent irritation and to exaggerated depression’.47 What we 
can gather from the aforementioned authors is that changes in the 
way people lived, as well as changes in their spatial and social envi-
ronments – brought about by railroads, electricity, and urbanisation 
– were regarded as explanations for the modern prevalence of suicide. 
Here suicide is seen as a sign of modernity, and as a disease born out 
of progress. But how did this perception translate to societies where 
‘express-railway’ and fast-paced urban life were only a rumour heard 
from those travelling abroad?
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Death followed hunger and disease
As the quotation at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, Westerlund 
was well aware of the dissimilarities between his native country and the 
‘greater nations’ of Central and Western Europe, conditions of which 
had been the subject of the existing literature on suicide. However, as 
any scholar who strives to create dialogue, he picked up the central 
concepts of the transnational discourse of suicide and employed them 
in his analysis of the Finnish suicide data. A logical starting point was 
to compare rural and urban suicide rates and to see how Finnish statis-
tics answered their international counterparts.
For contemporary observers, the growth of urban centres was one 
of the most visible signs of modernisation. Unsurprisingly, urbanisation 
was often one of the prime explanations when the causes of suicide 
were sought. Urban life, it seemed, was especially plagued by the danger 
of suicide, while, as one American observer stated. People living in rural 
areas had no time to think mischievous thoughts of suicidal nature 
while they were engaged with agrarian activities.48 The traditional agrar-
ian way of life was regarded as morally superior to the busier character 
of urban life, which was generally considered to put a strain on the 
nerves due to its busier character.49 Westerlund, like his international 
colleagues, considered the comparatively high suicide rates in Helsinki 
to be caused by an intensified struggle for existence in urban areas.50 
However, as Finland was quite far behind many of the Western Euro-
pean countries in its level of urbanisation, he thought generally lower 
Finnish suicide rates to be a result of a less intense struggle for existence. 
He stated that Finland was spared from the overtly strong influence of 
degeneration due to the agrarian and less urbanised structure of the 
society.51 Despite this acknowledgement, Westerlund did consider 
suicide to be a problem for Finnish society, and one that was related to 
the country’s level of modernisation. By looking at the measures that 
he proposed to prevent Finnish suicides, we get a clearer picture of 
exactly how suicide and modernisation were connected to each other 
in Westerlund’s reasoning.
In the list of preventative measures, Westerlund placed a strong 
emphasis on the battle against famine, caused by failure of crops, as a 
measure to prevent suicides. He made a rather peculiar comparison 
between the ‘struggle for existence’ in other more developed nations 
The curse and the gift of modernity 205
and the impact of crop failures in Finland, arguing that they had a com-
parable influence on the suicide rates.52 Westerlund’s Western European 
colleagues generally viewed ‘struggle for existence’ in relation to the 
effects that modernisation had on society, usually targeting urban life-
style as a way of life that was seen as harmful to moral and even physical 
well-being. In Finland, however, the ‘struggle for existence’ was inter-
preted through a more practical lens. Born in 1844, Fredrik Wilhelm 
Westerlund had been in his mid-twenties when consecutive failures of 
crops in Finland caused the famine of 1866–68. The winter of 1866–67 
had been unusually cold and the spring of 1867 had come late, as the 
median temperature in May had been only +1.8°C in Helsinki, almost 
ten degrees below the average. On top of that, freezing weather in Sep-
tember had destroyed the crops in many parts of the country. Partially 
due to the slow reaction by the Senate of Finland, international food 
aid did not reach the country in time, and as a result Finland and espe-
cially the Finnish countryside was plunged into a food catastrophe. 
During these great hunger years, around 150,000 people died from 
hunger, diseases, and – for a small part – suicide, equating to almost 
10% of the population of c. 1.7 million. In the worst-hit areas, the death 
rate reached 20% of the population.53 The experience was engraved on 
people’s imagination, and it was echoed in art and literature for decades 
after.
Looking at the suicide statistics of the 1860s, there was in fact an 
increase of over 40% in the suicide rate in 1868, the worst year of famine 
(see Table 8.1). A growth of similar magnitude in suicide numbers had 
been experienced in 1848, when in the aftermath of the 1846 crop 
failure, a cholera epidemic reached Finland.54 During the famine, in 
addition to ‘normal’ suicides, it was fairly common for an individual 
who committed suicide to kill one or several family members before 
killing themselves. Westerlund described several cases of such ‘extended’ 
suicides, which he explained were caused by delirium due to typhoid 
fever and hunger.55 Looking at the Finnish statistics, Westerlund saw a 
very different statistical reality from his European and American col-
leagues, who were mostly worried about the fast-paced progress of 
society and the nervous strain it caused.
After the great famine years of the late 1860s, Finland went through 
a rapid period of industrialisation. The experience of catastrophe par-
tially speeded up the economic progress of the country; the government 
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instigated the development of the railroad network to ensure food aid 
would reach the periphery in cases of future famine, for example.56 
Between 1870 and 1910, the urban industrial labour force increased 
from 150,000 to over 600,000. However, when we look at the structure 
of the Finnish economy, only 4% of the population earned their liveli-
hood in industrial occupations in 1870, and even by 1910 the figure 
had only increased to 14.7% of the population.57 It is fair to say that the 
Grand Duchy of Finland was distinctly an agrarian society at the dawn 
of the twentieth century, around the time when Westerlund conducted 
his suicide study. Wide-scale urbanisation and the curses of the modern 
lifestyle that were thought to follow in its wake had not yet arrived in 
Finland. Social and economic circumstances that Westerlund consid-
ered as central points of focus of suicide prevention were very different 
in Finland from, for example, in France or the UK. But, as he noted that 
suicide and intensified struggle for existence were products of ‘laws of 
nature’ that gained their force from social circumstances, by manipu-
lating these very same circumstances humankind could also work to 
decrease the number of suicides and other social ills. As ‘progress gone 
too far’ could hardly have been the cause of suicides in Finland, the 
development and modernisation of the society on a very basic level, 
TABLE 8.1 Suicide per 1 million inhabitants in Finland, 1841–90
1841: 36.2 1851: 44.3 1861: 44.05 1871: 31.05 1881: 34.57
1842: 36.4 1852: 44.6 1862: 40.87 1872: 29.98 1882: 34.54
1843: 49.2 1853: 41.4 1863: 38.39 1873: 30.11 1883: 44.73
1844: 37.4 1854: 42.3 1864: 42.12 1874: 36.05 1884: 38.53
1845: 29.1 1855: 49.0 1865: 47.20 1875: 40.78 1885: 40.30
1846: 40.4 1856: 52.0 1866: 47.34 1876: 33.97 1886: 46.01
1847: 43.7 1857: 52.0 1867: 42.76 1877: 36.52 1887: 37.75
1848: 60.7 1858: 46.9 1868: 60.78 1878: 38.10 1888: 40.62
1849: 43.3 1859: 40.6 1869: 46.57 1879: 32.47 1889: 32.80
1850: 45.2 1860: 48.7 1870: 39.58 1880: 27.18 1890: 39.92
Source: F. W. Westerlund, ‘Själfmorden i Finland 1861–1895’, Bidrag till 
kännedom af Finlands natur och folk (Helsingfors: Finska Vetenskaps-
Societeten, 1900), p. 125.
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such as food production and distribution, was the remedy that West-
erlund recommended to combat suicides.58 As Finland was still suffer-
ing from such societal problems as famine, it becomes understandable 
why a Finnish suicide researcher asked for more modernity rather than 
denouncing modernity and progress as the sources of suicide. The situ-
ation was almost an exact opposite of other Western nations, where 
the faster pace of modernisation and the moral debates surrounding 
various aspects of modern life had directed the attention of suicide 
researchers to see modernity as something that causes suicides rather 
than preventing them.
Free-willed progress and its benefits
While Westerlund agreed with Morselli’s conclusion that there was 
indeed a connection between modernisation and suicide, he disagreed 
with Morselli’s rather strict deterministic outlook on the progress of 
civilisation and its effects on individual behaviour. He pointed out how 
the causes of suicide varied between social classes, intellectual causes 
being typical for the upper echelons of society. More importantly, he 
argued that the power of determinism varied between the social classes. 
Committed by intellectually advanced and well-educated individuals 
(typically doctors, businessmen, scholars, and artisans), suicide could 
be regarded as a premeditated act, as the higher reaches of society exer-
cised stronger moral freedom. The lower classes, due to generations of 
manual labour, alcoholism, poor education, and so on, were slaves to 
environmental determinism. In effect, Westerlund defined two differ-
ent kinds of suicides: the more common kind was committed by morally 
inferior people, and it was determined by environment and inherited 
degeneration. The other kind of suicide was an act of self-sacrifice, to 
which free individuals sometimes had to resort. A wife caring for her 
sick husband knowing that she might also get ill and die in the process 
was one rather ambiguous example given by Westerlund.59
Westerlund was far from being alone as he distanced himself from the 
excessively deterministic interpretation of statistics. Although Wester-
lund was mainly influenced by Morselli’s work, which exhibited a deter-
ministic combination of materialism and Darwinism, he also studied the 
works of Oettingen and Wagner. Both German statisticians, especially 
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after the former had convinced the latter, distanced themselves from 
rigid determinism and advocated social reforms as preventative meas-
ures to combat suicide.60 A similar stance had been voiced in the early 
1890s by Westerlund’s compatriot, a Member of Parliament, and the 
founding father of the cooperative movement in Finland, Hannes Geb-
hardt (1864–1933). In his article ‘Siveellisyystilastot ja ihmistahdon 
vapaus’ (‘Moral statistics and free will’), published in 1891, Gebhardt 
strongly rejected fatalistic implications of deterministic thinking. By 
pointing out correlations between suicide, mental illness, and other 
misfortunes, Gebhardt argued that with further social progress the 
freedom of individuals would increase and it would become possible 
to fix societal deficiencies that drove people into madness and suicide.61 
The only way to improve society was through the use of reason and 
rational planning of society; this was the approach taken by Westerlund 
and Gebhardt. Without freedom of will, deliberate societal develop-
ment was considered impossible.62 For those who distanced themselves 
from determinism, deliberate development of society was possible and 
also necessary to decrease the number of suicides.63 Statistics would 
provide insight into the past and the present state of society, but they 
did not predict the future, and said nothing about ever-present laws 
that would govern human behaviour, as yet another Finnish statistician, 
Anders Boxtröm (1846–1906) had noted in 1891.64
Conclusion
It was clear that the lack of modernisation and progress – as in the case 
of the nation’s inability to provide food aid in the case of crop failure 
– could also be considered as a cause of suicides, especially among the 
lowest classes of the society. Writing from a less developed country such 
as Finland, which had social problems due to lack of progress, Wester-
lund perceived suicide as a tragic outcome of vastly different scenarios, 
many of which had nothing to do with high levels of social progress, 
sophisticated brain development, or modern civilisation.65 Conse-
quently, Westerlund, with a critical attitude towards tying suicide and 
modernisation together, contested one of the most repeated statements 
of nineteenth-century suicide discourse, according to which only civi-
lised people would commit suicide. By pointing out that even societies 
that had only just begun to go through modernisation produced 
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suicides, Westerlund outlined suicide as an act universal to all human-
kind. He illustrated the argument by describing how many authors 
regarded suicide exclusively as a sign of modernity, as a privilege of 
culturally refined people, and therefore unheard of among the ‘barbaric 
races’. Rather laconically, he pointed out that it was not uncommon for 
women in India to follow their husbands to death, or for a Chinese 
official to ‘cut his stomach open at the slightest occasion of dishonour’.66 
It seems that Westerlund was here conflating Chinese customs with the 
Japanese practice of harakiri, but it is noteworthy that he saw suicide as 
a part of all cultures instead of as a phenomenon typical of a certain 
developmental stage of human society.
As we have seen, the introduction of modern suicide research pre-
sented the idea of suicide as a sickness of modernity. Statistical data and 
evolutionary theories provided suicide researchers with a theoretical 
framework with which to explain the increasing rates of suicide in civi-
lised countries, and the bond between suicide and modernity was 
forged even more strongly by the end of the nineteenth century. But 
even as the fear of modernity and urban degeneration ruled suicide 
discourse in the most materially advanced nations, the fact remained 
that suicides were also committed in less-developed societies, and even 
outside of the Western cultural sphere. In fact, Westerlund attributed 
the Finnish suicide epidemics of the 1860s to the material underdevel-
opment of Finland. As mentioned in the Introduction of the present 
volume, one of the great theorists of the ‘disease of modernity’, George 
Miller Beard, attributed mental exhaustion, a typical cause of suicide, 
to such elements of progress as steam power and telegraphy. Ironically, 
the poor means of communication between coastal and inland regions 
was seen as one of the primary causes of the great famine and increase 
in suicide in Finland in the 1860s by contemporaries. Modernity, when 
it was regarded in the light of suicide statistics, became an ambiguous 
concept, which had to be interpreted in the local context.
For an observer like Westerlund, writing outside of the heart of mod-
ernisation, to see suicide as a universal human behaviour gave him an 
opportunity to critically evaluate dominant perceptions of suicide. As 
it turned out, the widely popular concept of the intimate connection 
between suicide and modernity was itself a product of modernisation. 
It was partially based on statistical findings as to what was happen-
ing in societies experiencing urbanisation, industrialisation, and other 
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aspects of modernity. But the way these findings were interpreted 
was to aggrandise the material and cultural development of ‘civilised’ 
nations and to emphasise the gap between them and those which were 
regarded as cultures without modern civilisation.
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To be modern, in its most fundamental sense, is to be distinct from the 
past (if not actually opposed to it) and to be an inalienable part of the 
present. To call something ‘traditional’ is therefore to deny it a rightful 
place in the present: to reduce it to an exotic anachronism. Johannes 
Fabian has described the anthropological trope of ‘primitiveness’ as a 
‘denial of coevalness’ by which people and institutions – the anthro-
pologist and her subject who are very obviously contemporary to each 
other – are split up and rendered within their own discrete temporal 
envelopes.1 This is largely the case when we speak of ‘traditional medi-
cine’. Therapeutic practices that are labelled ‘traditional’ are marked off 
as leftovers from a bygone era.
A 2012 report by the World Health Organization, however, con-
firmed that over 115 countries in the world, including such demographic 
giants as China, India, South Africa, and Nigeria – to name but four – 
now have official policies for ‘traditional medicine’.2 To varying extents, 
all these countries have carved out officially recognised spaces for 
various so-called ‘traditional medicines’ within their state health 
systems, albeit often at a level subordinate to biomedicine. The nomen-
clature notwithstanding, these allegedly ‘traditional medicines’ do 
share the contemporary present with biomedicine and have done so for 
some time now. Yet it is partly by their continued framing as ‘traditional’ 
that their official subordination to biomedicine and their frequent 
erasure from scholarly overviews of the medical present is ensured.
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Nowhere is this refusal of coevalness more conspicuous today than 
in overviews of the history of medicine. A 2008 work entitled Medicine 
and Modernism, for instance, has this to say about the conundrum of 
the modern: ‘“Modernity” and “modernization” are terms that histori-
ans use to refer to the interrelated series of economic, social, and politi-
cal transformations that occurred in western societies during the period 
of the long nineteenth century. Urbanization, industrialization, and the 
spread of market capitalism were among the most salient features of 
these changes’.3 Both modernity and modernisation are thus made syn-
onymous with ‘western societies’. A place like South Asia, though inti-
mately connected to the developments in Britain and thus equally 
implicated in the dynamics of urbanisation, industrialisation, and the 
spread of market capitalism (though in different ways and at distinct 
rates), is yet expunged from the ambit of nineteenth-century moder-
nity. In the same year that L. S. Jacyna wrote the above lines, William 
Bynum published The History of Medicine: A Very Short Introduction. 
Despite having deployed the definitive article in the title, and thus 
foreclosing any possibility of there being Other Histories of Medicines, 
Bynum’s account remained firmly focused on the story of biomedicine. 
Even in his final chapter, entitled ‘Medicine in the Modern World’, the 
possibility of the ‘modern world’ being inhabited by anything but bio-
medicine is never allowed to interrupt the narrative.4 A few years later, 
in 2011, Roger Cooter contributed a fascinating chapter entitled ‘Medi-
cine and Modernity’ in an Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine. 
Once again, notwithstanding Cooter’s careful attention to how actors 
themselves used the notion of modernity and his just insistence that 
‘not only the history of medicine, but the history of modern thought 
depends upon an understanding of modernity in medicine and medi-
cine in modernity’, he completely eschews the possibility of their being 
other modernities and other medicines.5
I cite these authors not to single them out as somehow exceptionally 
blameworthy. Rather, I cite them for the exact opposite reasons. They 
are all eminent historians of medicine – amongst the very best in the 
field in fact – known for their archival rigour and their theoretical 
sophistication. Yet, and here’s the rub, they seem entirely unaware of 
the debate over multiple modernities. The latter debate is now close to 
two decades old and in many circles it is already a fait accompli; but 
alas, not in medical history circles.
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The watershed moment for the debate over multiple modernities 
came in 2000 when S. N. Eisenstadt edited a special issue of the journal 
Daedalus on the subject.6 The contributors to the Daedalus volume 
described many different types of modernity ranging through Israeli, 
Turkish, Confucian, Islamic, Indian, Diasporic, Communist, and many 
more. Even before the Daedalus issue, however, postcolonial scholars 
such as Partha Chatterjee had made a powerful case about the fractured 
and plural nature of modernity.7 In fact, Chatterjee’s entry point into 
the question had been precisely through the actor’s category of ‘adhuni-
kata’ or ‘modernity’ amongst nineteenth-century Bengali intellectuals. 
Along similar lines and more recently, Dipesh Chakrabarty has called 
for the ‘provincializing’ of European modernity.8
The argument I want to pursue here, however, is not merely that 
there are many medical modernities. Of course there are and the intro-
duction to this volume does a splendid job in underlining that moder-
nity is ‘a constantly changing accretion of history, social context, and 
material conditions’. What I want to add here in this chapter is a recog-
nition that just as there are many modernities, so too are there many 
medicines. Western, or biomedicine, is not the only form of ‘medicine’ 
that confronted, negotiated, or developed its own figure of modernity. 
Neither did all non-Western forms of medicine simply oppose moder-
nity. Yet these parallel medical modernities continue unfortunately to be 
largely ignored within mainstream histories of medicine.
My ambition in this chapter, therefore, is to pursue the history of a 
specifically Ayurvedic medical modernity.9 I do not wish to claim that 
Ayurvedic modernity was the only South Asian medical modernity. 
There were certainly both Western-style biomedical forms of moder-
nity and vernacularised South Asian versions.10 There were also other 
medical modernities engendered in and organised around other medical 
traditions such as Unani Tibb, Siddha, and Sowa Rigpa, to name only 
the most prominent ones.11 Each of these medical modernities had their 
own specific accents, politics, and, above all, their distinctive body 
imaginaries. They were each shaped by their own historically specific 
trysts with what the practitioners themselves conceptualised as moder-
nity. Each of these merits a devoted historical exploration. But in the 
present chapter, I shall focus exclusively on the Ayurvedic tradition, 
which has today emerged as not only the largest and best funded non-
biomedical tradition in South Asia, but also as a global therapeutic 
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option available in each of the major continents.12 Moreover, my 
window into this Ayurvedic modernity will be the nineteenth-century 
Ayurvedic body.
In the interests of space, I have developed my account of Ayurvedic 
modernity through a discussion of the writings of one particular Ayur-
vedic author, Binodbihari Ray (1862–?). After a brief review of the 
extant literature on Asian medicines and modernity, I demonstrate how 
Ray developed an explicit and self-conscious discourse about Ayurve-
dic modernity. I follow this up with a more detailed interrogation of his 
descriptions of the Ayurvedic body and show how, through the use of 
metaphors, he radically refigured the Ayurvedic body. Finally, after 
another brief excursus contextualising the metaphors themselves, I 
conclude with a section on Ray’s later cosmological writings and their 
relationship with his medical writings.
Binodbihari Ray and Ayurvedic modernity
Not a whole lot is known about Binodbihari Ray. He was born around 
1862 and in his youth, he trained in Western-style medicine and eventu-
ally earned a VLMS (Vernacular Licentiate of Medicine & Surgery) 
diploma. Unfortunately, there is no record of his subsequent profes-
sional life. In January 1890, he launched a short-lived medical journal. 
At the time he was based in Talanda, Rajshahi, in present-day north 
Bangladesh. He also claimed to have run into huge debt to finance the 
publication. Very few issues of this journal have survived, suggesting 
that it probably did not last very long (though we cannot be sure of 
this). We next hear of him in 1908 when he published a lengthy book 
on Ayurveda written entirely in verse titled Podyo Ayurbbed Siksha 
(‘Medical Educational Verses’). Also interestingly, while in 1890 he had 
described himself simply as a Daktar, that is, the vernacularised form 
of address for a Western-style physician, in 1908 he styled himself as 
‘Daktar Binodbihari Ray Kabiraj’ (Kabiraj being the designation used 
to refer to Ayurvedic physicians).
In 1908, the same year that he published his last medical writing, Ray 
published his first cosmological work. In the years to come he went on 
to publish three more erudite cosmological works devoted to the theme 
of ‘creation-existence-apocalypse’ (srishti-sthiti-pralay). In none of the 
books did he refer to his life as a doctor, nor use addresses like daktar 
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and kabiraj. Had it not been for his penchant for publishing photo-
graphs of himself in his books along with his birth year and his address 
in Rajshahi, there would be no way of knowing that the medical author 
and the cosmological author were one and the same person. Why he 
made such a clean and absolute break with his medical identity – at least 
in print – remains a mystery, as do the precise connections between his 
medical and his cosmological writings. These scant details are sadly the 
sum total of our knowledge about Ray’s life.
We can add a little more to this by contextualising the sparse infor-
mation we do possess. For instance, the VLMS diploma was a special 
qualification introduced in 1851 to cater to the colonial state’s growing 
medical needs. The course followed for this diploma was shorter than 
the five years necessary for both the Bachelor of Medicine (MB) and 
the Licentiate of Medicine & Surgery (LMS) qualifications. Moreover, 
knowledge of English was unnecessary for the VLMS. Two separate 
classes of VLMS students were taught respectively in Hindustani and 
Bengali. Ray almost certainly read in the Bengali class. After a three-year 
truncated course, this would have rendered him eligible for appoint-
ment as either a Hospital Assistant or in one of the growing number of 
dispensaries under full or partial state funding. If Ray attended medical 
school in Calcutta, he would have attended classes at the Campbell 
Medical School in Sealdah where the Bengali class used to be held. 
There is, however, also a chance that he may have attended classes at 
the Dhaka Medical School that also offered VLMS diplomas from 1874 
onwards.13
What we lack in circumstantial details for Ray is compensated by his 
own powerful voice. In explaining his decision to launch his short-lived 
medical journal, Chikitshak (‘Physician’), Ray explained that ‘Ayur-
veda, our national therapeutics’ (amader deshiya chikitsha byabostha) 
had fallen on very bad times. ‘Leave alone foreigners’, he lamented, 
‘even our countrymen detest it and demean it by labelling it unscien-
tific (abaigyanik)’.14 Many ‘great souls’, he admitted, had already taken 
up the cudgels for Ayurveda and many Kabirajes too were making 
strenuous efforts to reverse the situation, but given the dire situation 
it was in, according to Ray, the ‘help of locals trained as daktars was 
indispensible’. The likelihood of this happening, however, was remote. 
Many a local, Ray accused, began to hate Ayurveda the moment they 
entered through the gates of the Medical College. Yet he insisted that 
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it was the ‘beholden duty’ of every daktar to labour for the revival of 
Ayurveda.15
Not one to be satisfied with abstract statements, Ray also had a clear 
plan for what needed to be done. He insisted that one of the foremost 
tasks was to publish more Ayurvedic journals. He lamented that one of 
the earliest journals, Ayurveda Sanjeevani, had proved short-lived and 
another, Chikitsha Sammilani, while faring better was often irregular 
and dependent on the magnanimity of a single generous aristocratic 
patron. The bigger aim, however, was ‘to explain the complexities of 
Ayurveda and make it easily accessible, to elaborate on those issues that 
are only briefly mentioned in Ayurveda, to search for and to incorporate 
from other therapeutic traditions what is missing in Ayurveda’.16
In explaining this further, Ray mentioned that medicine is ‘improv-
ing day by day’ (din din unnati hoitechhe) and newer things are being 
discovered. None of this was there in the ‘olden days that is in the days 
of the Aryans’ (purbakale arthat Arjyaganer samay).17 This is clearly 
a framing in terms of modernity by positing a clear break with an 
‘older time’ of tradition. Ray’s espousal of a classical time identified 
with ancestral ‘Aryans’, was fairly widespread amongst late nineteenth-
century Indian, especially high-caste Hindu, intellectuals.18 But unlike 
many others, Ray did not see the present as merely a degeneration 
of that classical, Aryan antiquity. Rather, the contemporary moment 
was for him marked by ‘improvements’ (unnati) and new discoveries 
(abishkar) that necessitated new efforts within the specific realm of 
Ayurvedic medicine.
Ray further suggested that some of the things that were being discov-
ered were already there in Ayurveda but perhaps in complex, difficult-
to-comprehend forms or indeed too briefly. He would elaborate on 
these and demonstrate that what appeared new was after all not so new, 
and already there in Ayurveda. But there were also things that were 
simply absent in Ayurveda. Ray confessed, for instance, that biomedi-
cal diagnosis (nidan) was much superior to Ayurveda, just as anatomy 
(shaarir) and physiology (sharirkriya) were weak in Ayurveda. Though 
he hastened to add that this was not a grievous fault since Ayurvedic 
diagnosis and therapeutics were not as heavily dependent on a thor-
ough knowledge of anatomy and physiology as biomedicine was, the 
confession of a lack was telling.19 It was particularly significant because 
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he followed up this particular discussion with an entire serialised essay 
on physiology. Clearly, he was seeking to fill the gap here as he had 
promised to do in setting up the goals of his project.20
Ray’s attitude towards modernity was further clarified when he inter-
vened in a debate that had been taking place on the pages of another 
Ayurvedic journal, the Chikitsha Sammilani (‘Meeting of Medicines’). 
The debate had originally involved a Bengali daktar, Pulinbihari Sanyal, 
and a Kabiraj, Prasannachandra Maitreya, and their respective defini-
tions of the Ayurvedic notion of ‘dhatu’. Maitreya was opposed to San-
yal’s attempts to interpret Ayurvedic concepts along biomedical lines 
and at one point had asserted that pitta (one of the key pathogenic 
principles in Ayurveda) was actually the ‘Lord Brahma himself ’. Ray 
summarised the debate in the Chikitshak and retorted that, ‘if there is 
no other way of describing pitta, then Mr Maitreya’s utterances are like 
the hollow boast of a child, for in the nineteenth century if we were to 
simply call pitta the god Brahma and left it at that, no one would accept 
it’.21 Once more, in this exchange, we are given a clear sense in which Ray 
was thinking of his project as a modern project. His argument was a tem-
poral one based on the attitudes of people in ‘the nineteenth century’. 
People would not accept Maitreya’s statement because it was incompat-
ible with nineteenth-century horizons of belief and plausibility.
This horizon of plausibility seemed to be firmly linked, at least for 
Ray, to the idea of demonstrability. In every issue of his journal, he 
explained anatomical and physiological concepts by describing simple, 
do-it-yourself experiments or giving directions about the dissection of 
goats. One series of do-at-home experiments, for instance, was aimed 
at explaining to readers the chemical composition of the air and involved 
simple tools like candles, glasses, etc.22 In another similar series of 
experiments, he demonstrated the chemical explanation for combus-
tion.23 Likewise, he advised readers to dissect a goat and conduct an 
experiment by blowing into the dead goat’s trachea through a rubber 
tube and following the movements of the air.24 Another similar demon-
stration involved dissecting the goat’s stomach and examining the flex-
ibility of the diaphragm by various simple experiments.25
As Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer point out in their classical 
history of ‘experimental life’, there emerged towards the end of the sev-
enteenth century in Britain a new paradigm of experimental knowledge, 
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which generated ‘moral certainty’ around ‘matters of fact’. The produc-
tion of such experimental knowledge ‘commenced with individuals’ 
acts of seeing and believing, and was completed when all individuals 
voluntarily agreed with one another about what had been seen and 
ought to be believed’.26 There were, therefore, two key moves involved 
in the production of such experimental knowledge. First, a faith that 
‘seeing is believing’ and second, a consensus that everyone is seeing 
the same thing. The generation of this consensus, in turn, was prem-
ised upon the disciplining of the experimental community, that is the 
standardisation of the experiment itself as well as the ways of seeing. 
When ‘Western’ science and its oculo-centric ways of knowing were 
disseminated, therefore, it was not simply visual demonstration that 
was privileged. The eye of the seeing subject or experimentalist was also 
carefully trained and guided. Shigehisa Kuriyama’s fascinating account 
of anatomical viewing amongst Japanese doctors amply illustrates that 
what distinguished older and new forms of anatomical knowledge in 
Japan was not so much cadaveric dissections per se, but rather what 
the dissector observed.27 I would argue that Ray’s detailed descriptions 
of do-at-home experiments were, in essence, attempts to disseminate a 
culture of visually anchored knowledge based upon standardised ways 
of seeing.
This experimental imperative, not to mention the actual experiments 
and demonstrations being recommended, was utterly new to Ayurveda 
but it seemed to be at the heart of the attitude that Ray thought neces-
sary for the nineteenth century.28 Ray was attempting not only to estab-
lish a novel, experimental basis of Ayurvedic knowledge, but also to 
create a community of experimentalists in the process. In an interesting 
early essay, Ray framed his new curiosity and quest for visual proof in 
terms of a generational difference in orientation. Structured as a dia-
logue between Ray and his aged grandfather around the chemical expla-
nation of combustion, Ray repeatedly depicted his grandfather as 
lacking the curiosity to ask further questions. The grandfather seemed 
happy with the simple fact that the lamp stops burning when the oil 
runs dry, but deemed it foolish to ask why this should happen. Ray, on 
the other hand, urged his grandfather to ask more questions, while the 
latter feared that Ray was losing his mind. At one point in the exchange, 
the eponymous grandfather asked how Ray proposed to answer such 
absurd questions. Ray replied, ‘We will ask nature (prakriti)’. Suitably 
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taken aback, the grandfather asked again, ‘And where will you find her?’ 
‘I shall bring her here, into this room’, explained Ray.29
There were a series of assumptions here about ‘nature’ as a discrete, 
rule-bound entity, about the ability to probe this ‘nature’ by way of 
experimentation, and of course, the alleged transparency of the meaning 
of these experiments. Carolyn Merchant argues that though the Euro-
pean idea of ‘nature’ as a discrete, frequently feminised, entity had roots 
in classical antiquity, it underwent one of the several crucial mutations 
at the end of the nineteenth century. An idea of ‘nature’ based on pure, 
idealised Forms, at this time, began to give way to a more ‘materialist, 
process-oriented perspective’.30 Whereas the idealised Forms derived 
their perfection from the Supreme Deity, the new natural laws were 
immanent in the regularity of the materialist world of nature. Rather 
than being plainly visible, they had to be made visible. Ray’s dialogues 
sought to import this new, process-oriented, materialist nature into 
Ayurvedic thinking. By deploying the word prakriti, however, he also 
sought to braid this new idea of ‘nature’ with older notions of the 
cosmos available in Indic philosophies.
Being sensitive to this explicit recalibration of ‘nature’ by Ray is 
particularly important in view of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s recent 
call to replace ‘multi-culturalist’ analysis – where nature remains ahis-
torical and universal and yet defined exclusively by the modern West 
– with a robust ‘multi-naturalism’ that acknowledges the different, his-
torically specific ways in which people across the globe mobilised a 
sense of ‘nature’.31 As Ray made it clear through his trope of generational 
conflict, his ‘nature’ was a new one. It was this new ‘nature’ and its 
practical enactment that was constitutive of the modern present of the 
nineteenth century. Ray and his grandfather were clearly reified tropes 
standing in for ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, which, in turn, were them-
selves undergirded by distinct notions of the natural.
These themes were further elaborated in an essay Ray wrote in the 
third year of his journal Chikitshak on the scientificity of Ayurveda.32 
He mocked those who declared that Ayurveda was unscientific by 
saying that, when the ancient Aryan seers had composed the funda-
mentals of Ayurveda, those who now boast of science and claim to 
teach it to others (i.e. the British) had not even learnt to build the 
foundations of houses. The wisdom of such antiquity, he urged, ought 
not to be thrown away without some consideration. Notwithstanding 
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the rhetorical broadside against the British, Ray’s plea for the respect 
of tradition seemed almost to be in the vein of asking for some consid-
eration for an aged grandfather.
This was not all. Having thus pleaded for age being given its due 
respect, he then advanced a more systematic case for considering Ayur-
veda to be scientific. He asserted that anyone with a truly scientific 
mind investigates everything before passing judgement. Thus Newton, 
he argued, had been able to connect the falling of the fruit with gravity 
because he was both observant and possessed an inquiring mind. Upon 
investigation, he further declared that medicine is universally focused 
upon six objects: 1) place (in the sense of soil); 2) time (in the sense 
of seasons); 3) patient (in the sense of constitutions); 4) materia 
medica; 5) air; and 6) water.
Ray’s proposal of this six-fold classification bears some clarification. 
It seems to superficially resemble the robust Hippocratic tradition of 
Airs, Waters, and Places.33 Here, it is also worth recalling that such an 
‘ecological theme’ was also available in classical Ayurvedic texts.34 What 
Ray was saying, however, was quite distinct from both of these. 
Summing up the Hippocratic tradition, at least in its medieval and early 
modern form in Europe, Andrew Wear points out that, a ‘central 
assumption in Airs, Waters, Places is that there is a causal connection 
between a place, including its climate, season, water, and food, and the 
people born into it’.35 Ray, by contrast, neither posits a fixed causal con-
nection between place and the temperament, nor indeed does he insist 
that native-born people are the only ones whose health is shaped by 
their milieu. Ray’s point was simply that medicine universally has six 
objects of enquiry.
Moreover, the link that connected all these six objects of medicine, 
according to Ray, was the Ayurvedic doshas. In subsequent sections we 
shall see why doshas are distinct from the Hippocratic notion of 
humours. This, in turn, will introduce another level of distinction 
between the superficially similar Airs, Waters, Places tradition and Ray’s 
position. Though, here again, it is worth pointing out that Ray’s version 
of the doshas was not identical to the classical doshas found in Sanskrit 
texts. Ray in fact, glossed his description of the three doshas as ‘nervous 
influence’ or ‘electricity’, ‘body heat’, and ‘lymph’. This is again some-
thing I shall discuss more fully later, but for now it is worth noting the 
distinctive idea of doshas, transcreated by braiding together classical 
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Ayurvedic definitions with concepts such as electricity drawn from the 
nineteenth-century ‘Western’ scientific tradition.
Ray’s argument, therefore, had two basic propositions. First, that 
medicine everywhere was defined by its attention to six objects of 
study, and Ayurveda did in fact focus on these six objects. Second, that 
in order to be scientific, any medical tradition had to explore these 
six objects systematically through an experimental framework. Again, 
he argued, Ayurveda had done this for longer than any other thera-
peutic tradition. Hence, he posited that Ayurveda was eminently sci-
entific. In so doing, of course, he also subtly repositioned Ayurveda 
itself. He inserted into the Ayurvedic framework a new experimental 
orientation premised on observation and demonstration and linked 
it to late Victorian ideas of ‘natural laws’. The new ‘Ayurvedic nature’ 
that emerged through Ray’s braiding of Indic and Western ideas was a 
distinctive one. Just as it differed from classical Ayurvedic understand-
ings of reality through its emphasis upon the experimental and the 
demonstrable, as well as its refractions through notions of electricity, 
lymph etc., it differed also from contemporary Western ideas by insist-
ing on the three doshas as the basis of all reality. This latter insistence, 
in turn, as I will show later, pushed Western notions such as ‘lymph’ to 
acquire entirely new meanings as a heat-storing substance immersed in 
the blood.
The reticulated body
In 1908, Ray’s versified text depicted the Ayurvedic body he had been 
describing in prose in his journal nearly twenty years earlier. This is 
what he wrote:
Bayu Pitto Koph name dhatu tin jon,
Jibdehe thaki’ kore tahare dharon.
Tripodi upore jotha thake drobyochoy,
Todrup dehoti thake koriya ashroy.
Morttyodhame shantiram telegraph jotha,
Jei shoktite songbad bohe jotha totha.
Temni tarit-shokti ache norodehe,
Tahari bayu naam ayurbede kohe.
Snayusutro ache dehe tarer soman,
Tarit tahate – shanti, kore obosthan.
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Mostishko janibe ta’r aphis prodhan,
Odhin aphis ache bohu-poriman.
Jalsomo dehe snayu royechhe beriya,
Tarit tahate ache dehoti dhoriya.
Tariter poriman kom beshi hole,
Songbader karjyo nahi somobhabe chole.
Dehete tarit jodi kom beshi hoye,
Karjyobighno ho’ye rog koribe ashroy.
Reler koler gari thanda jotokkhon,
Mritobot eksthane thake totokkhon.
Jol-ognijoge ushno hoibe jokhon,
Hoibe shojib dekho kolti tokhon.
Ognir obhabe thanda mritosomo ro’be,
Shojibota-bhab ta’r kotha cho’le ja’be.
Temni manob-deho ushno jotokkhon,
Shojib shey deho, shanti, thake totokkhon.
Roktomajhe ek drobyo diyachhi rakhiya,
Tahatei tap shoda rakhi’chhe dhoriya.
Bohiya shey tap rokto shorbottro chhoraye,
Tahate ushnota dehe shomobhabe boye.
Je drobyo roktete thaki’ tap dhori’ rakhe,
Ayurbbed-mote, shanti, pitto bole ta’ke.36
[Vayu, Pitta, Kapha are the names of three people,/ Residing in the 
bodies of the living they bear it./ Just as objects are placed on a three-
legged table/ So the body remains upon them./ Just as on earth, Shan-
tiram there is the Telegraph,/ The power that bears news here and there/ 
Similar electric-power is in the human body/ Ayurveda tells us its name 
is Vayu./ Nerve-threads are in the body akin to wires/ In them, Shanti, 
resides electricity./ The Brain is its main office, this you ought to know,/ 
There are many subordinate offices./ A web-like nerve encircles the 
body,/ Electricity in it bears the body./ Should the electricity increase 
or decrease,/ The work of news does not function smoothly./ So long as 
the railway engine remains cold,/ It remains stationary like a corpse./ 
When it heats up on adding water and fire,/ See the machine comes alive 
then./ Lacking fire it remains cold as a corpse,/ Its liveliness will disap-
pear./ Likewise so long as the human body is warm,/ It is alive, Shanti, 
only so long./ I have kept a substance in the blood,/ That is what stores 
heat at all times./ Flowing in the blood, the heat spreads everywhere,/ 
Thus the body remains uniformly hot./ This, Shanti, is called Pitta in 
Ayurveda.]
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Ray’s metaphors were surprisingly stable over the period of nearly two 
decades between his journal and his versified text. In 1890 he had 
described the Ayurvedic body along almost identical lines. In the very 
first issue of his journal he had stated that, ‘All our present glory is down 
to the single theory that the Aryans had discovered long ago in the 
distant past … That theory is vayu, pitta, and kapha the three doshas’.37
Having established the centrality of vayu, pitta, and kapha, he then 
went on to describe what these three entities were. In living bodies, he 
explained there was a ‘white-coloured bunch of threads’. They emanate 
from the brain and the spine before branching into numerous branches 
and sub-branches and covering the entire body. These were called 
snayus.38 Vayu was the ‘force’ or shakti in these thread-like snayus. 
Explaining this mechanism Ray wrote that, ‘we notice when a telegraph 
wire lies on the ground it lacks the power to transmit messages. But 
when it is connected to an electricity-producing machine, then news 
can be transmitted by it. That is why we call the telegraph wires things 
made by electricity-conducting materials and not simply electricity’.39 
Furthermore, ‘Just as we have described the snayus as the pathway for 
electricity, so we will dub blood the conductor of heat’.40 Explaining the 
importance of body heat, Ray wrote, ‘The railway engine runs so long 
as it is hot, not when it goes cold. Our body is exactly like the railway 
engine’.41 The description is almost identical to the one he versified 
eighteen year later in the 1908 text. In these descriptions heat is pitta 
and it is something akin to, but not identical to, electricity. It is the vital 
essence in the body.
Laura Otis has pointed out that railways and the telegraphs were 
frequently used as metaphors that allowed the worlds of physics and 
physiology to be connected.42 Here we notice a third partner joining 
the duo in the form of Ayurveda. These metaphors in Ray’s writings 
functioned to create a three-way connection between physics, physiol-
ogy, and Ayurveda. Thus not only was electricity rendered as a force 
within the body, hence bridging the worlds of physics and physiology, 
but was also aligned with the Ayurvedic idea of vayu. Likewise, the heat 
of physics and the blood of physiology had to further induct the pitta 
of Ayurveda into their tightly knit families.
By thus redefining Ayurvedic ideas in terms of ideas from physics 
and physiology, a new Ayurvedic body was being crafted. This new 
body was essentially a reticulated body, crisscrossed throughout by 
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snayus through which vayu-electricity and pitta-heat submerged in 
blood were constantly circulated. The newness of this body can only be 
fully appreciated once we compare it to earlier Ayurvedic bodies.
This is easier said than done. Two initial problems impede any efforts 
at clear comparison with earlier Ayurvedic bodies. First, Ayurveda is 
almost unique amongst the classical medical traditions of the world in 
not having developed a significant tradition of visually representing the 
body.43 Second, from what we know about medical education in preco-
lonial Bengal (which is the region Ray came from), for centuries – if 
not millennia – erudite Kabirajes seemed to have studied compilations 
based on the older canonical texts rather than the canons themselves. 
These compilations, of which Madhavakara’s Rogavinishchaya was the 
best regarded, were organised according to diseases and gave no single 
crisp definition of the three doshas, namely, vayu, pitta, and kapha.44
If we look back to the core Ayurvedic canon with these caveats in 
mind, we find in the Charaka-samhita, the oldest and most canonical of 
Ayurvedic works, multiple, fairly distinctive meanings for each of the 
three doshas. The chapter on vayu, for instance, is framed as a confer-
ence of sages where different sages offer distinct definitions of vayu 
without contradicting each other. Thus one sage describes vayu as 
‘Rough, light, great, cold, sharp, and elaborate – these are the six normal 
qualities of Vayu’. A second sage, without in any way contradicting the 
former, has this to offer: ‘The Lord Vayu is the primal cause of creation, 
the cause for the rise and demise of the mortal and immortal, he is the 
dispenser of joys and sorrows, he is death, he is Yama, he is the control-
ler, he is the father of his subjects’.45 The chapter makes no attempt to 
reconcile these two positions. Both definitions, along with others, are 
equally valid. This polysemy allows both substantive and deific mean-
ings of vayu to co-exist. It is both a specific ‘moribific entity’, to use a 
term coined by Sanskritist G. Jan Meulenbeld, as well as a deity. It was 
this polysemy and the agentive/deified set of meanings that Maitreya 
was deploying when, to Ray’s mild vexation, he insisted that pitta, 
another one of the doshas, was actually the god Brahma.46
Another aspect of premodern discussions of doshas was that, unlike 
the humours of classical Greek medicine, each of the three doshas had 
their own particular ‘seats’ or doshasthanas. Thus vayu is generally local-
ised in the large intestine, pitta in the navel, and kapha in the chest.47 
Pathogenesis was not merely the result of increase or decrease of doshas 
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but rather their displacement. The Madhukosha, a famous premodern 
commentary on the Rogavinishchaya, thus states that, ‘when a [dosha] 
that maintains its proper measure is dragged away from its receptacle 
by the wind and moved to another seat, it generates even if maintaining 
its proper measure, a morbid alteration’.48
Finally, the doshas themselves are not monolithic, homogenous enti-
ties. Each of the three, vayu, pitta, and kapha, are internally differenti-
ated by location and function into five subordinate types.49 In some 
cases even the direction of their movement, that is, upward, downward, 
or lateral, is taken into consideration.50
Premodern ideas about doshas therefore had three significant aspects 
that I have highlighted here. First, they existed on a spectrum between 
being deified/agentive and substantive things in the body. Second, 
while they were capable of motion, they had very specific seats in the 
body. Finally, they were not homogenous entities. Their translation as 
either electricity or heat elided all these meanings and rendered them 
into fluid energies cognisable by Western physics and physiology. In so 
doing it also homogenised and rationalised the space inside the body. 
Instead of being an internally variegated and, one might say, ‘suprara-
tional’ space where deities could reside, it was rendered into a mundane 
and uniform space organised around a reticulated network of snayus.
These snayus themselves are no less interesting. In Ray’s writings 
they acquired a strong resemblance to nineteenth-century ideas about 
nerves. Sanskrit scholar Dominik Wujastyk points out, however, that 
‘Faced with the word snayu, one is virtually obliged to use its English 
cognate term “sinew”. But the snayus seem sometimes to refer to what 
are today called nerves rather than to sinews or tendons’.51 Ray’s transla-
tion then, while not entirely wrong, is at best a partial reading. Struc-
tures that could simultaneously be sinews, tendons, or nerves are 
certainly different from what nineteenth-century physiology described 
as ‘nerves’.
Elsewhere I have described the image of the body crafted by Ray 
and his contemporaries as a Snayubik Man.52 I think of such images 
as ‘physiograms’, that is, ‘materialized physiologies’ or ‘middle-level 
inchoate generalities (about the body) embedded in everyday forms 
of medical practice’.53 In Ray’s repeated descriptions of the workings of 
the body we catch a glimpse of this physiogram of the Snayubik Man. 
The reticulated and rationalised physiological space it occupied had 
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been fashioned out of a three-way exchange between physics, physiol-
ogy, and Ayurveda through the shared metaphors of the railway and 
the telegraph.
The Snayubik Man
Interestingly, the Snayubik Man’s fluid, undifferentiated energies did 
not last long in practice. Long-entrenched Ayurvedic belief in the inter-
nal subdivisions of the doshas re-emerged in Ray’s writings, thereby 
complicating, if not undermining, his metaphors of electricity and heat. 
Yet these subdivisions did not re-emerge in their classical form. They, 
too, acquired new locations and functions.
Pitta, which Ray had equated with heat, is a good example of the new 
subdivisions within the Snayubik Man. According to the Susruta 
Samhita, the second oldest Ayurvedic treatise, pitta has five subtypes, 
namely, pachaka-pitta situated between the pakkashaya (stomach) and 
the amashaya (mucous receptacle in the belly), ranjaka-pitta located in 
the liver and spleen, sadhaka-pitta located in the heart, alochaka-pitta 
located in the eyes, and bhrajaka-pitta located in the skin.54 Ray’s 
description of the location of these five subtypes of pitta was different. 
He located pachaka-pitta in the gall bladder, ranjaka-pitta in the liver 
and spleen, alochaka-pitta in ‘that part of the brain (mastishka) which 
is known as the optic thalamus’, aadhaka-pitta in the brain (mastishka) 
more generally, and bhrajaka-pitta on the surface of the skin.
There is clearly a general tendency in Ray to map the location of the 
five types of pittas onto a biomedical anatomic space. While preserving 
a broad locational symmetry, he therefore tries to be more bio-
anatomically specific. Instead of placing pachaka-pitta somewhere in 
between the pakkashaya and the amashaya, he located it precisely in the 
gall bladder. Similarly, in the case of bhrajaka-pitta he located it specifi-
cally on the surface of the skin. But in some cases Ray’s attempts to find 
precise bio-anatomical correlates led him to radically alter the original 
location. Thus in the case of alochaka-pitta, he located it in the ‘optical 
thalamus’ – a bio-anatomic structure that made little sense in a classical 
Ayurvedic imagination of the body. What seems to have motivated him 
is his general reading of the Ayurvedic tradition to make this type of 
pitta responsible for visual cognition of form. Since the bio-anatomical 
body of Western medicine held that the actual act of visual cognition 
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took place in the brain and not the eyes themselves, he had to relocate 
alochaka-pitta from the eyes to the optic thalamus. Even more dramati-
cally, but motivated undoubtedly by a similar quest to reconcile the 
bio-anatomic body with the Ayurvedic body, he located sadhaka-pitta 
away from the heart and in the brain.
These relocations are significant in themselves. By depriving the eyes 
and the heart of cognitive functions and by consolidating these cogni-
tive actions in the brain, Ray affected a significant shift in Ayurvedic 
anatomy. The ‘mind’ in Ayurveda had never been exclusively identified 
with the brain. As the Charaka-samhita stated, ‘The mental faculty is 
indeed independently produced. It is what binds the life together with 
the experiencing body, and just before it departs, its behaviour alters, 
affection mutates, all the senses suffer, strength drains away, and dis-
eases wax strong’.55 It continues further that, it is this mind that is the 
apprehender of the senses. Clearly then, the act of cognition is not 
located in the brain, but rather in this independent mental faculty.
In fact, the close identification of the self with the mind, and the 
mind with the brain, is novel even within the Western tradition. Regard-
ing this ascendancy of the brain as the prime location of selfhood under 
modernity, Fernando Vidal has dubbed it ‘brainhood’. Vidal argues that 
the ‘cerebral subject’ was an anthropological figure inherent in moder-
nity and one that ideologically motivated much of modern neuroscien-
tific research, rather than emerging from such research.56 Clearly, Ray 
was being driven by the same ideological propensities that were inspir-
ing the emergence of Western ‘brainhood’ precisely at this time.
Yet, what is interesting is that this emergent brainhood in Ray is 
disrupted and left inchoate by his insistence of the circulatory nature of 
pitta. If alochaka- or sadhaka-pitta were the quintessential cognitive 
forces, their location in the brain must be balanced with their under-
standing as a form of ‘heat’ that can flow throughout the body. There 
was thus a fundamental contradiction in the Snayubik Man between its 
cerebral subjectivity that resonated with contemporary Western explo-
rations in neurology and the more holistic subjectivity engendered in 
the hydraulic metaphors of electricity and heat.
The Snayubik Man was in effect pulled in two different directions. 
On the one hand, there was a bodily imagination that was clearly 
centred on the brain. On the other hand, there was an image of the body 
that was circulatory and did not privilege any one part over another. 
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Neither of these two possible imaginations had been available in this 
form in classical Ayurveda. They had both emerged through Ray’s tryst 
with modernity. The fluid metaphors he drew from the physical sci-
ences were as modern as the brainhood. But yoked together they did 
not always work in unison. As a result the Snayubik Man was an unsta-
ble, effervescent entity constituted in the cauldron of two opposing 
tendencies.
The contradictory pulls engendered in the Snayubik Man are clearly 
noticeable in the visual representations of the modern Ayurvedic body. 
While a familiar Western image of the circulatory system was progres-
sively incorporated into modern Ayurvedic texts, these images con-
spicuously lacked a discrete brain, showing only a tangle of nerves in 
the skull, whereas the Western templates they were drawn from invari-
ably possessed a distinct brain.
Figure 9.1 Nagendranath Sengupta, Sachitra Susruta Samhita.
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Experience and metaphors
By the time Ray began writing, the ‘kinship of nineteenth-century 
physics and physiology’ was well established through such eminent 
authors as Hermann von Helmholtz.57 This kinship was engendered in 
a constant flow of metaphors, and a host of leading European scientists 
of the nineteenth century used the same metaphors of electricity, tele-
graphs, railways, and so on that Ray deployed. It was highly likely then 
that Ray himself had merely stumbled upon these metaphors in the 
course of his daktari education and redeployed them. Such a purely 
textual genealogy of Ray metaphors, however, would be misleading. 
Even if he had indeed picked up these metaphors from his readings in 
Figure 9.2 Gopalchandra Sengupta, Ayurveda Samgraha  
(Calcutta, 1871).
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Figure 9.3 Lecture on the Nervous System from 1860. Wellcome Images.
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Western scientific literature, how he used them was shaped by his own 
experiences of the material realties of colonial infrastructure.
Railways had been introduced in Bengal in the early 1850s and were 
quite well established by the 1890s.58 After 1870, precisely the time 
when Ray was growing up, the railways began to grow at an exponential 
rate. Route mileage grew from a mere 4,771 in 1870 to 26,955 in 1905. 
Passenger traffic went up from 19,283,000 in 1871 to 231,283,000 in 
1905.59 The story of the telegraph system was broadly similar. After 
early experiments by the talented W. B. O’Shaughnessy in the 1830s, 
the first telegraph networks in India began to be built by 1851. By 1851, 
4,000 miles of cables had been established in the major seats of British 
power. It was the great mutiny and rebellion of 1857 that spurred the 
British to speed up the building of telegraphic lines. Thus, within two 
years of the rebellion, and despite the damage done during that time, 
the mileage of telegraph lines had jumped to 11,000 by 1859. Like the 
railways, the telegraph had also been heartily embraced by the local 
people. In 1855 Kalidas Maitra, a Bengali intellectual, penned the first 
Bengali book on telegraphy which also gave detailed explanations about 
electricity.60
Ironically, even as the usage of the railways and the telegraphs grew, 
most Hindu Bengalis, such as Ray, were barred from technical proxim-
ity with these technologies. Particularly after the rebellion of 1857, 
anxious to keep the channels of communications in the hands of social 
groups whose loyalty the imperialists felt more confident about, the 
British followed a deliberate policy of employing Eurasians in both the 
railways and the telegraphs.61 The scope for men such as Ray to get 
closely acquainted with these technologies was therefore limited by 
official policy. They were only allowed to consume the services pro-
vided by these technologies, not work with them closely.
Ray therefore knew of these communication networks as a con-
sumer, not as an operator. Yet these communication networks remained 
the only ways he could interact with electricity. Domestic electricity 
was still a long way off in the 1890s for most people, even in the capital 
city of Calcutta, not to mention the village of Talanda in Rajshahi 
where Ray was based. Moreover, the consumer’s relationship with this 
kind of large technological system could never be as intimate as the 
relationship of users with smaller, everyday technologies.62 As a result, 
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when Ray turned the railways and the telegraph into metaphors, his 
usage was marked by his own distant and mediated experience of these 
technologies.
Two major features of Ray’s metaphoric usage mark him off from 
European men of science who also deployed such metaphors. For 
Helmholtz, and most of the other Europeans interested in such meta-
phors, the metaphoric interest in networks, circuits, and electricity led 
putatively to actual experimentation. This concrete experimental ethos, 
in turn, progressively produced a sense of electricity as something 
measurable. Measurements of time became particularly important.63 
They began to ask questions about how long it took for bodily impulses 
to travel through the body or produce a reflex action, etc. None of this 
happened in Ray’s case, despite his overt enthusiasm for conducting 
experiments.
Over the years, Ray, as we have seen above, carried out numerous 
experiments. But not one of them involved electricity. All his experi-
ments were essentially chemical experiments involving gases and 
liquids or anatomical dissections of goats and rats. The mismatch 
between his experimental vigour and his broad-stroke, impressionistic 
description of the railways and telegraphs is a testament to how his own 
mediated experience of these technologies from afar influenced his 
thinking. As Otis points out with reference to Charles Babbage, ‘The 
better one got to know machines, the better one understood the body 
and mind. Technology suggested not just what questions to ask about 
the nervous system but how to perform the experiments and what sort 
of answers one might expect to find’.64
In the absence of hands-on experience with the technologies, Ray’s 
metaphors remained overly generalised. Otis has demonstrated with 
great acuity how Helmholtz’s researches led not only him, but also 
Friedrich Nietzsche, to eventually evolve a new theory of knowledge 
itself as being metaphorical.65 In Ray’s case, none of this happened. But 
what did happen was rather surprising.
From physiograms to cosmograms
In 1908, the same year that he published his versified Ayurvedic text, 
Ray also published his first cosmological text. Over the subsequent 
decades he went on to publish three more such texts with the last 
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volume appearing as late as 1941, when Ray would have been touching 
eighty. These books were audaciously ambitious works wherein Ray 
attempted to recover the history of those ‘times of which there are no 
records’.
He himself divided the themes covered in these books into four 
broad areas: first, the mysteries of creation and the end of the world; 
second, the question of the origin of man and his early history until 
records could be found; third, the history of the planetary system 
and the cosmos; and finally, the history of the origin of language and 
writing. When he published the first of these books in 1908, he claimed 
that he had already been working single-mindedly on these themes 
for fourteen years. If this were true – and there is no reason to doubt 
him – it would probably explain why so little of his thinking on the 
body had changed between 1890 and 1908. It would also mean that he 
spent nearly forty-seven years – from around 1894 to 1941 – completely 
ignoring his medical interests and dwelling instead on these large cos-
mological issues.
Why did he do so? How were these interests connected? And 
why did he make no effort to connect the cosmological writings to 
his earlier medical ones? I argue that it was precisely because of the 
mediated, distant, and hands-off way in which he began to use the 
technological metaphors that led him down this track. Unlike men 
such as Helmholtz, for whom the metaphors led to experimenta-
tion and experimentation led to a theory of knowledge itself as being 
metaphorical, Ray’s metaphorics led him down a very different path. 
Since he never experimented with his metaphors upon the human 
body, there was little that the body could reveal to him. His meta-
phorical deployments thus became completely one-way. He used the 
world to understand the body and not the other way around. Thus, 
to him, the world at large increasingly seemed to be the source of all 
knowledge and secrets. There was nothing to be learnt within the body 
that could not be fathomed without it. This was in stark contrast to 
the centrality that Ayurveda affords to the body in thinking about the 
cosmos.66
Similarly, whereas Helmholtz, and following him Nietzsche, began 
to move away from a strictly referential and denotative idea of know-
ledge precisely because they began to interrogate the workings of the 
mechanisms of perception itself, Ray once again went in the opposite 
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direction. Not only did he not interrogate how perception worked, he 
increasingly arrived at a strongly positivist idea that knowledge was to 
be gained, as he put it, by ‘breaking through metaphors and allegories’.67 
Repeatedly, Ray reiterated the need to ‘break through metaphors and 
allegories’ to ‘reveal the true history of nature’. Reading widely and 
eclectically from the texts of Pierre-Simon Laplace to Charles Darwin 
on the one hand, and a wide array of religious literature from across the 
world ranging from the Zoroastrian Zend Avesta to the Christian Bible 
as well as the Quran and the Indic Vedas on the other, Ray pursued his 
key strategy of ‘breaking metaphors’. The fascinating cosmology he 
arrived at through his strategy and his elaborate mathematical calcula-
tions are too rich and complex to unpack here. But it included, amongst 
other things, an ancient race of man-lions, an extremely dark-skinned 
Aryan race inhabiting the Arctic regions at a time when the rest of the 
planet was simply too hot to sustain life, a global climate change attended 
by large-scale migrations, life on the moon, and much else. He even 
attempted to start a new calendar which, according to him, would be 
pegged to the actual geological age of the earth.
This elaborate cosmology that Ray worked out throughout his life 
was, of course, not simply an aimless, benign, and apolitical set of 
musings. It was as political as his physiograms of the Snayubik Man had 
been. It was in fact a ‘performative assertion, [an] entr[y] into debates, 
points of reference for further elaboration’.68 It was, in other words, what 
John Tresch has called a ‘cosmogram’, a materialised cosmology that 
bore the political and historical imprint of the milieu in which it was 
created.69 Throughout these cosmological texts Ray sought to reveal the 
validity of what he called ‘ancient Aryan knowledge’. To do so, he 
repeatedly spoke of ‘Nature’ as an objective entity out there whose 
‘history’ had to be revealed by the application of ‘science’ to break open 
the ‘metaphors and allegories’. Yet, all that this ‘science’ eventually 
proved was the glory of the ‘ancient Aryans’. But along the way it also 
completely recast traditions about those ‘ancient Aryans’. The move-
ment from the modern to the ancient and back to the modern – in a 
way that created an alternative modernity orthogonal to the hegemonic 
colonial modernity which also managed to heap glory on the ancient 
Aryans – was almost identical to how the Snayubik Man had been 
figured. The only difference was that Man, Snayubik or otherwise, had 
now disappeared in the mists of the cosmos.
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What led from the alternately modern man to the differently modern 
cosmos were metaphors. In the absence of experimental possibilities, 
and with the body being rendered a mere screen upon which metaphors 
played out their stories, Ray had come to seek knowledge not through, 
but beyond metaphors. Metaphors would be what would then connect 
the knowledge back to the body. But the truth itself stood beyond the 
reach of the metaphors, and without the confines of the body, in the 
depths of the cosmos. This position also broke with the earlier pattern 
of his embrace of a late nineteenth-century European notion of ‘nature’ 
and ‘natural laws’. Whereas the former had consistently included the 
human body as a crucial constitutive element, Ray’s cosmological writ-
ings entirely abandoned it.
Whilst Ray’s early medical writings are fairly representative of late 
Victorian trends in Bengali Ayurvedic circles,70 his abandoning the 
body altogether in the pursuit of a new cosmology is highly quixotic. 
In their idiosyncratic singularity, however, they illuminate how an 
enthusiastic engagement with Victorian technologies, without the pos-
sibility of hands-on access to them, could lead Ayurvedic modernity 
away from the concrete practicalities of the body and towards purely 
speculative contemplation of the cosmos.
Distinctive modernities were not simply imaginal formations engen-
dered by the creativity of particular intellectual agents. Neither distinc-
tive intellectual inheritances nor the mere fact of geographic distance 
were in themselves sufficient to produce alternative medical moderni-
ties. They were developed within particular social, political and material 
contexts. In colonial Bengal it was these practical exigencies that shaped 
Ray’s singular version of an Ayurvedic modernity. On the one hand the 
colonial state’s need for cheap medical manpower created the educa-
tional institutions that acquainted him and numerous others like him 
with new ideologies of scientific medicine. At these institutions Ray 
and his peers imbibed new ideals of curiosity and observation and 
embraced new images of ‘science’ and ‘nature’. Likewise, it was the colo-
nial state’s economic and political interests that produced the large tech-
nological infrastructures, such as the railways and the telegraph, which 
informed Ray’s thinking. On the other hand though, the possibilities 
for conducting original medical research or gaining practical operative 
experience with technological equipment were severely limited for 
lowly Bengali VLMS doctors like Ray. They were neither encouraged 
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to undertake such experiments nor given access to material resources 
to pursue experimental programmes that Western scientists of the day 
could pursue.
The colonial state had hoped that these doctors would imbibe a 
modicum of ‘Western science’ and then be happy to apply their training 
in the service of state in either a military or civil posting in the vast 
subcontinent hinterland. For the state, these were not really men of 
science. They were just a cheap fix for a large administrative responsibil-
ity. But men like Ray had other ambitions. As upper-caste men who had 
enjoyed social status through their links to precolonial traditions of 
learning, they saw themselves as unique inheritors of two distinct tradi-
tions of knowledge. It was their self-appointed task to compare, con-
trast, translate, and evaluate these two traditions to which they alone 
seemed to have access. Both the eponymous ‘grandfather’ and the 
ghostly figure of the ‘Western scientists’ who flitted through Ray’s writ-
ings were limited to only one tradition. But as legatees to both tradi-
tions, Ray, and quite a few like him, saw themselves as distinct from 
either. The colonial state’s diminutive sense of Ray’s role and his own 
grandiose sense of purpose were hence constantly forced to rub against 
each other. His singular medical modernity was cooked in the cauldron 
of these contradictory material realities established by the colonial 
regime.
Medical historiography, like the colonial state before it, imagines a 
singular medical modernity because it imagines the non-West as a 
tabula rasa upon which Western scripts could be authored. As we see 
in Ray’s case, however, the non-West was not an intellectual tabula rasa. 
The script of Western medicine had to be written upon the palimpsests 
that bore the distinct marks of earlier therapeutic traditions. The way 
historical agents such as Ray read these two scripts, one slightly fading 
and another still emergent, depended upon the social, political, and 
material context within which they encountered the therapeutic 
palimpsest.
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From Schenectady to Shanghai:  
Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale  
People and the hybrid pathways  
of Chinese modernity1
Alice Tsay
I don’t suppose there is a proprietary medicine manufacturer of impor-
tance in any part of the world who has not, at one time or another, 
encouraged his imagination to play with the idea of the prosperous busi-
ness he might build up, and the wealth he might accumulate, if he could, 
by some means, convince a reasonable number of Chinese of the effi-
ciency of his remedies.2
Pills on the move
The American folk-singer Pete Seeger tells a story about a girl who falls 
ill and is prescribed Dr Johnson’s Pink Pills for Pale People by the 
doctor. Her father makes up a silly song for her while on the phone and 
is overheard by the inquisitive telephone wire, which replicates and 
disseminates the song to all its ‘friends’ until the communications infra-
structure becomes so noisy that no one can hold a proper conversation. 
The government eventually cuts down the telephone poles and wires, 
throwing them overboard far from shore. In the watery depths, however, 
the wires continue to resonate with the sounds of the song:
Pink pills for pale people,
Pink pills for pale people.
Pink pills, pink pills,
Pink pills for pale people.
Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha!3
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The story takes its inspiration from a widely distributed patent medi-
cine called Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People. Though Seeger turns 
it into a fable about the white noise of commercialism in modern 
society, the tale also suggests the ubiquity and pervasiveness of the 
product to which it alludes.
In real life, Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People never languished 
in the sea but made it across several oceans. This chapter examines 
advertisements for the product in Chinese-language publications in 
Shanghai during the early twentieth century, comparing them to 
English-language advertisements printed in Shanghai, England, and the 
United States. Much like the telephone poles that refuse to be silenced, 
the long advertising history of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills in Shanghai rep-
resents survival against the odds. In marked contrast to the endlessly 
repetitive underwater song that Seeger describes in his story, however, 
Dr Williams’ Pharmaceutical Company created a range of culturally 
adaptive approaches to selling their product. Other Western brands in 
Shanghai favoured one of two marketing strategies: dropping their 
product unchanged into the new environment or attempting to fashion 
a market for new tastes. In contrast, the advertisements for Dr Williams’ 
Pink Pills insisted on the particularities of their specific product while 
evoking a familiar psychical world for their Chinese consumers. Taking 
the extensive history of the pills into account thus complicates the 
accepted narrative of advertising as the major driving force of urban 
modernity in Shanghai and offers a more nuanced account of the way 
hybridity – not only cultural, but also temporal – was strategically 
mobilised to articulate a distinctly Chinese vision of twentieth-century 
society.4
Studies of advertising content in this historical and geographical 
setting have tended to focus on the development during this period of 
a multivalent visual culture that promoted an aspirational or fictive 
reality. Tani Barlow claims that the ‘sexy girl iconography’ in 1920s and 
1930s Shanghai presents ‘the fantasy of modern social life in the colo-
nial modern arena’ even through products as mundane as insect repel-
lent.5 In Selling Happiness, Ellen Johnston Laing similarly argues for the 
role of calendar posters in transforming the visual culture of Shanghai 
and normalising Western-style art for the Chinese public.6 Along the 
same lines, Weipin Tsai contends that advertising in the newspaper 
Shenbao helped to produce the idealised image of the housewife as at 
once ‘consumer, domestic, and patriot’ in the new vision of liberated 
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femininity that emerged after the 1915 New Culture Movement.7 Even 
in case studies in which the advertising medium consists primarily of 
text, emphasis is placed on the construction of an ideological position: 
Susan Glosser’s study of the Shanghai Dairy Association’s marketing 
campaign for milk, for example, tracks how a product originally ‘so 
foreign as to be literally indigestible’ for most Chinese was recast ‘as the 
key to China’s success in the evolutionary struggle to survive’.8 Such 
scholarly accounts frequently align modernity in China with Westerni-
sation and progressiveness in ways that diminish the role of internal 
forces in influencing the social, economic, and ideological shifts that 
took place in China in the decades following the fall of the Qing Dynasty 
in 1912. While historians such as Samuel Y. Liang and Marie-Claire 
Bergère have identified the need for more nuanced accounts of Shang-
hainese and Chinese modernity, their works do not focus on advertis-
ing culture as an important site of cultural confluence.9
The case study of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People advertise-
ments in Shanghai suggests that modernity in China emerged through 
a more complex negotiation between old and new, local and global, 
rather than arriving as a fully fledged cultural export from the West. 
These widely popular pills were marketed in Chinese-language publica-
tions in Shanghai from at least 1913 to 1941, and from even earlier in 
the North China Herald, an English-language newspaper that was also 
based in the city. While these Shanghainese advertisements employed 
the cutting-edge strategies of representation of the time, this progres-
siveness belies other aspects of the Pink Pills story, most notably its 
sustained reputation as backwards and outdated in the West. The for-
gotten Chinese afterlife of this derided patent pills opens up an alternate 
version of global modernity that develops along hybrid cultural and 
temporal pathways. Beyond calling into question the sequential con-
notations implicit in the language of modernity, the deeply site-specific 
sense of the modern self that emerges in this case study of early 
twentieth-century China suggests the need to decentralise the role of 
the West in the historical narrative of modernity. One localised moder-
nity implies the existence of others, each unique in its configuration.
A chequered history
A discussion of the history of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People 
helps to contextualise the inroads it made in Shanghai. Formulated in 
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Canada by Dr William Frederick Jackson in 1886, the pills quickly 
spread to the United States.10 Following the company’s relocation from 
Ontario to Schenectady, New York, Dr Williams’ Pink Pills were mar-
keted extensively in England and around the world. By the early twen-
tieth century, the product had been advertised in more than eighty 
countries.11 A 1907 advertisement, for instance, listed branch offices in 
‘Rockville, Ont., London, Eng., Paris, France, Sidney [sic], N.S.W., Cape 
Town, South Africa, Bombay, India, Rio Janeiro, Brazil, Mexico City, 
Mex.’ 12 George Fulford, who ‘purchased Jackson’s patent for the paltry 
sum of $53.01’ in 1890,13 reportedly amassed a fortune of over £1.6 
million after just sixteen years of marketing the pills.14 Though it had 
become an object of contempt and a symbol of quackery in England 
Figure 10.1 Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People.
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and North America by the early twentieth century, the company existed 
until 1989.15
According to an 1899 Illustrated London News advertisement, Dr 
Williams’ Pink Pills could cure a vast range of ills: anaemia, consump-
tion, scrofula, rickets, fits, chronic erysipelas, bronchitis, lumbago, 
rheumatism, rheumatic gout, sciatica, eczema, paralysis, locomotor 
ataxy, neuralgia, St Vitus’s Dance, and nervous headache.16 This list of 
purported uses was not exhaustive, since other advertisements empha-
sised different sets of ailments. Another Illustrated London News adver-
tisement from 1898, for example, claimed to have healed an ex-Royal 
Marines sergeant who had ‘suffered more than most men in a lifetime’ 
from myriad afflictions, among them ‘disease of the lungs’ and ‘giddi-
ness of the head’.17 In short, Pink Pills were sold as a cure-all drug, 
adaptive to longtime medical concerns such as rickets as well as the 
proliferation of nineteenth-century anxieties about nervous systems 
gone awry.
Given these untempered claims to miraculous power, the actual effi-
cacy of the pills should come as little surprise. Even as early as 1897, 
the brand had been dogged with accusations that its contents included 
harmful ingredients such as ‘impure carbonate of iron, with a little 
arsenic, green copperas, and pearl ash’.18 In March of 1902, the British 
publication The Chemist and Druggist published a virulent attack on Dr 
Williams’ Pink Pills in the form of a coroner’s inquest into the death 
of an unnamed cabdriver in an article appearing right before a piece 
entitled ‘The Week’s Poisonings’.19 The results from pharmaceutical tests 
are less lurid, though not by much. Table 10.1 gives the results of a 
series of lab tests, reflecting the changes in the ingredients of the pills 
over the years.
In short, only the first formula seems wholly innocuous. Ferrous 
sulphate, listed as ‘exsiccated iron sulphate’ and ‘iron sulphate’ through 
the years, is an iron supplement.20 According to the National Institutes 
of Health, however, the 80.99 milligrams present in the 1961 formula 
is nearly double what is now considered the tolerable upper intake 
level for adults, undermining the relative harmlessness of the caffeine 
and Vitamin B1 (thiamine hydrochloride) it also contains.21 The 1935 
formula, which contains significantly smaller ferrous sulphate quanti-
ties, also contains manganese dioxide, used today in pyrotechnics and 
as a ‘depolarizer in dry cell batteries’, as well as copper sulphate, which 
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is toxic when ingested and used as a textile mordant and wood preserva-
tive.22 In contrast, the earliest formula combined potassium carbonate 
and magnesia, both food additives, with a sugar- and liquorice-heavy 
mixture. While safe enough, this combination gives new force to the 
1897 advertisement declaring, ‘These are not like pills; they are like 
sweets’.23
In North America and Britain, the public tide had turned definitely 
against Dr Williams’ Pink Pills by the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. Perhaps influenced by the many scathing pieces appearing in 
professional medical journals, the United States government seized 
large quantities of the pills in 1915 on grounds that the company had 
made ‘false and fraudulent claims’.24 While US advertisements subse-
quently worded their declarations more conservatively, the company 
was accused of continuing to make outrageous assertions in inter-
national advertisements over which the United States government held 
no jurisdiction.25
TABLE 10.1 Contents of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People
Formula, 1905 Formula, 1935 Formula, 1961
Powdered 
liquorice






















1.77% Copper sulphate 0.01%





Magnesia 2.90% Copper 
sulphate
0.08%
Source: P. G. Homan, B. Hudson, and R. C. Rowe, Popular Medicines: An Illustrated 
History (London/Chicago: Pharmaceutical Press, 2008), 141–2.
Note: In the source, the formulas for the three years are each given in different units 
(‘grains’ in 1905, percentages in 1935, and milligrams in 1961) and have been 
standardised and listed in descending order in this table.
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The divergence in advertising strategy across global markets was 
both more and less extreme than contemporary critics asserted, depend-
ing on the region being considered. In most foreign countries, Pink Pills 
advertisements aligned closely with their counterparts in England and 
the United States. However, the marketing of the pills in Shanghai – and 
in China more widely – presents an anomaly that suggests highly local-
ised efforts to promote the products.
Foreign opportunities
While Dr Williams’ Pharmaceutical Company sold its products in 
many global markets, its marketing history in Shanghai offers an unusual 
case in terms of timing, scale, and audience-specific strategy. Most 
foreign advertisements for the company appeared in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. This turn-
of-the-century period roughly coincides with the company’s heyday in 
North America and England but predates the widespread circulation of 
Pink Pills advertisements in Shanghai by several decades. For instance, 
in South Africa, the company trademarked the name by 1893 and was 
circulating advertisements in local publications such as the Mafeking 
Mail and Protectorate Guardian soon after.26
Additionally, the company generally focused on English-speaking 
audiences in these foreign territories, even in dual-language publica-
tions. While the South Africa-based Mafeking Mail and Protectorate 
Guardian was published in both English and Afrikaans, Dr Williams’ 
advertisements only appeared in the English sections. The same was the 
case with the Amrita Bazar Patrika, a Bengali and English newspaper 
published in Calcutta. Many of these English advertisements were 
taken directly from Anglo-American publications and cited testimonies 
from England or the United States rather than drawing from a local 
customer base.
There were some foreign-language advertisements, but they were the 
exception rather than the rule. Between 1906 and 1907, three different 
Zulu advertisements for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills ran in Ilanga lase Natal, 
a Cape Town-based newspaper that was the first Zulu newspaper. 
However, no more appeared in the publication thereafter. Spanish-
language advertisements appeared on a greater scale around the turn of 
the century in a few South American publications, such as El Comercio 
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in Peru and Mercurio de Valparaiso in Chile, but still in relatively limited 
numbers.27 In comparison, as will be further discussed, the marketing 
of the pills in China established a scale of distribution and level of cul-
tural tailoring that made it unique even within the global history of the 
company.
The belated but dramatic flourishing of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for 
Pale People in Shanghai suggests that the company’s products can be 
read, in more ways than one, as holdovers from a bygone time. This 
interpretation even appeared in some contemporary accounts, includ-
ing that of the North Carolinian agriculturalist and travel writer Clar-
ence Hamilton Poe. After travelling through Asia from 1910 to 1911, Poe 
wrote angrily about a time in Shanghai when he discovered an adver-
tisement for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People on the back of a 
religious newspaper. He interpreted this as a prime example of Western 
avarice preying on Chinese ignorance and vehemently criticised oppor-
tunists for ‘coining the poor Chinaman’s substantial shekels’ using 
‘American patent medicines discredited at home by the growing intel-
ligence of our people’.28
Poe’s picture of the Chinese people trailing behind Americans in an 
ignorant past is undoubtedly problematic, part of a long Western tradi-
tion of mapping evolutionary progress onto cultural difference. More 
importantly within the context of this study, however, his comments 
situate the advertisements as temporally displaced. In Poe’s reading, 
despite the contents of the patent medicine having been established as 
outmoded and inert, it continues to function as an active agent by 
‘coining’ and conning Chinese citizens.
This case study seeks to examine the counterintuitive and continued 
pertinence of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills in Shanghai long after the brand’s 
obsolescence in other parts of the world. Advertisements for the pills 
in Shanghai combined hallmarks of their marketing in other parts of 
the world with a customised blend of references to longstanding healing 
traditions as well as modern Chinese culture. Questions of medical 
efficacy aside, these advertisements resist a linear and Western-centric 
account of modernity. Contemporary Chinese commentators anthro-
pomorphically located the contributions of the West in the two figures 
of ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr Democracy’. However, the study of modernity 
in early twentieth-century Shanghai must also account for ‘Dr Williams’ 
as a Western import that disrupts the narrative of unidirectional pro-
gress and influence. Instead, the extensive body of advertising for Dr 
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Williams’ Pink Pills in Shanghai represents an archive of complex and 
occasionally contradictory negotiations of self and society during the 
first decades of the twentieth century in relation both to the outside 
world and to the past.
Pills for all people
In their initial encounters with Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People, 
Chinese consumers would probably have been less mystified than by 
unfamiliar products like deodorant, powdered milk, or even porridge 
oats, which entered the market around the same time. A 1923 Quaker 
Oats advertisement had to assure consumers that it could be ‘used in 
the same way as rice’ (效用如米).29 In contrast, the wan (丸) or pill 
form of medication dates back several centuries in China. Traditionally, 
a variety of medicinal powders were bound with water and honey, creat-
ing a round ball that was then covered with a protective wax coating.30 
Though there is no indication that Dr Williams’ Medical Company 
revised the familiar ‘ovoid’ shape of its Pink Pills, they took other steps 
to ensure that their brand and product were appropriate for the intended 
audience.31 In Chinese, ‘Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People’ was 
translated as Weilianshi Dayisheng Hongse Buwan (韋廉士大醫生紅色
補丸), or ‘Doctor Weilianshi Red Supplement Pills’. Alliteration aban-
doned, the pink pills became red in name, a colour with greater cultural 
resonance and existing precedence in traditional medicine packaging.32 
During the Qing Dynasty, for instance, an apothecary company called 
He Ming Xing Tang (何明性堂) produced detoxifying hong wan 
(紅丸) or ‘red pills’ that appear to have been widely distributed.33 
Moreover, this Chinese name dropped the reference to being ‘for Pale 
People’ present in the English. Instead, the roundabout allusion to a 
sickly complexion was replaced in Chinese with an explicit declaration 
of the pills as bu (補), adopting the language of bodily nourishment 
and strengthening central to Chinese medicine.34 In English advertise-
ments for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills, the frequent references to impure 
blood likely derived from the vestiges of belief in humoral theory.35 
Translated into the terms of Chinese corporal understanding, this was 
depicted as xueqi chongying (血氣充盈): sluggishness or thickness of 
the blood from problems with the circulation of qi (氣).36 Incidentally, 
as a purported panacea, Dr Williams’ Pink Pills were in a good position 
to fit the symptom-based rather than disease-based approach central to 
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traditional Chinese medical treatment.37 Sherman Cochran has argued, 
using the British-American Tobacco Company as his subject, that ‘the 
transmission of culture was not simply a matter of an American busi-
ness unilaterally exporting to China advertising that had been invented 
in America’.38 In drawing on a long history of Chinese medicine, Dr 
Williams’ Pharmaceutical Company fashioned implied lines of cultural 
transmission that ran not only between different places but also differ-
ent times. On many levels, then, the Shanghai advertisements carefully 
situated the product as simultaneously new and known.
Available evidence suggests that Dr Williams’ Pink Pills was a widely 
available and increasingly established product in Shanghai. While con-
sumers always had the option of contacting the company directly with 
their orders, in the mid-1920s, the advertisements went from declaring 
that the pills could also be procured ‘wherever Western medicines were 
sold’ (凡經西藥者均有出售) to announcing that they were available 
‘at all pharmacies’ (各藥局均有), a significantly wider claim.39 By 1941, 
advertisements sent customers directly to the National Department of 
Health (國民政府衛生署) for their pills, suggesting integration into 
official distribution channels.40 Given the beleaguered reputation of 
Pink Pills in North America and England, surely no one could have 
predicted the stamp of approval that Dr Williams’ Pharmaceutical 
Company appears to have received in Shanghai from a governmental 
organisation whose focus on establishing public health and sanitation 
standards has been seen as a main component of developing modernity 
in China. The success of the product was particularly remarkable in the 
immediate wake of the New Culture and May Fourth Movements of 
the mid-1910s and 1920s, which reacted against both traditional Chinese 
culture and anything suggesting excessive imperialist influence, leading 
to a growing enthusiasm for aiguo huo (愛國貨), or patriotic prod-
ucts.41 As a foreign product that had been familiarised through the form 
of traditional Chinese medicine, Dr Williams’ Pink Pills should have 
been doubly pressured. It seems, however, that the pills’ hybrid identity 
functioned as a strength rather than a liability.
Anatomy of an advertisement
For the most part, the complex cultural mixture underlying Chinese-
language advertisements for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People 
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were coded through a highly consistent set of content and formatting 
tropes. This happened despite the fact that they appeared in publications 
with a diverse range of orientations and intended audiences, including 
Shenbao (申報/Shanghai News), Liang You Hua Bao (良友畫報/The 
Young Companion), Funü Zazhi (婦女雜誌/Ladies’ Magazine), and 
Funü Shibao (婦女時報/Women’s Eastern Times). Excepting a few runs 
in Liang You Hua Bao in 1925, these advertisements tended not to 
be repeated within the same publication, suggesting that Dr Williams’ 
Pharmaceutical Company had the financial means to hire a large staff 
to source and design new variations on their established patterns of 
layout and narration.
Chinese advertisements for the Pink Pills made use of personal tes-
timonies as their main rhetorical technique, a practice that derived from 
overseas. In England and the United States, the earliest advertisements 
for the pills had sought to create an aura of objectivity around personal 
testimonies, framed in pseudo-investigative style. One Ladies’ Home 
Journal advertisement, for example, had the following heading:
An Illinois Miracle: A Case of Deep Interest to Women Everywhere: Saved 
Through a Casual Glance at a Newspaper – Weak, Pale, and in a Deplorable 
Condition when Relief Came – A Remarkable Narrative Carefully Investi-
gated by a Dubuque Times Reporter.42
Other English-language advertisements for the Pink Pills in China rep-
licate this textual encounter (i.e., ‘a casual glance at a newspaper’) that 
apparently brings about the ‘Illinois miracle’ mentioned above. For 
instance, the North China Herald of 18 January 1913 includes a two-
column advertisement that narrates one Señora F. Palacio’s recovery 
after ‘a pamphlet telling of the many cures Dr Williams’ Pink Pills have 
wrought’ fortuitously arrives in her husband’s post-box.43 These adver-
tisements emphasised authority derived from documentation (pam-
phlets, newspaper) or genre (investigative journalism) in order to 
legitimise their claims to the consumer.
In Chinese advertisements, this testimonial strategy was taken much 
further and given a slightly different focus. Antonia Finnane identifies 
a Shenbao advertisement from 1913 as featuring Madame Liu Pan, a 
Shanghainese sewing machine instructor.44 Another Shenbao advertise-
ment, which ran in April of 1915, includes two testimonies, one from 
Mr Cui Xiwu (崔錫溩君), a clerk in the executive department of the 
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Ou-lu Company, and another by Mr Zhao Shaoqin (招少琴君) from 
the Guangdong Da Gong Bao news agency (Figure 10.2).45 Adver-
tisements for Pink Pills for Pale People in Funü Shibao included testi-
monies from ‘the wife of Mr Ding Zhenzhi’ (丁振之君之夫人) and 
‘the wife of Mr Liu Zhengxing’ (劉振興君之夫人).46 These lengthy 
personal testimonies were accompanied by woodcut portraits of the 
individuals. Explicitly labeled as yüzhao (玉照), or formal portraits, 
these images contributed to the cultural and personal specificity of 
the advertisements, particularly when compared to English-language 
advertisements that often used more generic imagery. Furthermore, 
with very few exceptions, the Chinese advertisements for Pink Pills 
always included a drawing of the packaging, most likely for promoting 
brand recognition, though this was often not included in advertise-
ments in North America or England. In contrast to Chinese advertise-
ments for companies like British American Tobacco, which initially 
featured ‘illustrations to German fairy tales … American landscapes 
and American heroes like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln’, 
Dr Williams’ Pharmaceutical Company appears to have been early 
in adopting audience-specific advertising techniques in the Chinese 
market.47
Consequently, despite their heavy emphasis on text, Pink Pills 
advertisements in Shanghai tended to emphasise personal connec-
tion rather than written authority. A 1923 Shenbao advertisement, 
for example, alludes to a large populace who has ‘confidence [in their 
product] from personal experience or the experiences of friends’ (由其 
自己之經驗或由其友人之閱歷確知).48 Similarly, multiple testimo-
nials in Liang You Hua Bao refer to a friend (友人) who recommended 
the medicine to the sick man or woman.49 Despite the obvious ironies 
of medium, the transference of knowledge was framed as happening 
not between text and person but between one person and another. 
This emphasis of word-of-mouth connection can be interpreted as a 
means of evoking the guanxi (關係), or interpersonal relationships, 
central to Chinese culture. This nuance marked a way in which the 
advertisements for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills were more sophisticated 
than those for competing medicines, such as Sanatogen Tonic, which 
focused more directly on the product’s properties.50
Framing the advertisement as a discourse among friends, family, and 
fellow Chinese nationals, moreover, may have allowed Dr Williams’ 
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Figure 10.2 1915 Shenbao advertisement for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills 
featuring testimonies from Mr Cui Xiwu (top) and Mr Zhao Shaoqin 
(bottom), 3 April 1915.
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Pharmaceutical Company to circumvent anti-foreign sentiment by 
minimising the cross-cultural origins of their product. While the May 
Fourth movement of 1919 catalysed resistance to traditional Confucian 
values and rejected the veneration of the elderly, the emphasis in the 
media of the late 1920s that a modern housewife must also be a ‘mother 
of good citizens’ meant that a good deal of attention remained on the 
nuclear family, though now shifted to the younger generations.51 The 
trend of pairing Pink Pills with other Dr Williams Pharmaceutical 
Company products in advertisements after the 1930s likely reflects this 
trend, particularly as Baby’s Own Tablets were often the secondary 
product of choice. A Liang You Hua Bao issue in 1933, for instance, 
included an advertisement for both the Pink Pills and Baby’s 
Own Tablets entitled ‘The whole family of Mr. Wu Jinqing’ 
(呉俊卿先生闔府), featuring a couple with their four children.52 
While the English-language advertisements for Dr Williams’ Pharma-
ceutical Company hewed closely to the portraits of solitary suffering 
that seemed particularly symptomatic of the Western experience of 
modernity, these Chinese advertisements drew a wider orbit around 
the company’s various products and the people who used them.
At the same time, these gestures towards new values were countered 
in the advertisements by features more closely associated with the tra-
ditional. Linguistically, the Chinese used in these advertisements 
appears not to be in baihua (白話), or the vernacular register that was 
gaining traction in writing during this time. Instead, Classical Chinese 
phrasing and textual markers give a formal inflection to the language. 
The previously mentioned 1923 Shenbao advertisement described its 
wisdom as ‘coming from personal experience or those of friends’ 
(由其自己之經驗或由其友人之閱歷), employing zhi (之) as a pos-
sessive marker. Similarly, ye (也) appears with some regularity at the 
end of sentences for emphasis, as do compressed four-word phrases. 
These features, along with highly formal diction throughout the body 
of these advertisements, suggest Classical language registers.
Similarly, while women were sometimes portrayed progressively as 
nation-building mothers, at other times they were shuffled out of the 
limelight, as in the case of a 1929 Liang You Hua Bao advertisement 
that includes a testimony about the wife of a certain Mr Fung.53 In the 
text, he speaks on her behalf and refers to her using the phrase neizhi 
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(內子), a traditional term for ‘wife’ that men used when addressing 
outsiders, literally translating to ‘the one inside’. Moreover, the Chinese 
advertisements appear not to target women, as the various English-
language advertisements for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills seemed to do. 
Barbara Mittler notes that advertisements directed toward women in 
Shenbao frequently used punctuation marks within the text – a newer 
writing style influenced by Western practices.54 However the Chinese 
Pink Pills advertisements that have been found are written in continu-
ous text blocks without punctuation, following the assumption in most 
traditional forms of Chinese writing – much akin to the practice of 
scriptio continua in Classical Latin and Greek – that the educated and 
predominantly male reader will automatically recognise clausal and 
sentence breaks without the need for spaces and punctuation. The 
media and advertising culture of early twentieth-century Shanghai cer-
tainly offered women a new prominence in the public sphere. Such 
visual prominence did not necessarily equal progressiveness, however, 
but could just as easily be employed to re-affirm rather than reform 
the old.
Tailored and culturally adept, the advertisements for Dr Williams’ 
Pink Pills for Pale People in Shanghai represented extended and ground-
breaking efforts by a Western company to inhabit the social and cultural 
world of its new audience. As the advertisements themselves show, 
however, this world was itself one of conflicting forces. The company’s 
linguistic and cultural touchpoints often drew heavily on traditional 
visions of language, gender, medicine, and authority, even as the prod-
uct’s prominent commercialisation and implied association with the 
National Department of Health suggested that the company sought to 
push against many of these same traditional structures in order to take 
advantage of new systems for mass marketing and distribution.
Where she stands
One of the most striking illustrations of the complex position given 
to the Chinese subjects featured in advertising for Dr Williams’ Phar-
maceutical Company products appears not in newspaper advertising, 
which has been the main focus of this chapter, but in a 1922 yuefenpai 
(月份牌), a type of calendar poster that served as a major medium 
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Figure 10.3 Dr Williams’ yuefenpai poster designed by Hang Zhiying, 
1922.
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for advertisement in China during the early twentieth century (Figure 
10.3). Designed by Chinese artist Hang Zhiying, this poster includes 
a prominent image of the Pink Pills for Pale People packaging, along 
with smaller inset images of two other products from Dr Williams’ 
Pharmaceutical Company: Baby’s Own Tablets, the infant supplement 
mentioned above, and Pinkette’s, a laxative. In the image itself, a woman 
dressed in blue patterned silk stands next to a little girl in a Western-
style pink outfit with a matching bow in her hair and Mary-Jane shoes. 
The woman appears to be wearing black silk stockings, which became 
popular among Chinese women during the ‘sudden flurry of interest 
in Western fashions’ following the 1911 Revolution.55 She leans on an 
iron fence wrought with a Chinese-style design, but this fence is linked 
to an arbour of wisteria growing on a Western-style trellis. Thus, the 
picture ties together imagery from a wide range of origins, reflecting the 
cultural fluidity that was central to the lifestyles of Shanghai’s privileged 
classes.
At the same time, this poster contains many hallmarks of the text-
heavy print advertisements discussed earlier. The colophon text to 
the upper right of the image declares, ‘To keep your family safe and 
healthy, you must be prepared with the world-renowned medicines of 
Dr Williams’ (卻保安康居家需備天下馳名韋亷士醫生各種靈藥). 
The word used for ‘medicines’, interestingly, is lingyao (靈藥). While 
ling can mean ‘highly effective’, it also has connotations of the spir-
itual or magical. Another translation of lingyao could be ‘miraculous 
cure’, which would seem closer in emphasis to the xiandan (仙丹) 
or mystical elixirs of Chinese folklore than to Western medicine and 
scientific progress. Moreover, the image is not left to speak for itself, 
which may be wise considering that the woman portrayed looks fairly 
frail. Instead, it contains far more text than appears on the usual cal-
endar girl poster, which sometimes includes only the brand name and 
company details. Located at the bottom of the calendar and in the 
two inset boxes at the top, these blocks of text anchor the calendar 
and prevent it from being a solely visual advertisement. The font is 
far too small to be taken in from a distance, and thus it forces the 
close reading encounter that was central to the early English advertise-
ments of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People discussed earlier. Just 
as the clothing and surrounding of the figures in the advertisement 
reflect a complicated mixture of influences, the woman’s stance seems 
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to reflect the same ambiguous poise. Does she stand on her own two 
Western-shod feet, bolstered by the strength given to her by the packet 
of Pink Pills in her left hand? Or does her weight actually fall on a 
symbol of tradition, the elaborately wrought red fence? The semiotic 
space of this yuefenpai resists easy decoding, its sense of modernity 
signalled more through its fluid integration of varied cultural points 
of reference than in the fact that it is a Western product she clasps in 
her hand.
While the colourful, rich imagery of the yuefenpai stands out against 
the stark, black-and-white newspaper advertisements that were the 
main medium for Pink Pills advertisements, the indeterminacy of 
the calendar poster is highly characteristic of the brand’s resistance to 
clean geographical and teleological narratives about cultural influence 
and historical progress. Spanning several decades, the advertisements 
for Dr Williams’ Pink Pills in Shanghai clearly demonstrate how the 
transmission of a Western product resulted in the creation of culturally 
hybrid modes of expression and self-identification, producing a deftly 
accommodating visual and linguistic vocabulary. While excoriated and 
dismissed in Northern America and England, the product’s counterin-
tuitive survival in Shanghai seemed to lend truth – psychologically, if 
not medically – to its dubious claims of being everything to everyone. 
Moreover, the dexterous blend of cultural references found in these 
advertisements illuminate varied, oftentimes frictional forces that pro-
duced change and moulded selves in early twentieth-century Shanghai. 
In particular, for a port city that had been home to a significant foreign 
presence since the Opium Wars of the previous century, it is criti-
cal to emphasise that this hybridity represented not only inter-cultural 
but also intra-cultural confluences. The inhabitants of Shanghai could 
choose between an array of possibilities for self-definition, between 
being oriented toward the future and influenced by the past, between 
being conclusively ‘Western’ and adaptively ‘Shanghainese’. In revealing 
the interwoven pathways of cultural influence defining early twentieth-
century Shanghai, the unlikely revitalisation of Dr Williams’ Pink Pills 
for Pale People in the international marketplace also demonstrates the 
need to recognise how socio-cultural changes taking place around the 
globe in this period produced heterogenous and localised versions of 
modernity that differed markedly from its emergence in the West. The 
marketers examined in this chapter figured this out and generated a 
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rich body of work in response; it is now time for scholars to follow 
their lead.
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Poisonous arrows and unsound 
minds: hysterical tetanus in the 
Victorian South Pacific
Daniel Simpson
When the Royal Navy sloop and flagship of the Australia Station HMS 
Pearl returned to Sydney harbour on 23 August 1875, it brought with it 
sad and disturbing news. On the journey home, three sailors, including 
the Station’s popular and well-respected commodore, James Graham 
Goodenough, had died from wounds sustained a fortnight earlier at 
Nendö Island, part of the Santa Cruz group in the South Pacific Ocean. 
On 12 August, Goodenough and five members of his crew were shot 
with reputedly poisonous arrows following an unsuccessful attempt to 
interview Nendö people as part of their investigation into the Pacific 
Islands labour trade, which Goodenough considered a modern form 
of slavery. In an echo of the death of Captain James Cook almost one 
hundred years before, the men came under attack while fleeing the 
beach for the relative safety of the Pearl’s whaleboats, pursued by island-
ers who had long since grown wary of British intrusion. Diligently 
recorded by the Pearl’s surgeon, Adam Brunton Messer, the symptoms 
suffered by at least three of the wounded sailors were undoubtedly 
those of tetanus. Though the disease had long since been associated 
with open wounds and tropical climates, the tetanus bacterium Clostrid-
ium tetani had not yet been discovered; the poisonous arrows’ power to 
tetanise their victims was therefore unexplained. This chapter explores 
how Messer subsequently utilised the ambiguous aetiology of tetanus 
in order to dispute claims that the arrows were poisonous and to argue 
instead that the sailors of the Pearl in reality suffered from a ‘hysterical’ 
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form of the disease. In doing so, Messer imbricated mid-Victorian 
concern about stress and nervous breakdown with imperial efforts 
to ‘civilise’ the South Pacific. Sympathetic to missionary proselytisa-
tion in the region, and desirous to bolster the standing of the Medical 
Department of the Navy, Messer suggested that tetanus was most likely 
to occur in victims possessing a ‘superstitious dread’ of poisonous 
arrows. The social, physical, and mental health of the inhabitants of 
the Santa Cruz group, and of those who visited, were therefore said to 
be contingent upon the spread of Christian belief and modern medical 
understanding.
Only one year previously, Goodenough had sought to associate 
himself with Cook rather less literally by unveiling a memorial to the 
famous navigator at Randwick, in Sydney.1 It was owing to the contem-
porary predominance of such conventions of ‘naval hagiography’ that 
the specific nature of the Santa Cruz poisons met with an initially 
uncritical reception.2 The throng which greeted the Pearl’s unhappy 
return to Sydney in 1875 was more enthused by the opportunity to 
mourn its fallen commodore. Reporting a week later, the Sydney 
Morning Herald declined even to mention that poison had been 
involved.3 Of greater significance to the crowd was the fact that Good-
enough’s party had been ‘massacred’, in further proof of the ‘savage’ and 
‘cruel’ nature of a people who, four years before, had murdered the first 
bishop of Melanesia, John Coleridge Patteson, on nearby Nukapu.4 The 
intensity of popular ill-feeling, helped along by reports of the failing 
missionary endeavour, occurred within a period otherwise distin-
guished, according to Jane Samson, by an emerging sense of ‘imperial 
benevolence’ in which ‘Christian piety, public duty and particular con-
structions of race and culture’ informed ‘a powerful alliance between 
humanitarian activism and naval power’.5 The clamour which sur-
rounded the perceived martyrdom of the Royal Navy’s ‘strikingly 
modern’ and Christian luminary thus underlined the dialectical and 
introspective nature of the much-championed humanitarian ethos; as 
with rumours of cannibalism, reports of poison were fleeting, vague, 
and requiring of little evidentiary support.6
Much of Messer’s argument was therefore controversial at the time. 
Lauded not only in Sydney society but throughout the British Empire 
as a paragon of the rational, moral, and Christianly virtues then thought 
to exemplify the ‘modern’ condition, Goodenough was an inauspicious 
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target for the surgeon’s claim that a ‘civilised’ state could be lost as well 
as gained. Safely beyond the range of Santa Cruz arrows, colonists living 
in Australia were far from curious about their true nature, and did not 
necessarily sympathise with claims that Nendö people could be 
‘improved’. Nevertheless, Messer undoubtedly sought to appeal to 
public and learned audiences alike. A pamphlet outlining his theories 
was distributed in 1877, seemingly with government assistance, to ‘all 
museums’ in Australia, where it sought to draw the venom from popular 
displays of poisonous arrows, and the lurid claims of their efficacy often 
made in accompanying texts.7 The pamphlet was a much abbreviated 
version of two striking reports published by Messer, ‘An enquiry into 
the reputed poisonous nature of the arrows of the South Sea Islanders’, 
and a ‘Continuation’ of his enquiries, which appeared in the Admiralty’s 
Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy for 1875 and 1876.8 Owing to 
the considerable interest with which it was received, the surgeon also 
published a summary of his work in an 1878 edition of the journal of 
the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, of which 
Messer had become a fellow in 1877.9
Messer’s reports, and in particular his argument for ‘hysterical 
tetanus’, offer valuable evidence of the application of psycho-
physiological theory to constructions of modern and civilised behav-
iour, civilisational progress, and mental illness in the late nineteenth 
century. However, the fate of Messer’s work also highlights the chal-
lenge which the emergence of germ theory posed to understandings of 
the relationship between good mental and physical health. Arthur 
Nicolaier’s 1884 experiments with bacteria, and the first isolation of the 
tetanus bacterium by Robert Koch and others in 1889, challenged theo-
ries of tetanus, including Messer’s, which blamed eccentric systems of 
thought for the muscular stiffness and spasms associated with a disor-
dered nervous system.10 Soon disputed, the evasions and contradictions 
of Messer’s work, which I explore below, had also the unintended effect 
of dramatically increasing concern about the manufacture of poisonous 
weaponry by the indigenous populations of the South Pacific Ocean. 
Largely alone in thinking that fear of poison was superstitious, and 
unable convincingly to rule out Nendö people’s use of plant-based 
poisons such as strychnine, Messer appears, by giving substance to the 
issue, to have single-handedly transformed what was formerly a vague 
suspicion of indigenous toxins into something approaching a colonial 
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and imperial crisis. This is apparent, for example, in a series of fearful 
editorials thereafter published in British and Australian newspapers.11
Never comprehensively resolved, the legacy of the debate endured 
into the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially within com-
parable, albeit literary, ‘murder mysteries’, which perpetuated the notion 
that contact with isolated and ‘primitive’ peoples threatened at best to 
prejudice a modern and civilised visitor’s moral condition, and at worst 
to inflict sudden death. Many readers are likely to recall the character 
Tonga, a man from the Andaman Islands, who accompanied the antago-
nist Jonathan Small in Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes story 
The Sign of Four, first published in 1890.12 Weakened first by the lure of 
an oriental treasure and thereafter imprisoned for stealing it, the narra-
tive tells of Small’s encounter with Tonga in an Andaman penal colony, 
and of his subsequent use of the ‘little Andaman Islander’ to wreak 
revenge. Significantly, Tonga’s deadly poisoned ‘darts’, shot from a blow-
pipe, were found by Holmes and John Watson to contain ‘some 
strychnine-like substance which would produce tetanus’.13 This confla-
tion of an unknown poison with tetanic spasms suggests strongly that 
Conan Doyle was inspired by the well-publicised research into Santa 
Cruz arrows which occurred in the aftermath of Goodenough’s death. 
In so doing, Conan Doyle influenced further stories about strychnine 
poisoning (a poison derived from certain plants), and its association 
with a sudden, mysterious, and violent fate. Examples include Agatha 
Christie’s 1920 novel, The Mysterious Affair at Styles.14
Naval medicine and imperial modernity, c. 1875
The peculiar combination of inductive logic, careful rationalism, and 
fascination with strange and exotic phenomena which suffused Conan 
Doyle’s life and writings, and indeed the late Victorian period more 
generally, was present too in Messer’s enquiries into the attack on the 
Pearl.15 Eager from the start to exploit the incident as an opportunity to 
investigate the poisonous character of Santa Cruz arrows, the surgeon 
recorded in his journal a detailed ‘epitome’ of the condition of the 
wounded sailors in the eight days from 13 to 20 August.16 At sea, Mess-
er’s treatments were limited; in the manner of responding to snakebites, 
the puncture wounds left by the arrows in their victims were at first 
sucked by whichever volunteers were immediately to hand. Thereafter, 
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the care given by Messer comprised of linseed poultices, cupping, mor-
phine, carbolic acid (for cleaning wounds), and silver nitrate (for cau-
terising them). The men’s wounds were varied; fired from a mere five 
yards, two arrows had pierced Goodenough’s thin frock coat and straw 
hat, leaving a scratch to his head and a deeper injury to his left side. 
Further arrows hit two ordinary seamen named Edward Rayner and 
Frederick Small, causing injuries to their legs and scalps that were also 
eventually to prove fatal. The coxswains Thomas Jones and Allen Jervis, 
and the ship’s cook, Thomas Satchwell, suffered similar arrow wounds 
but recovered after the second day. A sub-lieutenant, Henry Hawker, 
‘accidentally came in contact with an arrow in the hand of a native and 
received a slight scratch of the skin’ before the attack occurred. Hawker 
and Jervis complained of twitching, and the latter suffered two ‘epilep-
tiform fits’, but both recovered by the eighth day. A final sailor, the 
engineer Alfred Belts, also demanded treatment after handling some of 
the arrows which had been brought on to the ship, but was not included 
in the epitome.
Tetanus did not become apparent in Goodenough, Rayner, and 
Small’s wounds until the sixth day, at which stage Messer attributed the 
disease to their insomnia and worsening spasms. By 21 August, these 
symptoms had proven fatal in all three patients. Messer’s actions fol-
lowing the Pearl’s arrival in Sydney two days later are not recorded, but 
the surgeon’s records show that it took until March 1876 to complete 
his first official report of the incident.17 Making the most of Sydney’s 
ready access to imperial networks, Messer’s research was eclectic; his 
report drew upon a reading of sixteenth-century naval journals, corre-
spondence with the Melanesian Mission, recent psycho-physiological 
theories of the nervous system, and an emerging expertise in toxicol-
ogy sourced from the Melbourne and Sydney universities in order to 
dismiss the reality of Santa Cruz poisons and to argue that a form of 
mental illness was instead responsible for the sailors’ and commodore’s 
deaths. Rejecting strychnine-based explanations, which nonetheless 
later gained prominence, Messer argued that several of his patients had 
in reality suffered from ‘hysterical tetanus’; a prevailing terror of the 
reputed poisons among medically uneducated British sailors predis-
posed them to a nervous irritability which mimicked or encouraged 
the onset of the disease.18 By the same mechanism, Messer claimed 
that an ‘ignorant’ belief in poison both illustrated and perpetuated the 
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enduring state of backwardness and mental abnormality then said to 
characterise Nendö people, and so compounded the difficulties of the 
Melanesian Mission.19 Messer’s ‘chief object’, he later wrote, was there-
fore to ‘dispel this belief in the poisons, and thereby minimise the risks 
of tetanus; for it is asserted by many missionaries and others that this 
and other allied diseases of the nervous system, have become much less 
frequent among those islanders who have renounced superstition and 
have embraced Christianity’.20
The tone and message of Messer’s reports are best understood in 
relation to the Royal Navy’s contemporary efforts to distinguish itself 
as an engine of modernity and an affiliate of imperial expansion. Implicit 
in much of the surgeon’s writing is an argument concerning the rele-
vance of then emerging understandings of stress and nervous break-
down to constructions of civilisational progress and the modern, 
rational self. These themes reflected the Medical Department of the 
Navy’s then ongoing struggle to police the mental health of its sailors, 
as much as they did naval surgeons’ broader desire to associate them-
selves with the extension and consolidation of imperial control.21 The 
particular elegance of Messer’s study was that one of its main subjects, 
the late commodore Goodenough, had formerly embodied a growing 
trend of humanitarian activism within the navy distinguished by deter-
minedly ‘benevolent’ efforts to improve and to Christianise South 
Pacific peoples. Posthumously immortalised in 1876 as ‘The Christian 
hero of Santa Cruz’, Goodenough was, according to Samson, a ‘staunch 
modernizer’, who sought to associate muscular Christianity and Victo-
rian notions of patriotic duty with the navy’s efforts to colonise and to 
civilise the South Pacific.22 Following the attack at Santa Cruz, the sub-
jection of the wounded Goodenough to Messer’s ministrations neatly 
underlined the need for medical interventionism to operate in parallel. 
By 1875, Messer had become a firm advocate of the argument that civi-
lisational progress mapped the subjugation to rational thought of igno-
rance, stress, and superstition. Proper regimes of thought expressed a 
sound psycho-physiological state, the main guarantors of which were 
Christian belief and a modern medical understanding of the mind.
Though it is difficult to be certain, there is an intriguing possibility 
that the surgeon’s arguments were therefore to some degree opportun-
istic. Messer’s analysis of Goodenough’s mind, which is explored in 
more detail below, sought through the language of volitional and 
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non-volitional mental reflexes to lessen the aspersions which the sur-
geon’s diagnosis of hysterical tetanus cast upon the commodore’s Chris-
tianly character and masculine virtues. It did not, however, do so 
completely. Since Goodenough had come, by 1875, to represent impe-
rial British exploration to a degree almost comparable with that earlier 
achieved by Cook, Messer perhaps hoped to increase perceptions of the 
significance of his report by revealing the commodore to be vulnerable 
to malign and superstitious influences. What is certain is that the Pearl 
had recently become a site of peculiar significance to debates concern-
ing the best means of ‘modernising’ South Pacific cultures; as experts 
in unrelated fields, it is tempting to imagine Goodenough and Messer 
arguing for the relative merits of paternalistic protection and medical 
intervention over dinner on the ship’s quarterdeck. The commodore 
and surgeon had, for instance, each developed their own close links 
with imperial officials in the British metropole during the Pearl’s earlier 
visits to Fiji in 1874. As Samson observes, the British government was 
persuaded to carry out its subsequent annexation of Fiji partly in con-
sequence of Goodenough’s investigation of the local labour trade.23 At 
a time in which the Royal Navy was increasingly evangelical and pious, 
Goodenough’s Christian, humanitarian, and anthropological insights 
formed a potent mix.24 Contemporaries also recognised, however, the 
distinct contribution made by Messer himself. A report by the surgeon 
on the climate and inhabitants of Fiji, which he sent to the Colonial 
Office in 1874, was even said by some to have been the dominant factor 
in its subsequent annexation.25 There, Messer spoke of Fiji’s healthy 
climate as a means to encourage colonisation. ‘Dysentery’, he argued, 
‘is the only disease which Europeans have to fear in Fiji and to guard 
against, as can generally be done by observing a few simple precau-
tions’.26 In a manner which foreshadowed the interventionist style of his 
later work, the surgeon suggested that the local popularity of native kava 
root was a symptom of poor education, and a cause of delirium.27
Messer was one of many nineteenth-century surgeons trained to 
show scientific initiative, and to develop independent investigations of 
this kind, while on naval voyages. Born in Edinburgh in 1838, Messer 
had studied medicine at the University of Edinburgh, and in 1859 
joined the navy as a surgeon.28 In so doing, he formed part of a large 
diaspora of Scottish medical graduates in the naval service. The Royal 
Naval Hospital Haslar in Gosport lay at the centre of this network, and 
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it was to here that Messer’s draft report on Santa Cruz arrows was first 
sent. Since 1827, the hospital had maintained a museum and library 
under the direction of the Edinburgh graduate and naval Inspector of 
Hospitals, William Burnett. With the encouragement of two further 
Edinburgh graduates, the phrenologist James Scott and, after 1855, the 
navy’s Director-General John Liddell, Haslar supported and trained the 
navy’s surgeons in a manner reminiscent of the broad curricula which 
flourished within Scottish universities in the aftermath of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.29 The museum and library reflected not only pathologi-
cal and anatomical interests but also promoted anthropological trea-
tises and collections, thus supporting and extending colonial interest in 
the joint study of exotic climates, cultures, and peoples. After the mid-
1850s, surgeons at Haslar seeking cures for a growth in toxic injuries 
inflicted against the navy’s sailors became increasingly interested in the 
use of plants to manufacture poisonous weapons; relevant botanical 
specimens were displayed in the hospital museum alongside examples 
of the objects themselves.30 The study of poison, about which almost 
nothing was known, thus increased in tandem with the British Empire’s 
incursion into tropical climates.
Messer was influenced too by the study of so-called ‘naval lunatics’. 
Haslar, where a ‘Naval Lunatic Asylum’ opened in 1815, had been 
central to the medical investigation of the minds of the navy’s sailors 
since 1807, when the Edinburgh graduate Thomas Trotter, a former 
Haslar physician, published his essay on the ‘increasing prevalence’ of 
nervous diseases in Britain.31 The seamen of the navy, who were sup-
posedly more ‘manly’ and thus less susceptible to mental illness than 
the general public, had alarmed Trotter by exhibiting signs of a weak-
ened ‘nervous temperament’ then thought to be widespread.32 Though 
Trotter argued that ‘savage races’ tended to possess a healthier mental 
state than ‘civilized’ Europeans, he followed a convention later used by 
Messer in remarking that the ‘inhabitants of some of the South Sea 
Islands are examples to the contrary’.33 Citing the ‘mania’ associated 
with the collapse of the South Sea Company in 1720, Trotter also pre-
ceded Messer in commenting upon the dangers the region posed for 
those of an unsound mind.34
In November 1836, naval surgeons first began to study mental illness 
in an imperial and systematic manner following Burnett’s publication 
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of a ‘nosological synopsis’ designed to be filled out in conjunction with 
their standard medical journals. In the synopsis, surgeons were asked 
to record ‘neuroses’ such as apoplexy, dyspepsia, and mania.35 Although 
the synopsis was designed only to record mental ailments suffered by 
sailors of the Royal Navy, surgeons were encouraged to extend their 
commentary in the space provided for ‘General Remarks’ at the back 
of naval medical journals. Here, surgeons could make observations on 
a range of imperial affairs. Every two years, gold medals were awarded 
to the surgeons whose journals were ‘most approved of by the principal 
Medical Officers of the Navy, and the Presidents of the Colleges of 
Physicians and Surgeons’.36 The medals, funded since 1830 by a bequest 
from the Scottish physician Gilbert Blane, bore the inscription mente 
manuque, meaning ‘with mind and hand’, and thus encouraged scientific 
research.37 In 1874, Messer used this space to make his report on the 
colonial potential of Fiji. In 1875, he won the Blane medal for his work 
on poisonous arrows.38
Sailors, ‘savages’, and poison
Messer’s 1875 report used historical, ethnographic, and medical allu-
sions similar to those employed by Trotter as a means to encourage 
support for the Melanesian Mission and the Royal Navy’s humanitarian 
endeavour. Whereas sailors had previously been compared with 
‘savages’ as a means to point them toward more ‘civilised’ behaviour, 
Messer was arguably attempting the opposite. By linking sailors’ belief 
in poisonous arrows with that of Nendö people, Messer sought to 
equate missionaries’ efforts to bring Christianity to the South Pacific 
with a better-established consensus about the need to educate the 
Royal Navy’s ‘ignorant’ and ‘superstitious’ workforce. Following the 
attack on Goodenough, the Melanesian Mission was much in need of 
such a defence. Missionaries had hardly dared to visit Nendö Island 
since 1864, when Patteson narrowly escaped an arrow attack himself, 
and it was reportedly with Nendö people’s encouragement that he was 
later killed at Nukapu.39 Reporting the commodore’s death on 28 
August 1875, the Sydney Mail and New South Wales Advertiser observed 
that ‘the Santa Cruz group has acquired for itself a savage pre-eminence’ 
as a place of ‘inhuman massacre’, and cast doubt upon missionaries’ 
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ability to redress the ‘peculiar hostility to white men among the 
savages’.40 As an antidote to such feeling, Messer’s reports on poisonous 
arrows emphasised the importance of a well-functioning nervous 
system for rational behaviour, and argued that this was wanting in 
sailors and Nendö people alike. Notions of racial difference were 
thereby undercut in favour of an argument for the latent capacity for 
civilisation that resided in the mind; behaviour befitting of the modern 
age could only be brought about by Christian belief and medical under-
standing, and could easily become threatened if they were neglected.
The Victorian period was one of pronounced concern with the 
‘enigma’ of nervous breakdown, as Janet Oppenheim has shown.41 The 
relationship between civilisation, stress, and depression being much 
contested, Messer’s effort to conflate religious instruction with a func-
tional nervous system, and a functional nervous system with sane and 
civilised behaviour, offered a powerful physiological apparatus and vin-
dication for missionary work. Premised, too, upon an attempt to 
promote the abilities and influence of naval surgeons, Messer’s argu-
ment was helped by the fact that allusions to mentally unstable or 
superstitious sailors were used frequently in the nineteenth century to 
promote Christian belief and theological education. The Christian 
magazine Leisure Hour, published by the Religious Tract Society, for 
instance, interpreted the problem of ‘naval lunatics’ from a moral and 
educational angle in its long-running series on the ‘Superstitions of 
Seamen’. In 1852, the magazine observed that ‘seamen are perhaps the 
most superstitious of mortals’, and that ‘ignorance is undoubtedly the 
mother of superstition’.42 The Society offered libraries to sailors as a 
possible solution. ‘Much has been done of late years to improve the 
condition of seamen’, it wrote, and ‘to communicate to them that reli-
gious knowledge which is the best counter-agent of superstitions’.43
The salubrious qualities of ‘moral and religious instruction’ were 
similarly promoted within the navy’s asylums, which experienced an 
epidemic in cases of mental illness between 1874 and 1875. In this 
period alone, the Royal Naval Lunatic Asylum at Great Yarmouth was 
forced to hire extra attendants in order to cope with an influx of 268 
patients exhibiting ‘mania’ and ‘insanity’, twenty-two of whom died 
from ‘Diseases of the Nervous System’.44 Messer would therefore have 
had reason to assume the sympathy of Admiralty officials when he 
began his 1875 report on the Santa Cruz arrows with a deliberate 
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reference to the unhealthy superstitions of sailors. ‘It has been the 
popular belief from the earliest times’, he wrote:
that many of the more savage races which Europeans have met in differ-
ent parts of the world are in the habit of using poisonous arrows and 
darts, both in warfare and in the chase. This belief has, in many cases, 
been accompanied by an amount of dread of these weapons, which has 
led to the subject of poisonous arrows being obscured by numerous 
mysterious and improbable stories. Nowhere perhaps at the present day 
does so much of this sensational and unscientific rumour exist as among 
the Islands of the South Pacific, owing partly to the fact that most of it 
has been derived from uneducated sailors.45
In 1873, another of the Australia Station’s surgeons, Godfrey Goodman, 
similarly remarked in his medical journal that it was ‘generally believed 
by the traders to Santa Cruz, that all the arrows there are poisoned’.46 
Following an arrow attack, Goodman noted how one ship’s mate had 
recovered after pouring ‘strong hydrochloric acid, which he kept for 
cleaning shells, into his wound’.47 Goodman was nevertheless at a loss to 
describe the nature of the poisons involved, or to explain the efficacy of 
this drastic solution. In his own reports, Messer resorted to eighteenth-
century observations made at Santa Cruz by the British naval explorer 
Phillip Carteret for medical insights. ‘In the writings of the early voyag-
ers numerous instances are given of their men being wounded among 
the South Sea Islands “by deadly flights of poisonous arrows” ’, he wrote, 
‘but they are not so well known to modern voyagers’.48 This had allowed 
superstition to replace scientific analysis, and in consequence members 
of the Australia Station’s fleet had developed a tendency toward nerv-
ousness and hysteria comparable with the ‘peculiar mental constitution 
of ignorant and savage races’.49 At Santa Cruz, this was demonstrated by 
Nendö people’s supposed indulgence in ‘superstition, witchcraft, and 
sorcery in their most debasing forms’.50
Key to Messer’s argument was his observation that the painful 
spasms suffered by sailors wounded by Santa Cruz arrows did not 
resemble the known effects of blood poisoning, or of contact with the 
region’s plants. The methods by which Nendö people reportedly poi-
soned the arrows also seemed to point more to superstitious belief than 
to any developed knowledge concerning the production of poisons. 
According to Messer, the sailors of the Pearl were most particularly 
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afraid of a method said to involve immersing the arrows ‘in a dead 
decomposing human body’.51 Rumours focused on the story of a sailor 
who had reported seeing:
one or two dead bodies lying in a state of decomposition, with several 
arrows sticking in them ‘like porcupines, sir’, while sitting by them was 
a native, with a fire of wood, and a pot of vegetable poison, who drew 
the arrows from the bodies dripping with viscid animal matter, held 
them over the fire till they were partially dry, then smeared them with 
the contents of the pot.52
Messer argued that the method of poisoning there described sug-
gested certain misunderstandings of botanical and pathological 
science; the story was also so fanciful that sailors who were willing 
to believe it demonstrated a poor education, comparable with that of 
those who attempted to manufacture poison in this way. In 1866, the 
French morbid anatomist Victor Feltz had demonstrated that injec-
tions of ‘putrid matter’ could cause symptoms of blood poisoning in 
animals, but Messer noted that septicaemia had not likewise emerged in 
the arrow wounds.53 Though strychnine poisoning from certain plants 
was known to cause tetanus-like symptoms, Messer ruled this out on 
the basis that it usually did so immediately, and that in any case none 
of the necessary plants grew in the Santa Cruz region. George Britton 
Halford, a professor of medicine and expert on snake-poisoning at the 
University of Melbourne, had reassured Messer that his own experi-
ments with poisonous arrows from the neighbouring Solomon Islands 
had suggested no indigenous knowledge of, or access to, any dangerous 
plants.54
It is revealing that Messer was prepared to rule out the presence of 
poison on this basis. The tips of the arrows were, he noted, coated in a 
strange substance, and often dyed red; various interviews with mis-
sionaries confirmed that Nendö people possessed a strong belief in the 
arrows’ power to poison wounds55 Messer’s own knowledge of blood 
poisoning was seemingly poor, for he referred to Feltz only briefly, and 
called him ‘Felty’.56 Such was the surgeon’s wish to claim that supersti-
tious belief was the only potent poison associated with the arrows, his 
dismissal of the presence of toxins was therefore spurious. Although 
Messer’s second report investigated Santa Cruz plants more systemati-
cally, it too contained flaws. Messer wrote to the Melanesian Mission 
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to enquire into indigenous uses of plants, and in return received several 
specimens, which he sent to the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew. Upon 
their arrival, however, the plants were in no condition for adequate 
testing.57 Messer instead based his results on experiments which 
involved poking dogs and rabbits with collected arrows, and feeding 
them indigenous plants, which in some cases produced symptoms of 
tetanus comparable with those suffered onboard the Pearl.58 The animals 
made for inconclusive subjects, however. ‘Three quarters of an hour 
after swallowing the dose [a] dog vomited’, Messer wrote, ‘but at once 
ate all the vomited matter’.59 On this dubious evidence, Messer con-
cluded that ‘we may be justified in looking upon these reputed poisons 
with the gravest doubts as to their potency’.60
Disciplining fear: understandings of tetanus and the nervous system
Having cast into doubt the existence of Santa Cruz poisons on these 
grounds, Messer set out his theory that the wounded men onboard the 
Pearl in reality suffered from certain varieties of tetanus. The surgeon’s 
attempt to associate the suffering caused by poisonous arrows with 
poor education, stress, and superstition depended upon a nineteenth-
century understanding of the relation of the disease to the nervous 
system about which very little has since been written. Indeed, the 
history of tetanus in this period is almost completely unexplored.61 In 
the years which preceded the first isolation of tetanus bacterium, the 
aetiology of the disease was highly uncertain. The symptoms of tetanus, 
in particular muscular stiffness and spasms, were assumed to be the 
manifestation of one or more disorders in the nervous system, which 
might themselves have any number of causes. As Messer himself noted, 
warm climates were strongly associated with the disease; John Hunter, 
the well-known eighteenth-century surgeon and collector, had sug-
gested that climate alone might be sufficient to produce tetanus.62 What 
would now be recognised as the bacterial form of the disease was often 
also associated with, or mistaken for, conditions such as strychnine 
poisoning and a raft of neurological disorders such as non-epileptic or 
dissociative seizures. For this reason, Messer considered the sporadic 
but short-lived fits suffered by Jervis, Hawker, and Belts to be just as 
significant as the considerably more serious symptoms exhibited by 
Goodenough, Rayner, and Small.
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Messer’s conflation of tetanus with poor education and an ignorance 
of Christian teaching drew upon an earlier tradition of partisan diagno-
ses of hysteria made by religious authorities in Britain. Such diagnoses 
targeted, in particular, outbreaks of religious revivalism, spiritualism, 
and other ostensibly eccentric superstitious or supernatural practices.63 
In 1846, Hector Landouzy first coined the term ‘hystero-epilepsy’ to 
bring together medical investigations of the physical ailments which 
manifested in patients suffering extreme mental excitement, but it was 
only in 1881 that the neurologist William Gowers developed a method 
for distinguishing between epileptic seizures and ‘pseudoseizures’.64 
This ambiguity allowed Messer to wield diagnoses of tetanus as part of 
a wider struggle for the control of the indigenous inhabitants of Santa 
Cruz, in a manner comparable with that identified by Christopher Law-
rence in relation to the political history of scurvy.65 Despite the shared 
context of naval medicine, however, the moral conventions of discipline 
and hygiene associated with scurvy’s treatment did not feature signifi-
cantly in Messer’s discussion of tetanus; ideas of cleanliness were men-
tioned in his reports only in the most superficial terms.66 Tetanus’s 
capacity to affect sailors of all ranks and temperaments, from Goode-
nough to the ship’s cook, seemingly made a mockery of the cohesive 
and longstanding vision of moral behaviour which Lawrence describes. 
‘Habits of life, such as temperance, and the reverse’, Messer noted, ‘have 
no apparent connection with its production’.67
The potency of Messer’s argument accordingly lay in his access to a 
new psycho-physiological language of the nervous system, which per-
mitted him to claim that certain forms of tetanus were easily avoided. 
As suggested above, the important thing about Messer’s theory was that 
it could be applied universally; his was a treatment of the mind and 
spirit. The surgeon’s various references to ‘voluntary, reflex, sensory, and 
motor functions’, and more generally to ‘the well-known power of the 
mind over the body in inducing insanity and other allied diseases of the 
nervous system’, betrayed an association with the influential theories of 
the Unitarian physician William Carpenter.68 In 1874, Carpenter had 
first published The Principles of Mental Physiology, in which he stressed 
the interrelation of psychological and physiological behaviour, and thus 
the importance of the ‘training and discipline of the mind’.69 Here, Car-
penter explained that tetanus was a symptom of the breakdown of the 
nervous system, which itself occurred in consequence of ‘an undue 
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excitability of the Emotions [and] their known influence on the “vaso-
motor Nerves” ’.70
In a line of thought earlier developed in his Principles of Human 
Physiology and an essay on the ‘Voluntary and Instinctive Actions of 
Living Beings’, Carpenter argued that the progress of civilisation could 
be read in terms of the development of man’s powers of ‘internal voli-
tion’ over those of ‘external stimuli’.71 In a sign of divine providence, the 
human nervous system had been imbued with sufficient complexity to 
allow the expression of willpower.72 Involuntary and therefore irrational 
behaviour, which often manifested in spasms, was the consequence of 
a subversion of the reasoning process, and an affiliated disease of the 
nervous system. The rationale for strange behaviour, wrote Carpenter, 
‘is simply as follows. The continued concentration of Attention upon a 
certain idea gives it a dominant power, not only over the mind, but over 
the body; and the muscles become the involuntary instruments whereby 
it is carried in to operation’.73 Contrary to those, such as the philosopher 
George Henry Lewes, who assumed ‘that a Physiological Psychology 
strikes at the root of Morals and Religion’, Carpenter argued that models 
of the mind based in materialist science were no obstacle to religious 
faith or the idea of a conscious self.74
For Messer, the problematic dominant ‘idea’ among sailors and 
Nendö people was that of fatal and incurably poisoned arrow wounds, 
which considerably heightened the stressful nature of the navy’s increas-
ingly violent Pacific encounters. Fear of poison weakened the nervous 
system, and was a symptom of the superstitious belief which resulted 
from an ignorance of Christian education. Should a man with a fear of 
poisons proceed to encounter a suspected poison, his already fragile 
nervous system would be placed in a perilous state. In a departure from 
Carpenter, this was the condition Messer called ‘hysterical tetanus’, 
which he distinguished from the disease’s ‘idiopathic’ and ‘traumatic’ 
forms.75 The surgeon borrowed the latter two subdivisions from the 
early work of the military physicians Robert Willan and John Hennen, 
who had, in 1801 and 1820 respectively, identified the role of anxiety 
and terror in ‘inducing the traumatic, as well as the idiopathic form 
of the disease, as seen in its frequent occurrence after battles, earth-
quakes, etc’.76 In such cases, fear and allied conditions encouraged a 
form of tetanus which ultimately derived from wounds or exposure to 
dangerous environments. Hysterical tetanus could occur without such 
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provocation, but remained just as dangerous. It was a sign, perhaps, 
of the contemporary growth of professional interest in what Carpen-
ter called ‘Physiological Psychology’ that Messer cited no particular 
authority in his discussion of this latter form of the disease. Refer-
ences to ‘hysterical tetanus’ in texts published in English appear to date 
back at least as far as an 1844 translation of the German homeopathist 
Andreas Joseph Friedrich Ruoff ’s 1837 Repertorium für die homöopa-
thische Praxis, but were becoming increasingly frequent at the time of 
the attack on the Pearl.77 Short summaries of the condition appear, for 
example, in Timothy Holmes’s 1870 text, A System of Surgery: Theoreti-
cal and Practical, and in Frederick James Gant’s 1871 treatise, The Science 
and Practice of Surgery.78
Making only a very subtle allusion to the fact that hysteria was then 
commonly considered a feminine trait, Messer’s 1875 report sought to 
demonstrate the truth of his theory that hysterical tetanus was respon-
sible for the suffering of the Pearl’s crew by sorting Goodenough and 
the six other men wounded by Santa Cruz arrows according to their 
relative nervous temperaments. This gave the semblance of a controlled 
scientific experiment:
five men were wounded by arrows fired at them by the natives of that 
place, in a treacherous and unprovoked attack, while another officer on 
the same occasion accidentally received a scratch by coming in contact 
with the point of an arrow in the hand of one of the natives. Here, then, 
was suddenly afforded an opportunity of observing the effects of these 
arrow wounds, and testing the truth of their poisonous reputation in 
seven cases, two officers and five men. It is worthy of record, that Com-
modore Goodenough was an officer of the very highest intelligence, 
possessed of a most powerful and deeply cultured mind, free, one would 
suppose, from any weakness or dread of uncertain danger, and in whom 
the mens sana in corpore sano was most fully illustrated. In the other 
officer, a different and very highly nervous disposition, was combined 
with a weakly and rather delicate body. As for the five men, every differ-
ence in age, disposition, and habit of life was represented. The wounds 
themselves were in every case slight.79
The ‘slightness’ of the wounds made the hysterical form of tetanus 
the most likely culprit for the men’s suffering, once the poisons them-
selves were proven fantastical. The disease, Messer argued, had been 
abetted by certain environmental factors; ‘favourable’ conditions for 
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the production of tetanus, whether traumatic, idiopathic, or hysteri-
cal, had appeared at Santa Cruz in the form of ‘punctured wounds… 
an unusual amount of excitement after an attack, together with much 
anxiety of mind, fear of poison, and consequent despondency. To these 
must be added an exceedingly hot, damp, relaxing climate’.80 Refer-
ences to ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ behaviour, likely inspired by Carpenter’s 
success in reconciling divine willpower with mechanistic models of 
the mind, allowed Messer to overcome the contradiction between his 
diagnosis of a hysterical mental state and Goodenough’s reputation as 
a rational, masculine, and Christianly explorer. The commodore’s mind 
had exerted a sinister and seemingly autonomous agency in its fixation 
on the existence and deadly nature of indigenous poisons:
In the commodore’s case, as before mentioned, we would not have 
expected to find that the influence of the mind over the body was of a 
hurtful nature, but rather the reverse. Unfortunately, however, from the 
very first, although apparently disbelieving in the danger of the poison, 
his mind never left the subject, but at once began to look forward to and 
prepare for a fatal result. This, however, he did in all outward calmness, 
and with a courage and resignation which others have well described.81
Messer may have acknowledged that too overt a challenge to Goode-
nough’s character was likely to have a negative impact on the dissemina-
tion and publication of his report. The last sentence of the extract above 
likely refers to the work of Henry Goldfinch, one of the Pearl’s lieuten-
ants, who had written a moving account of Goodenough’s illness and 
death.82 There, Goldfinch emphasised the manner in which the com-
modore accepted and made a virtue of his fate:
19th August. This afternoon I witnessed the saddest scene possible we 
had been greatly alarmed all day about the state of the Com at 5pm he 
sent for all the officers into his sleeping cabin he spoke to us all generally 
at first telling us the great comfort he had in dying was the love of God 
and exhorting us to love him more then he said goodbye & spoke a few 
kind words to each of us kissing us all round every one in tears.
If Goodenough had not resigned himself to his death from poisonous 
wounds, Messer implied, he may have survived the attack; lack of 
medical education and a consequent superstition had encouraged the 
commodore’s fate. Whereas Rayner and Small similarly suffered from a 
hysterical mental state with few outward symptoms, the ‘delicate’ 
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officer, Hawker, and the engineer, Belts, had by contrast exhibited it in 
full. Though Hawker received only a slight scratch to his shoulder, 
Messer reported that ‘unusual and irregular symptoms of tetanus set in 
very early, his mind becoming extremely excited’.83 Convinced the pre-
sumed poisoning meant ‘he must surely die’, Hawker refused to leave 
his cabin and ‘adopted strange and eccentric methods to prevent his jaw 
becoming locked … He nearly succeeded in producing real tetanus, and 
probably would have done so had his wound been anything beyond the 
merest scratch.84 Belts, who was ‘extremely nervous and timorous’, suf-
fered similarly after he ‘allowed himself to imagine’ that a wound on his 
thumb ‘was caused by one of the arrows he had accidentally touched’.85 
Messer’s published report states that Belts’s fear of poison was so 
extreme that he was ultimately invalided from the navy, being ‘actually 
considered insane’.86 In his original notes, however, the surgeon noted 
more candidly his suspicion that Belts in fact ‘exaggerated his symp-
toms for his own purposes’.87 The surgeon’s desire to establish cases of 
hysterical tetanus may therefore have been acknowledged, and exploited, 
by devious elements of the Pearl’s crew.
Conclusion
It has not been my intention here to offer a final diagnosis of the suffer-
ings of the Pearl’s wounded sailors, but it is as well to observe that 
Goodenough, Rayner, and Small almost certainly died from an infect-
ion caused by tetanus bacteria. Strychnine poisoning appears an unlikely 
explanation, as Messer observed, because it took more than a week for 
the men to die. Nevertheless, it should be noted that since Nendö 
people were undoubtedly aware of the association between arrow 
wounds and tetanus, the arrows could indeed be considered poisonous. 
As no attempt has lately been made to settle this question, Santa Cruz 
arrows now held at the British Museum are pragmatically considered 
toxic, and have their points carefully wrapped.88 With respect to the 
‘outward symptoms’ of what Messer called hysterical tetanus, in the 
case of Hawker, Jervis, and perhaps Belts, the condition might now be 
referred to as a form of non-epileptic seizure; these can be stimulated 
by anxiety and depression, and may well have been less prevalent in 
sailors who, in consequence of Christian faith or otherwise, did not 
believe in the indigenous manufacture of poison.89
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The caution afforded to the arrows now in the British Museum speaks 
to Messer’s contradictory legacy. The surgeon was the first explorer of 
the British Empire to undertake a detailed study of exotic poisons, and 
incidents of poisoning, but he failed to make a significant impact upon 
medical research. Furthermore, though Messer sought to establish 
that no viable poisons were manufactured in the Santa Cruz Islands, 
his references to decomposing bodies, witchcraft, and painful death 
lingered long in the imagination of his contemporaries. The problem 
was that Messer’s case for hysterical tetanus, about which he himself 
called for more research, was not strong enough to convince physicians, 
sailors, and the public that poisonous arrows could safely be ignored. 
‘Is it certain’, came one typical response in the contemporary press, 
‘that the Polynesians never soak their arrows in a solution of strychnia 
or some analogous vegetable poison?’ 90 The Gilbert Blane medal, it 
may fairly be concluded, in truth rewarded Messer’s deft weaponisa-
tion of the Victorian concern with nervous breakdown, and his novel 
use of emerging psycho-physiological explanations for tetanic spasms. 
By proposing that the most dangerous and enduring barriers to the 
development of the South Pacific region were the stress and hysteria of 
superstition, the surgeon consolidated the Medical Department of the 
Navy’s influence within a triumvirate of imperial encounter, humani-
tarian activism, and Christian proselytisation. Though never explicit, 
the doubts Messer cast upon Goodenough’s mental state challenged 
the stability of contemporary formulations of ‘modern’ civilisation and 
its forms of behaviour; poisonous arrows, like Conan Doyle’s Tonga 
and his darts, had the power to disrupt and to terrorise civil socie-
ties. In 1877, an editorial in the Australian Town and Country Journal 
revealed that the political significance and religious symbolism of 
Messer’s reports had not been missed. ‘At present the prayer to be 
delivered from “the arrow that flyeth by day” has a peculiar significance’, 
it observed. Should Messer’s discoveries offer an antidote to terror, 
‘they will rank high among the services conferred by explorers upon 
mankind’.91
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What is your complaint? Health  
as moral economy in the long 
nineteenth century
Christopher Hamlin
Unlike most other forms of historical writing, histories of public health 
are moral narratives. For more than a century, historians of the infec-
tious diseases that were long its chief focus have been able to unfold the 
drama of heroic social and scientific achievement over complacency 
and ignorance. That narrative is possible because author and reader 
share metrics of progress – through microbiology and epidemiology. 
One knows what needs to happen. Suffering from faecal-oral diseases? 
Stop ingesting … But what and who will facilitate, or retard?
By this standard the pathologies of progress are at a disadvantage. 
George Beard’s neurasthenia, flagship of the conditions considered 
here (can we even call them diseases?), is no longer a medical entity, 
only a curious conceptual relic. Given that we have decided that the 
persons thus diagnosed had no such disease, must we throw out their 
whining? Without a way to validate what brings suffering persons to 
clinical encounters, we risk doing that. One sort of validation comes 
from subjectivity: we have suffered from analogous conditions – 
perhaps depression, stress, or anxiety. But all these too are controversial 
terms in negotiations between subjects, practitioners, and societies. 
For as Charles Rosenberg has pointed out, translation is not always 
validation.1
I have no solution to validating general, amorphous, or sub-clinical 
suffering beyond reorienting the writing of medical history to make 
such pathologies of progress less anomalous. That means exploring 
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dynamisms. What, in these cases, evokes response? Not – as elsewhere 
in public health, fear of catching plague or disgust at rot or ugliness.
This chapter explores the powers of medical expression – i.e., what-
ever a supplicant must say to elicit an adequate response – in nineteenth-
century Britain. Plainly, the responder must know the codes too; 
coadaptation between supplicants and responders will presumably vary 
by place and time and perhaps, too, by race, age, gender, or class. Here 
I focus mainly on class, defined not in terms of objective socio-economic 
status nor modes of discursive engagement, but in terms of expecta-
tions of suffering. And I am concerned not with particular injury but 
with general affliction – with forms of expression which equate to: ‘I 
can’t stand it’, ‘I can’t live like this’. The statements have no definite rela-
tion to the afflictions/conditions themselves, which may be life-
threatening in the near term or debilitating in the longer. They may be 
intensely irritating or involve incursion of risks.
Historians of medicine will find context for such concern in classic 
works by Michel Foucault and by Nick Jewson: both explore how social 
and professional structures affect the expression of affliction and 
perhaps the experience of it too.2 Some voicings of pain bring sympathy 
and soup. Others bring indifference, impatience, or contempt (espe-
cially if there are significant costs in responding to my whining). In that 
case I may learn to deny or suppress those pains.
Of the seven parts of this chapter, the first four are foundation, the 
next two application, and the last an assessment. My first task is to 
expand/adapt E. P. Thompson’s concept of a ‘moral economy’, devel-
oped to explain features of social relations at the beginning of the long 
nineteenth century, to the domain of social medicine. Next, à la 
Raymond Williams, I begin to consider ‘keywords’, here verbs of exis-
tential unacceptability. These are probes for social practices, and good 
ways to chart change.3 The first is the ‘complaint’ of my title. Sections 
three and four explore the nineteenth-century antecedents of general 
patho-physiological processes that served, and in some cases still serve, 
as currency in the moral economy of health: we use versions of them 
to validate suffering. Sections five and six are literary-historical case 
studies. With the help of Charles Dickens, I seek to show the limits of 
a medical moral economy in the 1830s and 1840s; with the help of D. 
H. Lawrence, I explore dynamic aspects of that moral economy in 
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late-century public health/social medicine: its use not merely to enforce 
standards but also its potential to raise them. In the conclusion I assess 
this sort of analysis as a narrative foundation for the social history of 
health.
Health as moral economy
The protests I have alluded to are equally moral and economic expres-
sions (they involve assertions of obligation and appeals for resources to 
relieve). For my period and for Britain, E. P. Thompson’s concept of 
‘moral economy’ is a good starting point. Thompson was seeking to 
explain so-called ‘bread riots’ of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries – episodes in which crowds, largely led by women, 
acted against purveyors who had raised the prices of staple foodstuffs. 
These crowds did not loot; they took what they needed and paid what 
they saw as the just price.4 Thompson was challenging narrative and 
analytic practices prevalent in one wing of Marxist historiography – 
that class conflict was incessant and unlimited, a zero-sum game, and 
that such explosions simply reflected a critical mass of tension and a 
circumstance. This Thompson challenged with two points. First that 
riots occurred not at the height of desperation but in anticipation of the 
price changes that would lead to it, and second that they were restora-
tive not revolutionary. While, in Chapter 1 of this volume, we saw the 
shock of revolution interpreted and treated within emergent psychiatric 
practice as a form of therapy, here the crowds were not maximisers but 
moral enforcers, acting conservatively to maintain familiar social rela-
tions and stations of life.
Thompson did not extend the concept to health, yet such extension is 
implicit. Bread prices are proxies for survival; rioters were acting ration-
ally, recognising that the debility of hunger would ultimately make it 
impossible to act.5 And the concept is particularly apt for health. Unlike 
markets generally, where the marginal utilities are morally neutral 
and the participants value them as they please, health assessments 
involve perceptions of obligation and entitlement as well as allocation 
of scare communal resources. In the broader terms of welfare, such 
assessments are familiar – treatment and experience of children in the 
child reform movement discussed in Chapter 3; in the endless debates 
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in charity organisation societies or about poor laws; in tergiversations 
about sturdy beggars or the deserving poor; and about moralising or 
demoralising forms of relief.
Thompson, however, was focusing not on obligation but entitle-
ment. Concerned to humanise the writing of social history by directing 
it toward subjects and cultures rather than material conditions and 
determinisms, he did not consider what particular moral code rioters 
were seeking to enforce; ‘moral’ was important chiefly as a category. 
Prices, however, are quantitative; not so states of health. Here real ques-
tions arise about what the operant moral principles were on which 
people made medical claims. For rioters were taking risks. Their actions 
might be grudgingly tolerated by the magistracy or might not: a ‘moral 
economy’ might as readily be invoked to sanction price rises, not only 
by political economists defending the market, but by merchants passing 
on wholesale price increases. Why did rioters think they would be 
successful?
First, probably, because their demands were specific, modest, transi-
tory, and local. To be deliverable, entitlements (or, more directly, 
‘rights’), must be well defined. The ‘state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infir-
mity’, which the World Health Organization (WHO) obliges states to 
guarantee their citizens is indefinite.6 The mandate offers no way to 
move from an expressed deficit of well-being to mediatory medicalisa-
tion, nor of prioritising harms to health. Nor does it acknowledge trade-
offs in which delivering the right to some might require taking it from 
others. Instead, health is treated as an inalienable entity, akin to the right 
of conscience. The point is important: for ‘moral’ does not come as the 
antithesis of ‘economic’; we should recognise that bargains are being 
struck, and allocations of costs and benefits will be occurring.
To make sense of the nineteenth-century medical moral economy 
– and the bread riots – would require a sharper definition of cultural 
conditions. Two sorts of explorations would be critical – one concep-
tual, and the other rhetorical, but also sociological. There must be an 
authoritative conceptual metric into which suffering may be translated, 
and hence claims of entitlement assessed and adjudicated – that is, a 
moral economy must have a currency. Since obligation, not price, is 
at issue, we cannot expect a market to make incommensurables com-
mensurable, but something must do so. In fact, there were integrative 
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biomedical concepts that did, though they changed radically over the 
course of the century. (By contrast, the WHO’s ‘well-being’ lacks a clear 
currency.) But we also need to understand the situations and speech 
acts through which people could successfully invoke those conceptual 
frameworks. In the absence of objective tests of suffering – and there 
were more of these than we may realise – by what magic words does 
one establish one’s claim? And how does this vary by speaker, place, 
and conditions? We might hope to discover too the determinants of 
the quality of response a claim elicited – minimal, grudging, and brief, 
or sympathetic, long-term support? For my goal here is to explore not 
only the kinetics of the medical moral economy but also its dynamics 
for progressive change. How was that moral economy made to grow 
in terms of the modestly rising entitlements and obligations for the 
public’s health that occurred during the period (though never to the 
asymptotic levels imagined by WHO visionaries in 1948)?
This approach differs from a common view in which public health 
provision is a gift of policy made in the aftermath of social investigations 
to those too dull to demand it themselves. The questions it involves 
are formidable. Many historians have avoided them, or have looked at 
them from one side only – that of the providers of relief, with their con-
cerns about epidemic diseases and their institution-building practices. 
Mathias in Chapter 5 demonstrated various means by which fictions 
of the period provoked and explored imaginative extensions of public 
health concerns. But ‘moral economy’ points us toward mandated 
exchanges, exchanges that are not merely permissible but obligatory.7
An essential beginning is the status of ‘complaint’. Any claim on the 
moral economy will come as a complaint – bread rioters were com-
plaining unambiguously about unacceptable prices. To complain, 
however, requires many things: recognition of suffering, the energy and 
capacity to express it, and perhaps the presumption of social sanction 
for the complaint’s legitimacy. For we must not mistake complaint for 
power. Along with the question of who can complain is the question of 
what they can complain about and to whom.
Here I shall use ‘complaint’ and ‘annoyance’ as the terms traders use 
in the moral economy of medicine – they express conditions crowds 
(including crowds of one) find morally objectionable. In turn, I shall 
use ‘stress’ and ‘overwork’, and their nineteenth-century predecessors 
as the integrative conceptual metrics that serve as currency. Effacing the 
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border between subjectivity and biomedical objectivity, these validate 
and delimit the complaint.
Irritations and agonies
Much of the history of moral economies is encapsulated in the changing 
valences of ‘complain’ over the course of the long nineteenth century. 
Earlier uses enforce seriousness and subjectivity: to ‘complain’ was ‘to 
give expression to sorrow or suffering’ (OED #1). It was linked to lam-
entation and wailing. This heritage lives on in the ‘plaintive’ ‘pleading’ 
of our ‘plaint’, registering pain and powerlessness.8 There is nothing 
accusatory here, no grounds to second guess the suffering of the term’s 
user. In medicine, too, a complaint is taken at face value as an existential 
expression: the recording medic writes, ‘patient complains of ’ (#4a) 
and in further references translates these into the patient’s ‘complaint’. 
Usually the term is a hybrid between the conditions the patient objects 
to and the healer’s understanding of the (quasi-diagnostic) entity to be 
remedied.9 Here, medicalisation helps to legitimise: the complaint is 
recognised as a departure from well-being, a situation that may be 
fixable and perhaps could have been prevented.10
The most familiar modern usage is quite different: ‘To give expres-
sion to feelings of illusage, dissatisfaction, or discontent; to murmur, 
grumble’ (#6). These all point to blameworthy external causes: the 
complainer is simultaneously alluding to an injury, identifying respon-
sibility for it, and appealing to a presumed entitlement. The valences 
differ from other ways of expressing injury and reparability: ‘I have a 
suggestion’, ‘I have a problem that needs fixing’, or even ‘this case falls 
under the moral precept’ may all be respected, even welcomed.
Yet with its overtones of sulkiness, ‘grumble’ suggests that by desig-
nating one’s expression as a ‘complaint’ one has pushed a presumed 
‘moral economy’ too far. We lose even more legitimacy if expressing a 
‘complaint’ puts us on the slippery slope from ‘subject who has com-
plained’ to the identity of ‘complainer’, a term for a habitual maker of 
such statements. Hence to have one’s dissatisfaction registered as ‘com-
plaint’ may be so counterproductive as to be the basis for dismissing 
one’s imperative, as the OED’s illustrations suggest. Thus Robert Burns 
writes of one ‘always compleenin frae mornin to e’enin’ (4b). Evelyn 
Waugh writes: ‘Everyone I met complained bitterly about the injustice 
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of having to earn a living and the peculiar beastliness of his own profes-
sion’ (6c). Here ‘complaint’ is self-indulgent kvetching.11 However dis-
contented we may be, no one wants to labelled a ‘malcontent’.
And those who say ‘X is complaining again’ are themselves complain-
ing – expressing exhaustion and exasperation at being expected to fix 
what is too hard to fix, or to deliver special treatments that the com-
plainers have no right to ask for. Though they may have the greater 
complaints, theirs may go unvoiced if, in the economy of exchanged 
rather than essential deference, they are paid to hear ours, as persons in 
customer service certainly are.
What shall we make of this evolution of heartfelt distress into barely 
tolerated moaning? I think the change reflects the coming of equality. 
‘Complaint’ has become less moral and more economic. The tone of 
powerlessness (at least of some) in the face of misfortune – human or 
divine – is gone, replaced by a jealousy about status in societies that 
purport to deride class and deny station. The situation is that depicted 
by Norbert Elias in his famous analysis of the history of manners. 
According to Elias, in complaining we are expressing aspirations appro-
priate to the imperial (and imperious) identity we would like to be 
granted.12 A lump under a mattress will no longer register if someone 
can respond: ‘you’re not a princess; you’re lucky to have a bed at all’.
Complaining then may represent not a rebalancing of the moral 
economy, but its collapse, through an amplifying infection of irritability 
as people complain about complaining – a ‘mood contagion’, as Kow-
alski puts it.13 The ‘moral’ in ‘moral economy’ was fragile. The equilibra-
tion Thompson’s actors seek depended on some shared notion of the 
legitimacy of some complaints. These were in part functions of the 
supposedly objective biomedical currencies that circulated in this 
‘moral economy’. If current enlistments of ‘complaint’ often bring loss 
of social capital, it behooves us to look more closely at the conditions 
of its creation. Perhaps those very ripples of dissatisfaction we label as 
complaint can, in other circumstances, generate rising expectations that 
translate into healthful aspiration.
The afflictive world
Probably the most common contemporary expression for medicalised 
complaining is ‘stress’. And, as Waugh suggests, its chief cause is the 
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grind of (over) ‘work’, not merely from paid employment but as mani-
festion of the composite exhaustion of modern living (the titular 
‘pathologies of progress’). Used together, the terms are especially 
helpful in uniting physical conditions with emotional responses.14 And 
both refer, sometimes simultaneously, to conditions and causes, and to 
perceptions, interpretations, and expressions. Both are critical terms. 
As with ‘complaint’ itself, an utterance of ‘stress’ signifies not only as 
diagnosis, but as accusation and explanation. Some nineteenth-century 
medical writers who spoke of stress were borrowing the notion of the 
forces that reshaped an object, while others drew from the vernacular 
‘distress’.15 ‘Work’ too was an activity, a human identity, and a physical 
quantity.
Given these foundations, it is easy to see how the terms might trans-
late subjectivity into objectivity. In doing so they functioned on three 
levels: to the individual they provided a way to articulate a state of being 
and adopt an appropriate identity on the basis of a self-assessment; to 
society they represented a demand for renegotiation of the terms of 
participation; and to the physician they offered a generic explanation 
that may guide both that sense of identity and that negotiation.
For contemporary scholars, that generic explanation is based in mid-
twentieth-century physiological research chiefly by Walter Cannon of 
Harvard and Hans Seyle of McGill. They translated the heritage of 
‘neurasthenia’, the quintessential pathology of progress, into hormone 
biochemistry. That translation broadened symptoms. In addition to 
providing a biomedical underwriting of subjective elements – mood 
changes, fatigue, trouble sleeping – it objectified and quantified injury 
in terms of elevated blood pressure, arthritis, ulcers, cancer, autoimmune 
conditions, coronary disease, or even suicide, though none was exclu-
sive to ‘stress’.16
There were other changes. First, some of these harmful changes were 
imperceptible. Thus stress validated complaint but was not limited to 
the ability to express. Second, physiological research provided a better 
conceptual basis for distinguishing recovery – the ‘homeostasis’ that 
allowed mammalian bodies to maintain stability in changing and in 
extreme situations – from irreversible damage: for overstressed bodies 
lost their ability to re-equilibrate. Remarkably, Cannon–Seyle managed 
to be explanatory and validating without being reductive. Just as there 
were stressors and manifestations of stress measurable but not felt, so 
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there were some that might be felt but not measured: stress was emo-
tional as well as physiological. Remarkable too is the cultural credit the 
concept acquired. In terms of declarations of illness accepted without 
biomedical confirmation, stress and anxiety come close to carrying the 
power of nausea or diarrhoea.
Discovery of ‘stress’ was not accidental. Concerned with under-
standing the dynamics of human performance, Seyle and Cannon drew 
from medical history and saw themselves as elaborating an equilibra-
tion agenda that had dominated classical (or ‘humoural’) clinical medi-
cine since Hippocrates.17 In turn their concept may serve as a currency. 
The explorations below suggest how it might be possible to apply that 
concept despite lack of confirmation from the usual epidemiological 
sources. For usually these concentrate either on immediate causes of 
death or on incidence of particular diseases. They obscure integrative 
conditions manifest in dissatisfaction or dysfunction. And leaving aside 
categories, the high incidence of infections will have masked stress-
related conditions that would become visible only after an epidemio-
logic transition made so-called ‘lifestyle-related’ causes of death more 
prominent.18
‘And all must have prizes’ 19
A medicalised ‘stress’ may seem the solution to the complainer’s problem 
of how to register one’s distress without being branded a malcontent. 
Yet it is equally possible that, linked to ‘complaint’, ‘stress’ will be swept 
into the same abyss. If it is to liberate or legitimise, medicalisation must 
first overcome a filtering based in class (and perhaps in gender, life 
stage, or race).
The irony is especially sharp for class. If those who complain the 
most about stress also possess the greatest means to avoid it, what of 
those without such means? Presumably they must be suffering more 
acutely. One may filter claims in two ways, both de-legitimising. One is 
to view ‘stress’ (or ‘complaint’) as peevishness. The other is the exotici-
sation of some persons as too dull to experience the refined anguish 
that plagues the more sensitive and vocal.
Prior to 1700 I find little class-specificity in discussions of constitu-
tional illnesses in European medicine. The predominant notion is that 
any person will need periodically to rebalance the so-called non-naturals 
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– air, diet, activity, sleep, excretions and secretions, and passions of 
mind. The circumstances of stress vary by class and occupation as do 
the remedies – Mme Sévinge’s accounts of mid-seventeenth-century 
Versailles life allude to the strain of courtly deference. Those of her rank 
can retire to their chateaux. That others cannot is simple fact, but the 
lack of any sharp demarcation between normal and pathological exis-
tence brings with it a presumption of universalism: we each in our way 
suffer from more or less the same strains.20
Diseases of affectation, or to James Adair, of ‘fashion’, begin to be 
evident shortly after 1700, with the emergence of the ‘valetudinarian’, 
one (usually a man) of such delicacy that health requires avoiding any 
‘annoyance’ (a term I explore later). Other terms, ‘spleen’, ‘vapours’, 
‘hypochondriasis’, ‘hysteria’, or merely ‘febricula’ did much the same 
work, though many had distinct class, life course, or gender implica-
tions. These would evolve by late in the century into a ‘nervousness’ 
endemic among wealthy young women and attributed in part to what 
are recognizably social stresses.21
Yet remarkably, these concepts took root first in a Newtonian cul-
tural context, in which cause must have effect.22 That view is even more 
prominent in another heritage of stress, also recognised in early modern 
medicine: the environmental, economic, and psychic stresses of poverty. 
Indeed, these, and not emotional stresses, were Seyle’s primary con-
cerns, and they were explored further by postwar physiologists study-
ing starvation.23 Bodies must respond lawfully to a variety of acute and 
chronic nutritional stresses, to dehydration, extremes of temperature 
(both hypothermia and heat stroke are kinds of stress), and sleep dep-
rivation, but also to the anxieties which all of these incur. The manifesta-
tions of hunger, for example, are equally somatic, psychic, and social.
Such stress is axiomatic for Karl Marx, for whom health, bodily and 
mental, is a liquefiable asset, which capital will convert into surplus 
value. In discussing the working day in the first volume of Capital, 
Marx quotes contemporary investigators of the mid-Victorian work-
place. He need not be a diagnostician of overwork, merely a compiler: 
these authorities recognise the slow destruction – of ‘frames dwindling 
… faces whitening … humanity absolutely sinking into a stone-like 
torpor’. Some note stress-related conditions: ‘dyspepsia … disorders of 
the liver and kidneys … rheumatism’.24
What is your complaint? 305
All are products of a lengthening work day. Capital burns individu-
als as fast as it can. It will extract time from eating, resting, or simply 
living, stopping only when the labouring population is no longer able 
to reproduce a future workforce. Marx quotes Benjamin Ward Richard-
son, writing, long before Seyle, on the ‘stress of work’. Richardson ima-
gines a blacksmith, capable of some number of hammer blows during 
a fifty-year working life, being ‘made to strike so many more blows, to 
walk so many more steps, to breathe so many more breaths per day and 
… producing for a limited time a fourth more work’, and dying earlier 
by exactly that proportion.25
Yet the protests do not come from the victims who ‘silently pine and 
die’, but from humanitarian investigators.26 In his extended treatment, 
Diseases of Modern Life (1882), Richardson embraced the stresses of 
intellectual and artistic work. In the case of manual labourers, ‘who 
wear out by such action itself, or by the addition of certain surrounding 
influences which add to the exhaustion’, it was plain that work (and thus 
life) was stress. Of these ‘sons of slavish toil’, Richardson declared that 
‘the misery of their lives is only ameliorated by the shortness of the trial’ 
– the hammer blows should be struck as rapidly as possible. As Rabin-
bach has shown, commodifying human lives had become a fetish by the 
end of the century.27
In converting stress into a currency of historical assessment – and 
not merely a crotchet of self-indulgent modernity, we face three central 
challenges.
I have considered the first, the palaeo-epidemiological. That the term 
‘stress’ is grounded both in experiment and expression; that something 
like it was diagnosed in severe cases does not necessarily allow us to 
link the expression of stress to physiological stress in sub-clinical cases. 
Stressors manifest in many ways and over a long period; and surely we 
can’t fit eighteenth-century persons with blood-pressure cuffs.
The second concerns expressibility. Can we assume that there will 
there be languages for stressed persons to say they are stressed? We have 
no basis for thinking that what is felt can and will be stated, much less 
recorded, nor any right to expect a transparent or uniform language of 
pain. Perhaps, if verbalising distress is forbidden, there will be other 
forms of protest, biomedical analogues to James Scott’s ‘weapons of 
the weak’.28
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Last, and most important here, are the conditions outlined earlier 
with regard to successful enlistment of the moral economy: issues of 
universality, targeting, and responsiveness. If language is available, who 
gets to use it, on which targets, and with what expectations of response?
These questions may be asked of any illness, but are harder to answer 
for stress. Yet we can find bodies of evidence that bear on them in 
periods before the modern era of stress-expressibility. For various 
reasons, late medieval and early modern historians have been more 
comfortable exploring such issues.29 Indeed, by integrating religious 
anxieties, their studies have sometimes approached the asymptote of a 
comprehensive accounting of stresses – psychic, physical, and spiritual. 
By contrast, nineteenth-century historians have often reduced the bio-
medical to epidemic infections – notably to cholera and tuberculosis. 
In British history in particular, the public health movement dominates. 
It is (correctly) seen as preoccupied with faecal-oral diseases.
But public health, as the WHO reminds us, involves more. One of 
the two cases I explore below concerns the desperation of unsettled-
ness; the other the stultifying stuckness of settledness in a dehumanis-
ing environment. In each I use contemporary fiction to interrogate an 
ambiguous historical record. Literary artists claim access to characters’ 
senses of self and world, including individuals’ understandings of and 
responses to the stresses of their lives. Historians rarely aspire to such 
intimacy; rarely do our sources encourage it.
Cold women
To illustrate the importance and potential of ‘complaint’, it may help to 
consider its absence in conjunction with a minimalist concept of a 
moral economy. Thus: in the aftermath of the infamous New Poor Law 
of 1834, a nameless gravid woman is found ‘lying in the street’ by a local 
overseer. She has evidently ‘walked some distance’ and has been admit-
ted to a workhouse where she gives birth, asks to see her baby, states 
that she will then die, and does so. She is overworked (‘labouring’ may 
apply equally to birthing, labouring under fever, and to walking and 
carrying – all heavy caloric demands). That she has undertaken a long 
journey on foot during her third trimester suggests desperation – 
mental as well as physical stress. Knowing what we know of contempo-
rary mores and bastardy laws we may assume ostracism too: she is in 
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need among persons who may despise her. Tea and sympathy might 
help but no one offers. How does she die? Not apparently from any 
single disease entity: the sequence of events rules out puerperal fever, 
but it is plausible to understand her death in some broadly accumulative 
sense. She suffers from exhaustion and exposure compounded with 
abjection and hopelessness. She has neither strength nor will to live.
You may know this woman as Agnes Fleming, mother of Oliver 
Twist, and the events as those of the first two pages of Dickens’s novel. 
The modern reader only learns her name and background hundreds of 
pages later, while the first readers of this serialised novel were presented 
with her effective anonymity: they had to wait two years for a scanty 
backstory.
It is hardly possible to acknowledge, and yet dismiss, deadly stress 
more effectively than Dickens does here. In contrast with the ‘well-
being’ guaranteed by the WHO, here obligation is asymptotic as it 
approaches nullity. Dickens comes close to denying her the person-
hood of speech. Agnes gets seven words. ‘Let me see the child, and die’. 
Her postpartum condition and behaviour get fewer than 200 words, 
her background (discovery by the overseer, shoe wear indicating long 
journey, lack of identity), only forty-six. Her social status – ‘No wedding-
ring, I see’ – takes just five. Here Dickens, perhaps sharing contempo-
rary views, permits Agnes no complaint, except perhaps about herself, 
evident in her intent to die.30 Not so David Lean, who concentrated on 
her complaint in filming the book. He opens with a tiny figure cresting 
a hill, with rising wind followed by rain and thunder. We see a thorn-
bush, an exhausted face, a distant light toward which she staggers, and 
later a waking Agnes who smiles with delight at her baby.31
Here, none of the three conditions are met: the group to which 
Agnes is assigned – fallen women – is one in which complaint is forbid-
den; she is too stressed even to muster the strength to complain, and 
the targets of her complaint would be diffuse. Finally, this is a legal, 
not a moral economy: the parish officials do only what the poor law 
requires.32 To the degree that a moral economy underwrites this, it is 
that of Thomas Malthus, whose analysis of human population dynam-
ics indicated a need to minimise the population-inflating stimulus of 
obligation.33
Given Dickens’s outrage at the physical and nutritional stress the 
New Poor Law imposes on Oliver, his neglect of his mother is striking. 
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But the very absence of a moral economy here invites consideration of 
the enormous range of obligations that might be recognised. Given a 
slug of brandy, and then asked, as a parish surgeon might, ‘what is your 
complaint’, where would Agnes begin? She might say, ‘Isn’t it obvious?’ 
But what would she be targeting? Would she be admitting that she is, 
as Dickens later labels her, a ‘weak and erring’ fallen woman? Or might 
she fulminate at the sources of stress – God, men, or a society that so 
signally despises isolated pregnant women? Or perhaps she would be 
protesting a more general frailty of nature – the cold and exhaustion 
that bring on hopelessness, or even the nature of the body of a fertile 
female.
Accrediting Agnes’s experience requires giving her a vocabulary. 
What might be the keywords for converting experience into protest? 
Two would be ‘misery’ and ‘miserable’. Yet, as with ‘complain’ and ‘com-
plaint’, the OED chronicles confusion: both conflation and inversion of 
moral valences. Originally ‘misery’ was objective: ‘A condition of exter-
nal unhappiness, discomfort, or distress; wretchedness of outward cir-
cumstances; distress caused by privation or poverty.’ (OED ‘misery’, 
#1a). The subjective version, ‘Great sorrow or mental distress; a miser-
able or wretched state of mind; a condition characterized by a feeling 
of extreme unhappiness’, only begins to be (ambiguously) evident in 
the seventeenth century and takes hold only in the mid-nineteenth 
(#3a).34 If this evolution may seem to humanise the physical condition 
of misery, it also allows its trivialisation: the well-off can now claim 
‘misery’.
‘Miserable’ evolves on a similar schedule (OED, ‘miserable’, #1a, 
#1c), but acquires even more nuances.35 It can refer to external stressors 
as in ‘miserable weather’ or ‘miserable working conditions’ (#2b) but 
also to opposing representations of a person: either as ‘contemptible, 
despicable’ (#3b) or as ‘poor, unhappy, or wretched’ (#5b). The oppor-
tunity for confusion/inversion is evident. Both Agnes and a poor law 
official might call her ‘miserable’, but the first would mean ‘unhappy’ 
and the second, ‘contemptible’. Even more sharply than with ‘complaint’ 
the very word with which one makes a claim on a moral economy sub-
verts the claim.
For two reasons we should not regard Agnes an ‘everywoman’, even 
for early nineteenth-century Britain. Her pregnancy and marital status 
are factors in the operation of a moral economy; so too is the New 
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Poor Law itself, which in England, but not Scotland (or yet in Ireland) 
transferred much of the domain of entitlement/obligation into public 
policy. Agnes (and later Oliver) get care from the infamous workhouse 
of the New Poor Law, where an ‘experimental philosophy’ is in opera-
tion to determine the minima of human survival. But one may ask 
how other overworked and stressed persons – friendless, travelling on 
foot, perhaps in bad weather – negotiate their complaints with them-
selves and with medical or charitable institutions? How did this moral 
economy work for them? For here too there were gatekeepers and 
magic words.
This is a matter both of ideas and of institutions. With regard to 
ideas, a holistic Hippocratic-Galenic heritage, still ascendant in British 
medicine in the first half of the nineteenth century, emphasised indi-
vidualistic causation of illness and gave exhaustion primacy as a cause. 
The key theorist was the popular Edinburgh medical teacher William 
Cullen. He and his successors trained many of the practitioners active 
in the north of England and in Scotland and Ireland.36 Though his inte-
grating entity is ‘debility’, a condition jointly physical and mental, Cul-
len’s model anticipates Seyle’s ‘stress’. For Cullen ‘cold’ (a term implying 
too the lack of nutriment needed to withstand it) effectively stands 
for physical, and ‘fear’ for psychic stressors, with the latter including 
anxiety about meeting physical needs as well as ‘watching’ or sleepless-
ness, whose significance has been highlighted by modern stress theo-
rists.37 When these factors, operating collectively, reached a threshold, 
fever would result. That misery-induced fever might then spread to 
non-miserable persons. Via the emergent-contagion doctrine the poor 
became a threat to the rich.38
In the first half of the nineteenth century the most important medical 
institutions of a moral economy of health were dispensaries, infirma-
ries, and fever hospitals, particularly in Scotland and Ireland, where no 
legal obligation to support the destitute existed for most of the period. 
It may seem that this Cullenian paradigm will underwrite any com-
plaint Agnes might make: to be exhausted, hungry, cold, or scared is to 
be dangerously ill. Therapy too was commonsensical – provision of the 
‘necessaries’ (food, warmth, and shelter).
But there are ambiguities. With respect to expressibility, exhaustion 
exhausts reflection; fever (or hypothermia) undermines reason and 
behaviour – the very dignity we need if we expect accreditation of our 
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protests. While acute irrationality would be noticed as delirium – itself 
interpreted as exhaustion – less serious cases might be unrecognised 
and unarticulated.39
Nor, even when it became serious enough to trigger a clinical 
response, did that composite debility imply culpability. Indeed, ‘soup 
kitchen’ medicine – the common practice during epidemics of dis-
tributing soup, blankets, and coals – has been denigrated as temporis-
ing: a patching-up that neglects underlying causes of social problems.40 
And yet there are hints that even where no legal provision existed, 
soup kitchens and other ‘medical charities’, providing relief – rest and 
food – did come to be seen as entitlements, as one would expect in a 
conservative and restorative ‘moral economy’. Without acknowledg-
ing the agenda of culpability, they compensated reliably for oscilla-
tions in the conditions of survival. I have examined patient records 
from Dublin, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Carlisle. In them are bits of 
Agnes-like stories, with Cullenian detail of exposure/exhuastion. 
Thus some examples from 127 cases described in Dominic Cor-
rigan’s service at the Hardwicke Hospital, Dublin, in 1840–41, and 
in 1844.41
A servant, 28, unable to shake a cold, with debility and loss of appe-
tite, reports much ‘mental anxiety and bodily exertion’.
A servant, 19, attributes lightness and giddiness, loss of appetite to a 
cold from sleeping in a damp room. A laundry maid, 37, attributes pains, 
cough, and cold feet to going out in the cold while hot. Two others refer 
illnesses to neglecting to change from wet clothes (had they a change 
available?). So too does a groom, ill from cold and wet on a February 
crossing from England.
A tailor, 24, having caught cold from wet, reports ‘cold trembling all 
over, and general weakness. He wishes for something to eat’. The medic 
writes: ‘he has merely to complain of weakness and thinks appropriate 
nutriment would quickly restore his health’.
A shoemaker, 27, has headaches and abdominal pains from ‘falling 
asleep outside’.
An ‘intemperate’ cabinet maker, 29, of ‘wretched appearance and 
feeble emaciated frame’, has chest pain, but was ‘observed not to suffer 
so much from cough as from want of food for which he had a good 
appetite’.
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A woman, 39, having recovered from bronchitis, is discharged, but 
returns four days later with a relapse. On readmission she is found to 
have ‘slight symptoms of common inflammatory fever – [but] to suffer 
more from the effects of want of care and of food’. Following a treatment 
of ‘warmth. Food and some diaphoretic medicines, … she was dis-
charged well’ two-and-a-half weeks later.
A shoemaker, 26, with pain in small of back and ‘extreme mischief 
all over’ cannot sleep. ‘His Countenance … expressive of distress rather 
than of illness’.
And, finally, an Agnes, 22, eight months pregnant, delivers and dies 
on the day of admission. She is described as ‘cross and irritable’, the only 
occasion in these notebooks where mood is mentioned.
How should we hear such summaries? Are patients accusing or 
simply explaining? Are doctors hinting that such problems are social 
and political, not medical, or simply acquiescing in the realities of their 
practices? Or even, does the privilege of hearing ‘complaint’ inhere only 
in critics, distant in time, situation, or both?
Usually we don’t know. In July 1840 a woman, 21, attributes her fever, 
by then pretty well over, ‘to having over-worked herself, and when very 
much heated … having exposed herself to cold’. The language (if we can 
trust the recorder) seems to assert choice, to admit error. Yet how free 
is she? Depending on the expectations of an employer or the demands 
of a market in which she engages, not overworking may not be an 
option.
The Hardwicke was a state fever hospital. Because it might be, or 
become, contagious, incipient fever was taken especially seriously. And 
yet few of these patients have the most serious fever, typhus, and several 
have no fever at all. Some stay for weeks. A woman, 28, described 
as ‘almost convalescent on admission … [and] without any particular 
complications’ stays two weeks.
Dublin’s fever hospitalisation practices are unique, reflecting an over-
supply of beds subsidised by a state fearful of masses of hunger-generated 
fever moving across the Irish Sea. Institutional responses differed in 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Carlisle. With fewer beds, they relied more 
on organised home care (as with Edinburgh’s Society for the Relief of 
the Destitute Sick), or on intermediate institutions (like Glasgow’s 
Town’s Hospital).
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Nosy neighbours
My second case explores the vocalising of chronic complaint rather 
than the negotiation of desperation. Do people come to recognise and 
protest the invisible stresses of debilitating conditions? To challenge 
the responsible moral economy when sudden changes threaten survival 
is not especially remarkable; to challenge it on a broad front in times of 
normality is more so.
Yet imagine a truly complaint-encouraging world. ‘I am annoyed’, I 
say, ‘and stressed too, by rubble in the street, or the smell of sausage-
making, or simply by filth’. A minor official, possessed of some obscure 
quasi-medical authority by virtue of the title of ‘inspector of nuisances’ 
appears, confronts the irritating parties, and makes their nuisance stop 
– by summons, fines, and mandamus action if necessary.
The Victorian nuisances inspector was the foot soldier of sanitary 
reform. What ultimately became the profession of Sanitary, or later 
Environmental Health inspector, was not wholly the brainchild of 
Edwin Chadwick, but he had much to do with ensuring the universal 
appointment of such officers by English local authorities in the two 
decades after the pioneering Public Health Act of 1848. Their odd work 
was not only to respond to complaints, but also to declare conditions 
to be nuisances.42
That their pronouncements were seldom contested is less a matter 
of expertise than of the cultural capital with which they operated. ‘Nui-
sance’ was both a vague and a powerful term. Its derivation is from 
‘annoyance’, which, in turn, went well beyond private pique or insuffer-
able affectation to refer to real condition. Thus, well into the eighteenth 
century, we see references to roads ‘annoyed’ by trash.43 They are not 
being personified with capacity for taking offence; rather, ‘annoy’, like 
‘injury’ or ‘harm’ united human with non-human. To the degree that 
nuisances were real, their discovery was a matter of perception, not of 
heightened sensibility.
Nuisances were legally real too. Under the broad heading of trespass, 
common law underwrote annoyance. A nuisance might be private or 
public, remediation of the latter being the responsibility of the magis-
tracy or other appropriate local authority. One need not show harm to 
health, merely transgression of public standards. In many towns, moreo-
ver, there was a centuries-long tradition of citizen-based environmental 
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enforcement through courts leet or assizes of nuisance. These relied 
on juries to inspect and adjudicate. To physical, customary, and legal 
authority, Chadwick added biomedical authority. The stench from next 
door was not just a violation of community standards or an impairment 
of one’s enjoyment of property, but potentially deadly under the ‘all 
smell is disease’ maxim.
By ingeniously grafting a central government functionary onto the 
heritage of local self-government and common law, Chadwick and his 
successors were creating a role rife with a tension common to many 
forms of policing. As its appointed ‘nose’, the inspector was to represent 
the community; however, as representative of state- and science-based 
biomedical expertise, the inspector must be outside it, able to dictate 
the standards necessary for collective (and individual) well-being.
Inspectors were not miracle-workers transforming industrial towns 
into garden suburbs. The grand question is not so much what they did 
but how – both how they mitigated distressing conditions in nineteenth-
century towns and transformed expectations and attitudes, instilling a 
culture of complaint. As with food riots, enlistment of communal 
standards was essential – as Elias and Mary Douglas remind us, ‘dirt’ is 
a communal declaration and a powerful social motor, just as a proper 
sense of annoyance was a key mark of class identity. By marshalling 
these forces the inspectors, prodding and praising on behalf of health, 
beauty, decency, and community, might hope gradually to produce 
change.44
Survival of inspectors’ records is spotty, but among the best series is 
that for the east Midlands brewing and coal town, Worksop, for which 
there are weekly summaries in fine hand from 1871 to 1886. There the 
first inspector we meet is Henry Mellars, who shares a surname peculiar 
to the region with D. H. Lawrence’s fictional gamekeeper, Oliver 
Mellors, aka Lady Chatterley’s lover.45 Lawrence’s Mellors hails from 
the fictional Tevershall, a Nottinghamshire coal town based on Law-
rence’s boyhood home of Eastwood, about thirty miles from Worksop. 
However facile, juxtaposing the fictional Mellors with the real Mellars 
is a fruitful way to explore responses to the stresses of life in industrial 
towns.
Lady Chatterley’s Lover is a novel of oppositions: living and dead, 
nature and artifice, beauty and ugliness, masters and servants, capital 
and labour, cleanliness and squalor, hope and despair, and, of course 
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sensual engagement and dull acceptance. ‘Tevershall’ applies equally 
and interchangeably to town, coal pit, and people. There what Marx 
anticipated has come to pass: work drives out all else, including ability 
to challenge the conditions of existence.46
To outsider Connie Chatterley, Tevershallian conditions preclude 
the ‘spontaneity’ and ‘intuition’ of full ‘humanness’ (205). Not only is 
a stroll in the woods impossible, to feel annoyance and to complain, 
preconditions of any moral economy, are too. Describing ‘blackened 
brick dwellings … black slate roofs … mud black with coal-dust … 
pavements wet and black’, she reflects: it seemed ‘as if dismalness had 
soaked through and through everything. The utter negation of natural 
beauty, the utter negation of the gladness of life, the utter absence of 
the instinct for shapely beauty which every bird and beast has, the utter 
death of the human intuitive faculty was appalling’ (204).
For Connie, horror gets the better of any sympathy, for it is she, not 
the Tevershallians, who experiences stress. Of ‘the industrial masses’, 
she is ‘absolutely afraid’. They seem ‘so weird’ – ‘incarnate ugliness’. All 
this brings ‘a queer feeling … all over her, like influenza’ (213). But ‘if 
you were poor and wretched you had to care’, insists insider Mellors. In 
fact, there was too much life, ‘a terrible, seething welter of ugly life’ 
(146) behind the ‘flat drabness’; lives of ‘misery, bitterness, and ugli-
ness’, and of ‘futility, futility to the nth power’. His pathology was not, 
like flu, a dangerous corruption of passing innocents, but internal – a 
malignancy, a ‘great cancer’ (193).
Capitalists Connie and Clifford Chatterley may choose how to 
engage with Tevershall – Connie with revulsion; Clifford, as a progres-
sive industrialist, creatively. The responses of Mellors and of the other 
main character, the nurse Ivy Bolton, are necessarily more complicated. 
Being of Tevershall and dependent on it, they have fewer degrees of 
freedom. Yet each, crossing boundaries of class, encounters the same 
ambiguities that inspectors experienced. Like the inspectors, game-
keeper Mellors is expert yet servile. His education and experience 
would allow a middle-class career of local civic leadership, yet as much 
as possible he has abandoned Tevershall for a life in the woods raising 
pheasant chicks.
Not so Ivy Bolton, miner’s widow, parish nurse, and finally nurse-
companion to Clifford, a role in which she is both above and of Tever-
shall. Her story is complicated. Were Sophocles in charge, it might be 
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one of vengeful karma. Ted, the husband she loved, had died in an 
explosion in Tevershall pit (before Clifford inherited). On the grounds 
of his independence – he stood while others crouched – compensation 
had been minimal (122–3). Ted had hated that life; he could not escape 
it even in sex with a caring partner seeking to relieve his anguish (217). 
After his death, Ivy finds the means to train as a nurse and reintegrates 
into Tevershall as ‘one of the governing class of the village’ (122) until 
her appointment to care for the paraplegic Clifford.
Here questions do arise about moral economies. ‘What justice will 
she enforce?’ Lawrence wonders. Her relationship with Clifford is deep, 
intimate, and multidimensional, yet ultimately she is a labourer, though 
one who, like Thompson’s riot leaders, controls in quiet ways the terms 
of the relationship. And, like the inspectors, she mediates as a double 
agent, interpreting Tevershall for Clifford. If she is his spy, she is also its 
advocate, defending the workers against the masters. As to what stresses 
she feels from being a sounding board of Clifford’s complaints and being 
chiefly responsible for Clifford’s well-being (no less than Mellors is for 
his baby pheasants), Lawrence is silent.
In Worksop, Henry Mellars too must be both outsider and insider, 
dictator of propriety for the public’s good and sensitive to the practicali-
ties of life in a coal town. Worksop had about 11,000 people by the 
mid-1880s. Even before discovery of coal in the 1860s, it had been 
viewed as a sanitary disaster, a place of high death rate and squalor.47
It is in the first instance as a physical entity that Mellars confronts 
Worksop: persons appear in regard to structures. His moral economy 
must bypass any grand mal issues of class conflict. Wages and strikes, 
rents and prices, those factors that concentrate humans into small and 
dirty spaces and their most important means of protests, are off-limits 
for him. Instead, he will disturb this universe by modest architectural 
alterations, public and private. Want to stop the contemptuous gesture 
of male public urination? Remove corners to piss in, thus dulling the 
edge of class conflict by, literally, removing edges. Yet prostates and 
distended bladders still rule and urban settings must accommodate.48
The surviving notebooks begin in 1871. They show Mellars already 
busy seeking a standard of acceptable living – how many persons per 
privy? One, for twenty-one people on Church Walk, is too few. So are 
two for more than thirty, and ‘the tenants are strongly of this opinion’, 
he notes.49 Indeed.
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Water quality is a common complaint:
• ‘unfit to drink … has been … for some months. The tenants declare 
that the drainage gets into the well’. This affects seven cottages, four-
teen adults, and twenty-three children.
• Again, ‘The tenants declare’ – ‘unfit to drink, being muddy and of 
nasty taste’, with ‘soap suds’. ‘Tenants are much distressed to procure 
that required for drinking and cooking’.
• Or the ‘inhabitants of the row … complain much’.
• Or tenants ‘complain greatly of the water … It makes “awful” tea. … 
I examined a large pot which had been filled over night; (the owner 
assured me that it was previously perfectly clean), a greasy, filthy 
smelling sediment was collected. Forty Two persons … are supposed 
to drink the water’.
• Or water ‘green in colour and nasty smell … inhabitants are at … 
wits end … Several children have had slight fever’.50
This last is not epidemiology: that residents – who have not, we may 
presume, read John Snow – find the water that bad is authority enough 
for Mellars, though his successor Sampson White will routinely seek 
the authority of analysis. If, sometimes, Mellars associates bad water 
with disease, it is more as reminder: behind the work of defending 
decencies that should need no defense are health dangers too.
Accident prevention is a concern. Parents and Mellars worry about 
children falling into open wells. Or loose bricks or a sign may fall. 
Sometimes Mellars endorses tenants’ direct action, as when, during a 
dry summer, they have ‘wisely filled up the gullies with soil’ as ‘the 
stench was unbearable’. Yet they may need tutelage: women throw ‘soap 
suds and dirty water into a field opposite houses, … causing a Nuisance. 
… Asked … to discontinue the same’. Or he may mediate: whose turn to 
clean a common privy? The inspector must intervene.51
We should not assume that rules of sanitary propriety are obvious 
– to anyone. Why, after the stable has burned, can the horse not be 
buried in the garden? Are doors on privies the public’s concern? Yes, 
his Board declares.52 That raises the question: ‘whose decency does 
Mellars enforce?’ He respects local power, giving much time to the 
bishop’s complaint of an obscure smell, while insinuating its frivolous-
ness. But he also pushes, suggesting policy initiatives (the banning of 
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pigsties), challenges developers of unsound housing – ‘a discredit to the 
Town and its Sanitary Authorities’, demands major repairs (‘entire 
reconstruction’ of a row of privies and wash-houses), and regulates 
nuisance industries (gas lime must be instantly barged out of town).53 
Ironically, among the malefactors is a non-complying landlord, Mr. 
Edward (not Edwin) Chadwick. (And Connie Chatterley visits Chad-
wick Hall.)54
Mellars defies classification. He is more than policeman, yet not 
quite activist. It may help to think of him as a live-in architect, always 
alert to what might be changed. Consider the following assessment of 
structure, circumstance, and use. A set of wash-houses and privies in 
the afternoon sun: ‘in one corner of the Wash-house (that next to the 
privy pit) is a small … set-pot for heating water for washing … . [But] 
when used, the fire warms … the contents of the pit, making the whole 
place unbearable. The ventilation also is inefficient. When the collier 
… retires into the wash-house to strip and wash, for decency’s sake the 
door is closed. The effect on an empty stomach may be imagined’.55
‘Imagined’, perhaps, but evidently not complained of. Much like 
Connie, Mellars has imported sensibility into a setting where it has 
been blunted by familiarity and lack of possibility. But here that sensi-
bility generates not revulsion, but sympathy and possibility. Will (and 
should) anyone care if he gets these privy-wash-houses rebuilt? No 
grand sanitary problem will have been solved. Lawrence, who ignores 
sanitation in Tevershall, will still sneer: more fiddling with nth degree 
futility.
Here, however, the half-century separating Mellars from Lawrence’s 
novel may matter. Whether or not class stratification was sharper in 
Lawrence’s day, it was different: unions, a Labour Party, and concepts 
of inevitable struggle had transformed class consciousness. By contrast 
Mellars’s notebooks remind us of an earlier paternalism in which seem-
ingly incidental elements of the physical environment were both mark 
and means of moral progress. The idea of nuisance inspectors as 
counter-revolutionary cadres may seem far-fetched, but Chadwick’s 
1842 Sanitary Report was presented to a government terrified of Chart-
ism, and for good reason: later in the summer the ‘plug plot’ rioters 
would make parts of the north ungovernable. Such a ‘moralising’ thrust 
continued: it would be central in late-century reformism – evident in 
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the Charity Organisation Society and in Beatrice Webb’s career as a lady 
rent collector.56
Given the emphasis in modern public health on the quality of com-
munities, best known in the Healthy Cities movement, we should not 
dismiss such work.57 However, I am less concerned with the impossible 
task of measuring Mellars’s social-capital production, than simply with 
the recognition implicit in the public work that nuisance inspectors did 
– that the built environment (like the natural one that soaked and 
chilled Dubliners) strains health and may become a domain of moral 
economy.
Conclusion: recovering bodies
Each of the bodies of documents I have explored reaches randomly into 
matters both quotidian and intimate. Each of the many persons who 
come into our gaze arrives bearing some complex burden of exigency, 
which has precipitated a crisis. Each asks to be taken seriously. Often 
the tragedies they describe move us in their familiarity – travellers 
overcome by cold, wet, and worry; parents worrying about accident-
prone play-spaces. These records remind us of irritants that always assail 
existence – hunger and thirst; weariness and the need for darkness, 
quiet, and rest; the many impediments and distractions to our move-
ment, efforts, or attention; the discomforts of convenient elimination; 
the gasping for breath; the shivering and sweating from sun, cold, 
humidity, rain, or wind; and the incessant demands of impatient others. 
All these come with varying doses of fear. Rarely are the backstories 
detailed but we do the in-filling. We can overcome, too, the literary 
practices of probing junior doctors or officious inspectors. They bypass 
the most immediate and powerful expressions of pain, despair, or frus-
tration – sobbing or yelling – though, inadvertently, the effect of their 
omission may dignify their subjects.
But what to do with these records? Learning what the Dublin doctors 
or Mellars did is all very well, but I am more concerned with those with 
whom they were interacting, persons often overlooked as too ordinary 
to be interesting, as if, in such lives, nothing happens that might be 
registered in complaint and/or stress. How they have come to be lost 
may be understood by considering two axes of interpretive practice: the 
axis separating social history from the social history of medicine, and 
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that separating ‘soft’ from ‘hard’ Marxist interpretive practices. I will 
touch briefly on each, then on their intersection.
At the risk of over-generalisation, it is probably right to say that a 
commonplace of contemporary historical narrative is the awarding, and 
even the fetishising, of full ‘agency’ to historical subjects, as if all are 
wholly healthy mid-life adults living in constitutional polities and 
accountable accordingly. By contrast, the subjects of medical history 
(even after two generations of social historians seeking access to the 
experience of illness), remain largely doctor-defined. Usually being rec-
ognised as a medical subject has required diagnostic confirmation, 
whether by modern or by past professional standards, no matter how 
poorly that diagnostic status registers the existential complaints these 
persons may have had. Those poles suggest a missing middle – of people 
who complain and who have much to complain of, like those we meet 
in these records, and who live lives that are strained, but who cannot 
be written off as ‘diseased’. Susan Lynn Smith’s wonderful title, Sick and 
Tired of Being Sick and Tired, captures that existence. If the latter ‘sick 
and tired’ represents a draining of agency, the former reminds us of the 
further stress that comes from reflecting on that despair.58
We have invited ourselves into these lives via the bridging concepts 
of stress and overwork. But these terms, especially the former, a product 
of mid-twentieth-century physiology, are not fully adequate to liberate 
the experience of sufferer/complainer from the categories imposed by 
states or doctors. There is first the epistemic problem. Even were stress 
(or overwork) well defined, we have no obvious way to measure them 
in past populations, particularly for acute episodes.59
Marx’s analytic, the presumptive monetisation of lives through con-
version into surplus value, was too crude for that purpose – biologi-
cally, because life histories cannot be reduced simply to energy, and 
historically because struggles to control lives could not be reduced to 
that conversion either. Rather, as so-called ‘soft’ Marxists pointed out, 
class relations were contingently historical. Each formation of class rela-
tions would constitute a unique ‘political culture’ that would mediate 
historical processes. As a part of this more fluid approach, Thompson’s 
‘moral economy’ concept fostered rich empirical studies of how identi-
ties and interests emerged and evolved, but it went further. The ‘cultural 
turn’ of the 1980s, evident in the history of medicine as well as in social 
history, replaced bodies and conditions with linguistic practices, for 
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articulation and restoration of the just balance of misery was a linguistic 
achievement.60 To some radical medical historians, however, notably 
Roger Cooter, the cultural turn gave up far too much.61
For many of its latter day explicators, the subject and substance of 
justice of the moral economy was unimportant: what mattered was that 
there was a moral economy. Not so for Thompson. The moral economy 
concerned food. He saw himself as supplementing economists and old-
style social historians – ‘ineducable positivists’ for whom behavior was 
a function of grain prices – but not as denying the biological foundation 
of their concern. ‘Of course food rioters were hungry’, Thompson thun-
dered, ‘but this does not tell us how their behavior is modified by 
custom, culture, and reason’ – factors which mediated the psychic and 
physical aspects of stress.62 Yet practitioners of the cultural turn would 
go further. Consider James Vernon’s view: ‘that even hunger, that most 
material of conditions, was also the work of culture’; ‘that how hunger 
was understood shaped who actually experienced it, and how’.63
For Thompson, culture ‘modified’; for Vernon, it comes close to 
supplanting. What then to do with nine-year-old Oliver Twist, taken 
from the baby farm where he was ‘atrociously presuming to be hungry’ 
and transported to the workhouse, where the boys, ‘voracious and wild 
with hunger’ and contemplating cannibalism, pick him to lead a food 
riot by asking for more gruel? Both Thompson and Vernon can show 
us that Oliver has violated the moral economy of ‘hunger’ as Bumble 
and his Board understand it, but to stop there leaves us without access 
to Oliver’s experience. Simply to say he has misunderstood that expe-
rience would be the height of callousness. Or one could respond that 
there is no issue: we are hearing only Dickens; Oliver is only words 
on paper. Yet the same applies to the representations of Thompson 
or of Vernon. In part these omissions reflect choices of gaze, for one 
may examine ‘hunger’ without denying hunger. Yet they reflect also the 
broader problem I have alluded to of the dependence of imagination 
on expressibility.
For Thompson, more than historical precision was at stake in cor-
recting the economists. He was seeking an approach both sympathetic 
and analytic. Yet in the rarefied atmosphere of ‘political culture’, the 
morality of ‘moral economy’ simply evaporated: people acted and they 
talked about why they acted; that talk, coupled with the mysterious 
magic stimulant of ‘agency’, became a sufficient accounting.
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What Thompson had overlooked was the need for a moral econom-
ics, a circulating currency.64 Here it is worth keeping in mind the limits 
of relying on Capital for an understanding of the stakes in converting 
humans into surplus value. Marx (and Engels) were appallingly ignorant 
of the medicine of their day, particularly the post-Cullenean medicine 
relating poverty to disease, and being practised in Scotland and Ireland. 
Rarely too have later Marxist theorists appealed to biomedical metrics, 
though social (or social medical) theorists certainly have done.65
This chapter has explored whether stress might play a role akin to 
that of ‘marginal utility’ in economics. The complaints which express 
our stress are, after all, expressions of desire that presumably reflect 
determinations of marginal utility. Expressing and responding to them 
has both costs and benefits. Might we then theorise the pursuit of low-
stress ‘health and happiness hours’ as the primary motor of moral 
economies? In recognising positive and negative forms of stress, Seyle 
and others were exploring such a possibility. Yet however tempting, this 
will not quite work (other than by definition). While marginal utility is 
an axiom in economics, stress is an empirical entity, loosely defined 
though supported by plausible theorizing. Conceiving it as a currency 
is complicated by its ambiguous relation to complaint. It might be nice 
if complaining were a proxy of harm, but it is not. Expressibility is 
problematic, equally between soma and psyche and between self and 
culture. Moral economies of complaint do matter, but as noise rather 
than signal.
How to respond? The current polarisation between biomedical 
objectivity and cultural interpretation omits an enormous missing 
middle of embodied subjectivity. Historians have been baffled to know 
what to make of someone who says ‘I’m hungry’, ‘I’m cold’ (hypother-
mia and heatstroke are invisible in histories of medicine and public 
health), ‘I’m tired’, ‘I’m sad’, or ‘I’m afraid.’ A phenomenologist’s per-
spective may help, but the issue ultimately is an acceptance of embodi-
ment: ‘experience’ should open a door to explaining, not merely to 
explaining away.
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